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THE DARK SIDE OF ECOSYSTEM ORCHESTRATION:  
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF BUILDING INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 




Ecosystem strategies have increased in importance as a powerful means by which 
competing interdependent organisations cooperate to create innovation that no single firm can 
match. As such, nowadays, scholars, practitioners and policy makers actively search for 
mechanisms to enable ecosystem emergence and orchestration. Prior research has generally 
examined strategies of established long-lived successful ecosystems in which ecosystem 
orchestrators take different approaches (closed-system and open-system) to ecosystem 
orchestration. Less is known about failed ecosystems and the failure of ecosystem emergence 
in mature sectors.  
This thesis addresses this gap through three linked empirical studies set in the digital built 
environment (DBE) sector. The first is an inductive single-case study of failed open-system 
orchestration set in the national Building Information Management (BIM) programmes in 
Finland over the period from 1982 to 2002. The second is an inductive single-case study of a 
failed closed-system orchestration process led by a software vendor in the northern 
Californian DBE sector. Despite the significant differences in orchestration processes and 
contexts between the first and the second study, analysis of these cases indicated very similar 
results, namely the intentional preservation of the status quo by the sector and a failure in 
business model innovation, which indicates the importance of the nature of context. This led 
to the third study that inductively examined the contexts of the Finnish and northern 
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Californian DBE sectors and their importance for ecosystem orchestration. The failure of the 
DBE sector is further contrasted with successful ecosystems to articulate the critical 
constructs and components for ecosystem orchestration.  
Together, the empirical studies of this thesis offer theory regarding why and how ecosystems 
fail. Overall, this research contributes to the literature on strategy and organisation theory and 
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Under the networked digital economy, the traditional views of linear models of 
innovation have shifted to view innovation as non-linear, complex, multidisciplinary and a 
highly collaborative phenomenon driven by global forces (Horn, 2005). As such, ecosystem 
strategies have increased in importance, and are a powerful means by which competing 
organisations cooperate to create innovation in ways that no single firm can; moreover, 
through co-evolution and interdependence, they focus on value creation and capture (Adner, 
2006; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a; Moore, 1998). Therefore, ecosystems are often portrayed as a 
necessity to succeed in the modern economies (Jacobides, Sundararajan, & Van Alstyne, 
2019; Russell & Smorodinskaya, 2018). The innovation that emerges from extensive 
collaboration between complementors in ecosystems is difficult for competitors to replicate, 
as Toyota and its suppliers exemplified (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
Nowadays, scholars, practitioners and policy makers actively search for mechanisms to 
enable ecosystem emergence and orchestration (Lang, von Sczepanski, & Wurzer, 2019; 
Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Rinkinen & Harmaakorpi, 2018). As the research progresses, 
numerous studies emerge to deepen the insights of how long-lived successful ecosystems 
have been orchestrated, while discovering the secrets of their success stories. Although these 
insights are critical for the development of the ecosystem discourse, more ecosystems fail 
than succeed (Cusumano, Gawer, & Yoffie, 2019b) which suggests further useful insights to 
the discourse on ecosystem orchestration may be possible.  
Ecosystems can fail for different reasons. For example, some ecosystem strategies can fail 
and others can win in the same contexts with strong opposition from powerful incumbents 
(Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). Alternatively, an ecosystem strategy can be successful in one 
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context and fail in another (Tee & Gawer, 2009), or they can be affected by power relations 
and the desire to preserve control in the sector (Jacobides, MacDuffie, & Tae, 2016; Ozcan & 
Santos, 2015). Finally, ecosystems might not emerge because actors are blindsided by their 
perceptions of the environment (Helper & Henderson, 2014; Lucas & Goh, 2009; Porac, 
Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989). However, little research has been conducted to provide a 
systematic empirical approach to the failure of ecosystem emergence and orchestration. 
Without a rigorous analysis of failed ecosystems, the debates around the success of 
ecosystem orchestration suggest a “serious form of selection bias: to the extent that 
researchers study only industries that survived long enough to make their mark […] they 
overlook the unsuccessful industries” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994: p.665). Recognising the need for 
empirical research on failed ecosystems, the current debates on inter-organisational networks 
further emphasise the dark side of inter-organisational relations (Oliveira & Lumineau, 
2019). The term “dark side” was introduced to refer to the ill-intended behaviours of 
individuals (Bizzi, 2013) and the negative effects of inter-organisational relations, such as 
opportunism (Seggie, Griffith, & Jap, 2013), unethical practices (Dawson, Karahanna, & 
Buchholtz, 2014; de Man, Koene, & Ars, 2019), detrimental outcomes (Villena, Revilla, & 
Choi, 2011), and conflict and disagreements (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Thus, the 
dark side can manifest in multiple forms.  
As most ecosystems are viewed from a firm perspective, scholars tend to recognise the 
success of individual firms in orchestrating ecosystems but overlook the side effects produced 
by a successful individual firm that also might negatively affect the interdependent 
complementors and customers. For example, while Uber was recognised as a success story 
(Bashir, Yousafm A., & Verma, 2016; Cramer & Krueger, 2016; Libert, Wind, & Fenley, 
2014), there is empirical evidence of Uber’s business model negatively affecting dependent 
communities, thereby producing negative side effects (Heikkilä & Heikkilä, 2019) and 
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constituting the dark side of ecosystems. Therefore, the idea that an ecosystem strategy could 
become a success story seems to be paradoxical.  
This emphasises that the research on ecosystems needs further empirical evidence with a 
focus on interdependence while shifting the focus from singular firms to ecosystems and the 
side effects they produce. A new approach is called for that simultaneously looks in two 
directions of ‘grey areas’; it should focus on the empirical analysis of ecosystem 
orchestration, while also exploring the dark side of ecosystem orchestration in the context of 
implementation. This thesis aims to provide comprehensive insights into how and why 

















Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter starts with a review of existing theoretical and empirical knowledge within 
strategic management and organisation science literature. This review presents some 
important theoretical relationships within ecosystem theories in order to provide a theoretical 
basis for the forthcoming chapters. The basis constitutes the introduction to the ecosystem 
concept and its difference to other related concepts. I also offer my own definition of the 
concept. Hence, this thesis aims to contribute to the discourse on ecosystem orchestration, I 
present current debates and gaps in the ecosystem field that I also aim to address. As 
orchestration processes comprise ecosystem related constructs and components, I present 
each to provide a theory and language that I will use throughout this thesis. Then, I articulate 
key contributions and the aims of this study while also presenting the overall framework that 
guided the theoretical contributions of this thesis. Considering the empirical nature of the 
conducted research, I provide a description of the research setting while presenting the 
critical issues within the digital transformation of the built environment sector in the UK and 
the world. I also present and explain the importance of the Building Information Management 
(BIM) concept that is the focus of the selected case studies. The selected case studies are 
systematically justified. This is followed by the methods of study section that offers a 
justification of the methodology while also noting its methodological limitations. It presents a 
framework that illustrates how cases are connected within one coherent storyline and how the 
process of research occurred.  
The introduction chapter concludes with a thesis outline that provides an overview of the 
empirical chapters and its key contributions. These chapters offer a series of logical steps for 
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the empirical exploratory research, which resulted in the design of three consecutive studies. 
These studies constitute chapters 2, 3 and 4. A list of the related publications and 
presentations are also presented to offer an additional validation of the empirical results, 
which proves the significance of the study and the sector’s interest. Overall, the introduction 
demonstrates how the analysis of these consecutive cases individually and collectively 
contribute to the specific topic of ecosystem orchestration, while the study’s importance and 
contributions to the theory and practice are articulated in the conclusion chapter.  
1.1 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
In the following section, I present the concept of the ecosystem and articulate the 
pressing debates around the success of ecosystem orchestration while highlighting gaps in the 
literature. I draw the attention to the multiple levels of ecosystem orchestration and elaborate 
why the dark side of ecosystems has been chosen as a topic for this research.  
The following sections will provide the theoretical basis on ecosystems, which will support 
the subsequent chapters and the development of the thought process towards a grounded 
theory.  
1.1.1 Ecosystem Concept in Management  
Over the last two decades, the ‘ecosystem’ has proliferated across strategy management 
and organisation science in academia, policy and practice. The proliferation is so extensive 
that ecosystems have become a ‘buzzword’. However, it is useful to understand why 
ecosystems have become important for modern organisations. With the global shift towards 
digitalisation, sectors are becoming knowledge-intensive digital economies (Russell & 
Smorodinskaya, 2018). Technological advancements offer new ways of disintegration, from 
vertical organisation to dispersed disintegrated forms of inter-organisational collaboration 
that are no longer limited by a single sector or geography (Yoo, Henfridsson, & Lyytinen, 
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2010). Thus, in the last few years, scholars have shifted focus towards the relationship 
between firms and their environments, which offers profound implications for how firms self-
organise and strategise. 
As such, the linear models of innovation (products developed in isolated laboratories to 
commercialisation) have shifted to non-linear models in which value creation is dependent on 
the collaboration of diverse multi-disciplinary organisations outside of single firm (National 
Research Council, 2012). The work is no longer bounded by the sector’s organisation but can 
be organised across organisational and geographical boundaries. Such work calls for 
capabilities that a single organisation is not able to offer or develop on its own. It led to a new 
method of inter-organisational collaboration that was not previously possible.  
Therefore, traditional industry analysis is no longer capable of explaining this phenomenon as 
organisations increasingly organise themselves into webs of collaborating and competing 
firms that offer interconnected products and services (Iansiti & Levien, 2004c; Moore, 1993). 
Teece (2007) argued that ecosystems cover the limitations of the Five Forces framework of 
industry analysis (Porter, 1985), such as the competitive environment, the role of 
complementors, institutional interdependencies, the consideration of a dynamic environment, 
and that learning and innovation defines market structure while a firm’s survivability depends 
on the selection process. Consequently, the nature of competition has changed from intra-
firm, through firm to firm, to inter-organisational, which is a mixed duopoly where an 
ecosystem competes with another ecosystem (Piepenbrock, 2009), meanwhile the focus 
shifted from efficiency and productivity to effectiveness.  
Ecosystems reflect a paradigm shift in how firms operate nowadays. The increasing interest is 
also justified by the importance of inter-organisational relationships and the superior 
advantage that ecosystem strategies promise to its leaders and participants. The advantage is 
7 
 
achieved through interdependence, complementarity, co-evolution, mutual benefit and 
simultaneous cooperation and competition for new value propositions that a singular actor 
cannot produce on its own (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Moore, 1993; 
Tsujimoto, Kajikawa, Tomita, & Matsumoto, 2018). Typical examples of successful 
ecosystems are Facebook, Airbnb, Uber, Amazon, Google, Qualcomm and Intel. Successful 
ecosystems create unique mechanisms for value creation and capture that link the 
complementarities and, through mutual symbiosis, achieve a superior organisational 
advantage that threatens to displace traditional markets and vertically integrated forms of 
organisation (Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018). Ecosystems exhibit a group level co-
specialisation of complementarities, thus complementors depend on one another for value 
creation (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009) while competing for value capture (Hannah & 
Eisenhardt, 2019). This raised opportunities for new configurations of inter-organisational 
relationships that require investments that are not fully fungible (Jacobides et al., 2018).  
A review of ecosystem literature has illuminated that the majority of research scholars 
typically take a single actor - at firm level - from a top-down perspective and specifically 
focus on singular successful examples, thus forming “a selection bias” (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994). Despite this bias, there is a difference between scholars’ interests in ecosystems that 
operate in the US and EU. For example, some US scholars extensively focus on singular 
firms that lead heroically successful business ecosystems and their platforms (Dhanaraj & 
Parkhe, 2006; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004c; Moore, 2006; 
Piepenbrock, 2009). Meanwhile, some scholars in EU countries actively search for 
orchestration mechanisms for innovation and knowledge ecosystems to support the 
emergence and growth of business ecosystems (Clarysse, Wright, Bruneel, & Mahajan, 2014; 
Rinkinen & Harmaakorpi, 2018; Sunesen, Henriksen, Kantanen, Dressler, & Buhrmann, 
2019; Thomas & Autio, 2020). Jacobides et al. (2019) argued that ecosystems thrive in 
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unregulated and information intensive industries. Therefore, it seems that the focus of 
scholars is largely influenced by the varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and 
successful examples that operate in their regions. Indeed, most of these successful examples 
of business ecosystems operate in the US context but are not limited to it.  
There is also a difference between scholarly domains in terms of their conceptual focus. For 
example, strategic management scholars focus their attention on how firms simultaneously 
compete and cooperate with rivals to capture value in business ecosystems (Iansiti & Levien, 
2004c). Technology management scholars tend to focus on the adoption and evolution of 
networked interconnected technologies in technology ecosystems (Adomavicius, Bockstedt, 
Gupta, & Kauffman, 2007), digital ecosystems (Henningsson & Hedman, 2014) and platform 
ecosystems (Gawer, 2014). Economic geography scholars tend to focus on the spatial features 
of innovation ecosystems (Feldman, Siegel, & Wright, 2019), whilst innovation scholars tend 
to focus on knowledge creation and diffusion in innovation and knowledge ecosystems 
(Ritala & Almpanopoulou, 2017; Thomas & Autio, 2020). Finally, entrepreneurship scholars 
tend to focus on the enablement of entrepreneurial activities within a certain context (Autio, 
Nambisan, Thomas, & Wright, 2018; Stam & Spigel, 2018).  
Regardless of the popularity of ecosystems amongst scholars and their importance, the debate 
around their usefulness is still ongoing. Oh, Phillips, Park, and Lee (2016) called the 
ecosystem a “flawed analogy” with a lack of rigor, while Adner (2017) argued for its 
usefulness to understand modern digital economies. Overall, the ecosystem concept “requires 
a great deal of conceptual and empirical rigor” (Ritala & Almpanopoulou, 2017: p.39) and 
needs clarity to reach theoretical maturity (Thomas & Autio, 2020). In recent years, there 
have been increasing attempts to explore the constructs of the ecosystem concept in order to 
provide a theoretical underpinning and make sense of the phenomenon (Aarikka-Stenroos & 
Ritala, 2017; Adner, 2017; Gomes, Facin, Salerno, & Ikenami, 2018; Jacobides et al., 2018; 
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McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017; Oh et al., 2016; Suominen, Seppänen, & Dedehayir, 2019; 
Tsujimoto et al., 2018).  
This thesis aims to contribute to the development of theory by exploring the constructs and 
components of ecosystem orchestration while contributing to the stream of research on the 
dark side of ecosystem orchestration (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). The empirical insights on 
the dark side of ecosystem orchestration will invaluably alleviate existing biases and provide 
novel perspectives on failed ecosystems that are currently insufficiently explored, both 
theoretically and empirically. The exploration of failed ecosystems will offer an 
indispensable opportunity to ground ecosystem components in failed empirical cases to 
understand why, how and what contributes to the failure of ecosystem emergence and 
orchestration.  
1.1.2 Ecosystem Definition 
Despite emerging research and proliferating interest in ecosystems amongst scholars and 
practitioners, there is general confusion on what an ecosystem is and how it differs from other 
concepts (Thomas & Autio, 2020; Valkokari, 2015). Table 1 highlights terminological and 
conceptual inconsistencies across the literature on what ecosystems are. The analysis of 
existing terminology suggests that the underlying logic of ecosystems rests upon the notion of 
multilateral networks, value co-creation, interdependence, non-generic complementarity, 
simultaneous cooperation and competition, and co-evolution. Across the literature, the 
ecosystem term typically refers to a network structure of interdependent complementary 
actors that, through mutual symbiosis, survive and co-evolve around focal value propositions 
(Adner, 2017; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b). Adner and Kapoor (2010: p.309) suggested that the 




Table 1 Overview of Ecosystem Definitions  
N Author Type1 Definition Keywords 
1 (Granstrand & 
Holgersson, 
2019: p.3) 
IE “An innovation ecosystem is the evolving set of 
actors, activities, and artefacts, and the 
institutions and relations, including 
complementary and substitute relations, that 
are important for the innovative performance of 
an actor or a population of actors.” 
Co-evolution, set of 
actors and institutions, 
complementarity, 
substitute, innovation  
2 (Stam & Spigel, 
2018: p.2) 
EE “A set of interdependent actors and factors 
coordinated in such a way that they enable 





3 (Jacobides et 
al., 2018: 
p.2264)  
E “An ecosystem is a set of actors with varying 
degrees of multilateral, non-generic 
complementarities that are not fully 
hierarchically controlled. […] ecosystems are 
distinct forms of organizing economic activities 
that are linked by specific types of 
complementarities.” 
Multilateral, non-generic 
specific types of 
complementarities, not 
fully hierarchically 
controlled, distinct forms 
of organising 
4 (Tsujimoto et 
al., 2018: p.7) 
E “To provide a product/service system, an 
historically self-organized or managerially 
designed multilayer social network consists of 
actors that have different attributes, decision 
principles, and beliefs.” 
Self-organised, designed, 
multilayer, network 
5  (Russell & 
Smorodinskaya, 
2018: p.115) 
IE “Open non-linear systems that are 
characterized by changing multi-faceted 
motivations of networked actors, high 
receptivity to feedback, and persistent 
structural transformations, induced both 
endogenously and exogenously.” 




6 (Autio et al., 
2018: p.74) 
EE “A distinct type of cluster that specializes in 
harnessing technological affordances (Gibson, 
1977) created by digital technologies and 
infrastructures…and combines them with 
spatial 
(i.e. proximity-related) affordances to support a 
distinctive cluster dynamic that is expressed 








7 (Gomes et al., 
2018: p.16)  
IE “A set for the co-creation, or the jointly 
creation of value. It is composed of 
interconnected and interdependent networked 
actors, which includes the focal firm, customers, 
suppliers, complementary innovators and other 
agents as regulators. This definition implies that 
members face cooperation and competition in 
the innovation ecosystem, and an innovation 





actors, cooperation and 
competition, co-
evolution, lifecycle 
8  (Adner, 2017: 
p. 40) 
IE “The alignment structure of a multilateral set 
of partners that need to interact in order for a 
focal value proposition to materialize.” 
Alignment structure, 




1 Types: Ecosystem -E; Business Ecosystem -BE; Innovation Ecosystem – IE; Knowledge Ecosystem – KE; 
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem – EE.  
11 
 
9 (Autio & 
Thomas, 2014: 
p.3) 
IE “A network of interconnected organizations, 
connected to a focal firm or a platform, that 
incorporates both the production and use of 
side participants and creates and appropriates 






10 (Thomas & 
Autio, 2014a: 
p.1) 
E “The fifth facet of the organizational field, 
consisting of both network and institutional 
elements with value co-creation as its 




11 (Williamson & 
De Meyer, 
2012: p.24) 
BE “A network of organizations and individuals 
that co-evolve their capabilities and roles and 
align their investments so as to create 







BE “An aggregate collection of externally 
interacting heterogeneous organizations or 
competing enterprises. These external 
interactions tend toward the competitive selling 






13 (Teece, 2007: 
p.1325) 
BE “The community of organizations, institutions, 
and individuals that impact the enterprise and 
the enterprise’s customers and supplies.” 
The community, the 
enterprise 
14 (Iansiti & 
Levien, 2004c: 
p.6) 
BE “Characterized by a large number of loosely 
interconnected participants who depend on 
each other for their mutual effectiveness and 
survival.” 
Loos interdependence, 
mutual benefit, survival, 
mutual effectiveness  
15 (Moore, 1993: 
p.76) 
BE “A business ecosystem […] crosses a variety of 
industries […], companies coevolve capabilities 
around a new innovation: they work 
cooperatively and competitively to support new 
products, satisfy customer needs, and eventually 






The conceptual inconsistency of ecosystem terminology relates to the unit of analysis and the 
type of ecosystem (Thomas & Autio, 2020). Descriptions of ecosystem types are provided in 
Section 1.1.4.  
Moore (1993) was the first to introduce the concept of an ecosystem with a biological 
approach, which he described as a set of organisations and consumers that align themselves 
with a focal firm. He suggested viewing a firm not as a member of a single sector but as part 
of a “business ecosystem” that includes suppliers, complementors, competitors and other 
stakeholders. Teece (2007) has further emphasised that ecosystems cross a variety of 
industries and stakeholders such as customers, competitors, complementors, suppliers, 
regulatory authorities, standard-setting bodies, the judiciary, and educational and research 




Figure 1 Ecosystem Stakeholders (Adapted from Moore (1997)) 
The fundamental idea is that ecosystems produce value that singular firms cannot and 
therefore, by recognising the advantages and opportunities, competitors are willing to 
cooperate for their collective survival. Piepenbrock (2009) distinguished “the extended 
enterprise” (Dyer, 2000) as an organisational set that defines the focal firm and its key 
exchange actors and ecosystems. These represent an “organisational community” (Aldrich, 
1999) and “an aggregated collection of externally interacting heterogeneous or competing 
enterprises” (Piepenbrock, 2009: p.68), see Figure 2.  
Adner (2017) recognised two streams of the ecosystem concept that are compatible despite 
their distinctive approaches, namely ecosystem-as-structure and ecosystem-as-affiliation. The 
ecosystem-as-structure views ecosystems as a network configuration of activities around a 
focal value proposition; in comparison, the ecosystem-as-affiliation views ecosystems as 
networked communities that are interconnected around a platform or defined by their 




Figure 2 Distinctions of Firm, Enterprise, Sector and Ecosystem                                
(Reproduced from Piepenbrock (2009)) 
ecosystems emphasising interdependence and symbiotic relationships. To explain aggregate 
forms of interactions for value co-creation, Adner (2017) noted the following examples of 
ecosystem-as-affiliation: Silicon Valley, healthcare ecosystems and the Microsoft ecosystem. 
The ecosystem-as-structure is aligned with the current view of what constitutes an ecosystem. 
In particular, an important contribution made by Adner (2017: p.47) is to emphasise an 
alignment structure which is “the extent to which there is mutual agreement among the 
members regarding positions and flows, […] to secure its role in a competitive ecosystem”. 
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Thus, a question arises as to what makes up the alignment structures within ecosystem 
strategies? 
Recently, Jacobides et al. (2018) took a further step by considering conditions and 
modularity, which are necessary for ecosystem emergence, and the interactions and co-
existence of different types of complementarities that make ecosystems non-linear and non-
hierarchically controlled. Although the ecosystem is an evolving concept and as it is 
continuously refined, the ecosystem definition provided in this thesis is aligned with the work 
of Jacobides et al. (2018). Thus, in this thesis I build on, refine further and conceptualise my 
own definition of ecosystem concept as: 
“A multilateral non-generic community of complementary interdependent 
unilaterally non-hierarchically managed organisations that cross a variety of 
industries. These organisations serve different functions, have conflicting goals 
and therefore is a political coalition. Through simultaneous value creation 
(cooperation) and value capture (competition), they co-evolve capabilities 
individually and collectively around multiple value propositions, and produce 
distinct system structure consisting of sub-systems, the business models, that 
generate ecosystem dynamics, define ecosystem type, and, thus, affect the 
business environment through its performance and activities.”  
1.1.3 Ecosystem and Related Concepts 
As a stream of management literature, the ecosystem concept rests on network theories 
as the characteristics of ecosystems have been present within “strategic networks” (Gulati, 
Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000), “business networks” (Möller & Halinen, 2017), “value networks” 
(Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995), and “value nets” (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011). 
Networks are treated as a distinct mode of organisation that is different from both the 
vertically organised hierarchy and the market (Thorelli, 1986). Networks can be 
conceptualised as a system with interconnected nodes where nodes can be any entities, such 
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as actors, technologies and organisations (Powell, 1990), and “represent webs of standardised 
formal and informal alliances between participants” (Jacobides et al., 2018: p. 2261) . The 
characteristic that sets ecosystems apart from networks is that the opportunity in an 
ecosystem for customers to choose among components of a product or a service that are 
supplied by each complementor while affiliating themselves with a specific platform or an 
ecosystem. In comparison, in networks, customers choose a standardised offer from a 
predefined menu based on market-based arrangements (Jacobides et al., 2018). The research 
on networks also largely focuses on a single sector (Uzzi, 1997) while ecosystems span 
multiple sectors and have “the existence of a set of distinct and asymmetrical links tied at the 
group level by specific complementarity” (Jacobides et al., 2018: p. 2275). 
The theoretical underpinnings of the ecosystem concept set it apart from other related 
concepts. The ecosystem concept differs from “supply chains” (Mentzer et al., 2001) and 
“value chains” (Porter, 1985) by their non-linear and non-hierarchical focus on value creation 
and capture through co-evolution and interdependence (Iansiti & Levien, 2004c). Industry 
and sector structure are irrelevant in ecosystems (Moore, 1998). “Value nets” (Brandenburger 
& Nalebuff, 2011) do not take into consideration the emergence and co-evolution of actors 
nor the structural dynamics that affect the arrangements of value creation and capture. 
Ecosystems draw on the research traditions of both “clusters” that are “geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies, specialised suppliers, service providers, firms in 
related industries, and associated institutions … in particular fields that compete but also co-
operate” (Porter, 1998: p.197) and “innovation systems” (Edquist, 1997). In comparison, 
innovation systems incorporate clusters (McDonald, Huang, Tsagdis, & Josef Tüselmann, 
2007) and differ in terms of the unit of analysis. The clusters and innovation systems focus on 
firms and industries while ecosystems incorporate various levels starting with the individual 
and its relationship within the larger socio-economic system or context (Spigel & Harrison, 
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2018). Rinkinen and Harmaakorpi (2018) emphasised difference in terms of the functions 
relevant for new digital global economies, such as clusters that focus on local economies and 
learning. Meanwhile, ecosystems are on the scale of global economies, and the competitive 
advantage of clusters is to enable firms to achieve economies of scale based on local spill 
overs that appear and evolve at both local and global levels (Boari, Elfring, & Molina-
Morales, 2016). Clusters are representative of an industry where firms compete fiercely and 
exploit the cluster’s resources (Porter, 2000; Tallman, Jenkins, Henry, & Pinch, 2004). 
However, Porter (2000) emphasised that firms also cooperate in clusters. Competition and 
cooperation happen on different levels and in different dimensions, specifically between 
buyers and suppliers. In ecosystems, firms simultaneously compete and cooperate (Hannah & 
Eisenhardt, 2019) while the complementary assets of firms add value to the end product and 
service through interdependence. The notion of interdependence and co-creation are also 
present in the literature on clusters (Saxenian, 1994). Spigel and Harrison (2018) adopted 
three principles from clusters: collective networking and exchange between firms, the ability 
of firms to get knowledge from the environment, and the acknowledgment that knowledge 
creation is a core component of the modern economy. However, clusters also share 
similarities in their focus on the external business environment which contributes to a firm’s 
competitiveness (Boari et al., 2016; Stam & Spigel, 2018). Both ecosystems, particularly 
entrepreneurial ecosystems and clusters, build on the arguments of Marshall (1920) that the 
geographic features of economic activity influence a firm’s competitiveness. As with 
ecosystems, clusters can also cross city, regional and national borders (Porter, 1998) and a 
variety of industries (Rinkinen & Harmaakorpi, 2018). Overall, clusters are characterised by 
geographic concentrations, proximity, location, pro-competition and productivity growth 
(Porter, 2000). These characteristics differentiate clusters from ecosystems.  
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The co-evolution of populations have been present in the literature on the ecology of 
populations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The population ecological perspective focuses on 
the relationship between the environment and firm-level output including its survival and 
growth, while ecosystems focuses on the ecosystem level and value co-creation by 
heterogeneous interdependent actors (Thomas & Autio, 2020). In comparison, “open 
innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003) concerns the governance of innovation, and aligns with the 
ecosystem in the willingness of the leading firm to exercise flexibility and support 
interdependent communities, however, it differs from ecosystems in relation to multilateral 
coordination.  
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) suggested that innovation networks, referring to ecosystems, can 
be viewed as loosely coupled networks of actors. Loosely coupled networks are viewed as 
separate entities but have a certain interdependence (Weick, 1976). Orton and Weick (1990) 
described such systems as formed voluntarily, with no hierarchical control and have some 
degree of indeterminacy and interdependency. “Loosely coupled systems correspond to the 
notion of modular architectures” (Piepenbrock, 2009: p.379).  
Overall, ecosystems are explicitly set apart from other theories by the following features: the 
consideration of complementarity (Teece, 1986); a system-level goal of value creation 
(Gulati, Puranam, & Tushman, 2012); simultaneous competition and cooperation (Hannah & 
Eisenhardt, 2019); the health of the ecosystem (Iansiti & Richards, 2006); the consideration 
of a wider network of value creating participants (Teece, 2007); interdependence (Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010); the complexity of relationships, structures and governance mechanisms 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006), and the co-specialisation of complementors that requires non 
fully fungible investments that ‘lock in’ the complementors in the ecosystem (Jacobides, 
Knudsen, & Augier, 2006). To conclude, ecosystems are distinct forms of organising due to 
their structures and coordination mechanisms (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
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1.1.4 Ecosystem Types  
Over the last decade, the ecosystem concept has become granular. The nature and 
extent of dependencies, common goals, and shared capabilities vary and gave rise to different 
types or contrasting forms of ecosystem (Nambisan, Lyytinen, Majchrzak, & Song, 2017). As 
such, a wide range of descriptive phenomenon and related concepts have emerged, such as 
the “business ecosystem” (Moore, 1998), “knowledge ecosystem” (Clarysse et al., 2014), 
“innovation ecosystem” (Adner, 2006), “service ecosystem” (Wieland, Polese, Vargo, & 
Lusch, 2012), “digital ecosystem” (Weill & Woerner, 2015), “entrepreneurial ecosystem” 
(Autio et al., 2018), etc. While new types of ecosystem continue to emerge, business, 
knowledge and innovation ecosystems typically dominate the literature alongside the 
platform concept. Table 2 provides the characteristics of business, knowledge and innovation 
ecosystems. Valkokari (2015) provides a useful comparison of these three ecosystems. 
Table 2 Characteristics of Knowledge, Innovation, and Business Ecosystems. 
Characteristics Business ecosystem (Iansiti 
& Levien, 2004; Moore, 
1993) 
Knowledge ecosystem 
(Clarysse et al., 2014) 
Innovation ecosystem 
(Adner & Kapoor, 2010) 
Logic  Business value co-creation, 
sharing and capturing for 
customers amongst competing 
and cooperating actors with a 
complementary niche  
Knowledge exploration, co-
creation and sharing around 
knowledge hubs 
Innovation co-creation, 
sharing and capturing 
throughout all actors 
fostering the creation of 
growth, interaction, and 
innovative start-ups around 
so-called knowledge hubs  
Connectivity, 
interdependence 
Global value network, closed 




knowledge hubs to co-
create and share knowledge 
between non-competing 
actors, closed and open, 
high density of actors 
Geographically or 
internationally clustered 
actors that create an open 
network to diffuse 
innovation, closed and 
open, high speed 
innovation diffusion 
Complementors Suppliers, customers, and 
companies as a core, other 
actors more loosely involved 
as complementary actors 
Public and private research 
institutes, academia, 
technology entrepreneurs 





absence of customer actors 
Orchestrator Global large company or an 
alliance 




The business ecosystem highlights a business relationship between actors focusing on the 
value capture and end-users which are orchestrated by a hub firm (Iansiti & Levien, 2004c). 
The knowledge ecosystem focuses on knowledge generation and value creation reflecting the 
open processes of R&D and innovation at the regional level (Clarysse et al., 2014; Järvi, 
Almpanopoulou, & Ritala, 2018). The innovation ecosystem is concerned with the 
mechanisms for fostering value creation around knowledge hubs and often share 
technological standards to enable ecosystem-level value co-creation (Adner, 2017). Thomas 
and Autio (2020) suggested that distinctive theoretical logics have not matured, as it is 
difficult to distinguish knowledge from innovation ecosystems. Entrepreneurial ecosystems 
are initiated by new ventures to facilitate business model innovation that reflects the 
entrepreneurship of individuals instead of knowledge, a product, service or technology 
innovation (Autio, Cao, Chumjit, Kaensup, & Temsiripoj, 2019; Stam & Spigel, 2018). 
Often, ecosystems and platforms are used interchangeably (Teece, 2018b) despite their 
theoretical complementarity. Cusumano and Gawer (2002: 54) referred to the “platform and 
its innovation ecosystem” suggesting that these two entities are interrelated. Platforms are 
primarily concerned with the management of interfaces and offer the basis for value co-
creation while ecosystems are concerned with structure and interdependence (Jacobides et al., 
2018). Platform ecosystems are associated with a platform hub within a technology-based 
business system (Thomas, Autio, & Gann, 2015). Considering the extensive proliferation of 
the ecosystem concept and the existing lack of theoretical clarity, researchers are increasingly 
trying to make sense of the trends of ecosystem research. As such, scholars present 
conflicting but partly overlapping results on how the ecosystem field is evolving. For 
example, Jacobides et al. (2018) suggested three emerging streams of research on 
ecosystems: platform ecosystem, business ecosystem, and innovation ecosystem. Partly 
overlapping with Jacobides et al. (2018), Tsujimoto et al. (2018) defined four streams of 
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research: industrial ecology, business ecosystem, platform management, and multi-actor 
network perspective. A multi actor network stream does not have a clear theoretical 
background, which resonates with the observations of Jacobides et al. (2018). Scaringella and 
Radziwon (2018) further recognised four main types of ecosystem: business, innovation, 
entrepreneurial, and knowledge. Gomes et al. (2018) conducted a systematic literature 
review, from 1993 to 2016, highlighting that the original interest in business ecosystems 
(Moore, 1993) has recently shifted towards the concept of innovation ecosystems, thus also 
shifting the focus from value capture towards value creation. Furthermore, Thomas and Autio 
(2020) articulated that business, platform, innovation and technology ecosystems are types of 
innovation ecosystem while knowledge and entrepreneurial ecosystems are considered 
separate streams.  
Considering the emerging state of the ecosystem field, Thomas and Autio (2020) suggested 
that the proliferation manifests along two dimensions - the unit of analysis and the type of 
output. They further distinguished four characteristics that are common to all ecosystems: 
heterogeneity, system-level output, the nature of interdependence and ecosystem 
orchestration. The notion of ecosystem boundaries have also provided some focus in defining 
ecosystem types; for example, Adner (2017) articulated boundaries at the level of firms 
(Apple’s platform ecosystem), sectors (payment ecosystem or a healthcare ecosystem) and 
regions (Silicon Valley). He further argued that the focus on boundaries creates inconsistent 
views and an illusion of focus while the focus on value propositions gives rise to the 
emergence and governance of ecosystems. Valkokari (2015) further suggested that 
boundaries can be set in several ways: by geographical scope (local vs. regional or national 
vs. global); on a temporal scale (from history to future or static snapshots vs. dynamic 
interactions); by permeability (open vs. closed), as well as by the types of flow (knowledge, 
value, material) chosen. Organisational boundaries can also be set in relation to power 
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(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). For example, in the recent years, successful leading ecosystems 
cooperate to develop superior capabilities and power by forming super ecosystems (Jacobides 
et al., 2019).  
1.1.5 Ecosystem Emergence and Orchestration  
With the increasing interest in ecosystems, ecosystem orchestration has become an important 
research theme. In strategic management literature, the term orchestration refers to the 
capability of a firm to purposefully manage the interdependent set of co-specialized and 
interdependent customers and complementors without a hierarchical authority (Nambisan & 
Sawhney, 2011). However, there are several issues that remain unclear in relation to 
ecosystem orchestration (Dattée, Alexy, & Autio, 2018; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Ozcan 
& Santos, 2015). Empirical research on the processes for ecosystem and innovation 
orchestration remains poorly understood and is considered of great importance for practice 
and theory (Batterink, Wubben, Klerkx, & Omta, 2010; Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Gawer, 
2014; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013; Pittaway, Robertson, 
Munir, Denyer, & Neely, 2004; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Spencer, 2003; Teece, 
2018b).  
Research on orchestration processes is divided into two main streams: studies that look at the 
process of emerging ecosystems (Hannah, 2016; Navis & Glynn, 2010; Roundy, Bradshaw, 
& Brockman, 2018; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Thomas, 2013), and orchestration processes 
in established long-lived ecosystems (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Gawer, 2000; Nambisan & 
Sawhney, 2011). Particular focus is given to ecosystem and network leadership from a firm’s 
perspective and how a successful firm intentionally coordinates, directs and manages network 
members (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). From the 
perspective of leading firms, the value created in the network should be extracted (Kogut, 
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2000). Indeed, some firms are found to be successful at directing networks’ innovation 
efforts, e.g Toyota (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000) or Intel (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). As the 
processed deployed by leading firms differ in outcome, scholars often attribute the success of 
such firms to its capabilities in orchestrating the ecosystems (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; 
Teece, 2007) and mechanisms deployed for network orchestration (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; 
Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011).  
Research into ecosystem orchestration is often built on the frameworks provided by Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe (2006) which were updated by Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) and theorised how 
leading firms orchestrate innovation network activities. They provide useful insights on 
established, long-lived firm-centric ecosystem orchestration mechanisms which reflects the 
interplay between network design and innovation design. In their frameworks, they clearly 
distinguish between network design, orchestration processes and the outcome. The focus of 
their work is on the processes that leading firms must perform and the interactions between 
them.  
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) offer a framework of network orchestration by elaborating three 
processes that a leading firm must perform: managing innovation mobility, innovation 
appropriability, and network stability (see Figure 3 A Framework for Orchestration in 
Innovation Networks Network (Reproduced from Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006)) ). Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe (2006: p.660) defined knowledge mobility as “the ease with which knowledge is 
shared, acquired, and deployed within the network”; innovation appropriability as 
“environmental property that governs an innovator's ability to capture the profits generated 
by an innovation" (Teece, 1986: 610)”; and network stability as “dynamic (not static) 
stability, which aims for a nonnegative growth rate while allowing for entry and exit of 




Figure 3 A Framework for Orchestration in Innovation Networks Network 
(Reproduced from Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006))  
 
Figure 4 Orchestration Processes, Innovation Design, and Network Design  




Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) focus on the hub-based processes of managing innovation 
leverage, innovation coherence and innovation appropriability (see Figure 4). Innovation 
leverage allows ecosystem actors to reuse and deploy the available resources, capabilities and 
knowledge to facilitate innovation co-creation. Innovation coherence allows for the internal 
and external coherence of activities. Internal coherence relates to the coordination and 
alignment of processes within the ecosystem while external coherence relates to the 
alignment of the goals and outputs of ecosystem actors with the external market and 
technology environment. Innovation appropriability provides the mechanisms for value 
capture by ecosystem actors. A hub firm has a central role in setting the standards, rules and 
roles while coordinating innovation activities for value creation and value capture 
(appropriation) (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). 
Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) focused on a few constructs at one level that require the 
further refinement of theory because the complexity of network-centric innovations can vary 
with the industry or sector’s structure, agency and the power relations of interrelated 
innovators (Jacobides & Winter, 2012; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). Thus, understanding 
orchestration at multiple levels in different contexts can provide new constructs that are 
relevant to orchestration processes. Thus, the contextual nature of orchestration processes and 
what constructs and components contribute to success and failure are a promising line of 
inquiry in this research.  
Ecosystem orchestration builds on two intertwined processes value creation and value 
capture. It is important to distinguish value creation from value capture (appropriation) for 
theoretical clarity. In strategic management literature, scholars clearly distinguish between 
value creation and value capture by recognising that, in some cases, organisations can lose or 
share value while engaging with other organisations (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000). Thus, it 
is important to understand that value creation and value capture in ecosystems are two 
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distinct processes that require further research to examine the relationships between these two 
concepts (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007). Lepak et al. (2007) argued that a tension between 
cooperation for value creation and competition for value capture is a multi-level phenomenon 
that operates across all levels of analysis. Oskam, Bossink, and de Man (2020) explored the 
tensions between collective and individual value creation, and the gain and loss of value 
during sustainable ecosystem development. The process of value creation and value capture 
reflects the process of exploring new ideas and exploiting ideas (March, 1991), and that 
which Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) distinguished between use value and exchange value. 
Jacobides et al. (2006) further emphasised that value creation concerns who can do what 
while value capture concerns the division of revenue and who gets what. Gomes et al. (2018) 
further highlight a shift in focus from value capture towards value creation and the re-
distribution of value. This shift can be observed in ecosystem literature as scholars shifted 
their focus from business ecosystems that are associated with value capture towards 
innovation ecosystems that are associated with value creation. Organisations adopt different 
approaches to the process of orchestrating value creation and value capture.  
Orchestration processes are determined by the closeness and openness of the system approach 
(Giudici, Reinmoeller, & Ravasi, 2018); business ecosystem orchestration falls into a 
category of closed-system orchestration that reflects the self-interest orientation of the hub 
firm in deliberately extracting value from the ecosystem (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). This 
suggests that the value in ecosystems is not necessarily equally distributed amongst 
participants. Some orchestrators can become dominators destroying the ecosystem’s health, 
as conceptualised by Iansiti and Levien (2004c). Thus, ecosystems can become “ego-
systems” (Jacobides et al., 2019). Open-system orchestration, as opposed to closed-system 
orchestration, reflects the orchestrator’s orientation in supporting network members in value 
creation and capture (Giudici et al., 2018). For example, when Intel created an open modular 
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platform, it undercut its ability to compete effectively by not owning an intellectual property 
of industry standards and distributing it to its partners to co-create value (Gawer & 
Henderson, 2007). Firms in ecosystems balance tensions between value creation 
(cooperation) and value capture (competition). Closed-system orchestrators tend to capture 
value for themselves while occupying bottlenecks and restricting competition in their own 
component and, at the same time, fostering competition in complementary components 
(Bremner, Eisenhardt, & Hannah, 2017). There are underlying foundations of orchestration 
that seem to be common across all types of ecosystem: 
• Mechanisms for value creation and capture (Jacobides et al., 2018); 
• Business model innovation (Teece & Linden, 2017); 
• System-level business goals, outputs or value propositions (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
There is an increasing understanding that ecosystem strategies require distinct structures and 
processes to generate certain outcomes. For example, Clarysse et al. (2014) argued that 
different types of ecosystems differ in system dynamics and orchestration mechanisms for 
value creation and capture. They further argued that it is not clear whether the success factors 
of business ecosystems are similar to knowledge ecosystems. This has serious implications 
for orchestration and policy research. The same debate applies to the orchestration 
mechanisms adopted in Business-to-Consumer (B2C) contexts. As successful ecosystems 
tend to operate in B2C contexts, it is still unclear how ecosystems operate in Business-to-
Business (B2B) contexts (Aarikka-Stenroos, Jaakkola, Harrison, & Mäkitalo-Keinonen, 
2017). It is evident that more B2B ecosystems and platforms fail than succeed. For example, 
a study of 209 failed platforms by Cusumano et al. (2019) highlighted that twice as many 
platforms fail in B2B contexts than in any other category. They also have the shortest lifespan 
(as shown in Appendix Table 4-1 in the book ‘The Business of Platforms: Strategy in the Age 
of Digital Competition, Innovation, and Power’ written by Cusumano et al. (2019).  
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Although there is an emerging stream of research on orchestration mechanisms, less is known 
about early-stage ecosystems (Hannah, 2016; Thomas, 2013) and even less is known about 
why and how ecosystems emerge or fail, and the critical components and constructs 
necessary for ecosystem orchestration andemergence or how they contribute to failure and 
success. Determining these factors is therefore critical. Early-stage ecosystems pose certain 
challenges to scholars as they did not live long enough to leave a “blueprint” of who does 
what, when and how (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009: p.256). As previously mentioned, most 
literature focuses on the limited empirical analysis of successful examples, which suggests a 
“serious form of selection bias: to the extent that researchers study only industries that 
survived long enough to make their mark […] they overlook the unsuccessful industries.” 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994: p.665).  
There are two long-standing debates in relation to ecosystem orchestration. First, whether 
sources of successful long-lived ecosystems rest on the firm’s capabilities or the firm’s 
environment (e.g. industry architecture). While some scholars argue that the emergence of 
ecosystems is largely dependent on industry architecture (Jacobides et al., 2006; Jacobides & 
Winter, 2012), Piepenbrock (2009: p.5) argued that: 
“Sources of superior firm performance lie neither exclusively within the firm, nor in its 
industrial environment, but in how the firm interacts with its environment - i.e. in the 
network architecture of the firm's extended enterprise. It appears that these enterprise 
architectures, which both enable and constrain managerial agency and adaptation through 
spatially and temporally bounded rationality, give rise to architectural inertia and the 
power of environmental selection”.  
Second, whether ecosystems can be intelligently orchestrated to determine the outcome or are 
part of an evolutionary organisational design that is directed by the selection process in the 
context (Piepenbrock, 2009). Indeed, some studies imply that ecosystems are intentionally 
designed (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004c; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; 
Ritala & Almpanopoulou, 2017) while others suggest a self-organised nature (Clarysse et al., 
2014; Jacobides & Winter, 2012). However, this research is agnostic on this debate, and 
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instead explores the process of emergence and failure in a specific context of digital 
innovation.  
Research on ecosystems seems to miss a critical understanding of the success factors of 
ecosystem orchestration. What can be perceived as a success from a single firm perspective, 
can also be a failure from end-users’ and complementors’ points of view. This understanding 
of what contributes to failure and what is a failure has been limited in the research on failed 
ecosystems (Heikkilä & Heikkilä, 2019; Ozcan & Santos, 2015). The dark side of ecosystem 
orchestration (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019) is another promising line of inquiry taken in this 
thesis. Indeed, new organisational forms have advantages as well as downsides and effects on 
the societies at large (de Man et al., 2019). Although a new stream of research on the dark 
side of ecosystems has emerged, it calls for further rigorous empirical research (Guerrero & 
Urbano, 2017; Heidenreich, Wittkowski, Handrich, & Falk, 2015; Mantovani & Ruiz-
Aliseda, 2016; Mele et al., 2018). Therefore, this thesis aims to address this call.  
The following sub-section offers a definition of ecosystem orchestration process.  
1.1.6 Ecosystem Orchestration Definition 
There is clear inconsistency and a lack of theoretical clarity on what ecosystem orchestration 
is (Aarikka-Stenroos & Ritala, 2017; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). As ecosystem 
orchestration is a new phenomenon, a clear definition of what it is does not currently exist. 
However, ecosystem orchestration literature largely builds on inter-firm network governance 
literature referring to the terms of “interfirm networks” (Grandori & Soda, 1995; Uzzi, 1997), 
a “network form of organisation” (Powell, 1990), “quasi-firms” (Eccles, 1981), “loosely 
coupled systems” (Weick, 1976), “network organisation” (Miles & Snow, 1986), “complex 
entities of group-related actors” (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2013) and “network-centric 
innovation” (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). This literature refers to interfirm coordination 
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that is mostly characterised by dyadic relations that are formed as informal social systems as 
opposed to hierarchically and contractually managed systems (Jones et al., 1997). Purposeful 
action by a leading firm or network hub is often considered of great importance in 
orchestrating ecosystems and networks. According to Jacobides et al. (2018: p.2260), “an 
important but neglected characteristic of ecosystems is that they help coordinate interrelated 
organisations that have significant autonomy”. Indeed, successful ecosystems are not 
hierarchically managed but often enabled by modular architecture (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). 
Therefore, orchestration processes are the result of a partly designed process (Jacobides et al., 
2018). Overall, powerful firms design rules and try to shape processes wittingly and 
sometimes unwittingly. As such, the ecosystem orchestration literature often builds on the 
definitions provided by Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) and Nambisan and Sawhney (2011). Key 
definitions used in the ecosystem orchestration literature are presented in Table 3. 
In this thesis, I refer to ecosystem management and governance as ecosystem orchestration 
and conceptualise it thus: 
Ecosystem orchestration is characterised by the processes and mechanisms that 
are used by a leading firm or a leading hub to intentionally direct, coordinate, 
influence and manage diverse sets of conflicting complementors and customers. 
These processes are not fully hierarchically controlled and enable individual and 
collective value co-creation and capture at multiple levels. Depending on the 
context and the approach taken by the leading hub or firm, these processes can 







Table 3 Overview of Network Orchestration Definitions 
N Source Term Definition 
1 Perks, Kowalkowski, 




“An orchestration practice is an observable, re-
peated and routinized single or set of activities of the 
lead firm related to the development of the value 
platform.” 
2 Planko, Cramer, 
Chappin, and Hekkert 
(2016: p.2329) 
Collective system 
building, a sub-set 
of strategic 
networks 
“Processes and activities that firms can conduct in 
networks to collectively create a favourable 
environment for their innovative sustainability 
technology.” 
3 Paquin and Howard-




“The process of assembling and developing an 
interorganizational network.” 





“Orchestration processes that a hub firm must 
perform to coordinate, influence, and/or direct other 
firms in the innovation network.” 




“The set of deliberate, purposeful actions 
undertaken by the hub firm as it seeks to create 
value (expand the pie) and extract value (gain a 
larger slice of the pie) from the network.” 
6 Jones et al. (1997: p.914) Network 
governance 
“Network governance involves a select, persistent, 
and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as 
non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or 
services based on implicit and open-ended contracts 
to adapt to environmental contingencies and to 
coordinate and safeguard exchanges. These 
contracts are socially—not legally—binding.” 
7 Powell (1990: p.295) Network forms of 
organisation 
“Reciprocal patterns of communication and 
exchange - represent a viable pattern of economic 
organization. Networks are contrasted with market 
and hierarchical governance structures.” 
 
1.1.7 Theoretical Components and Constructs Underpinning the Ecosystem Concept 
Despite the plurality of definitions and lack of clarity, there have been attempts to 
describe and explore the theoretical underpinnings of the ecosystem concept2 (Adner, 2017; 
Grandori & Soda, 1995; Jacobides et al., 2018; Thomas & Autio, 2014b; Thomas et al., 
2015). While extensive research has been produced to characterise ecosystems and to frame 
their system level output and unit of analysis, there is limited understanding as to what 
 
2 I refer to the ecosystem as a concept to underline its theoretical under-development as a concept, which is used 
to describe something that is not yet well understood theoretically. I will refer to components as building blocks 
or ingredients of the ecosystem concept. A construct is a statement of a concept that is useful for theorizing and 
incorporates various components that form a certain configuration to make up a construct.  
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constructs and components make up ecosystems. In particular, the constructs offer a theory of 
how different conceptual elements or components come together while the components are 
elements that are used to construct theory. Ecosystems reflect system dynamics, which occur 
at aggregated levels and are accompanied by a cohort of other related theoretical constructs, 
such as leadership, capabilities, complementarity, business models, industry architecture3 and 
components, such as platforms, modularity, bottlenecks. These constructs and components 
were selected because they are present across the literature; this suggests their critical 
importance for ecosystem orchestration and therefore for value creation and capture. There 
are possibly more elements that comprise ecosystems that were not included in this thesis. 
The selected constructs also include several components that are not described in detail but 
can be included in the future. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to understand what 
constructs and components are critical to ecosystem orchestration, which sets the foundation 
for future research. The selected constructs and components are summarised in the following 
sub-sections. 
Leadership  
Studies in the strategic management research stream focus on the role of a central firm 
or orchestrator as a central actor in the orchestration process. Some say that the facilitation 
and coordination of innovation is necessary (Thomas, 2013) and requires “architectural 
leadership” (Piepenbrock, 2009) while others argue that, without an orchestrator, networks 
are unable to meet the global challenges of modern economies (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 
1995). The presence of an “architect” who sets the system-level goal and directs the rules, 
 
3 The components and theoretical constructs were selected based on the available literature and my own reading. 
Although other constructs and components exist in ecosystem literature, I will focus on these as the most 
important and common across all ecosystems.  
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roles and mechanisms for value co-creation and capture are essential in ecosystem 
orchestration (Gulati et al., 2012). 
Research on the leadership of orchestrators has proliferated across a broad range of 
management literature in which it has been referred to as “hub firms”, “system integrator”, 
“platform leader” (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006), “keystones and dominators” (Iansiti & Levien, 
2004c), “network administrative organisations” (Human & Provan, 2000), “kingpins” 
(Jacobides & Tae, 2015), “strategic centre” (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995), “anchor 
firm” (Wang, Madhok, & Xiao Li, 2014), “platform leader” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014), 
“lead firm” (Williamson & De Meyer, 2012), “organisational leader” (Nadler & Tushman, 
1990), and “innovation broker” (Batterink et al., 2010). These types of orchestrators typically 
represent closed-system orchestration processes. Open-system orchestrators (Giudici et al., 
2018) are referred to as “bridging organisations” (Berkes, 2009) or “open system 
intermediaries” (Dutt et al., 2016; Giudici et al., 2018) or “innovation brokers” (Winch & 
Courtney, 2007).  
Piepenbrock (2009) argued that, as the nature of strategic leadership has changed, the role of 
orchestrators should focus on the power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1981) and politics of inter-
organisational relationships (Freeman, 2010). The success of innovating firms depends on the 
efforts of other actors in the ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Not every firm is capable of 
becoming an orchestrator as orchestrators master specific capabilities and are able to perform 
multiple roles simultaneously (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Nätti, 2018).  
Capabilities 
Interdependencies within ecosystems tend to be standardised within each role, which 
creates the need for a new set of skills when designing ecosystems (Helfat & Raubitschek, 
2018). Ecosystem formation requires new capabilities at least at three levels, namely the 
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orchestrator, firm and ecosystem as a collective notion. Capabilities are required to design 
new business models, while change must be possible in response to competition, and abilities 
should be present to deal with inter-organisational politics and to understand customer and 
technology needs (Teece, 2018a). A firm’s capabilities have been widely explored in the 
literature on dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). The established view of 
dynamic capabilities theorised the firm-level capacity to drive innovation, such as sensing 
opportunity, seizing the opportunity, and continuing to transform or renew the firm (Teece et 
al., 1997). 
The role of orchestrators requires new capabilities to direct activities upward (components, 
suppliers) and outward (complementors) (Dyer, Singh, & Hesterly, 2018) as opposed to 
traditional management activities that are directed mostly inward (organisation) and 
downward (supply chain) (Piepenbrock, 2009). Teece (2018a) argued that firms require 
dynamic capabilities in order to design new business models and to be able to create and 
capture value. Dynamic capabilities theorists (Teece et al., 1997: p.516) define these 
capabilities as "the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments". Helfat and Raubitschek (2018) 
further argued that three distinct types of dynamic capability are necessary for ecosystem 
orchestrators. They are innovation capabilities, environmental scanning and sensing 
capabilities, and integrative capabilities for ecosystem orchestration. Integrative capabilities 
play a key role in the orchestrator’s ability to capture value; these are used interchangeably 
across the literature as architectural capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). The orchestrator’s 
architectural capabilities are a subset of dynamic capabilities that allow managers to 
comprehend the complexity of systems in an abstract way and understand how the system 
functions in order to intentionally change the system’s structure by rearranging its 
components (Teece et al., 1997). Architectural capabilities allow one to construct bottlenecks 
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and modularity to create and capture value. For example, over the course of its ecosystem 
orchestration, Intel developed architectural capabilities through trial and error (Gawer, 2000), 
which shows that capability development is context dependent and can be exercised. 
However, most orchestrators do not have all the necessary capabilities or resources to design 
systems, so they need to collaborate with complementors (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002).  
Most of the strategy literature, such as research by Helfat and Raubitschek (2018) and Teece 
(2018a), is largely concerned with the capabilities of singular firms. However, the industry 
architecture shapes and is shaped by the capabilities of actors in the ecosystem (Huygens, 
Van Den Bosch, Volberda, & Baden-Fuller, 2001; Jacobides & Winter, 2012). While there is 
heterogeneity in the capabilities of firms embedded in the same structure (Gibbons & 
Henderson, 2012), capabilities emerge from differences in perception and belief (Nelson, 
1991). Literature on dynamic capabilities considers these as a given and necessary 
component for ecosystem orchestration; however, less is known about an ecosystem’s 
capabilities, how these develop collectively and whether they are given or must be 
orchestrated. Jacobides and Winter (2012) emphasised the role of industry architecture in 
driving capabilities through feedback loops. A firm’s capabilities co-evolve with the 
ecosystem and the business environment in which firms are embedded (Huygens et al., 2001). 
This will be explained in the section on industry architecture later in this chapter. However, 
further research is needed to explain the ecosystem’s capabilities at the aggregate level, 
which could provide an interesting avenue for future research.  
Platform 
Platforms are typically seen as multi-sided markets that enable transactions by end-
users and offer an open or semi-open interface upon which complementors can co-create 
value (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). Platforms are leveraged through transactions, 
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production and innovation across different customer groups (Thomas et al., 2015). Platforms 
have been referred to as “two-sided markets”, or “multi-sided markets” or “multi-sided 
platforms” (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Parker, Van Alstyne, & 
Jiang, 2016a). Two-sided markets can be defined as “markets involving two groups of agents 
interacting via 'platforms' where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the 
size of the other group that joins the platform” (Armstrong, 2006: p.668). Rysman (2009: 
p.127) states that "in a technical sense, the literature on two-side markets could be seen as a 
subset of the literature on network effects.". 
Platforms are characterised by the “network effects” (Katz & Shapiro, 1985) between the 
“two sides” of market participants and are facilitated by intermediaries (Eisenmann, Parker, 
& Van Alstyne, 2011). Network effects can magnify advantages to the platform orchestrator 
because the value to customers on one side of the platform increases with the number of 
participating complementors and customers on the other side when using compatible 
technology (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). For example, sellers on Amazon gain more value 
when there are more buyers and vice versa. Network effects can have a chicken-and-egg 
barrier as one side will not join unless the other side joins. Platform owners can face a 
challenging task overcoming this barrier (Eisenmann et al., 2011). The literature further 
distinguishes between two types of network effects: direct network effects and indirect 
network effects (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). Direct network effects are when a benefit to 
the user depends on the number of othersusing the platform (Gawer, 2014). The value of 
direct network effects can be augmented by indirect network effects whereby all sides of the 
network benefit from the size and diversity of network members (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 
2017). For example, users of Netflix, a video streaming service, benefit from a large number 
of movies and videos, while movie studios and other context providers benefit from their 
large base of users (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). Gawer (2014: p.1241) further emphasised 
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that “direct network effects constitute demand-side economies of scale, indirect network 
effects in fact constitute demand-side economies of scope”. According to Hagiu and Wright 
(2015: p.163): 
“a cross-group network effect arises if the benefit to users in at least one group (side A) 
depends on the number of users in the other group (side B) that joins. An indirect network 
effect arises if there are cross-group network effects in both directions (from A to B and 
from B to A). In this case, the benefit to a user on side A depends on the number of 
participants on side B, which in turn depends on the number of participants on side A. 
Thus, the benefit to a user on side A depends (indirectly) on the number of users on side 
A”.  
While multi-sided platforms build on network effects, the platforms are not necessarily 
technological systems. Indeed, most of the successful platforms are digital (Amazon, Google, 
Facebook), but they can be non-digital. For example, Gawer (2014) suggests that, in biology, 
a human genome database is a platform, whereas in banks, credit cards like visa are platforms 
for micropayments and other services, whilst pharmaceutical firms develop compounds that 
are the basis for many drugs (Gawer, 2014). Platforms can be a standard or a contract upon 
which complementors can co-create value. Ecosystems are extensively building on the 
standards required for coordination. Thus, digital and non-digital platforms can be present 
within ecosystems to offer a foundation for orchestration (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). A 
new kind of platform that is orchestrated without a focal leader or any intermediary is 
emerging. Parker, Van Alstyne, and Choudary (2016b) argued that blockchain, a distributed 
public ledger, offers decentralised and completely trustworthy interactions without the need 
for intermediaries or platform leadership. They further argued that blockchains put pressure 
on existing platforms by threatening to displace some elements, for example, financial 
services that rely on costly gatekeepers for transactions.  
Gawer and Cusumano (2014: p.418) recognised two predominant forms of platform “internal 
or company-specific platforms, and external or industry-wide platforms.” Internal platforms 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2014: p.418) are: 
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A set of assets organized in a common structure from which a company can efficiently 
develop and produce a stream of derivative products. […] external (industry) platforms as 
products, services, or technologies that act as a foundation upon which external innovators, 
organized as an innovative business ecosystem, can develop their own complementary 
products, technologies, or services 
Internal platforms are a set of assets that allow a firm to develop and produce a stream of 
derivative products (Meyer & Lehnerd, 1997). They offer a reusable foundation for product 
development and “product platforms” allow customers to modify the platform’s features or 
increase product variety (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). This type of platform typically exists 
in manufacturing production processes, such as the automotive, aircraft and consumer 
electronics sector. Firms such as Sony, Rolls Royce and Boeing build their products on 
internal platforms. Supply chain platforms also fall into this category as “a set of firms follow 
specific guidelines to supply intermediate products or components to the platform owner or 
the final product assembler” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014: p.419).  
External platforms, like internal platforms, offer a foundation for reusable modular 
components and technologies. Gawer and Cusumano (2014) draw a distinction between 
internal and external platforms in terms of their openness to outside firms. The purpose of 
external platforms is to bring multiple users and complementors together to increase the 
degree of innovation on complementary products and services. As the adoption rate grows, 
the rise of the industry platform can lead to a number of issues, such as barriers to entry, and 
trade-offs between the social benefits and negative effects created. The case studies comprise 
Intel for microprocessors, Qualcomm for telecommunication and semiconductor systems, 
Microsoft Windows and Linux for operating systems, Google’s internet search engine, video-
game consoles, Android’s operating systems for smart phones, and giants such as Facebook, 
LinkedIn and Twitter (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). Gawer and Cusumano (2014: p.421) 
further argue that the platform must “(1) perform a function that is essential to a broader 
technological system, and (2) solve a business problem for many firms and users in the 
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industry”. Intel is a good example of a platform leader that sustained its position as an 
orchestrator and offered relevant incentives to complementors to continue participation while 
giving away their intellectual properties (Gawer & Henderson, 2007).  
There are four streams of research on platforms: organisational, product family, market 
intermediary and platform ecosystem (Thomas et al., 2015). Scholars have tried to provide an 
“integrated framework” (Gawer, 2014) or a “unified view” (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009) to 
platforms. Gawer (2014) states that all platforms share a fundamental unity in platform 
architecture, modularity (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009), technological interface and 
coordination mechanisms. All platforms build on the modularity of complex systems where 
components are stable while complements are encouraged to vary and innovate (Ethiraj & 
Levinthal, 2004). Modularity is described in the following section.  
Modularity 
Modularity enables ecosystem emergence by providing technical structures to grow upon 
(Jacobides et al., 2018). Jacobides et al. (2018) argued that modularity has been a neglected 
topic in ecosystem research as, in almost all empirical cases, successful ecosystems were 
enabled by modular architecture (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Baldwin and Von Hippel (2011) 
suggested that the transition to modular architecture coupled with the low cost of internet-
based communication technologies creates a “paradigm shift” where innovation is based on 
the distributed nature of collaboration, thereby displacing the restriction of traditional 
innovation by producers. Modularity helps to manage complexity by breaking up complex 
system into modules that are connected through interfaces with a standardised architecture 
that facilitates autonomous innovation within modules, and the mix and match of modules 
combined within the system (Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1995). “The value of the system as a 
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whole is greater than the value of the components disassembled” (Baldwin, 2015: p.3). 
Modularity opens up opportunities for open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003).  
Modularity incorporates defined standards and rules that ensure compatibility amongst 
modules and flexibility in product design (Rietveld, Schilling, & Bellavitis, 2019). Baldwin 
and Clark (2000) defined modular architecture as a structure that consists of interdependent 
modules that follow “design rules”.  
Figure 5 presents the concept of modularity. Design rules specify the degree to which the 
modules of a system interact through standardised interfaces, rules, and specifications 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000). 
According to Baldwin and Clark (2000), design rules are predefined, agreed and coordinated 
by a hub firm or design architect. Modularity allows the coordination of independently 
structured yet loosely connected modules. They are highly structured while the modules are 
loosely structured. Modularity reduces interdependence between modules but does not 
eliminate it (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Each module consists of interdependent elements that 
allow for innovation in one module without the need to change the whole system. Each 
module can be produced by different producers with limited coordination. The modules fit 
through standardised interfaces and are coordinated by operators. The set of interfaces that 
connect modules determine how organisations evolve. Interfaces are fundamental to how 
modularity enables innovation. For Baldwin and Clark (2000: p.64), "when the complexity of 
one of the elements crosses a certain threshold, that complexity can be isolated by defining a 
separate abstraction that has a simple interface. The abstraction hides the complexity of the 
element; the interface indicates how the element interacts with the larger system". The 
interface holds the dual role of connector and separator between the modules and therefore 




Figure 5 Concept of modular system 
division of labour (Baldwin & Clark, 2000). While modularity is relevant for internal and 
external platforms, the degree of interface openness influences the facilitation of innovation 
and determines whether a platform is internal or open for facilitation at the sector level 
(Langlois & Robertson, 1992). 
Afirm that establishes a modular system does not always have control over the modules, and 
thus generates its own negative consequences for the orchestrator. For example, the end 
product or service is not necessarily fully predetermined by the orchestrator if the modular 
platform is designed for sector use (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014).  
Bottleneck 
The bottleneck is a concept used in ecosystem research (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2019; 
Jacobides & Tae, 2015). It is a component in a complex system whose performance 
significantly limits the performance of the whole system through poor quality, poor 
performance, or short supply (Baldwin, 2015; Goldratt, 1990; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2019). 
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A system is made up of conceptually separable but complementary components which, in 
their own way, contribute to the overall performance of the system. Bottlenecks arise as 
important issues that constrain the system’s growth, performance (Baldwin, 2015). Scholars 
argued that bottlenecks can be key in capturing and creating value (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 
2019) while others searched for ways to resolve bottlenecks to create value (Ethiraj, 2007; 
Langlois & Robertson, 1992). For example, to support complementors Intel used its own 
resources to improve the bottlenecks of PC ecosystems (Gawer & Henderson, 2007). Firms 
that want to capture value are advised to control bottlenecks, thus becoming a bottleneck, and 
to beware of bottlenecks that other firms want to control (Jacobides & Tae, 2015).  
Baldwin (2015) defined two types of bottlenecks, technical and strategic. A technical 
bottleneck limits the system’s performance with the physical properties of the system 
(Ethiraj, 2007). A strategic bottleneck is the ability to control the technical performance. 
Strategic bottlenecks offer points of disproportional value capture for the firm through control 
over the access or availability of a unique solution to the technical bottleneck. For example, a 
strategic bottleneck can be a property right (Kim & Mahoney, 2005) or a valuable inimitable 
and non-substitutable asset (Barney, 1991). The literature distinguishes among technological, 
adoptive, and strategic (Bremner et al., 2017). Adoptive bottlenecks rely on the availability of 
component providers (Adner, 2012); technological bottlenecks represent technical or supply 
limitations (Ethiraj, 2007); strategic bottlenecks are a firm or a network of firms that control a 
critical component and are able to capture disproportional value (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 
2019).  
Interdependence in ecosystems naturally leads to the emergence of bottlenecks (Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009) while innovation is challenged by the location of bottlenecks (Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010). The presence of bottlenecks in ecosystems further suggests that the potential 
for value creation and capture in ecosystems is distributed unevenly (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). 
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Hannah and Eisenhardt (2019) articulated a bottleneck strategy for nascent ecosystems 
requiring a dynamic balancing of the ecosystem’s tension between cooperation and 
competition. They further emphasised the critical role of bottlenecks for ecosystem 
orchestrators by creating opportunities for its own advantage.  
Complementarity 
“Ecosystems are distinct forms of organizing economic activities that are linked by 
specific types of complementarities” (Jacobides et al., 2018: p.2256). Complementarity is a 
core construct of ecosystems. However, “the literature on complements is both confused and 
complex” (Teece, 2018b: p.1373) and requires further modern fresh theorising (Jacobides et 
al., 2018).  
Ecosystems incorporate the co-existence of different types of complementarities that offer 
focal and complementary innovations. Ecosystem actors are viewed as co-specialised 
complementors (Jacobides et al., 2006). Ecosystems include upstream suppliers and 
downstream complementors (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Ecosystems are set apart from market-
based arrangements by a set of products or services offered by producers or complementors 
who are interdependent with the end users (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
Jacobides et al. (2018) characterised two types of complementarity: unique and 
supermodular. Unique complementarity is when one component cannot function without a 
second component although both are specific items (Hart & Moore, 1990), or “A doesn’t 
‘function’ without B. […] the value of A is maximized with B.” (Jacobides et al., 2018: 
p.2261). Unique complementarity is underpinned by the idea of co-specialisation (Teece, 
1986). Supermodular complementarity means “a group of activities are (Edgeworth) 
complements if doing more of any subset of them increases the returns to doing more of any 
subset of the remaining activities” (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990: p.6) or “more of A makes B 
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more valuable, where A and B are two different products, assets, or activities.” (Jacobides et 
al., 2018: p.2262). For example, Jacobides et al. (2018) distinguished between unique and 
supermodular complementarities in OS platform/app ecosystems.4  
Ecosystems cannot create value, or the value is limited unless complementors are present. For 
example, the case of nascent wireless game publishers led the emergence of the new industry 
by organising complementors around handset making (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). Toyota’s 
close relationship with its suppliers have provided a superior advantage over its competitors 
suggesting that complementary relationships are important for ecosystem formation (Dyer, 
2000). Toyota’s case draws on the nature of formal interdependence and relational 
mechanisms for effective coordination (Dyer & Singh, 1998) while ecosystems rely on the 
“alignment structure” for joint value co-creation which is not necessarily a formal 
mechanism (Adner, 2017). The alignment structure further defines the business models, 
interoperability and distribution of value to complementors. The advantage of engagement 
with complementors is that ecosystems allow for the coordination of innovation activities 
without the need for vertical integration. Most ecosystem actors are complementors with 
limited power. The analysis of complementarities by Jacobides et al. (2018) offers useful 
guidance on ecosystem orchestration.  
Business Model  
Ecosystems are characterised by new types of focal value propositions, alongside the 
rules, roles, complementor’s interdependence, the mechanisms for monetization, and value 
creation and capture which are essential parts of the business model design (Jacobides et al., 
 
4 “In the example of an OS platform/app ecosystem, the app and the platform have a unique complementarity in 
the sense that the app does not function without the OS (unique complementarity, unidirectional, as the OS 
operates without most apps); and supermodular complementarity, as the presence of apps increases the value of 




2018). The business model construct “articulates the logic … that demonstrates how a 
business creates and delivers value to customers [and] outlines the architecture of revenues, 
costs, and profits associated with … delivering that value” (Teece, 2010a: p.173). Zott, Amit, 
and Massa (2011) found four emerging common themes in business model literature: “(1) the 
business model is emerging as a new unit of analysis; (2) business models emphasize a 
system-level, holistic approach to explaining how firms “do business”; (3) firm activities 
play an important role in the various conceptualizations of business models that have been 
proposed; and (4) business models seek to explain how value is created, not just how it is 
captured.” A business model design defines how all these components work together; 
therefore, an ecosystem is a new type of business model design.  
All successful ecosystems have embraced business model innovation. Their success depends 
on business model design and implementation as well as the orchestrator’s capabilities 
(Teece, 2018b). Poor technology with a great business model is more valuable than great 
technology with a poor business model (Chesbrough, 2010). The imitation of a novel system 
is a difficult process compared to the imitation of a product or a service; thus, business model 
innovation is contributing to the next generation of competition (Bashir & Verma, 2017). An 
ecosystem orchestrator designs a business model or a combination of business models that 
define its ecosystem. By designing the business models, it defines the rules of the ecosystem 
while also imposing these rules on the complementors and customers. Value capture depends 
on the design of the ecosystem’s business model, which is often designed by a leading firm, 
and the business models are adopted by the individual firms. For example, Teece (2018b: 
p.1376) explains that “owning or controlling a successful platform upon which other firms 
erect their business model can provide a commanding position from which to enhance an 
ecosystem and capture value from it.”  
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Thus, my interpretation is that ecosystems can combine multiple business models at different 
levels in the same way that ecosystems can combine multiple sub-ecosystems, which can be 
interconnected at different levels. For example, Google’s original business model was based 
on ad-supported technology development. Then, Google structured Android’s ecosystem to 
capture royalties from mobile ads while the makers of Android devices competed against 
each other (Teece, 2018b). Google first designed a business model for its search engine 
product, and then for Android but connected the two in a larger ecosystem and allowed 
competing complementors to design their own business models. However, Google is one of 
the few examples able to sustain business model innovation. A well-designed business model 
is rare and its suitability must be assessed against a particular context (Teece, 2010a). The 
existing literature provides little insight into how new business models can be operationalised 
while each business model has its unique operationalisation requirement that should be 
contextualised (de Man & Luvison, 2019).  
The business model design of ecosystems has implications for the ecosystem’s evolution. For 
example, Jacobides and Winter (2012) argued that the co-evolution of a sector’s context and 
the business models of individual firms provide structures that generate firm-specific choices 
and the development of agency and capabilities. They articulated industry architecture as a 
context that defines the division of labour as well as the profit share within the sector. 
Therefore, the context influences the choice of business models, whilst successful business 
models can shape the industry architecture. They further called for research that seriously 
considers the context of business model implementation, thus contributing to the origin of 
capabilities. This thesis partly addresses their call for research on the relationship between 






The nature of aggregate levels, what they constitute and how a division of labour in the 
industry or sector is organised was largely taken for granted (Jacobides et al., 2006; Jacobides 
& Winter, 2012). Scholars have started to extensively look at the “Industry architecture” (IA) 
construct (Jacobides et al., 2006) while also linking it with ecosystem research (Jacobides et 
al., 2016; Jacobides & Tae, 2015; Tee & Gawer, 2009). “IA is a sector-wide construct that 
defines the terms of division of labour” (Jacobides et al., 2006: p.1202) . Jacobides et al. 
(2018) argues that there are connections between ecosystems and the industry architecture as 
“ecosystems appear to be one of many ways that a sector or set of sectors can be structured; 
that is, they seem to represent a specific type of industry architecture.” (Jacobides et al., 
2018: p.2274). They further argue that industry architecture, as a unifying concept, allows for 
the existence of ecosystems and platforms but does not assume its existence. It rather focuses 
on the structural properties of the industry or sector. Therefore, the concepts, IA and 
ecosystems, are complementary as ecosystems can benefit from a construct that explores the 
industry context (Jacobides et al., 2018).  
IA is a construct that explores the structural features of the division of labour in the sector 
while treating complementarity and mobility as components of co-specialisation (Jacobides et 
al., 2006). Jacobides et al. (2006) argue that the division of labour, rules and roles can be 
intentionally shaped and redefined by firms to create an architectural advantage as they shape 
the division of profit. They further argue that the industry architecture shapes and is shaped 
by the capabilities of actors. For example, Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005) studied the British 
building industry and found that the division of labour shaped the capability and development 
of a knowledge base. It also shapes the feedback loop that drives the system dynamics 
(Jacobides & Winter, 2012). The perception of the actor’s role within the sector drives the 
agency to pursue architectural advantage or to preserve the status quo (Jacobides & Tae, 
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2015). Industry architecture provides the foundations that allow an understanding of how 
labour is divided, and how rules and roles are shaped by understanding that, ecosystems 
represent a special business model case that can also intentionally and unintentionally shape 
sectors. 
Firms can take a lead in changing IA, and become the orchestrators of their industry, thus 
also becoming bottlenecks to retain value (Jacobides & Tae, 2015). Jacobides and Tae 
(2015), for example, followed the leading firms, “Kingpins”, that intentionally aim to shape 
the computer sector to their advantage by tracking profitability in the sector within different 
segments. As such, the competition between different segments can happen vertically in the 
traditional sense and between ecosystems that span across many segments and sectors. For 
example, firms or a group of firms can cooperate to shape the sector through standard wars 
(Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1994). Standard wars can impose serious implications on the 
structure of the sector and can impact both power and profit share in the sector (Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999). Tee and Gawer (2009) explored the reasons why a successful i-mode Mobile 
Internet Service that operated successfully in Japan failed in Europe. They suggested that 
similar platform strategies led to different outcomes because of IA, which the incumbent 
failed to recognise or address in its business strategy.  
IA can have serious implications for the evolution of ecosystems. However, there is still 
limited knowledge on how the changing rules concerning the division of labour and profit 







1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND FRAMEWORK 
1.2.1 Contributions and Research Aim 
The previous section provided theoretical insights into current debates around 
ecosystem orchestration. In considering these relevant debates this thesis intends to contribute 
in several ways to ecosystem orchestration literature, as discussed below:  
1. Ecosystem orchestration has been underexplored empirically (Dattée et al., 2018; 
Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Ozcan & Santos, 2015). I conducted research that extensively 
utilised empirical evidence to contribute to the current discourse on ecosystem orchestration 
while offering novel insights to a specific context of study. 
2. While prior studies extensively looked at ecosystem orchestration from a firm’s 
perspective, the nature of orchestration ecosystems, and openness and closeness have been 
underexplored. This thesis further contributes to the emerging discourse on open and closed-
system orchestration (Giudici et al., 2018) by presenting empirical evidence of orchestration 
processes by open-system (public) and closed-system (private) orchestrators in two contexts.  
3. Ecosystem literature tends to focus on the success stories of ecosystem orchestration, 
while empirical research on failed ecosystems remains a “grey area” thus forming a selection 
bias (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). This thesis addresses this gap by empirically analysing failed 
cases in two contrasting contexts and offering a theory of what and how contributes to these 
failures.  
4. The emergence of new markets and sectors nowadays is attributed to the emergence 
of ecosystems that co-evolve value propositions (Jacobides et al., 2018). However, an 
ecosystem is a network of interdependent actors that depend on each other for mutual 
effectiveness. While the success of these interdependencies is told from a successful firm 
perspective, the stories told from other perspectives can manifest the dark side of inter-
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organisational networks (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). This thesis contributes to the theory of 
the dark side of ecosystem orchestration by providing novel insights into how the dark side 
manifests in ecosystems and how ecosystem orchestration can damage the innovative 
capability of complementors and customers.  
5. While ecosystems are a multi-level phenomenon, the majority of ecosystem studies 
take a firm level perspective (Jacobides & Winter, 2012). This thesis aims to develop a multi-
level perspective on ecosystem orchestration by identifying critical constructs and the 
components of ecosystem orchestration, and by juxtaposing the empirical evidence of failure 
derived in this research to the documented examples of success.  
6. The importance of industry context has been recognised in the work of Jacobides et 
al. (2006). However, the importance of the industry or sector context for ecosystem 
orchestration has been neglected (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). This thesis explores the 
nature and importance of context for the emergence and orchestration of ecosystems while 
reconciling the mixed findings in the literature.  
7. The context of study, namely the Digital Built Environment (DBE) sector, was 
overlooked by management scholars (Katila, Levitt, & Sheffer, 2018; Pries & Janszen, 1995). 
This sector has distinct characteristics that provide an interesting context of study. By 
focusing on the digital transformation of the DBE sector with Building Information 
Management (BIM), this thesis contributes to the current discourse on sector-wide innovation 
mechanisms with policy implications. It further contributes novel insights to the deployment 
of BIM by explaining why the sector is preserving the status quo and inadequately 
transitioning to digital practices. Thus, it provides novel insights to address a practice and 
policy search for effective mechanisms for BIM implementation in the DBE sector, which is 
a hot topic in the sector. 
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Given the aforementioned contributions, the aim of this thesis is: 
To explore empirically the critical constructs and components of failed 
ecosystems, and importance of sector’s context while discovering and 
illuminating the dark side of ecosystem orchestration. 
1.2.2 Overall Multi-Level Framework 
An overall framework is developed to accomplish the research aim of this PhD. The 
overall multi-level framework is depicted in Figure 6 and presents the combination of a 
firm’s ecosystem and the sector’s wide-ranging network levels; the antecedents of ecosystem 
orchestration and the specific contributions to theories of ecosystem orchestration are 
included. The circles represent the chapters, whilst the straight line illustrates the chapter’s 
contribution to the theory of ecosystem orchestration. Meanwhile, the dashed lines present 
the results that were derived in Chapters 2 and 3, which contributed to the development of 
Chapter 4 and therefore represent the interaction effects. As represented in Figure 6, Chapter 
2 presents the study of open-system orchestration while Chapter 3 presents the study of 
closed-system orchestration. Both studies analysed ecosystem orchestration from customers’ 
and complementors’ perspectives, thereby contributing to the theories of the dark side of 
ecosystem orchestration. Chapter 4 builds on the results derived from Chapters 2 and 3. 
Specifically, it extends the findings from the previous chapters by focusing on the sector 
context’s importance for ecosystem orchestration. It conducts a comparative study of the 
failures in the built environment sector and the successes in the automotive, taxi and 
semiconductor industry contexts. The study contributes to an understanding of the critical 
components of ecosystem orchestration. The three studies are discussed in more detail in 




Figure 6 Overall Framework of Ecosystem Orchestration  
1.3 METHODS OF STUDY AND RESEARCH SETTING 
1.3.1 Research Setting 
In order to address the research aim formulated in section 1.2, I adopted a single-sector, 
multi-case qualitative inductive research design. The settings of the two empirical studies are 
embedded in the Digital Built Environment (DBE) sector. I will refer to the Built 
Environment (BE) sector as a generic term that incorporates the supply chain including the 
owners, their building operators and everyone related to this sector. The Digital Built 
Environment distinguishes the traditional from the digital sector and will refer to firms in the 
sector that adopted emerging technologies for building information management. This sector 
was selected for several reasons.  
First, I was trained as a specialist in architectural design and worked for six months as an 
intern in the BIM department at the largest general contractor in Montreal. I modelled, 
updated and visualised Building Information Models at the construction site in a project 
Centre d'Entretien AMT Point Saint Charles (a Public Private Partnership contract, 180 
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million CAD project budget) in a consortium, Pomerleau & Kiewit. As an architect, I worked 
with general contractors on the construction site while observing strong resistance from some 
practitioners across different levels towards the digitalisation of the sector. I was intrigued by 
the situation; I wanted to know why the sector was resisting the qualitative transition to 
emerging technologies. 
Thus, through my personal observation and academic career, I have developed a great interest 
in understanding the systemic drivers of technology transformation within the DBE sector. 
While studying, practicing and observing the nature of the sector, I realised that the sector 
recognised a need to undergo systemic changes in its practice with innovative solutions and 
technologies (e.g. Building Information Management, Mixed Reality, Lean, etc.) (Eastman, 
Teicholz, Sacks, & Liston, 2011)) for a very long time. The early critiques of the modern 
problems of the sector were documented in the report by Oliver Roskill (1938) for the Royal 
Institute of British Architects (RIBA). The notion of the need for technological innovation 
was also accepted by some actors as early as the 1980s but the actual use of BIM and other 
digital tools across the sector only started to emerge after 2007. 
Despite numerous efforts by different governments and actors across the world to transform 
the sector with technologies, the sector systematically fails to make the qualitative transition 
to inter-organisational cooperation and value capture from the adoption of technology 
(Morrell, 2015; Winch, 1998). Therefore, little progress has been made to date (Cabinet 
Office, 2011; Langford & Murray, 2003; Roskill, 1938). The initial observation was that the 
current established methods of studying the transition to digital technology in this sector are 
ill-suited to explain this phenomenon. A new holistic approach is needed. The ecosystem 
concept has proved to be useful in exploring and comprehending this phenomenon.  
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Second, the available literature on BIM reveals an overemphasis on the technological 
possibilities while overlooking the inter-organisational, socio-cognitive and political aspects 
of adopting technology (Borup, Brown, Konrad, & van Lente, 2006; Deutsch, 2011; Emmitt 
& Gorse, 2009; Kerosuo, Miettinen, & Mäki, 2012; Miettinen & Paavola, 2014). The 
literature on BIM tends to focus on singular successful projects and firms marketing the 
benefits of BIM, and thus fails to capture the multiple and complex dimensions associated 
with adopting innovation and technology which transcend the boundaries of any singular 
firm, project or industry/sector. 
Third, very few management scholars have examined this sector (Katila, Levitt, & Sheffer, 
2018; Pries & Janszen, 1995), although it provides a fruitful ground to study a system-level 
phenomenon such as ecosystem orchestration. First, it is important to note that the definition 
of “ecosystem [as] a set of actors with varying degrees of multilateral, non-generic 
complementarities that are not fully hierarchically controlled” provided by Jacobides et al. 
(2018: p.2264) fits perfectly with the notion of the project-based nature of co-specialised 
disciplines in the BE sector. The ecosystem concept and the notion of the project-based 
nature of the BE sector are both characterised as loosely coupled systems (Dhanaraj & 
Parkhe, 2006; Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Second, the BE sector is largely dependent on the 
adjacent sectors as various actors in the sector are complementary and mutually co-
specialised. The sector incorporates a large network of actors that go beyond the boundaries 
of a single industry in the BE sector. The notion of the BE sector integrates various sub-
sectors that make up the realisation of a building product. Considering the complexity of the 
BE sector, Ribeirinho et al. (2020: p.15) further suggest that the construction industry is 




Construction is already in the perfect storm. Industrialization, globalization, and 
digitalization have been key drivers of change in all industries. While this change 
happened in sequential waves—for example, in auto industrialization in the 1970s and 
1980s, globalization in the 1990s and 2000s, and digitalization in the 2010s and ongoing—
all of these drivers are hitting construction simultaneously. It is a daunting task and will 
require bold and agile moves to manoeuvre, but the size of the prize is enormous.  
Therefore, the study of BE, and particularly the DBE sector, can potentially aid the 
development of ecosystem orchestration.  
Before I present the selection of the case studies, I explain why this sector is an important and 
interesting context for any study. 
1.3.2 Research Setting: Digital Built Environment Sector  
It is important to note that the sector is significant to the global economy. The BE 
sector consists of many sub-sectors constituting industries such as design, construction and 
operation, etc., and represents the largest sector in the world. It is a $10-trillion-a-year sector 
and contributes 13 percent of the global GDP (Bartlett, Blanco, Rockhill, & Strub, 2019). 
Moreover, the importance of the built environment sector has been recognised by 
governments. The BE sector is one of the four priority sectors (next to life science, AI and 
automotive) highlighted in the recent UK Government Industrial Strategy Plan for future 
investment to support further growth of its infrastructure and business environment (HM 
Government, 2017).  
Despite its significance, the built environment sector was criticized for its high costs, low 
productivity and performance, slow delivery, unsafe working conditions and systematic 
failure to innovate (Dainty, Leiringer, Fernie, & Harty, 2017; Egan, 1998; Latham, 1994; 
Morrell, 2015). The sector is infamous for its low performance compared with other 
industries (Fuchs, Nowicke, & Strube, 2017) (see Figure 7). According to the U.S. Bureau of 
Labour Statistics (Teicholz, 2004), the BE sector’s productivity not only lags behind other 




Figure 7. Low Productivity of Construction Practices Compared to Other Sectors5 
(Fuchs et al., 2017) 
productivity has been one of the most serious concerns, as only the mining sector has 
performed worse (Nam & Tatum, 2010). The failures were largely attributed to the 
fragmented disorganised complex structure of the sector and its conservative male-dominated 
culture (Latham, 1994). Winch (1998: p.268) stated:  
As with most of his prognoses for the future of capitalism, Schumpeter, writing in the late 
1930s (1976 p. 68), was wrong about construction ­ his ’gale of creative destruction’ 
(1976, p. 84) has passed construction by. Ever since the emergence of volume production 
methods in the late 19th Century, there have been repeated attempts to apply them to the 
construction industry […] Such attempts have repeatedly failed, with the result that the 
 
5 GGCD-10; national statistica agencies of Malaysia, Sinapore, and Turkey; Organisation for Economic Co-
peration and Developmen (OECD); Rosstat; US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics (BLS); World Bank; World Input-Output Database (WIOD); Mckinsey Global Institute analysis 




relative cost of housing compared to other goods and services has been rising inexorably. 
This is a problem common to all advanced nations […] Therefore, it is worth reflecting 
upon why the construction of housing and other built products has been so resistant to the 
virtuous cycle of simultaneous cost reduction and quality improvement that has benefited 
most other industries over the last century. 
The sector is a service-based supply chain with the absence of inter-firm adaptations (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002; Weick, 1976), which means it is an inherently social process (Abowitz & 
Toole, 2010). As mentioned earlier, it is regarded as a “loosely coupled system”  
(Weick, 1976) “with particular complexity factors owing to industry-specific uncertainties 
and interdependences and inefficiency of operations” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002: p.611).The 
sector operates as a network of simultaneously cooperating and competing firms in the same 
and different projects. These networks are characterised by co-specialised firms; thus, a 
single project, namely the delivery of a building product, is always the result of collective 
activity. According to the World Economic Forum (2016: p.11): 
Construction is a “horizontal” industry (like the Financial Services industry), serving all 
industry verticals; in other words, construction has considerable interaction with numerous 
other sectors, since value creation almost always occurs within or by means of buildings or 
other constructed assets The construction industry is affected by megatrends in four 
domains: markets and customers, sustainability and resilience, society and workforce, and 
politics and regulation 
Projects are characterised as “distributed (designed and constructed by multiple, autonomous 
actors), heterogeneous (composed of communities with distinct skills, expertise, and 
interests), and sociotechnical (requiring trust, values, and norms, as well as IT capabilities 
and complex fabrication processes)” (Bolland, Lyytinen, & Yoo, 2007: p.633). Buildings are 
characterised as “expensive customized goods with a comparatively long-life span, and 
typically are purchased before the client can fully assess their features” (Cacciatori & 
Jacobides, 2005: p.1856). The value of the building is largely defined by the cost of land, 
which depends on the location. Moreover, buildings are immobile products. Jacobsson, 
Linderoth, and Rowlinson (2017) suggested that the BE sector and manufacturing sector have 
reverse relationships between the building product and “the factory”; thus, in the BE sector 
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“the “factory” is mobile whereas the product is immobile” (Jacobsson et al., 2017: p.9). 
Overall, the BE is one of the oldest and mature sectors.  
Any innovation effort in the BE sector is mostly dedicated to sub-optimization and technical 
development (Gann, 1996). Some argued that the BE sector is “a complex systems industry” 
(Winch, 1998) that follows a model of complex systems in the context of the flight simulation 
industry developed by Miller, Hobday, Leroux-Demers, and Olleros (1995). Winch (1998: 
p.270) argued that the BE sector exhibits unique particularities that set it apart from “the 
model of the complex systems industry developed by Miller and his colleagues”. These 
particularities are: the systems integrator role, which is shared between an architect or 
engineer and the principal general contractor; the fragmentation and competition between 
professional bodies that hold protectionist attitudes towards their professions; trade 
contractors or specialised suppliers who have limited power in propagating technology 
innovation and whose role is different from the specialist components described by Miller 
and his colleagues. However, others argue that the characteristics of this sector are better 
suited to incremental than systemic innovation because of the inherent characteristics (Katila 
et al., 2018). There is a general belief in this sector that it is unique or different.  
Therefore, various governments are developing strategies and mandates in an attempt to 
integrate their sector with the use of BIM (Björk, 1986; GSA, 2007; Office, 2011). The UK 
government views BIM as an enabler of the sector transformation agenda, as indicated in its 
industrial strategy (HM Government, 2013: p.9): “... only through the implementation of BIM 
will we be able to deliver more sustainable buildings, more quickly and more efficiently”. 
BIM Level 2 was mandated in all public contracts procured by the central UK government in 
2016 (The Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2016). Around the world, there is a 
disproportionate emphasis on the technological side of BIM implementation in the sector. 
Dainty et al. (2017) point to a potential danger that performance improvement could easily be 
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elevated beyond a mandated technological improvement and seen as the only possible 
mechanism for realizing “radical, transformational change”, as is the case with the 
positioning of BIM in the UK government’s industrial strategy. For example, NBS (2017) 
reported that the Government is failing to enforce the BIM mandate as “a lot of government 
agencies and bodies have used loopholes in contract form to get out of mandated BIM 
requirements” because “everyone has their own version of what it means to meet the 
mandate” (NBS, 2017: p.12). The adoption of BIM disrupts prevailing practices and 
challenges institutional momentum, and consequently, it suffers from a slow rate of BIM 
practice adoption. 
There has been a steady yet slow emergence of work practices in which BIM has effectively 
been utilised to support collaborative knowledge sharing across organisational and 
disciplinary boundaries. However, the adoption and efficacy of BIM faces limitations when 
there are complex problems involving multiple organisations and collaborators with diverse 
and often conflicting viewpoints (Dossick, ASCE, & Neff, 2010). For example, a report by 
Mosey et al. (2016) presents critical issues suggesting that structural changes in contracts and 
procurement must take place to support BIM adoption and the complementors, such as 
software vendors who must take responsibility for the quality of data produced in the BIM 
software. There is evidence that the transition to BIM highlighted systemic inherent 
contradictions in the sector that hinder its innovative potential.  
Despite this, BIM is considered an invaluable process to enable an integrated process of 
information management across the BE sector (Sacks, Eastman, Lee, & Teicholz, 2018); 
however, the promises of BIM, which advocates the revolution of sector practices, are yet to 
be realised (NBS, 2017). The deployment of BIM has proved to be an incremental innovation 
with modest improvements although the potential benefits for ecosystem formation are 
evident (Aksenova, Kiviniemi, Kocaturk, & Lejeune, 2018; Dainty et al., 2017; Miettinen & 
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Paavola, 2014). The report by HM Government (2013) emphasizes the emerging need for a 
more critical perspective to address the diverse implications of the BIM policy and 
management approach. A broader view is needed to identify the impact of various 
endogenous and exogenous factors that influence the sector’s qualitative transition towards 
BIM and make up the ecosystem. In comparison, others suggested that the structural features 
of the sector seriously hinder innovation rate (Winch, 1998). It seems that sector’s structure 
has been taken for granted or ignored in the research on BE practices (Egan, 1998; Morrell, 
2015).  
Thus, the characteristics of BIM as a networked technology and process (Linderoth, 2010), 
the sector’s project-based networked nature, the importance of BIM for governmental 
strategies and the systemic struggles of innovators in the sectors’ ecosystem to gain the 
promised benefits from BIM have narrowed the focus of this research and defined the 
selection of cases.  
Building Information Management, Modelling and Model (BIM) 
The focus of this research is on the context of BIM implementation in the DBE sector; thus, I 
provide a short description of BIM. There is general confusion in the industry and academia 
regarding what BIM is, whilst the understanding of BIM also varies across countries and 
individuals.  
Building Information Modelling, as a term, is used interchangeably with Building 
Information Management. While both concepts are interrelated, the first concept proposes 
fundamentally new methods of handling, creating and sharing information and new ways of 
working with other stakeholders in project networks by re-aligning the disciplinary roles and 
responsibilities, and creating opportunities for additional roles in the sector (Eastman, 
Teicholz, Sacks, & Liston, 2011). The second concept, Building Information Management is 
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concerned with “business processes across the built environment sector in support of the 
management and production of information during [the] life cycle of built assets” (BSI 
Standards Limited, 2019) with the use of Building Information Modelling processes to 
deliver Building Information Models. Building Information Modelling is the “use of a shared 
digital representation of a built asset (3.2.8) to facilitate design, construction and operation 
processes to form a reliable basis for decisions” (BSI Standards Limited, 2019). A Building 
Information Model refers to the digital model that is delivered with BIM processes and 
underpinned with the use of BIM technologies. Echoing the definition of a Building 
Information Model by Prof. Arto Kiviniemi, Rothenberg (1989: p.1) states that “a model 
represents reality for the given purpose; the model is an abstraction of reality in the sense 
that it cannot represent all aspects of reality”. Kiviniemi (2020) further emphasises “This 
means that we must always define the purpose before we can define and build the model, and 
that there will always be several models for different purposes”. Therefore, in this thesis I 
refer to BIM as Building Information Management as it provides an integrated concept that is 
aligned with the research aims.  
The BIM concept has a long history of development. According to Prof. Arto Kiviniemi, the 
first notion of the BIM concept emerged in 1962 when Engelbart (1962) presented a vision of 
the future architect in his seminal work “Augmenting Human Intellect” in which a virtual 
model is imagined to “augment an architect” and aimed to extend “human intellectual 
effectiveness” (Engelbart, 1962:p.4). However, Eastman (1975) presented a more articulated 
definition of the use of computers instead of drawings in building design. 
Before 2002, BIM was referred to and researched as “Building Product Modelling”. For 
example, as early as the 1980s, the Finnish national strategy for the transformation of the 
design and construction industry was dedicated to the research, development and deployment 
of Building Product Modelling (Björk, 2009). Nevertheless, the BIM concept was 
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implemented in mainframe computers much earlier than 1980s; the first BIM software 
developed for personal computers was, according to Jerry Laiserin, “Lisa” which was 
published in 1984 and in 1987 renamed as ArchiCAD. ArchiCAD was the first BIM software 
developed for architects which is still widely used nowadays. The term “Building Information 
Model” was first used by van Nederveen and Tolman (1992) and became commonly used 
after Autodesk Building Industry Solutions (2002) published a white paper on Building 
Information Modelling in 2002. Despite the long history of BIM development, its concept is 
considered by many actors in the sector as a “novel technology”, which suggests a limited 
understanding and is largely marketed by software vendors. The following definition of 
Building Information Management is used in this thesis, which overlaps with the definition 
provided by BSI Standards Limited (2019): 
Building Information Management is characterised by the business processes 
across the built environment sector underpinned with the emerging digital 
technologies that enable management and production of information and 
communication during life cycle of built assets.  
1.3.3 Research Setting: Case Selection 
Two empirical case studies were selected to address the research aims, and the Finnish 
and northern Californian DBE sectors. Finland was selected because it is known as one of the 
leaders on a national scale in the implementation of Building Information Modelling (BIM) 
(Ciribini, Mastrolembo Ventura, & Bolpagni, 2015; Fischer & Calvin, 2002; Froese, 2002). 
Its long history of trust and open standards, its small and agile BE sector is viewed as the 
perfect environment for BIM implementation (Taylor and Levitt, 2007). TEKES, the National 
Technology Agency of Finland wholed one of the most advanced and longest research and 
technology programmes in the history of BIM, developed a programme that has been 
recognised as an international success story (Froese, 2002). Despite the far-reaching 
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technological capabilities within the sector, BIM has primarily been adopted as a 
“productivity tool” within individual firms which did not lead to systemic change nor 
business transformation within the sector (Aksenova et al., 2018).  
The northern Californian DBE sector was selected because of its proximity to growing and 
co-evolving Silicon Valley business ecosystems, the availability of capital, and its strong 
synergistic relationship with the network of top universities (Lee, 2000; Lenoir, 2014). The 
regional advantage of the Silicon Valley is seen as its “cumulatively self-reinforcing 
agglomerations of technical skill, venture capital, specialized input suppliers and services, 
infrastructure, and spill overs of knowledge associated with proximity to universities and 
informal information flows” (Saxenian, 2001: p.42). The northern Californian DBE sector is 
an early adopter of BIM and, over the years, academic research in the area has been driven by 
leading firms that have extensively focused on project process improvements as well as 
technology development (Fischer, Khanzode, Ashcraft, & Reed, 2017). In comparison, 
previously Finland was largely focused on technology development to support inter-
organisational practices with BIM and the life-cycle management of building information 
(Aksenova et al., 2018; Uusikylä, Valovirta, Karinen, Abel, & Froese, 2003); however, it has 
now shifted its focus towards the development of digital business ecosystems at both sector 
and country levels (Lehtinen, 2016; Sunesen et al., 2019).  
There are distinct differences between Finland and northern California, such as the varieties 
of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and differences in building systems (Winch, 2000). 
Several studies indicated that building systems, business systems and the division of labour at 
the sector level varies across many different countries (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005; Winch, 
2000). For example, the Finnish BIM deployment was led by the public agency while 
California is a self-organised ecosystem (Taylor & Levitt, 2007). While Finland is a country 
and northern California is a region, the cases were selected because their territories are 
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‘socially constructed’ and represent a set of local practices (Giordano & Dubois, 2019) as 
Finland and northern California clearly identify themselves as specific geographic units that 
hold similarities and differences within institutional, social and economic dimensions. The 
differences and similarities are presented in Table 4. They were collected from the literature 
and completed during the analysis of the cases. During the analysis of these cases and while 
reading about the nature of the DBE sector and BIM adoption across the world, several trends 
were also observed that were common to all contexts. These trends and observed similarities 
across the selected cases are presented in Figure 8. 
 Table 4 Similarities and Differences in the Contexts of the Finnish and Northern 
Californian DBE Sectors6 
CALIFORNIA  FINLAND 
DIFFERENCES 
Liberal market economy Varieties of capitalism 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001) 
Coordinated market economy 
Short term and long-term relations Temporal (Hofstede, 1983) Short term and long-term relations 
Highly valued individualism (i) Social (Hofstede, 1983) Collectivism (we) 
Inequality (you do not keep up, you are 
out) 
Power (Hofstede, 1983) Equality (support is highly valued)  
Derives from allocation of work in the 
USA 
Alignment  
(Taylor & Levitt, 2007) 
Derives from allocation of work in 
Finland 
Weak (tendency to contract from 5-6 
firms per specialist type) 
Relational stability  
(Taylor & Levitt, 2007) 
Strong (tendency to contract from 1-3 
firms per specialist type) 
Firm Interests  
(Taylor & Levitt, 2007) 
Network 
Impermeable Boundary permeability 
(Taylor & Levitt, 2007) 
Permeable 
Avoidance (we fire) Uncertainty orientation 
(Hofstede, 1983) 
Tolerance (we allow deviation) 
Market driven Power relations Institution driven 
Extremely large Market size Extremely small  
Co-Located with the Silicon Valley Geography Isolation 
Regulation but otherwise government 
intervenes as little as possible 
Corrective mechanisms Government and BuildingSMART 
Strong  University alignment with the 
sector 
Low (but high in relation to research 
institutes, e.g. VTT) 
Low Consistency in practice High 
Non-existent Open standards support Strong 
Non-existent BuildingSMART influence Strong 
Low Practice Standardisation High  
Varies  Quality of final products High  
Short-term (does it help me now?)  Planning mentality Long-term (does it help me in the 
future?)  
Self-organised, software vendor Leadership in the sector Public organisation, coordinated 
Large Availability of capital Low 
High demand  Demand Low demand 
 
6 Where the reference is not provided, the differences between Finnish and northern Californian contexts are 
derived from the empirical data presented in this thesis 
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Hire and fire’ principle, low-trust 
relationships  




Issue of blurred boundaries of 
ownership and responsibilities 
Largely recognised 
None (network is self-organised) Agent of change  
(Taylor & Levitt, 2007) 
National Technology Funding Agencies 
Software vendor Ecosystem orchestrated by Public funder, currently public agency 
SIMILARITIES 
Local business Market view Local business 
Diminished Labour market Diminished 
Market defines power relation between 
sub-contractors and contractors 
Market power Market defines power relation between 
sub-contractors and contractors 
Lack of talents and capabilities  Capabilities of champions Lack of talents and capabilities  
High Variability in skills High 
High Proximity to high-tech 
communities, universities and 
complementors 
High  
High Mobility between 
organisations 
High 
Low Diversity  Low 
High  Diversity in the area High 
Diverse portfolio of technology related 
solutions  
R&D focus Diverse portfolio of technology related 
solutions 
High Focus on technology High 
People are at different levels BIM practice People are at different levels 
Collaborative and competitive Relationship between firms Collaborative and competitive 
High  Collaboration capability High 
High Market fragmentation High 
Closed, siloed Ecosystem type Closed, siloed 
Established  Culture Established 
Low Culture of risk taking Low 
High Trust High  
   
 
1.3.4 Methods of Study 
Given the limited theory and empirical research on ecosystem orchestration, I conducted a 
multi-level, multi-case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2017). Considering the complexity of 
ecosystem orchestration, I chose a qualitative inductive inquiry using grounded theory 
(Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) to investigate the subjective 
experiences of key actors in each context (Langley & Abdallah, 2015). Inductive studies are 
useful when existing theories are underdeveloped or provide limited insights to articulate key 
questions (Bansal, Smith, & Vaara, 2018; Langley, 1999). Although theory-building from 
cases is seen as subjective, rigorously executed theory from the cases is objective due to close 




Figure 8 Similar Trends Observed in the Finnish and Californian DBE Sectors7 
A multi-method was used to collect data from a variety of sources. The research design 
evolved progressively and iteratively allowing for the progressive refinement of the focus of 
this thesis throughout my inquiry (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). First, I conducted the Finnish 
study, then the Californian study, and then conducted a comparative-cross case analysis of 
two contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2017). Therefore, I examined two cases separately and 
consecutively.  
 
7 The arrows indicate increase or decrease of trends. For example, while the productivity overall has decreased 
with the implementation of BIM, the accuracy of information has increased in projects.  
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The Finnish study (Chapter 2) was initiated in Canada where I served as a research associate 
at the Management and Technology, ESG – UQAM, The Université du Québec à Montréal 
(UQAM) for a project “A Study of the Quebec-Finland Gap In Building Information 
Modelling (BIM) deployment: A Critical Perspective Approach”. The research was financed 
by an SSHRC grant 2014-2016 (#430-2014-01070) and led by Prof. Albert Lejeune at 
UQAM. The project was dedicated to the study of the Quebec-Finland gap in BIM 
deployment as the Finnish design and construction industry is considered the earliest adopter 
of BIM. The aim of the project was to identify the critical success factors of BIM deployment 
in Finland, present the gaps between two industries, and thus design guidelines for BIM 
deployment in Quebec’s industry. Ethical approval was received at the UQAM and the 
project adhered to its guidelines. The data use in this thesis was approved by Prof. Albert 
Lejeune. The contacts for interviews in Finland were identified with the help of Prof. Arto 
Kiviniemi. The invitation letter to BIM experts is presented in Appendix A.1. The 
participant’s information sheet and consent form used in Finland are presented in Appendix 
A.3. The Finnish data was collected in 2015, on a face-to-face basis and in English. The 
results of the Finnish case clearly indicated the need for acontrasting case, namely the 
Californian study.  
The Californian study (Chapter 3) was conducted in the UK when I was a PhD student at the 
School of Architecture, the University of Liverpool and undertaken for the project “Business 
ecosystem for BIM – comparative study between Californian and Finnish BIM adoption” 
which was led by Prof. Arto Kiviniemi. The aim of the project was to identify the critical 
success factors in the business ecosystem around BIM. The study was sponsored by The 
School of the Arts Research Development Initiative Fund (RDIF) and supported by Prof. 
Martin Fisher at the Center for Integrated Facility Engineering (CIFE), Stanford University, 
California, USA. Prof. Fisher provided an official invitation and extensive support during the 
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researcher’s visit, such as an invitation to the key events at Stanford and an introduction to 
the key interviewees. The invitation letter to the Californian BIM experts is presented in 
Appendix A.2. The participant’s information sheet is presented in Appendix A.4 and the 
consent form used in California is presented in Appendix A.5. The Californian data was 
collected in 2018, on a face-to-face basis and in English.  
The data collection in California and Finland follows similar approaches and procedures. The 
data collection and analysis process started with the preliminary research assessment, 
selecting the case, planning the data collection, entering the field, processing the data, 
analysing the data, validating the data and results, and, finally, reaching the closure of the 
case. The overall data collection, processing, analysis and validation for each case took 
approximately two years as the process was ongoing and iterative. The overall detailed 
procedure of steps undertaken in each phase of the research process is depicted in Table 5. 
The Aim of this Table is to Illuminate the Rigor of the Research Methods Conducted in this 
Thesis.  
Table 5 Process of Data Collection and Analysis 
N Phases of 
Research 
Process 




• Identifying gaps and assumptions in the topic 
• Selecting the case 
• Developing objectives 
• Problem statement formulation 
• Identifying and planning key steps 
• Forecasting expected results 
2 Selecting case • Selecting a relevant case 
• Reviewing literature about the case (reports, articles and online media) 
• Developing a preliminary understanding of the case 
3 Planning data 
collection 
• Crafting protocol for semi-structured interviews 
• Preparing and obtaining ethical approval 
• Obtaining a travel grant and preparing a trip to the location 
• Identifying key contacts for interviews 
• Inviting key contacts for interviews 
• Arranging interviews at least 2 weeks ahead of the planned visit 
• Building a preliminary understanding about the case 
• Studying the background of each key contact for interview 
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• Training the researcher to conduct interviews 
4 Entering the 
field 
• Conducting interviews (signing ethical consent, introducing project, asking 
questions) 
• Building new networks by visiting industry-related events 
• Applying snowball sampling toidentify new contacts for interview 
• Arranging new interviews 
• Updating the list of key interviewees 
• Recording memos and notes after the interviews while depicting observations and 
key findings 
• Identifying key contacts that are interested in the project and arranging a second 
meeting for the presentation of preliminary findings for validation purposes 
• Organising the data for data storage purposes by uploading it on the departmental 
drive 




• Preparing the final list of conducted interviews with specific notes observations 
attached to each folder assigned to the interviewee 
• Writing ‘thank you letters’ to the interviewees and key support members 
• Reporting to key leaders of the project 
• Preparing Microsoft Word (MW) for interviews 
• Transcribing interviews in a prepared MW document 
• Anonymising transcripts by removing information that can identify interviewees 
and organisation 
• Sending transcripts to the interviewees for approval indicating the deadline beyond 
which the transcript will be used in the research unless overwise indicated 
• Organising approved transcripts for coding 
• Updating the list of the collected interviews 
6 Analysing 
data 
• Conducting the open coding of data in Nvivo software 
• Visualising relationships between emerging topics 
• Writing memos 
• Writing a preliminary report with the results of the open coding to the 
interviewees for feedback  
• Incorporating feedback into the report 
• Clarifying specific issues with the key interviewees 
• Discussing the emerging results with the supervisor team (ongoing) 
• Re-formulating the research questions and gaps 
• Preliminary synthesising of the research results 
• Searching for relevant concept to explain the observed phenomenon 
• Continuing the literature review for triangulation purposes 
• Conducting the axial coding of the data while taking advantage of the re-framed 
research focus  
• Re-reading key interviews to sharpen the construct definitions and to look beyond 
the initial impressions and Nvivo coding 
• Sharpening the construct definitions 
• Iteratively tabulating data in Nvivo coding for each construct 
• Searching for “WHY” behind the relationships 
• Comparing with conflicting literature (ongoing) 




• Presenting results at the workshops, conferences and industry events for feedback 
• Sharpening the focus of the study 
• Writing up the first draft of the study 
• Sending the draft of the study to key interviewees for feedback 
• Incorporating the feedback 
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• Comparing with conflicting literature (ongoing) 
8 Reaching 
closure 
• Comparing with similar literature  
• Finalising the theoretical contributions and constructs 
• Arriving at theoretical saturation 
• Ending the process by finalising the study with marginal improvements 
• Sending the study to key experts in the relevant field 
• Incorporating the feedback 
• Refining the writing of the study 
• Presenting the study in this thesis 
 
Theory-building typically combines multiple data collection methods (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). First, the data collection comprised published material to gain a perspective on the 
research setting. The literature included secondary data, such as reports, articles published by 
developers, and publications written about the events by external authors. The collected 
material served as inputs for the selection of case studies, the development of an interview 
protocol (see Appendix A) and the selection of interviewees for the studies. In order to build 
a generalisable theory, the researcher purposefully selected industry representatives and 
diverse organisations that are key ecosystem actors, and included: academics, public and 
private owners, public organisation representatives, the sector’s actors at business & 
management, and operation levels, and other relevant complementors. Once the data 
collection started, I applied snowball sampling to follow the recommendations of the 
interviewees.  
The interview sample was not random but reflected the selection of specific cases to extend 
the understanding of BIM deployment and ecosystem orchestration. Interviews ranged 
between 50 to 120 minutes. Most of the interviews were 60 minutes, and while 85% of the 
interviews were conducted face-to-face the rest were held over Skype or on a mobile phone. 
The interviews were always agreed via email before the meeting or call, and the consent form 
was signed at the beginning of each interview or in advance of it. The approach for the 
interviews was based on a long interview by McCracken (1988). Each interview was 
70 
 
recorded unless overwise indicated by the interviewee. The data was collected and 
transcribed verbatim by the researcher. Transcripts were anonymised and sent for approval to 
the interviewees. The interviewees were free to withdraw from the study at any time. The 
deadline for response and any changes in the transcript was clearly indicated in the emails 
sent for approval and if a reply was not provided by the deadline, the researcher was free to 
use the transcript in the research. The analysis of data in Nvivo software only started after the 
approval was received or the deadline for changes had passed. During the course of this 
research, I also kept in touch with the key interviewees in order to frequently clarify specific 
issues and any misunderstanding of the data while synthesising the results. The sensemaking 
data process kept those discussions alive and offered an advantage for validation purposes 
(Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). During the data collection, I kept producing field notes. Field 
notes are an ongoing stream-of-consciousness that involves both observation and analysis 
(Orton, 1997). Field notes were particularly useful during the analysis and re-framing of the 
focus of the study.  
A limitation in the use of grounded theory in this thesis is theoretical sampling. Typically, the 
process of grounded theory involves a collection of small data samples, and the analysis and 
identification of the next potential steps for the data collection, which followed the story of 
the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This process was not possible because of the limitations of 
funding that affected the time of the visit to Finland and California. Therefore, a large set of 
data was collected within a limited time. Despite this limitation, I collected rich data that was 
substantial for theory development.  
The data analysis in both cases closely followed the procedure explicated by Gioia et al. 
(2013). This procedure allows for the systematic, versatile and rigorous analysis of qualitative 
unstructured data (Corley & Gioia, 2011). With the use of this research strategy, the research 
constructs the codes where coding is the result of the researcher’s sensemaking and 
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interpretation (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). This research strategy recognises the researcher’s 
biases and preconceptions while encouraging an open mind (Locke, 2000).  
The data process analysis in each case started with open coding. This is followed by axial 
coding and the focused coding in order to make sense analytically. As the data analysis 
progressed, the focus of this thesis was continuously refined and reformulated. Synthesising 
the emerging constructs in the axial coding laid the foundation for the chapters. Although, the 
projects initiated in Finland and California were not specifically dedicated to TEKES and the 
software vendor, these two orchestrators were identified through the diligent data analysis 
and interpretation. Following the analysis, the focus of the PhD research shifted to ecosystem 
orchestration. While observing the failures in both contexts, the research further focused on 
failures and the dark side of ecosystem orchestration. The grounded theory procedure allowed 
for the building of generalisable and robust theory around the dark side of ecosystem 
orchestration. To present the results, I build theory separately from the collected empirical 
data for each case in order to illuminate the specifics of each case and the chorological order. 
Following the approach of Yin (2017), this PhD consists of two single cases, Chapters 2 and 
3, which are presented as separate chapters, and concludes with Chapter 4, which covers the 
cross-case analysis. The empirical chapters are dedicated to the cases and present a more 
detailed explanation of the data analysis that is not covered in this section.  
The analysis of each case presents its story that led to the development of this thesis 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). While collecting data in Finland which is considered a 
success story, the results were mixed and presented a different story that illuminated failures. 
The surprising observation was that, although, I initially went to Finland with a perception 
that the Finnish design and construction industry was a leader in BIM deployment, I collected 
interviews that indicated a more complex issue. The interviewees were not satisfied with the 
results of the national BIM deployment in TEKES’s national technology programmes. The 
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interviewees indicated a complexity in the national and international relationships involved in 
the national BIM technology programmes and the importance of ecosystem context. As the 
analysis of the Finnish study progressed, I searched for a relevant theory to complete the 
analytical process of grounded theory. The ecosystem concept was used to ground the data 
and build theory. It was the only concept available that provided a useful framework to 
understand the co-evolving national and global network of complementors, the presence of a 
hub, a platform for knowledge co-creation, the presence of technology, demand, and 
institutional environments. The surprising results were objectified and validated that they 
contributed to the theory-building process around the dark side of open-system orchestration. 
These results were extensively presented at research events, conferences and private industry 
events. The results of the Finnish study clearly indicated the need for a contrasting study and 
key experts recommended a comparison between the Finnish BIM deployment and the 
Californian BIM deployment. The results of the Finnish study clearly indicated a number of 
weaknesses in the environment of its BE sector. These weaknesses were strengths in the 
environment of the Californian BE sector. For example, the availability of capital, 
sophisticated clients, proximity to Silicon Valley and the network of top universities.  
While collecting data in California and considering it a success story, the results were again 
mixed and presented the failures of the BE sector in BIM adoption. I did not find a 
government presence leading the sector but rather the strong presence of the specific software 
vendor who offered an integrated platform to the sector and defined the use value of its 
platform on behalf of the sector. Thus, I have built a theory around the dark side of closed-
system business orchestration, as led by the software vendor. The results of the Californian 
study clearly indicated that failures are connected to the context of the BE sector. The 
differences in orchestration processes in two cases seem to be irrelevant drivers of failure.  
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However, failures of the BE sector in relation to BIM in both cases were surprisingly similar. 
The failures were observed around business model innovation, change management, 
education and competency management and multi-stakeholder governance. However, while I 
was building conceptual, plausible and persuasive arguments around the similarities in 
failures between the two cases, the data indicated the importance of the sector context. In 
Chapter 4, I performed a cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) to build a close connection 
between the empirical evidence and emergent theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Thus, 
the arguments derived from two separately executed studies led to the articulation of the 
question “Does the sector’s context matter for ecosystem orchestration?”. I answered this 
question by juxtaposing empirical evidence derived from the two cases with the success 
stories published in the literature. The success stories comprised Toyota, Uber and Intel. 
These cases were selected because of the interviewees’ recommendations and the contrasts 
they offered to the observed failures in Finland and California. The cross-case analysis 
process led to the development of theory around critical constructs and the components of 
ecosystem orchestration. A detailed visual overall framework of how this thesis was 
developed is depicted in Figure 9. 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
The research aims and unresolved issues presented in this introduction served as a basis 
for the development of consecutive chapters as a thought development. The thought process 
resulted in the studies presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The chapters are presented in a 
chronological order as the research unfolded following the data analysis over the course of 
the PhD process. Since this thesis co-evolved with my understanding of the phenomenon, the 
design of the thesis and each study was evolutionary in nature. Each chapter was built as a 
standalone study designed to present an individual contribution to ecosystem literature but 




 Figure 9 Overall Framework of How This Thesis was Developed  
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distort the storyline and the overall research process. As the research started with the Finnish 
study (Chapter 2) from which the analysis indicted the need for a comparative study, I 
followed the Californian study independently (Chapter 3). As the data of these two cases 
indicated specific orchestration mechanisms but extensive similarities in failure, I have 
conducted a comparative study, namely a cross-case analysis, that offered the final 
contribution of this thesis (Chapter 4). This structure follows the case study research 
approach defined by Yin (2017: p.184):  
Your full multiple-case report will consist of the single cases, usually presented as separate 
chapters or sections. In addition to these individual cases, your full report will contain an 
additional chapter or section covering the cross-case analysis.  
This process allows for a comparison of the experiences I had and the development of rich 
theoretical insights. The approach outlined addresses the call by Dyer and Wilkins (1991: 
p.613) “for more qualitative, contextual, and interesting research” echoing the views of 
Eisenhardt (1989). Eisenhardt (1989) suggested the use of contrasting multiple cases to 
illuminate theoretical constructs. Therefore, this thesis presents each study separately 
(Chapters 2-3) and then builds a theory based on the comparative cross-case analysis 
(Chapter 4). Following this approach, I was able to offer deeper and more accurate insights, 
which accounted for the intricacies of a particular context while presenting the rich 
backgrounds of each study (Van Maanen, 1979).  
Overall, the chapters are self-contained providing a relevant synthesis of the literature and 
methods. The methods section presented in each chapter is largely repetitive but also covers 
nuances of each study analysis. There is some repetition across the literature as certain 
concepts and theoretical linkages are used to build arguments for each contribution. However, 
each study covers a unique angle of the ecosystem orchestration while contributing to the 
overarching aim of this thesis. These studies are summarised and presented below. This thesis 
concludes with Chapter 5 in which the two studies of failure in the DBE sector contrasted 
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with the three cases of success in other sectors. Their contributions are juxtaposed in a 
discussion and evaluation of these contributions. It also identifies and presents theoretical and 
managerial implications, whilst the limitations and suggestions for further research are also 
discussed. A short summary of each empirical chapter is presented below. 
Study 1 (Chapter 2) 
The first study (Chapter 2), entitled “The Dark Side of Open-System Orchestration: A 
Case of National Deployment of Building Information Management in Finland”, examines 
the role of an open-system orchestrator in enabling sector-wide digital innovation. I address 
this through an inductive case study analysis of the Finnish national deployment of BIM led 
by TEKES between 1982 and 2002, and the digital evolution in relation to BIM deployment 
in the Finnish design and construction sector from 1965 to 2018. In particular, I examine the 
overlooked nature of public agencies’ roles as open-system orchestrators and the related 
actors of knowledge ecosystems, which include the challenges to overcome. In contrast to 
prior research, this study indicates that open-system orchestration can fail to bridge value 
creation (R&D) with value capture (sector-wide implementation and innovation). This study 
offers insights to the dark side of inter-organisational cooperation in ecosystems, even if the 
orchestrator’s aim is to contribute to the public good. A key insight is that, despite the ideal 
conditions for ecosystems emergence, there are distinct factors related to the complexity of 
ecosystem orchestration that also explain why business ecosystems might not emerge in 
certain conditions or simply function in a different way. In particular, I identify the strategies 
of the open-system orchestrator while clarifying how and when it failed. Building on these 
insights, I develop a theory of the dark side of open-system orchestration that yields 




Study 2 (Chapter 3) 
The second study (Chapter 3), entitled “Closed-System Orchestration: The Dark Side 
of Orchestrating Business Ecosystems for Industry Platforms”, examines the failure of a 
closed-system orchestrator to propagate a sector-wide innovation in a B2B context. I address 
this through the inductive case study analysis of an ecosystem strategy deployed by a 
software vendor in the northern Californian DBE sector, and examine how it orchestrates the 
sector for the BIM platform that it owns. A key tension is that a software vendor selfishly 
succeeds in value capture but negatively affects value creation for BIM innovation in the 
sector constituting a failed case. I find that the theories on business ecosystems have largely 
developed in B2C contexts, which are ill-suited to explain the business ecosystem dynamics 
in B2B contexts. A key question is whether the software vendor, who is a complementor to 
the sector, is legitimate in orchestrating the sector’s ecosystem for BIM innovation. I find that 
complementors and interdependent actors have to be legitimate participants within 
ecosystems. I also provide comprehensive empirical evidence that the co-location of a mature 
sector with successful business ecosystems in an area with a regional advantage is not critical 
for the emergence of ecosystems. A central contribution of this study is to extend prior work 
on business ecosystem orchestration in B2C contexts to B2B contexts. This study also 
contributes to literature on the dark side of ecosystem orchestration.  
Study 3 (Chapter 4) 
A final study (Chapter 4), entitled “Does the Sector Context Matter for Business 
Ecosystem Orchestration?”, examines the critical constructs and components of ecosystem 
orchestration. Building on the results of two previous orchestration mechanisms in two 
different contexts that produced similar results in terms of sector-wide innovation, I pose a 
logical question: how come both contrasting contexts with two different ecosystem 
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orchestration mechanisms have produced similar results? I address this through a multi-case, 
multi-level, inductive theory building approach to identify, generalise and analyse the failure 
similarities between the two sector contexts. I examine the documented success examples of 
ecosystem orchestration processes and systematically compare them to the empirical 
evidence of failures presented in the second and third chapters of this thesis. Prior work 
addressed the role of industry architecture (Jacobides & Winter, 2012) and the conditions for 
ecosystem emergence in B2C contexts (Hannah, 2016; Jacobides et al., 2018; Thomas, 2013) 
by studying the mechanisms of successful firms from a single firm perspective. I extend this 
prior research by examining the strategy in the context of failed business ecosystems and 
systematically juxtaposing the failures in one sector to successful examples in other sectors 
through a multi-level perspective that considers individual, organisational and system levels. 
A central contribution of this study is the multi-level framework that presents the critical 
constructs and components that enable, build and fail ecosystem orchestration. This study 
also contributes to theory by exploring and presenting empirical evidence on whether the 
sector context, particularly the nature of the sector, matters for business ecosystem emergence 
and orchestration.  
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1.5 GLOSSARY 
A glossary is provided to inform the reader about the key concepts used in this thesis, 
which will serve as a basis of working definitions to support the reader. The glossary 
provides key definitions in their most concise form as they are explained comprehensively in 
other sections of this chapter. I present the terms in alphabetical order (see Table 6). 
 Table 6 Glossary  
Concept Definition 
Bottleneck Is a component in complex system whose performance significantly limits 
the performance of the whole system due to poor quality, poor performance, 
or short supply (Baldwin, 2015; Goldratt, 1990; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 
2019). 
Business Model “Articulates the logic … that demonstrates how a business creates and 
delivers value to customers [and] outlines the architecture of revenues, 
costs, and profits associated with … delivering that value” (Teece, 2010: 
p.173). 
Built Environment Incorporates the supply chain, clients and all the related parties for the 
design, construction, operation and integration of physical, social and 
economic infrastructure and all the service providers that comprise the 
physical and digital infrastructure of buildings and cities.  
Digital Built 
Environment 
Actors in the built environment sector that has adopted, or is trying to adopt, 





“Represents reality for the given purpose; the model is an abstraction of 
reality in the sense that it cannot represent all aspects of reality” 




“Use of a shared digital representation of a built asset (3.2.8) to facilitate 
design, construction and operation processes to form a reliable basis for 




Business processes across the built environment sector underpinned with the 
emerging digital technologies that support management and production of 
information and communication during life cycle of built assets. 
Capabilities “The firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments" (Teece et al., 
1997). 
Complementarity Complementary innovations, products, or services are interdependent and 
co-specialised in a way that the combination of the two complementors 
provide superior value to both complementors and customers.  
Ecosystem  A multilateral, non-generic community of complementary interdependent 
organisations that cross a variety of industries. These organisations serve 
different functions, have conflicting goals and therefore form a political 
coalition. Through simultaneous value creation (cooperation) and value 
capture (competition), they co-evolve capabilities individually and 
collectively around a focal value propositions and produce a distinct system 
structure, a business model that generates ecosystem dynamics, defines the 
ecosystem type and thus affects all other interdependent actors. 
Modularity “The idea of interdependence within and independence across modules. A 
module is a unit whose structural elements are powerfully connected 
amongst themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements in other 
units. Clearly there are degrees of connection, thus there are gradations of 
modularity” (Baldwin & Clark, 2000: p.63). 
Leadership Presence of an ‘architect’ who sets the system-level goal and directs the 
rules, roles and mechanisms for value co-creation and capture are essential 
in ecosystem orchestration (Gulati et al., 2012).  
Network effects Magnify advantages to the platform orchestrator because the value to 
customers on one side of the platform increases with the number of 
participating complementors and customers on the other side. Network 
effects can be direct and indirect (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017).  
Industry 
Architecture 
Is a unifying concept that explores the structural properties of the sector, 
such as the division of labour, rules, roles and power relations that are 
derived from the structural organisation (Jacobides & Winter, 2012) 
Ecosystem 
Orchestration 
Ecosystem orchestration is characterised by the processes or mechanisms 
that are used by a leading firm or a network hub to intentionally direct, 
coordinate, influence and manage a set of actors with varying degrees of 
multilateral, non-generic complementarities that are not fully hierarchically 
controlled for value co-creation and capture at multiple levels and, 
depending on the context and the approach taken, these processes can be re-
configured and contextualised. 
Platform Are multi-sided markets that enable transactions by the end-users and offer 
an open or semi-open interface upon which complementors can co-create 
value (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). 
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Value Creation Who can do what, or the collaborative process of value creation for the 
users (Jacobides et al., 2006). 
Value Capture 
(appropriation) 
Who gets what or an ability to create profit from activities (e.g. transactions) 
(Jacobides et al., 2006).  
Value Proposition A focal-value proposition of a product or a service for the end-customers 
upon which the value is created and captured. There can be multiple value 





















Chapter 2. OPEN-SYSTEM ORCHESTRATION: A CASE OF NATIONAL 
DEPLOYMENT OF BUILDING INFORMATION MODELLING IN FINLAND 
 
ABSTRACT 
The literature on ecosystems highlighted the important role of open-system 
orchestrators in facilitating innovation ecosystems. They help participating organisations to 
create their own business opportunities. However, the literature has overlooked the nature of 
the challenges that open-system orchestrators have to overcome while orchestrating their 
ecosystems. This study presents a detailed account of the evolution of national technology 
deployment of Building Information Modelling (BIM) in Finland and the role of the national 
public funder in supporting this deployment through technology programmes as an open-
system orchestrator. The analysis indicates that the public funder successfully facilitated a 
knowledge ecosystem, but actors in the design and construction industry failed to bridge the 
created value with value capture in the industry to make a qualitative digital transformation 
with BIM. This study indicates that the industry context should be taken into consideration in 
open-system orchestration. By doing so, a discussion is provided on a promising direction for 
future research into the dark side of open-system ecosystem orchestration.  
KEYWORDS 
Open-system orchestration, national innovation system, public funder, knowledge ecosystem, 




2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Modern firms are increasingly moving to the collective creation of innovation (Powell 
et al., 1996). Previous research on ecosystems has highlighted the important role of hub firms 
in orchestrating collective efforts to cooperate for value creation and compete for value 
capture (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2019; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Paquin & Howard-
Grenville, 2013; Spencer, 2003; Teece, 2010b). These hub firms typically orchestrate a 
“closed-system” ecosystem (Giudici et al., 2018: 1370) pursuing self-interest around a 
collective innovation goal to harness “the dispersed resources and capabilities” of the 
ecosystem members (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011: 659).  
While such hub firms have received a large amount of attention from scholars (Dhanaraj & 
Parkhe, 2006; Iansiti & Levien, 2004c; Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995; Nambisan & 
Sawhney, 2011), other types of ecosystem orchestrator support members’ efforts in the search 
for their own business opportunities (Giudici et al., 2018). Scholars refer to such 
organisations as “bridging organisations” (Berkes, 2009), “open system intermediaries” 
(Dutt et al., 2016), “innovation brokers” (Winch & Courtney, 2007) or “open-system 
orchestrators” (Giudici et al., 2018). In this study, such organisations are referred to as 
“open-system orchestrators” (Giudici et al., 2018: p.1370). For example, business incubators 
(Phan, Siegel, & Wright, 2005), national systems of innovation (Lundvall, Johnson, 
Andersen, & Dalum, 2002), national agencies (Sapsed, Grantham, & DeFillippi, 2007), 
public agencies (Howells, 2006) and Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) associations 
(Arıkan & Schilling, 2011) are viewed as such orchestrators. Although there is an expansive 
understanding of the functions of these actors in enabling innovation, “the fundamental 
orchestrating role that such organizations play [...] remains undertheorized” (Giudici et al., 
2018: p.1370).  
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The literature on ecosystem orchestration suggests that open-system orchestrators have the 
potential to facilitate the emergence of new markets and network-centric businesses (Giudici 
et al., 2018; Howells, 2006). Thus, policy makers increasingly invest in national innovation 
systems to foster the creation of start-ups in a platform-based economy around so-called 
knowledge hubs (Clarysse et al., 2014; Levén, Holmström, & Mathiassen, 2014). These 
national innovation systems are typically orchestrated by a government representative, e.g. a 
public agency. However, this literature has overlooked the nature of the challenges that open-
system orchestrators and related ecosystem actors have to overcome to become a success 
story (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). The important role of the public agency as an open-system 
orchestrator that supports the emergence of innovation and nascent business networks has 
also been overlooked (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011).  
In order to build a theory around the role of public agency as an open-system orchestrator, 
this study presents a unique case of national deployment of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) with a particular focus on Building Information Modelling (BIM) 
technologies (Eastman et al., 2011; Sacks et al., 2018) in the Finnish design and construction 
industry8 . This case offers an ideal context to study the role of the national public funding 
agency, TEKES, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation. In 1982, the 
Finnish government established TEKES to boost “the development of [the] Finnish industry 
and the service sector by technological means and through innovation” (Van Der Veen et al., 
2012: p.39). TEKES was the main public funding organisation for Research and 
Development (R&D) promoting innovative, risk-intensive projects across all sectors in 
Finland, and was evolving in its role and the mechanisms deployed. In 2018, TEKES joined 
the Finnish trade promotion organisation (Finpro) forming an organisation called Business 
 
8 In this chapter, I specifically focus on design and construction industry because the national BIM deployment 
was in consideration of the design and construction industry. The notion of the built environment sector has only 
become widely used in the recent years.  
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Finland. Its function was to catalyse new growth and create opportunities for Finnish 
businesses (Soini, 2018).  
The focus of this study is the co-evolution of the digital design and construction industry in 
the national technology programmes run by TEKES. These were dedicated to BIM 
deployment and general ICT over the period 1982-2007 with a particular focus on the VERA 
programme, which ran between 1997 and 2002. Indeed, TEKES invested a large amount of 
resources and substantial effort in facilitating extensive R&D for ICT (e.g. BIM) in order to 
support technology initiatives by design and construction technological communities around 
national technology programmes. For example, in 2001 TEKES invested 20% from a total 
budget of €373 million on technology development in the energy, environmental and 
construction industries (Kiviniemi, 2001). This study further analysed national ICT 
deployment from 2007 until 2018, by presenting important initiatives run at the national level 
but not with the support of TEKES. These late initiatives by the industry were based on the 
lessons learnt from national BIM R&D and the failure to capture value.  
The role of TEKES in leading the first national technology programmes for BIM deployment 
in the Finnish design and construction industry is a unique case of the simultaneous success 
and failure of ecosystem orchestration. It successfully supported value creation in ICT R&D 
and the initiatives of BIM champions in perusing their technology ideas, but the industry 
failed to capture value from the knowledge developed in national technology programmes. 
The initial expectations were that a push toward technology in the industry could create a 
knowledge hub that would eventually lead to self-renewal and innovation in the design and 
construction industry with emerging technologies. The expectation was that participating 
SMEs would be gradually merged and become powerful international firms. However, 
despite its international success (Fischer & Calvin, 2002; Froese, 2002), TEKES produced an 
effective knowledge ecosystem that did not lead to value capture by the design and 
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construction industry, and thus failed to bridge the R&D outcomes with industry-wide 
innovation. Extensive support for technology invention did not lead to technology innovation 
in the industry. BIM technologies were adopted within the old practices. In other words, the 
industry failed to evolve beyond the traditional business models as it continued to largely 
operate in traditional ways.  
National ICT deployment in the industry was a learning curve for TEKES, in that a 
technology push does not lead to a market pull. The analysis of this study revealed the dark 
side (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019) of open-system orchestration, as demonstrated by 
TEKES’s failure to support the emergence of global business firms in the design and 
construction industry. First, the ecosystem participants were cooperating to exploit the system 
for individual value capture under existing business models. Public funding incentivised 
firms to rely on public resources rather than seek new business opportunities on a global 
scale. It contributed to the failure in bridging research and industry-wide innovation. Second, 
despite the effort that TEKES invested into disseminating the research results of the 
innovation, these results were often kept privately and intra-organisationally, and knowledge 
was often redeveloped and recreated afterwards. Knowledge loss from R&D and in the 
industry was an issue because the created knowledge stayed within the project participants in 
siloes. Third, although some industry actors followed the R&D results of national 
programmes, they were not actively involved in implementing technology. The established 
culture of the industry is “let’s see what happens” with BIM implementation in other firms 
before the industry actor invests in a digital transformation. Fourth, this small group of 
champions developed strong digital capabilities, knowledge, interdependencies and 
technological visions in siloes despite the presence of international and national inter-
organisational cooperation. The network’s participants developed capabilities in silos much 
faster than the rest of the traditional industry. This created conflicting competency levels 
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amongst project participants in design and construction projects. Qualitative BIM 
implementation requires most project participants to use BIM technologies effectively to 
deliver BIM processes. Thus, BIM champions were failing to capture value from BIM 
implementation in the projects that were not part of national programmes. Fifth, TEKES did 
not have specific mechanisms to incentivise the necessary actors to participate in national 
development as it relied on the good will of actors. The small group of champions were 
technology enthusiasts and participation in national R&D for technology was on a voluntary 
basis. The ecosystem actors also failed to incentivise crucial global and local complementors, 
leading international software vendors, clients, insurance firms and cities, to participate in the 
deployment of R&D results. Finally, TEKES, in collaboration with the BIM champions, 
invested resources and efforts in BIM R&D in a not-for-profit manner; this left them at a 
disadvantage on a global scale. 
The orchestration mechanisms set by TEKES fall into the category of open-system 
orchestrators according to the description provided by Giudici et al. (2018). However, 
evidence shows that TEKES intended to be an open-system orchestrator, which aligns with 
the literature; however, the actual setup resulted in a siloed development by a closed 
community of champions. Despite the good intentions of the ecosystem actors and effective 
knowledge creation mechanisms, TEKES failed to support the growth of international 
businesses in this particular industry. This case study suggests that open-system orchestrators 
need to consider the context of orchestration and to integrate mechanisms necessary to 
support the development of mindsets and to break siloes. While general literature suggests the 
altruistic nature of open-system orchestrators in supporting the firm’s business initiatives, the 
value capture by ecosystem members is rarely discussed. This study indicates that some 
open-system orchestrators need to find mechanisms to connect value creation in knowledge 
ecosystems with value capture in business ecosystems supporting the evidence discussed by 
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Clarysse et al. (2014). It also suggests that public agencies can struggle to simultaneously 
support national exploration and exploitation.  
These findings support the prominent stream of research on the dark side of inter-
organisational relations in ecosystems (Bizzi, 2013; Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019) and the 
impact of orchestration mechanisms set by an orchestrator for value capture by ecosystem 
actors (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). Specifically, this study takes a retrospective view on 
the co-evolution of the national technology programmes for BIM R&D run by TEKES and 
the design and construction industry, thus depicting the evolution of the knowledge 
ecosystem run by TEKES. Despite ideal conditions for the emergence of business ecosystems 
in the Finnish design and construction industry, there are distinct factors related to the context 
of the co-evolution of innovators, competitors, their complementors and the environment in 
which they operate. This study explains why, in some cases, ecosystem members can fail to 
capture value from the open-system orchestration.  
2.2 OPEN-SYSTEM ORCHESTRATION 
Ecosystems offer multiple benefits and opportunities to their participants in terms of 
access to resources, knowledge and learning (Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 1996). While some 
ecosystems are organised without a central network orchestrator (Håkansson & Ford, 2002; 
Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), recent studies emphasise that intentionally organised ecosystems for 
innovation can be successful and long-lived (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & 
Sawhney, 2011; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013). Literature suggests that there must be an 
anchor organisation to facilitate the connection between dispersed organisations with 
conflicting goals (Clarysse et al., 2014; Powell & Giannella, 2010). Such organisations are 
crucial in bridging value creation with value capture (Thomas, 2013) and in coordinating the 
tension between cooperation and competition (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2019; Hoffmann, Lavie, 
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Reuer, & Shipilov, 2018). As Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) indicated, although the 
important role of orchestrators is recognised, there is limited understanding of how ecosystem 
orchestrators should facilitate value creation and value capture. To date, little empirical 
support exists to provide such an understanding (Batterink et al., 2010; Jacobides et al., 
2018). Furthermore, organisational leadership research on networks and regional clusters is 
also scant (Sydow, Lerch, Huxham, & Hibbert, 2011).  
Scholars have different definitions for the anchor organisation that performs as an ecosystem 
orchestrator. Scholars refer to such organisations as “bridging organisations” (Berkes, 2009), 
“open system intermediaries” (Dutt et al., 2016), “innovation broker[s]” (Winch & Courtney, 
2007) or “matchmaker[s]”. This study adopts the term “open-system orchestrator” which 
aligns with the theory by Giudici et al. (2018: 1370) on open-system orchestration. Giudici et 
al. (2018) proposed two types of orchestration - closed-system and open-system.  
Closed-system orchestration is largely considered by Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006: p.659) who 
state that closed-system orchestrators tend to involve “deliberate, purposeful actions … to 
create value … and extract value … from the network”. Closed-system orchestrators 
intentionally design their ecosystems to preserve control and power by providing incentives 
to members in order deliver collective value around a focal value proposition (Adner, 2017). 
Ecosystem actors typically have self-interests when participating in such ecosystems 
(Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). The perspective of closed-system orchestration is taken 
almost exclusively from the view of a single private firm and is typically linked to the 
orchestration of business ecosystems. Such closed-system orchestrators have been referred to 
as “hub firms” (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006), “keystones” (Iansiti & Levien, 2004c), “network 
administrative organisations” (Human & Provan, 2000), “kingpins” (Jacobides & Tae, 2015) 
and a “strategic centre” (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995). According to Giudici et al. 
(2018), public organisations can also engage in closed-system orchestration, such as 
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“government-sponsored programs” (Levén et al., 2014) and “R&D consortia” (Sydow, 
Windeler, Schubert, & Möllering, 2012). Although, the studied case is a government-
sponsored programme, the orchestration processes established in the Finnish national 
programmes resemble open-system orchestration according to the definition offered by 
Giudici et al. (2018).  
Open-system orchestration functions are similar to those of close-system orchestration; 
however, rather than aiming at value capture, the mechanisms aim at value creation, open 
network membership, voluntary participation without contractual obligations, and to “support 
members’ decentralized and mostly independent entrepreneurial efforts… [this] typically 
revolves around network-specific criteria that members have to meet to access events and use 
facilities” (Giudici et al., 2018:p.1372). Open-system orchestrators support value creation by 
ecosystem participants in order to help realise their business ideas.  
With increased interest in ecosystem orchestration processes, the role of open-system 
orchestrators in facilitating and accelerating the development of innovation and the 
emergence of business networks across different industries has become more important 
(Adner, 2006; Adner & Kapoor, 2016; Autio & Thomas, 2014; Clarysse et al., 2014; Oh et 
al., 2016; Russell, Huhtamäki, Still, Rubens, & Basole, 2015; Sydow et al., 2011). There is 
little empirical and theoretical understanding of open-system orchestration processes or the 
effects they produce (Giudici et al., 2018; Jacobides et al., 2018; Nambisan & Sawhney, 
2011). For example, open-system orchestrators are regarded as having positive effects on 
innovation outcomes and yet there is little knowledge as to their effectiveness (Sapsed et al., 
2007). Levén et al. (2014) argued that there is little understanding of how innovation is 
orchestrated when several industries collaborate. The role of government and public agencies 
in nourishing innovation contexts for business ecosystem emergence also remains empirically 
and theoretically underexplored (Rinkinen & Harmaakorpi, 2018).  
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Public agencies try to play an active role in stimulating the environment for economic 
growth. There is an interplay between the governance models of public organisations and 
participating actors which shape the contours of the relationships they hold (Armstrong, 
Giordano, & Macleod, 2015). This study aims to explore the role of a public funder in 
orchestrating national programmes for ICT (e.g. BIM) R&D to support the competitive 
growth of firms in the Finnish design and construction industry. Although literature 
emphasises the positive role of public agencies in supporting the SMEs’ innovation efforts 
and the commercialisation of research (Clarysse et al., 2014), only a few studies present 
failure cases and the unintended consequences of orchestration processes. This study presents 
a case where open-system orchestration manifested in the unintended dark side of the 
ecosystem orchestration. The questions posed in this chapter also align with the study by 
Rinkinen and Harmaakorpi (2018) whose research was sponsored by TEKES following their 
experience of leading the national programmes in Finland. These questions are: “How did the 
design and construction industry co-evolve with the national efforts for ICT (e.g. BIM) R&D 
in Finland? How did the dark side manifest in open-system orchestration led by TEKES? 
What is the role of the public organisations in orchestrating ecosystems?”.  
2.3 DATA AND METHODS 
In viewing social interactions for value creation and capture as socially constructed 
phenomena (Pfeffer, 1993), this study adopted an inductive interpretivist methodology based 
on the study by Gioia et al. (2013). Gioia et al. (2013) offer a methodology to capture the 
meaning of people experiencing the phenomenon and to scientifically theorise about their 
experience (Gehman et al., 2018). An interpretivist approach gives voice to the interviewees 
to interpret the key issues they have experienced in their journeys while participating in the 
national programmes.  
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This study uses qualitative procedures to build a grounded theory of ecosystem orchestration. 
In particular, it aims to understand how a public funder orchestrated the national technology 
programmes for value creation, and impacted industry-wide innovation with BIM and the 
growth of digital services in the built environment sector between 1982 and 2002. A study of 
the co-evolution of national technology programmes and the design and construction industry 
requires detailed procedures of a macro-level study and a retrospective view on evolution. To 
present the evolution of the industry, analysis of the national ICT was extended until 2018 
although TEKES’s involvement with the design and construction industry stopped between 
2002 and 2007. Thus, the study includes historical data collected through the analysis of 
retrospective interviews and published literature (Langley, 1999; Van de Ven, Polley, & 
Garud, 2008). To stress and conceptualize the dynamic processes of interactions, 
complementary data sources were used to generate a comprehensive account of the 
retrospective evolution of national BIM deployment in the Finnish design and construction 
industry (Yin, 2017).  
2.3.1 Research Procedures and Data Sources 
Interviews. The qualitative data comprised primary (interviews) and secondary sources 
(archives). Professor Arto Kiviniemi, at the University of Liverpool, selected the first round 
of interviewees. I subsequently applied snowball sampling by asking interviewees for other 
key interviewees who could contribute to the study. The interviews were conducted in 
English with the Finnish representatives. 
Twenty interviews (31 hours of interviews) were conducted in 2015 with representatives 
across five key stakeholders and end-user groups, namely: i) public organisations; ii) 
academia; iii) management and business partners; iv) BIM users; and v) public building and 
infrastructure clients. Many of the interviewees served in different organisations over time, so 
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most had a wider view of the ecosystem wide efforts to enable digital transformation in the 
industry.  
In 2017, an additional four interviews were collected with new representatives from three 
levels - CEOs, managers and operations - to validate the analysis derived from the interviews 
collected in 2015. In 2019, an additional interview with a manager was conducted to obtain 
results from the KIRA-digi initiatives, a new orchestrator that was established by the Finnish 
government to enable stakeholder communication in the wider built environment sector. The 
interviews varied between 30 and 160 minutes. In total, 22 interviews lasted at least 60 to 90 
minutes and were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  
A total of 24 interviews were collected. Table 7 presents information on the sectors and 
occupations of the interviewees. Of the 27 interviewees, 15 actively participated in the 
national BIM deployment and the remaining 12 did not. The juxtaposition of different 
viewpoints on technological development brings into focus contrasting views of socio-
technical change and development that potentially led practices to today’s level of BIM 
adoption. Such integration provides contrasting pictures of the same processes without 
nullifying each other (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995).  
Interviews were prepared on the bases of existing case history documentation, such as 
literature (published in and outside Finland, 1965-2015) on the adoption and implementation 
of ICT in design and construction. As BIM was an important part of national ICT 
development, it was important to cover different aspects of BIM R&D. BIM, as a term, did 
not exist at the time. Finnish experts referred to the Building Information Model as the 
“Building Product Model” (Björk, 1994). The term 'Building Information Model' first 
appeared in a paper by van Nederveen and Tolman (1992), but came into wider use after 
Autodesk started to promote it in 2002 (Autodesk Building Industry Solutions, 2002). 
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A historical data analysis covered the periods from 1965 (when Tekla was established) to 
2015 (when the interviews were conducted) and extended to 2018 with additional interviews 
and literature review. The collected material helped prepare for the interview process. The 
semi-structured interview protocol was based on the approach developed by McCracken 
(1988). The interviews started with the following questions: (1) How has the Finnish industry 
evolved in terms of ICT use over the last 30 years? (2) How has BIM emerged in the 
industry? (3) What is the current state of industry adoption of BIM?  
Table 7 Selection of Interviewees  






Academia Researchers Research Scientists  6 10  6 
Public clients Senate Properties (Building 
sectors) 
BIM managers  3 2 2 
Finnish Transport agency 
(Infrastructure sectors) 





Manager 1 1 4 
Strategic Centre for Science, 
Technology, and Innovation 
of Built Environment in 
Finland 
Manager 1 2 
KIRA-digi Manager 1 4 
Intermediary interdisciplinary 
mediator 




Software developer Manager 1 2 8 
General Contractor Innovation & 
Business Managers 
3 5 
Architectural office Managers 2 2 
Private Organisation Consultant 1 2 
Engineering service provider CEO, Manager 1 1.5 
Engineering service provider Senior Specialist 
Digital 
1 1.5 




General Contractor  Site Manager 1 1 4 
Engineering service provider HVAC Engineer 1 1 
Architectural office BIM technician 1 1 
General Contractor Production 
planning engineer 
1 1.5 
TOTAL 27 41 24 
 
As the interviews progressed, open questions were directed to emerging themes and cases. 
The interviewees were free to highlight the important issues experienced in their practice 
from their perspective following guidance provided by Corley and Gioia (2011)’s problem-
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driven theory. The qualitative interviews provided a detailed contextual understanding of the 
problems experienced by interviewees, thereby revealing hidden motives and beliefs.  
Each interview was anonymised, and a transcript was provided for the interviewee’s 
approval. Only after approval were the transcripts used for analysis. Every transcript was 
labelled with a unique number identifiable only by the author of this thesis. Quotes in this 
thesis that can potentially identify individuals were eliminated to preserve the interviewees’ 
anonymity.  
Archival sources. In addition to the interview data, relevant literature was collected in the 
form of reports, published articles and internal company documentation to obtain historical 
evidence of strategic change in the Finnish design and construction industry regarding ICT 
deployment over the last 50 years. For example, Prof. Matti Hannus provided key reports 
from national ICT R&D by publishing them on the website, http://cic.vtt.fi/. Prof. Arto 
Kiviniemi provided all the relevant reports related to the VERA programme on 
http://cic.vtt.fi/vera.htm. Both websites were accessible in early 2018 but are no longer 
available. The combination of the archival and interview data provided reliable insights into 
the complexity of interactions created in national technology programmes.  
Triangulation and cross-verification of the collected data - namely the interviews, archival 
sources and the discussions with key experts - allowed the researcher to validate and 
eliminate potential biases in the findings (Jick, 1979). The triangulation was beneficial for the 
generation of theory yielding a stronger substantiation of the emerging concepts (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) and increasing the theoretical sensitivity (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  
This study enabled the researcher to maintain the high-level outsider perspective required for 
unbiased theorization (Gioia et al., 2013) and to deliver conceptual nonrepresentative insights 
with the power of a single unique case (Siggelkow, 2007). While I am inexperienced in 
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understanding the critical issues occurring across various disciplines and organisations, I 
actively engaged in discussions around the findings with knowledgeable actors, industry BIM 
experts and those who participated in the national technology programmes. This process 
validated that the results and offered novel insights. I further cross-validated the articulated 
findings at various workshops, industry events, conferences and through a publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal.  
2.3.2 Data Analysis 
Interview transcripts were used as primary data for the analysis while archival sources 
were used to refine the interpretation of emerging categories, thereby guiding the integration 
of these categories into an overall framework. First, I aimed to understand and characterize 
the current dynamics of the industry and the evolving relationship between ecosystem actors. 
Then, I narrowed the focus of this research to the orchestration processes by a public funder 
and the effects of national development on industry-wide innovation.  
I analysed the collected data by following a methodology provided by Gioia et al. (2013) in 
which the empirical observations were connected to extant theoretical ideas (Langley, 
Smallman, Tsoukas, & Ven, 2013). The research progressed through multiple intertwined 
steps that were repeated a number of times. The following section presents a simplified 
sequence of these steps that led to the construction of a grounded theory model.  
Step 1: Event analysis and open coding. I began by creating a comprehensive case narrative 
of the evolution of the Finnish national programmes by providing a chronological overview 
of events and reconstructing a network of activities and actors (Langley, 1999). The narrative 
resulted in a timeline of historical development, the Finnish Innovation Journey, which 
depicted the main organisations involved, the programmes established, and the activities and 
key outcomes of the national programmes. This draft timeline was used to help interviewees 
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trigger their memories about the projects and programmes realised within this national 
development and to use their insights to accurately complete the timeline. As I continuously 
engaged in intensive reading of the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), I built a large database of 
in-vivo codes, and distributed these codes according to the emerging timeline as the events 
occurred and according to the issues related to current state of the industry.  
I followed the guidance provided by Gioia et al. (2013). During the first phase of data 
analysis, a myriad of codes and themes emerged, each containing a sentence or a sequence of 
sentences (Weber, 1990). I constantly iterated and created mutually-exhaustive, first-order 
categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). When trying to make sense of the data, its abundance 
and emerging themes eventually became overwhelming (Gioia, 2004). However, it became 
evident that the evolution of national BIM deployment was connected to earlier phases of 
knowledge hub formation in the industry from 1965. This understanding later resulted from 
the inclusion of the additional phase, which presented interesting insights into the evolution 
of the industry before the emergence of TEKES and the national programmes.  
During the analysis process, I continued to communicate with key interviewees by providing 
preliminary evidence to clarify certain issues. As my understanding progressed, the first 
results in relation to BIM deployment were published in a paper “From Finnish AEC 
knowledge ecosystem to business ecosystem: lessons learned from the national deployment of 
BIM” (Aksenova et al., 2018) in a high impact journal “Construction Management and 
Economics”. The research results were presented in the UK, Finland, Canada and Spain to 
industry experts, government representatives and research communities in BIM. The results 
received a high appreciation, which validated the findings and the relevance of the research.  
As the research progressed, it became more focused on the phenomenon observed, namely 
the co-evolution of the TEKES-run national technology programmes and the efforts made by 
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design and construction industry actors to digitalise the industry. The data showed that the 
mechanisms set by TEKES were effective in generating knowledge on ICT but also had 
limited results in supporting value capture by ecosystem members for the systemic qualitative 
change through BIM deployment in the industry. I found that joint efforts by TEKES and key 
BIM champions were dependant on the industry context, local organisations (clients, 
academia, insurance firms, cities, etc) and global technology firms which aimed to preserve 
their market share and power. National efforts were also limited in changing the existing 
business ecosystem of the industry as the industry-wide network of actors wanted to preserve 
the status quo.  
Step 2: Axial coding. In the next step, I gradually progressed to axial coding and then to a 
theory-driven explanation (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Through continuous iteration between 
discussions with the supervisors and industry actors, I was able to extract the underlying 
components of ecosystem evolution by comprising the second-order categories of axial 
coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) while also ordering them according to the periods and 
phases of national BIM deployment. The evolution of the national BIM deployment resulted 
in a carefully presented storyline with key events as they occurred. As the study’s focus is a 
longitudinal process of TEKES’s orchestration, I continuously refined the emerging second-
order categories by reducing and merging them into aggregated themes (Gioia et al., 2013). 
Since the second-order themes constituted a particular period of development, I have further 
grouped them into third-order categories comprising periods and then aggregated dimensions 
comprising the overarching phases of Finnish national ICT deployment from 1965 to 2018. 
This step was performed iteratively by making extensive use of notes and discussions to 
interpret the data. The iterative analysis resulted in the data structure shown in Figure 10 (see 




















Step 3: Building a grounded model. Finally, I identified the linkages between the 
aggregated dimensions in order to build a grounded model that explained how the national 
deployment of BIM was evolving. I not only induced categories but also generated 
interpretations of orchestration processes and effects, forming a story line between the 
second-order categories and aggregated themes. Then, I returned to the relevant literature and 
cycled between the data, the emerging findings and the theory to articulate this study’s 
contributions to the dark side of ecosystem orchestration. The final work was sent for 
feedback to the manager at TEKES. The feedback helped to refine the focus of this chapter.  
2.4 FINDINGS 
2.4.1 Case Overview 
The case study focused on the role of a public funder TEKES, the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and Innovation, who supported the digitalisation of the design and 
construction industry in Finland. Through the TEKES programmes, “Finland was the first 
country to adopt the national innovation system approach in its science and technology 
policy during the depression of the early 1990s” (Haukka, 2005: p.15). TEKES played a 
major role in joining research and industry efforts to support R&D into BIM technology for 
the design and construction industry between 1982 and 20029 as well as many other sectors in 
Finland (Van Der Veen et al., 2012). TEKES has run many other technology programmes for 
different sectors with a wide-ranging project portfolio. It seeks to promote the 
competitiveness of Finnish industries and service sectors in the field of technological 
development. It prepares, funds and coordinates national technology programmes for 
technical research and high-risk R&D projects, and develops a national technology policy 
(Tuomaala et al., 2001). Already in the 1980s, TEKES has recognised the importance of 
 
9 Although, officially, SARA programme finished in 2007, TEKES role in leading the industry, technically, 
stopped in 2002 
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innovation in the Finnish design and construction industry as approximately 70% of the 
national wealth was invested within the real estate and construction cluster and linked to 
macro-economic development, and societal and demographic changes in Finland (Uusikylä et 
al., 2003). TEKES saw the potential in establishing several national programmes by linking 
technology to R&D in the design and construction sector. These programmes acted as 
platforms for value creation.  
In this study, I followed the national R&D of BIM in TEKES technology programmes and its 
co-evolution from its genesis in 1982 with national efforts for BIM development by the 
Finnish design and construction industry, which concluded in 2002. Although SARA 
programme sponsored by TEKES continued until 2007, the involvement of TEKES in 
leading it has ended after 2002. Hence, this study takes a longitudinal view on the evolution 
of national efforts for ICT and BIM deployment in the design and construction industry. The 
analysis incorporates additional information on the RYM pre-programme that was run by the 
industry to support ICT deployment, and KIRA-digi run by the Ministry of Environment to 
support the emergence of digital business ecosystems in the built environment sector. 
TEKES set exaggerated expectations for the self-renewal of the design and construction 
industry with emerging technologies, e.g. BIM. Indeed, Finland was the first country to invest 
in BIM technology R&D as no practical solutions existed in 1982. TEKES’s expectations 
were that public investment combined with existing enthusiasm and technological 
competence amongst industry champions would lead to a global competitive advantage for 
Finnish design and construction firms (Uusikylä et al., 2003). National BIM R&D, and 
particularly the VERA programme, were recognised by TEKES international success stories 
(Froese, 2002; Haukka, 2005; Uusikylä et al., 2003).  
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The BIM technology programmes, supported by TEKES, were meant to create new 
technological know-how by linking research and implementation with cooperation from the 
industry, research institutes, e.g. VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT), and 
universities. In addition to publicly funded R&D, matchmaking and marketing the results, 
TEKES funded public risk capital projects by providing a seed and early stage capital to 
innovative start-ups and SMEs. Between 1982 and 2015, the total expenditure on BIM related 
research in Finland was approx. 80-90 M€ of which more than 50% was spent on the VERA 
programme (1997-2002). The composition of participants in the national programmes were 
assembled with a diverse set of private and public organisations including small, medium-
size and large enterprises, research institutes, some universities and the largest public client in 
Finland, Senate Properties. The role of TEKES in the national deployment of BIM was strong 
as it shaped and conceptualised the content of the programmes with a focus on technology 
R&D (Uusikylä et al., 2003). As an open-system intermediary (Dutt et al., 2016; Giudici et 
al., 2018), it had an important role both in the distribution of public R&D funding and in 
bringing about cooperation between research and practice (Björk, 1994).  
The national deployment of BIM in TEKES’s programmes included national and 
international collaborations extending over 25 years and involving hundreds of organisations 
that piloted dozens of projects between the industry and VTT in the RATAS, VERA and 
SARA technology programmes. Despite its leading role in guiding the technology 
programmes, TEKES openly cooperated with industry champions and astutely listened to 
their advice. Empirical evidence shows that the orchestration process set by TEKES followed 
the role of an open-system orchestrator with a horizontal approach to cooperation with 
heterogeneous participants, as opposed to a closed-system approach. The champions had a 
strong voice in selecting the projects and in leading national deployment with the support of 
TEKES. However, the expected results did not follow quickly as the new global businesses 
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did not emerge with the support of TEKES despite the initial aspirations. TEKES’s interest in 
the design and construction industry waned between 2002 and 2007 as the exaggerated 
expectations were not achieved. National ICT deployment was a learning curve for everyone 
involved. The industry champions continued their negotiations with the government without 
the involvement of TEKES. The negotiations led to new initiatives by the Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Environment. The reconfiguration focused on a mindset shift and the 
development of necessary capabilities in the industry to support digital business development. 
It resulted in the establishment of the KIRA-digi project between 2016 and 2019. This 
reconfiguration brought about positive results as the new networked type of businesses that 
cross a variety of industries started to emerge across the Finnish built environment in 2018. 
Although there are changing dynamics within the built environment sector, further research is 
needed.  
Next, the co-evolution of the design and construction industry with the technology 
programmes and beyond are presented in the next section.  
2.4.2 Evolution of National BIM Deployment Between 1982 and 2002, and Beyond 
The analysis of national ICT deployment by the design and construction industry passed four 
important phases of development: a logic from Abstract Development (theory development in 
RATAS programme in Periods 1-3), to Concrete Development (VERA programme for 
technological development in Period 4), to Practical Implementation (in the SARA and RYM 
PRE-programmes, Periods 5-6), and more recently the reconfiguration of orchestration 
processes by the KIRA-digi project to enable the growth of Open Digital Business 
Ecosystems (Period 7). Figure 11 provides an overview of the key activities executed at the 
national level. For each phase of development, the periods present key events and national 





Figure 11 Outline of the Finnish Innovation Journey 
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The presentation follows a chronological order of the key incidents that occurred and 
facilitated an understanding of the co-evolution of national ICT deployment and the 
industry’s digital practice.  
Phase 1. The Emergence of the Knowledge Hub in the Industry, 1965-1983:  
Phase 1 is characterised by the development of digital competence within digital design 
and construction in Finland. It accumulated the necessary capabilities and interests in the 
industry to form a fruitful ground for the next phases of national development. Phase 1 
constitutes Period 1. Period 1 is characterised by the environment that supported an 
emergence of the knowledge unit that later participated in the national BIM programmes.  
Period 1. The Emergence of a Knowledge Hub  
Period 1 is characterised by the emerging knowledge hub in the industry that consisted 
of the technology champions. The establishment of Tekla in 1966 exemplified the knowledge 
hub that aimed “to challenge the industry with new technological solutions” (Researcher, 
FIN17). Tekla was a unique case that constituted an emerging interest in the technology and 
design within the construction industry.  
In 1980s, Finnish universities were ill-equipped to provide physical laboratories for 
simulation while physical laboratories were common in other universities across the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Due to the lack of facilities, some students started to 
use computers for engineering simulations as early as the 1970s and the use of computers in 
universities became widespread in the 1980s. The focus on computer simulation at university 
led to the development of digital competences amongst engineering students. Graduating 
engineers had skills to develop software for their own use. It was a period of innovation, as 
researcher (FIN18) suggested: 
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We did not have any laboratories, so, in order to do exercises. Instead of doing laboratory 
exercises and tests, we did computer simulations from the early on. I have done my first 
computer graphics program in 1968, which generated 3-D stereo images. I did everything 
with computers from the very beginning. […] We were getting better and better. Not, of 
course, all the time. […] At least some of us, I was one of them. […] Maybe before 1985 
we had a period of innovation. New ideas, people with great ambitions, setting up new 
companies. That was a period of pioneers. (Researcher, FIN18) 
Due to the low rate of market competition, the opportunities for software development by 
start-ups were open. Small scale software development flourished amongst engineers. 
Champions in the design and construction industry recognised the need for standardisation to 
create efficiency whilst rebuilding the country after the Second World War. Standardisation 
and efficiency were at the core of technological development even when technology was not 
commercially viable. As a result, the technology champions invested in immature technology. 
As they were involved in the same networks, these champions developed a shared 
understanding that the incompatibility between developed tools slowed standardisation and 
there was a need for more reliable technology to support the digital information exchange and 
management between disciplines. In 1982, this led to ongoing discussions on the need to 
standardise information and improve interoperability (Björk, 2009).  
In 1982, the government established TEKES to drive technology development in the country, 
hoping that newly developed technological know-how would be captured in the industry to 
support business growth. The establishment of TEKES “shows how much importance 
technology has been given in Finland” (Researcher, FIN05), and as a result “the discussions 
about the integration of IT applications in construction started in Finland in 1982” (Björk, 
2009: p.386). TEKES was recognised by this study’s interviewees as the driving force for 
commencing national R&D, stimulating the focus on technology R&D for new businesses 
and facilitating research and industry networks. The interviewees of this study recognised 
that public funding was a major motivator in the design and construction industry to engage 
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in technology R&D which otherwise would not have happened due to the industry’s 
reluctance to invest in innovation (Uusikylä et al., 2003).  
Setting up of TEKES caused turmoil in Finland. […] There was a lot of money coming in 
because people have read in the newspaper that TEKES has a budget for that. It was 
brilliant. No one really knew what it is going to do, but the budget was X million FIN 
mark to support technology development in Finland. It was not totally new because 
previously [the] Ministry of Trade Industry did provide resource funding also for 
institutes. But TEKES was something more visible, so this first innovation type of 
enthusiasts, including people like myself and other guys, got very enthusiastic and started 
to see money in that. (Researcher, FIN18) 
This was paradoxical as there was a network of champions investing their own time and 
resources in technology development due to their enthusiasm, while the industry-wide culture 
was risk-averse with low levels of investment in R&D:  
TEKES was providing funding for R&D, but they never fund anything 100%, so the 
companies must use also their own money or borrow it. As the R&D culture in the 
industry is very weak, very few companies used that possibility. (Researcher, FIN20) 
The separation between a small group of interested enthusiasts for technology and the 
traditional industry was already visible in this period. This emerging technology knowledge 
hub in conjunction with establishment of TEKES led to the next development phase for the 
BIM concept at the national level. 
Phase 2. Developmental Phase. Formation of the Knowledge Ecosystem, 1983-2002: 
Phase 2 is constituted by the start of the national BIM R&D in TEKES’s technology 
programmes. This resulted in the emergence of the knowledge ecosystem led by TEKES. It 
comprised Periods 2, 3 and 4 between 1983 and 2002. 
Period 2, 1983-1990. Abstract Development.  
Period 2 started with the establishment of the first national BIM project, named the 
RATAS-project. The RATAS-project was a theoretical exercise for thinking about the 
possibilities of Building Product Modelling, e.g. Building Information Modelling was called 
Building Product Modelling at that time. It aimed to resolve the problems of technological 
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integration, thereby eliminating information incoherencies between various industry 
specialists. The RATAS-project was initiated as a construction Information Technology (IT) 
roadmap project in 1985 (Björk, 2009) and laid the foundation for the following phases: 
I think this was the main breakthrough period and everything else was building on this. I 
do not see major steps forward. It is thinking. […] It was more like specific concepts. So, 
it was more about clarification to everybody that you can use computers in an intelligent 
way not just [the] creation of drawings but to create data which you could use in different 
ways. (Researcher, FIN18) 
TEKES actively collaborated with VTT experts in RATAS. VTT was crucial in creating a 
common understanding of the BIM and Finnish national standards between TEKES and the 
industry and research institutes. Many industry experts who participated in the RATAS-
project were interested in adopting these concepts in their organisations. This willingness 
arose because of a widespread awareness of technology R&D in Finland, as researcher 
(FIN18) explains: 
Some people would present their developments for those who were able to follow up these 
developments. Even during [the] 80s, if you would go to any place in Finland, or 
consultancy organisation, they would know all the news about these technologies. This is 
quite exceptional comparing to other countries. So, 20 years ago a consulting engineer or 
architect would know in this country. They did not have a deep knowledge, but at least 
they knew something. And I can’t think how it would have happened unless TEKES was 
showing some money. (Researcher, FIN18) 
TEKES used the following mechanisms to orchestrate the national programmes and RATAS-
project: (1) built collaborative international engagement through research institutes like VTT 
with BIM experts in the EU and the USA; (2) sponsored technology development in private 
& public networks; (3) created awareness of these developments through publicity and 
events, and (4) played the role of matchmaker encouraging members’ exploration for 
complementarities and research & industry R&D; (4) built a trust-rich environment and 
horizontal relationship with the industry actors, and (5) selected industry champions to lead 
the national technology programmes, determine the criteria for the project selection and the 
focus of the technology programmes. It is important to note that industry champions had a 
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strong voice in influencing TEKES’s decisions although TEKES was the final decision 
maker.  
With the help of TEKES, project participants of the RATAS-project created breakthrough 
concepts concerning the intelligent use of building data. The benefits of disciplinary 
collaboration underpinned with technology were recognised early. Already in the 1990s, 
RATAS project participants saw that the benefits of connecting building information to 
facility and property management could potentially be disruptive for established businesses. 
This led to a shared consensus of the importance of international open standards for 
technology deployment because “the software market is international” (Researcher, FIN20).  
Although the RATAS-project did not fulfil participants’ expectations (Björk, 1994), TEKES 
set great expectations that participating technology-oriented SMEs would eventually become 
powerful international software companies, as explained by researcher (FN18): 
I think, we were expecting that in the 80s, the small companies … were focusing on 
different subdomains of the construction industry, like heating and so on. They gradually 
would be merged and gradually become powerful international software companies. This 
has never happened which is quite amazing. […] It would be possible with the knowledge, 
which we have in this country, but that all these companies, which are software developers 
in the small market, some of them sell abroad, but they are not major players at the 
international market. (Researcher, FIN18) 
The expectation of TEKES was that, with existing competences and public funding for 
national R&D for ICT, the design and construction sector would renew itself and become an 
international service and technology provider. 
Period 3, 1991-1995. Depression: Knowledge Loss & Gain  
Interviewees referred to Period 3 as a “depression time” that lasted between 1991 and 
1995; this period represented a devastating crisis for the entire Finnish financial sector and hit 
the whole country. The design and construction industry was largely affected by this crisis, 
which saw the bankruptcies of several large construction companies. Some foreign 
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companies took over Finnish companies (Laitinen, 1998). The labour market also diminished 
as the industry lost the expertise developed in the previous periods. All these led to the loss of 
knowledge and the need to re-develop lost industry expertise. However, this crisis also served 
as a shock to the industry, which accelerated the adoption of Computer-Aided Design (CAD) 
technologies. TEKES recognised that this period presented an opportunity for private firms to 
develop digital capabilities as “the depression time was expected to end eventually” 
(Researcher, FIN21). While the disappearance of firms and downsizing were common, 
TEKES increased investment in national R&D for ICT. As a result of TEKES’s initiatives, 
Finland was the first country to implement a national innovation system in the early 1990s 
(Haukka, 2005). As suggested by the researcher (FIN20), the established national system 
“was the best innovation system in the world. […] it worked very well. [While] the main 
survival strategy [of industry] in the early 1990s was to reduce activities and lay off people”. 
Some leading firms used TEKES funding to develop digital capabilities and engaged early in 
technology R&D. According to the interviewees, this was a crucial factor that enabled 
leading firms in the industry to become a high-tech community over the next periods. Period 
3 generated a positive ground for the next period. 
Period 4, 1995-2002. Intensive Development of Industry-Specific Technologies 
Period 4 was characterised by the formation of a new knowledge hub with shared 
motives to realise the potential of the BIM concept and open standards. TEKES recognised 
the enthusiasm for technology in the industry. It started negotiations with industry champions 
and VTT to define common goals for serious R&D for BIM technology at the national level. 
These negotiations led to the establishment of the VERA programme with a vision of the 
“Management of information through the entire life cycle of the built environment” 
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(Kiviniemi, 2002)10. It is important to note that, although TEKES was orchestrating the 
VERA programme, it had a horizontal approach to ecosystem orchestration and the definition 
of common goals for all participants where a shared strategic cognition (de Mol, Khapova, & 
Elfring, 2015) is developed:  
There were really close relations, [a] network of some peers was close in sharing ideas and 
discussing things. It is difficult to put a border between TEKES and champions, because 
there were constant interactions between them, like business and friendship interactions. It 
was not so that TEKES was totally inventing the idea of VERA, but it was collaboration 
with the industry. We made a lot of interviews, we tried to find the common goal that the 
industry could agree about. So, it is not one side would be doing things, it was all sides 
were trying to find the common goal, it was heterogenous. It was TEKES, champions and 
VTT who also had a very strong role in that. (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES heavily sponsored the VERA programme; the total budget for VERA was 46.7 
M€ (22.2 M€ (47.5%) from TEKES and 24.5 M€ (52.5%) from the industry). Indeed, today’s 
equivalent would be approximately 60 M€. VERA’s aim was to develop technologies that 
were based on the theoretical concepts of the RATAS-project. The VERA programme was 
established as a framework to enable collaboration between industry & research institutes, as 
explained by researcher (FIN20): 
VERA’s outcomes were projects. […] The whole concept of this technology programmes 
is complex and unique. It is like a framework and you are funding projects that fit to your 
overall goals. Programmes defined criteria. But all the proposals were coming from 
industry. […] Projects were directly related to IFC […]; the basic rule was, if it is an 
industry project, you must have a research institute or university as a partner. […] So, they 
were reinforcing each other. It was one of the main effects of TEKES funding, creating 
this tight collaboration between industry and research institutes. (Researcher, FIN20) 
The VERA programme served as a platform for knowledge co-creation amongst 
complementors, the technology pioneer network, VTT experts and industry actors. TEKES 
actively supported activities run at VERA through the following mechanisms: (1) built 
awareness through heavy investment into marketing using emails, specialised seminars and 
newsletters and by extensively showcasing the interoperability potential at different events; 
 
10 The quote is from the official website of VERA programme http://cic.vtt.fi/vera.htm (accessed in 2018) is no 
longer available  
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(2) built networks for collaboration and the exchange of competencies, such as serving as a 
matchmaker between research and industry, between the import and export of expertise to 
and from Finland, and built all kind of networks for R&D; (3) sponsored high risk projects 
that were linked to the core goals of the programme; (4) built a trust-rich environment and a 
horizontal relationship with the industry actors; (5) selected industry champions to lead the 
national technology programmes, the criteria for project selection and the focus of the 
technology programmes.  
Through project-based R&D, “TEKES had a holistic understanding of what was happening 
in industry” (Researcher, FIN21). TEKES managed to create a sustainable supply and 
demand for the development of technology in the design and construction industry: 
We were able to create demand and supply, basically hand in hand. One of the problems 
is, for example, if somebody makes a software product too early, there is no demand for 
that, there are no users. The company is dying because nobody is buying the product, 
because people do not really see the value of that. On the other hand, if people are 
interested but you do not have the tools, people very quickly give up, because they think 
that `this is a very good idea, but I cannot do it, because there is no practical way to do it`. 
And providing the balanced development of these two things was very crucial in the 
VERA program. (Researcher, FIN20) 
The VERA Programme is recognised as the most successful technology programme in the 
construction cluster (Uusikylä et al., 2003) due to the wide-ranging technological support 
provided by key leading industry actors: 
A very positive aspect of the VERA-related work is the very widespread support for the 
idea that model-based interoperability is the way forward for the AEC/FM industry in 
Finland. […] many key industry leaders are among the strongest and most active 
supporters for the technology [IFC]. This degree of acceptance of the value proposition 
offered by the technology has been an important factor for success in the VERA 
programme. (Froese, 2002: 11) 
Leadership of the VERA programme is recognised as an important driver in propagating 
technology change across the industry and the achievement of international success by BIM 
R&D (Froese, 2002). Following VERA’s early success, TEKES doubled its budget due to the 
industry’s interest in technology: 
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When the Programme started in 1997 the planned total volume was expected to be 28 M 
euro, of which 12 M euro was planned to be funded by TEKES and the rest by the 
industry. However, the industry interest [in] the R&D projects on this area was so strong 
that the final budget increased during the Programme to almost 47 M euro, of which about 
22 M euro was funded by TEKES. […] I do not know any other TEKES programs which 
were in such situation that the budget would increase so dramatically. (Researcher, 
FIN20). 
It had a heavy focus on technology R&D and strong support for open standards and 
interoperability. The projects realised in TEKES technology programmes in VERA were 
mandated to support the Industry Foundation Classes (IFC). IFC is an open format for data 
exchange. The technologies and standards developed in the VERA programme led to the 
evolution of BIM technologies. The newly developed technological solutions were tested in 
pilot projects in the VERA programme. TEKES envisioned that IFC, as an open standard, 
would serve as a platform for information exchange by different disciplines in the industry. It 
hoped that, if open standards were offered to the industry, the industry actors would be able 
to create new business services and processes upon open platforms and eventually become a 
world leading service provider of BIM technology. VTT and TEKES strongly supported 
Finnish involvement in the development of international open standards in the International 
Alliance for Interoperability (IAI) (renamed buildingSMART in 2008) in 1996. 
The VERA programme piloted the world’s first integrated IFC project, HUT-600. The project 
pioneered collaborative practice with newly developed BIM technologies between different 
disciplines including a public client, Senate Properties. They also performed the first test of 
the Solibri Model Checker, a start-up that is now one of the world leading BIM software 
(Fischer & Calvin, 2002).  
In 1996, leading actors in the VERA programme established formal arrangements to 
participate in the International Alliance for Interoperability (IAI) through a Nordic Chapter 
between Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway for the development of international 
standards. This arrangement connected the global experts in BIM. However, the VERA 
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programme members’ engagement in the IAI was not easy; interviewees gave the impression 
that leading software vendors did not agree on the goals for open standards. For several years, 
the practical usability of IFCs suffered from insufficient implementation quality. The 
researcher (FIN18) explained the dynamics behind the lack of support for open standards by 
leading software vendors: 
There are some drivers against it; market-leading information technologies companies do 
not want their customers to change a system, because all of it for this work is locked into 
specific system, so you do not see these software companies like [software vendor 1] to be 
supporters of interoperability. This is natural, because they are the market leader. Why 
would they support standard when their system cannot be a standard?! If they would 
support the standard, they would lose clients. […] Actually, it makes the perfect business 
sense. You never seen market leader to support the standard in the industry sector. 
(Researcher, FIN18) 
Overall, the VERA programme created the following positive results:  
• Fostered and supported the “chicken and egg” cycle of creating demand for 
technology development;  
• Contributed to the development of knowledge and expertise in technology;  
• Created a positive technological environment for the development of new, globally 
competitive products;  
• Finland gained an international reputation as a world leader in technology and left a 
positive impact on the progress of IAI’s IFC;  
• The confederation of Finnish construction industries adopted BIM as a part of the 
technology strategy in 2002;  
• Finland achieved the widespread adoption of the product model concept as part of the 
AEC/FM industry's processes and strategy; large leading firms included BIM 
internally as part of business strategy;  
• The VERA programme produced leading software, such as MagiCAD and Solibri, 
which were later sold to international software companies; 
• Finland became the earliest adopter of BIM technology on a nationwide and global 
scale.  
Despite its success, there were critical challenges that impacted industry-wide innovation 
with BIM. The dark side of national BIM deployment manifested in a disconnect between 
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R&D and implementation as “there is too much invention and too little innovation in the 
construction industry” (Researcher, FIN20). The interviewees pointed to a systemic 
disconnect between the needs of the researchers and the industry, as explained by researcher 
(FIN20):  
[A bridge between value creation with value capture] is the biggest challenge in any 
national system. For some people, making applications and getting research money is the 
main business. I can see it also at the EU level. Loads of professionals are making 
money from R&D. It is not always about results. If I am genuine, it is seldom about the 
results. It is true almost anywhere. Mostly, researchers are interested to get good results for 
publications, but they are not interested in helping companies to implement the results. 
[…] It is almost impossible to start controlling that the research money should be risk 
funding. If you start measuring results and require all projects should get results, you are 
moving into a bad area. You have to accept that some projects do not get good results. The 
problem is how to bridge the gap between the research and implementation. Because 
research is never creating innovation, or it is very seldom. It is usually business that 
is creating innovation. (Researcher, FIN20) 
On the other hand, some industry firms avoided taxes by subsidising R&D as researchers 
(FIN18, 20) explained:  
And I can’t think how it would have happened unless TEKES was showing some money. 
The money itself is not a key thing, but people would do anything to avoid paying some 
taxes or get some public funding. It is not really proportional to the money itself, but it has 
some kind of impact, but this legal support would get them far. You can see that people 
can avoid a lot of trouble paying these taxes. (Researcher, FIN18)  
TEKES was strict, they were not paying for pilot project or any project cost, they invested 
only in documentation of the results but still money given for R&D can lead to the 
situation that companies do it for the money and not for the results. […] Even though 
research funding is a partial funding, it is never 100% but I know that some companies are 
misusing the system again so they can be recording hours to do research project at the 
same time. Again, it is something difficult to prove because no one speaks about it. […] 
People would go far to avoid some taxes […] Taxing has nothing to do with TEKES, 
companies did tax reports, but it was an incentive. By putting money in TEKES project, I 
can reduce tax. (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES had no effective mechanism to capture a collective body of knowledge by the 
industry (Froese, 2002). Unfocused project selections with loose connections to the 
programme’s objectives (Uusikylä et al., 2003) and limited cross-fertilisation between 
programmes and projects have proved to be a shortcoming of the TEKES mechanisms 
(Froese, 2002). Project identification mechanisms were informal and provided a great deal of 
flexibility for companies to define projects to fit their own business needs and opportunities 
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without targeting specific work that was highly important strategically. These informal 
communication networks between the TEKES organisers and interested parties created a 
situation where participants were not aware of the overall objectives of the programmes 
(Froese, 2002). While not all participants configured themselves towards public funding, 
motivated champions piloted BIM projects and implemented BIM technologies, mainly intra-
organisationally. BIM became part of a company strategy for productivity improvement. As a 
result, a small group of visionary champions distanced themselves by virtue of their 
traditional industry networks, as clearly indicated by researcher (FIN20):  
The development started from knowing each other and trusting each other and not so from 
friendships. In that sense, it was leading to this small group of people that are moving 
much faster than the industry and the gap was increasing. It can be a problem; you have 
small group of champions that support each other. It can also be dangerous […] when you 
have a group of enthusiasts, of course everyone wants to move as quickly as possible. 
People are not necessarily thinking or recognising risks. In that sense it is the dark side [of 
the inter-organisational relationships]. (Researcher, FIN20) 
While a heavy focus on technology R&D in the VERA programme created positive results in 
connecting technology demand and supply, national BIM deployment was a technology push 
rather than a market pull. TEKES struggled to secure involvement from universities, 
insurance firms and private owners. Some champions struggled with the implementation of 
BIM because of a lack of support from their top management. Overall, following the success 
and challenges of the VERA programme, the industry entered a maturity building phase.  
Phase 3. Maturity Building, 2002-2015:  
Phase 3 is characterised by the industry’s development of mature BIM practice, 
incremental improvement, the absence of a driver/vision and the visible stagnation of the 
design and construction industry that lasted between 2002 and 2015. This phase constituted 
Periods 5 and 6. The national deployment of ICT and BIM R&D supported by TEKES 




Period 5, 2002-2007. Practical Implementation. Failure of Business Models to Evolve 
Period 5 signifies the practical implementation of BIM technologies under the old 
system and the failure of the SARA programme to generate new business, and contractual 
and procurement models to support this practical implementation. Although, national efforts 
for the digitalisation of the sector continued, the active role of TEKES in orchestrating and 
supporting national BIM R&D ended during the SARA programme. 
As the international efforts to support international open standards continued, in early 2000, 
one of the leading software vendors was about to abandon their support for open standards; 
however, in 2006, they started to change their mind due to the mandate from major clients to 
support BIM with open standards – GSA’s Spatial Program Validation (United States 
General Services Administration, 2006 ). It was an influential driver for the use of open 
standards. In 2008, to further resolve these tensions around interoperability, the GSA in the 
USA and Senate Properties in Finland were supported by other countries which signed an 
International Statement of Intention to Support BIM with Open Standards (Winstead, Jensen, 
Kohvakka, Lie, & Jagers, 2008). This aimed to influence the commitment of software 
vendors to open standards. Later, this agreement was supported by the largest public clients, 
which represented other countries in the EU and around the world. However, the software 
vendors never stated the extent to which they would support open standards. To date, the 
interoperability improvements have been rather modest (Howard & Björk, 2008). 
Projects that started as part of the VERA programme continued after its completion. For 
example, in 2002 project ProIT (2001-2005) resulted in the adoption of BIM as a core 
element of the Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries. In 2006, the AURORA 
project (a continuation of HUT-600) had become standard BIM practice. After that an 
important development was the world’s first industry level general BIM guidelines, which 
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were published in 2007 and sponsored by Senate Properties. In 2007, BIM use became 
mandatory in all Senate Properties’ projects above €1million, and in 2008, the Finnish forum 
in IAI was transformed into BuildingSMART Finland. 
In 2003, TEKES established the SARA programme, which continued until 2007. Although 
the VERA programme generated recommendations for the SARA programme to focus on the 
change of business models and contractual relationships to support the adoption of BIM 
(Penttilä, 2005), the programme failed to meet these objectives:  
SARA wanted to continue development on business models, but I really do not think that 
SARA was successful [to] the same extent as VERA. […] The development in Finland 
was slowing down during SARA program. (Researcher, FIN20) 
I guess the driver in the early days was that we must improve the productivity of the 
industry. […] but the culture and the business processes have not been developed. 
(Consultant, FIN04). 
Following the failures of the SARA programme, TEKES lost interest in the industry, as 
explained by innovation manager (FIN21): 
TEKES has been actually quite critical towards the Built Environment sector in Finland. 
They kind of have given a lot of resources for these different BIM-based projects and, at 
some point, they felt that there are not enough results coming from the given resources, so 
they lost hope in the construction industry. […] TEKES’s focus was shifting more and 
more to global growth to support companies that have global visions. They did not see 
those kinds of players in BE. (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
TEKES questioned the results from the national BIM deployment, as a manager from TEKES 
(FIN12) explained:  
But when you look at the history you have here, I don’t think we are in position right now 
to say that we have been successful. I would say that we haven’t been successful. […] We 
have been very powerful. There have been success stories, the use of BIM is growing but it 
has been very slow. We missed key companies who would run the business; it should be a 
way of work in everyday life in Finland, but it’s not. After 30 years it’s not. […] I would 
say that now only 5% of projects are done by BIM. […] What I am saying is that BIM is 
not a key area of the business at the moment. Thirty years of development, why is BIM not 
used as it was planned? I would say that the main drivers were idealists, people which 
believed in it, but really the business drivers, they were lacking. […] Where is the 
customer value? End-users? Scalability? It was 100% technology push instead of market 
push. (Manager, TEKES, FIN12) 
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In 2003, TEKES’s technology programmes shifted their focus from specific fields of 
technology and industry towards a thematic approach for cluster-specific programmes 
(Uusikylä et al., 2003). However, competition was based on the same criteria ignoring the 
nature of the industries concerned, as explained by the researcher (FIN20):  
The system has been changing a lot many times. […] They did not think about different 
natures of the industry. Partly, I understand that because some of the results in the 
construction industry were not that encouraging. It was difficult to defend them inside 
TEKES. Partly, some big companies did it just because of TEKES’s money. And they 
were never really implementing results in practices. And when you see it from TEKES’s 
side, it is a waste of money. (Researcher, FIN20) 
Consequently, the Finnish design and construction industry stopped evolving during the 
SARA programme. Its stagnation was visible between 2002 and 2015. Although the Finnish 
industry made technological changes within large individual firms, thereby improving 
productivity, the vision for the management of information through the entire lifecycle of a 
building (proposed by the champions during Periods 2-4) had only been partially realised. 
The conception of BIM’s potential business value for clients remained unclear. Interviewees 
(FIN01, FIN02, FIN07, FIN08, FIN16) perceived that, at this stage, technology had reached 
its maturity and champions accelerating the maturity of developed practices had overcome 
the technical challenges.  
Period 6, 2007-2015. Industry Stagnation  
Period 6 is characterised by the industry’s loss in R&D and a lack of significant results. 
Although the industry associations initiated RYM shock, these established the RYM 
PRE (Process Re-Engineering) programme in 2010 that continued until 2014. However, the 
programme management had no decision-making power.  
During this period, leading companies in the industry matured BIM practices through 
incremental improvement following the AURORA project. Nevertheless, the focus on 
productivity improvement and technology R&D has not led to business development, as 
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suggested by FIN04, 05, 08, 14 and 19. Throughout the history of national BIM deployment, 
new business models were not mentioned by interviewees as the industry continued to 
operate in a traditional way. However, the long-established incumbent, the leading building 
services company Granlund Oy, and a challenger, general contractor Fira Oy, have both 
become successful examples of Finnish companies developing service-dominant logic and 
client-centric business models based on BIM, even though the external environment did not 
support such developments. They are widely recognised exemplars of innovative firms in 
Finland.  
The industry was not able to renew itself without the financial support provided by TEKES 
but was motivated to continue its digital development. The interviewees recognised that 
national BIM deployment was a learning curve and without a business model development, 
the industry could not achieve a qualitative digital transformation:  
It was a focus on technology. Businesses have not been a driver. Now we have to look at 
the business model and a change of business thinking. […] We have been the thought 
leaders in Finland, but it has been very private, and company driven. It is not anymore 
about technology; it is the question of innovation. (Manager, Public Agency, FIN14)  
The industry actors called for organised innovation and support from the government to 
continue the industry’s evolution: 
I see too little organized innovation taking place within the industry. Tools and 
information management have evolved profoundly over the last 10 to 15 years, but 
business processes have remained the same. That leaves doors wide open for outsiders to 
radically change the business. (Metsi, 2018) 
In Finland, the field is ready, because we started earlier […] We cannot go further if the 
government does not help us. We are now at a level that we cannot evolve anymore. 
(Manager, HVAC firm, FIN11).  
Lessons learnt from national BIM deployment between 1982 and 2015 led to a shared 
understanding of the need to address business development. This understanding served as a 




Phase 4. A New Wave of Exploration, 2016-Present: 
Phase 4 represents a new wave of experimentation with new orchestration mechanisms 
to enable digital business ecosystem emergence in the built environment sector. From 2016 to 
2019, this was led by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Environment in the new 
KIRA-digi project. This phase is built on a new understanding amongst industry actors and 
the government that the next phase of development must include support for capability 
development in the built environment sector to enable value capture by the sector. 
Period 7, Reconfiguration: Emergence of Open Digital Business Ecosystem  
Period 7 is characterised by a reconfiguration of the thought process in the industry to 
search for new mechanisms that enable innovation and business ecosystem emergence in the 
built environment sector. Since BIM practice is established in the industry, industry actors 
look for further evolution with the support of the government.  
Following continuous discussions on the role of the government in stimulating the 
digitalisation between the government and the design and construction industry, in 2016 the 
Ministry of Finance established a “neutral communication platform” (Innovation Manager, 
FIN21), known as the KIRA-digi project. This was the public and private engagement 
streamlined as Public-Private Partnership (PPP). Led by the Ministry of Environment, it has 
employed new mediators to coordinate discussions between the Ministries of Finance and the 
Environment, cities, and various inter-industries, while “The €16M programme’s vision is to 
develop an open, interoperable information management ecosystem for the built 
environment” (Törrönen, 2017). KIRA-digi facilitated open negotiations as a matchmaker 
between various stakeholders in the built environment sector. Previously, negotiations 
between institutional stakeholders were not easy due to conflicting goals and stakeholder 
interests. A neutral coordinator was expected to resolve any possible conflicts that arose. It 
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followed three objectives: unifying building information management across the built 
environment, changing legislation to enable digitalisation, and experimenting in the built 
environment sector. A Clinic Service was established by the government to support 
experimentation projects through legislation, whilst also giving ministries a good overview of 
the challenges in the field and accelerating the process of development. KIRA-digi project 
acted as an effective open-system orchestrator. 
KIRA-digi project had a different mechanism compared to TEKES. It extensively focused on 
shifting the mindset from siloes towards openness by demanding open communication about 
project results to set the right environment. It eliminated any corrective mechanisms “to focus 
on carrots rather than sticks” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) in order to embrace experimental 
culture and open learning. The funding mechanism was similar to TEKES as it provided only 
30-40% of the project costs but attracted venture capital to help start-ups. Matchmaking 
activities by KIRA-digi opened up opportunities for complementary industries to enter the 
built environment sector and challenge the status quo. It complemented the industry’s 
missing capabilities by educating project participants with the necessary skills. For instance, 
it provided support for the development of marketing, business and communication skills. In 
2018, the World Summit on the Digital Built Environment (WDBE) was established to attract 
global experts and to generate discussions around the opportunities to embrace the platforms 
and ecosystems in the built environment sector.  
The mechanisms deployed by KIRA-digi produced a spin-off effect amongst participating 
firms, thus forming a community. Experimental projects produced new disruptive business 
models with a service-dominant logic (Lusch & Nambisan, 2015). According to the manager 
(FIN21), design and construction actors have started to invest into R&D by embracing 
experimentation. The manager (FIN21) further explained that a shift in mindset towards 
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openness allowed for the emergence of new ecosystems with inter-industry collaboration for 
cutting-edge technology development.  
Following the success of KIRA-digi and its completion in 2019, a KIRAHub was established 
to scale solutions created on a global level and to impact the developed business models on a 
wider ecosystem. Although the initial results are very promising, at this point it is too early to 
know what impacts KIRA-digi and KIRAHub will have on the Built Environment sector.  
2.5 DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the evolution of national ICT and BIM deployment orchestrated by 
TEKES have deepened the understanding of open-system orchestration and its effects on 
industry-wide innovation. Findings of this study point to similarities amongst TEKES’s 
orchestration mechanisms with organisations, such as business incubators whose main 
purpose is to support the growth of new businesses. TEKES supported this growth by 
financing the advancement of technological knowledge, disseminating R&D outcomes, and 
building collaborative engagement (matchmaking) between universities, research institutes 
and industry, and by and building trust-rich horizontal relationships with industry champions 
who had a strong voice in co-leading the national technology programmes. These activities 
demonstrated that TEKES’s role as an open-system orchestrator differed from the self-
centred motives of closed-system orchestrators. However, TEKES’s orchestration mechanism 
produced unintended effects that also indicated its closed-system nature. The case of TEKES 
enriches the description of open-system orchestrators provided by Giudici et al. (2018). The 
mechanisms set by TEKES closely adhered to open-system orchestration mechanisms, but 
empirical evidence highlighted a more mixed picture. TEKES does not fall exactly in the 
category of open or closed-system orchestration. TEKES’s characteristics in relation to open 
and closed-system orchestration is depicted in Table 8. 
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Table 8 Closed-System Orchestration vs. Open-System Orchestration of Innovation 
Ecosystems (Adapted and Updated from Giudici et al. (2018: p.1371)) 
 
Closed-system orchestration 
(Giudici et al., 2018: p.1371) 
TEKES orchestration in 
technology programmes  
Open-system orchestration 
(Giudici et al., 2018: p.1371) 
Core 
reference 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) Tuomaala et al. (2001) Dutt et al. (2016) 
Orchestration 
orientation 
Directed, self-interested Pro-social, aiming at public 






Centralized coordination of 
innovation efforts, and 
negotiated distribution of the 
benefits of the collective 
output 
Centralized coordination of 
innovation efforts and support 
of independent entrepreneurial 
efforts  
Facilitation of decentralized 
and independent 
entrepreneurial efforts, with 
local appropriation of their 




Harness (exploit) distributed 
resources and capabilities of 
network members along a 
centrally coordinated 
innovation effort 
Provide shared resources and 
nurture capabilities of network 
members to support dispersed 
entrepreneurial efforts 
Provide shared resources and 
nurture capabilities of network 




(Relatively more) restricted: 
selection based on network 
needs and member-specific 
evaluation 
Semi-Open: Selection based 
on potential members meeting 
network-specific criteria with 
partially predefined criteria 
for selection of projects 
(Relatively more) open: 





Expected commitment to 
collective innovation efforts, 
typically enforced 
contractually 
Voluntary ad hoc participation 
in network activities. Expected 
voluntary commitment to 
collective innovation efforts, 
enforced contractually with 
voluntary participation (The 
engagement was contractually 
required from the research 
institutes (VTT) and 
universities, but not from the 
private companies) 
Voluntary ad hoc participation 
in network activities 
Examples Hub firms (Nambisan & 
Sawhney, 2011) 
R&D consortia (Sydow et al., 
2012) 
Government-sponsored 
industrial programs (Levén et 
al., 2014; Paquin & Howard-
Grenville, 2013) 
TEKES technology 
programmes (RATAS, VERA, 
SARA) (Valtakari, Roininen., 
Riipinen., & Nyman., 2014) 
Incubators (Dutt et al., 2016) 
National and regional 
agencies (McEvily & Zaheer, 
1999; Sapsed et al., 2007),  
SME associations (Arıkan & 







TEKES’s orchestration processes resulted in an effective knowledge ecosystem that failed to 
translate into new businesses in the design and construction industry. Despite the good 
intentions of the knowledge ecosystem’s core hub, findings also revealed the dark side of 
inter-organisational relations (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). 
The critical issue was that national BIM R&D involved a technology push rather than a 
market pull. These conditions contributed to the failure of qualitative digital business 
transformation in an industry that was heavily involved in the development of technological 
know-how.  
What follows in this section is the articulation of findings into theoretical underpinnings. To 
highlight the contribution of this research, the findings are juxtaposed with current 
assumptions on the challenging role of open-system orchestrators in navigating knowledge 
ecosystems and supporting value capture in the industry. Figure 12 and Figure 13 present 
the orchestration models set by TEKES and KIRA-digi respectively. Next, a grounded model 
of open-system orchestration led by TEKES is discussed together with the implications for a 
theoretical understanding of open-system orchestration. 
2.5.1 A Grounded Model of Open-System Orchestration  
Open-system orchestration enhances the network’s capacity to assess and use 
knowledge and resources by managing the network with a light touch (Giudici et al., 2018). 
Open-system orchestrators manage their ecosystems without assertive actions allowing 
participants to join based on free will (Dutt et al., 2016). The empirical evidence in this study 
suggests that, although the mechanisms deployed by the open-system orchestrator, TEKES, 
supported the creation of an effective knowledge ecosystem, the design and construction 
industry failed to capture value from the created knowledge. The expectation that 














An evolutionary process of national BIM deployment that developed thought and 
understanding based on technology did not lead to the development of business models and 
digital transformation in the industry. Overall, TEKES relied on the goodwill of actors to 
capture value from their national technology programmes, thus constituting the dark side of 
the orchestration processes.  
The dark side of open-system orchestration manifested in various ways and contributed to the 
failure to bridge value creation with value capture. First, researchers were preoccupied with 
the publication and not the implementation of results; second, some industry actors used 
public funding for self-benefit and not to implement results; third, some industry actors 
intentionally preserved the status quo as industry actors did not agree on the division of 
labour amongst emerging technologies; fourth, there were no incentives to attract necessary 
complementors, such as technology suppliers; at the international level, complementors, the 
software vendors, did not agree on the goals for open standards and data sharing; fifth, the 
results from R&D were often lost during the process as there was no effective means for 
knowledge capture; six, although the knowledge hub had good intentions, it largely operated 
in silos, generating biases and a reliance on the goodwill of actors; seven, national BIM 
deployment was a technology push instead of market pull; eight, the system failure, as 
academia did not have necessary competence and capabilities to become involved in the 
national technology programmes despite its crucial role in the development of the mindset. 
Finally, since TEKES started to support national industry-focused technology R&D very 
early, it did not have any mechanisms for start-up funding seeds or an aim for disruption; nor 
did it develop an understanding of venture capital. Only recently have such mechanisms 
became widespread. Business ecosystems were not considered at the time of these national 
technology programmes because the concept was not well established. Neither ecosystem 





Despite this, the empirical evidence derived in this research confirms the findings of Clarysse 
et al. (2014) that value creation in a knowledge ecosystem does not necessarily lead to value 
capture in the business ecosystem. Thus, open-system orchestrators should deploy additional 
mechanisms to connect value creation with value capture. The next section articulates a 
theoretical explanation of the dark side of orchestration processes set by TEKES in 
supporting the national technology programmes for BIM in the design and construction 
industry. The dark side contributed to the systemic disconnect between value creation and 
value capture in ecosystems.  
Incentivising necessary complementors. The empirical evidence highlighted a paradox 
(Smith & Lewis, 2011) between the need for an open-system orchestrator to offer a light 
touch in support of value creation (exploration) and the concurrent need to incentivise 
ecosystem actors to exploit the created knowledge for value capture (exploitation). 
Ecosystem participants can fail to capture value if necessary complementors are not 
incentivised in value creation, whilst others do not recognise the opportunity in value capture. 
While the hub firm in a closed-system incentivises network participants to participate in a 
collective goal (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006), the literature on open-system orchestration 
suggests that setting an incentive system to direct behaviour is less important than supporting 
the efforts of participants to search for their own business opportunities (Giudici et al., 2018).  
Open-system orchestrators do not force the complementors to join the ecosystem unless they 
are willing to join it freely. Instead, this study’s empirical evidence suggests that the 
participation of necessary complementors is necessary for value creation. For example, 
interviewees suggested that the participation of universities was critical in shifting the 
mindset of the whole built environment sector. However, universities were neither actively 
involved in the projects, nor were the developed technologies adopted as part of a university 





technological competencies, such as professors in relevant fields or researchers specialising 
in technology R&D. As a result, academia was not able to bid for proposals and actively 
participate in national BIM R&D until the end of the VERA programme. TEKES was not 
able to influence the activities of the universities in Finland because of their independent 
roles and the threat that new knowledge could displace established competence in academia. 
Overall, TEKES did not have any specific mechanisms to incentivise participation amongst 
the necessary actors, e.g. universities, international software vendors, clients, city 
stakeholders and all the other necessary complementors in the built environment sector.  
System exploitation. Theories on inter-organisational networks suggest that firms are willing 
to cooperate around value propositions and exploit the opportunities for combining 
complementary assets in order to stay ahead in rapidly developing technological fields 
(Iansiti & Levien, 2004c; Powell et al., 1996). It is assumed that ecosystem participants “are 
self-motivated to pursue their own entrepreneurial opportunities […] in trust-rich contexts” 
(Giudici et al., 2018: 1393). Instead, this study suggests that trust-rich contexts are important 
for exploration but the availability of resources to support exploration can result in the 
exploitation of the system for individual self-benefit under the established way of doing 
business. Both opportunistic behaviours by individuals and system exploitation manifested in 
several ways, which are discussed next.  
First, in some cases, system exploitation took the form of researchers using public funding 
for publications and not for the implementation of results. The empirical evidence shows 
the dark side of the conflicting objectives of research-industry cooperation. The existing 
business models around public funding for R&D limit researchers’ interests in implementing 
their results. What these insights highlight is that open-system orchestrators have to recognise 
the business incentives of ecosystem actors by setting mechanisms to ensure that the 





industry at an ecosystem, rather than individual, level. Indeed, established players relying on 
the strong ties with the orchestrator to obtain the resources were involved in incremental 
innovation. This network falls within a category of network evolution (Elfring & Hulsink, 
2007).  
Second, system exploitation amongst some private firms means that public funding was 
sometimes used for self-benefit and not to implement results. The study’s findings 
showed that some individual firms used public funding and R&D opportunities for “money 
and not for results” (Researcher, FIN20), e.g. tax reduction schemes that were not directly 
related to national R&D. Some organisations aimed to use the funding for state tax reduction 
benefits and not for the implementation of results. To prevent this, TEKES invested into 
mitigation mechanisms against freeriding by setting a review board. This mechanism was 
limited in nature, as it did not address how the firms captured value from R&D. The 
mechanisms of public funding configured individual firms to rely on public funding instead 
of seeking business opportunities on a global scale (Spencer, Murtha, & Lenway, 2005). 
Consequently, ecosystem participants competed for public funding and not for value 
propositions. Public funding created false expectations amongst SMEs, as explained by the 
researcher (FIN20): 
Very often, when small firms first contacted the programme, they expected that they did 
not have [to] pay [a] salary. They thought that they could just estimate their salary and 
TEKES would pay half of that for SMEs, but they were told that, unless they pay that 
salary, they will not get money from TEKES. And, you must pay first to be able to get 
funding from TEKES. You will need to cover 100% of your salary and other costs before 
you will get funding from TEKES. That was shooting down a lot of proposals. People 
had the wrong expectations. (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES typically sponsored only 40% of a project budget. Although it encouraged SME 
participation, it was mostly large organisations who were able to afford the match funding for 
R&D. This contributed to a disconnect between SMEs and large organisations concerning 





Third, system exploitation took the form of industry actors intentionally preserving the 
industry’s status quo and established business models. The system exploitation happened at 
both industry and international levels.  
At the industry level, the innovation network experienced two issues. The first issue was 
that BIM implementation would require a restructure of the industry’s division of labour 
and profit. The business models represent a critical issue in the industry as they impact value 
capture from R&D and were a key issue in the RYM Shock programme. For example, the 
early discussions between architects and champions led to an understanding that the 
implementation of BIM should address the fee structure of designers. However, restructuring 
the industry’s division of labour and profit would mean the restructure of institutional power 
relations. For example, architects traditionally lead projects institutionally. When BIM was 
proposed as an industry-wide innovation, architects were anxious about a power restructure 
in the industry, as explained by the researcher (FIN18):  
I participated under the confidentiality agreement for the strategic agreement with some 
architectural associations in the early 80s. They got anxious about their role with this 
technology: is it beneficial to them or is it dangerous, and so on! If there are any doubts of 
[the] benefits from this technology, companies usually do not do that, because they would 
rather stay in something they always done. It takes a lot of courage to change how the 
system works. (Researcher, FIN18) 
Consequently, the industry actors could not agree on the division of labour. The preservation 
of established business models is therefore the dark side of the national BIM deployment, as 
explained by researcher (FIN20): 
Main thing that did not happen was changing business models and contractual models. 
VERA was creating processes and technologies and SARA was expanding business 
models. So, these are the dark side of national development, that business models are 
unchanged. […] Probably, it is more difficult to change businesses and contracts than 
changing technology as people see more risks in that and, if the clients do not see the 
benefits of having different contractual models, they are not willing to change their 
procurement methods to buy services. Unless you do it on a wider scale, you cannot prove 
the benefits. […] how to prove that something is useful if no one ever used that?! It is 





Another example is that general contractors and sub-contractors profit from established 
business models as they create money from existing inefficiencies within construction 
processes, as researcher (FIN20) noted: 
The dark side of [the] status quo is that the industry creates money from waste and some 
people do not want that to change. […] The culture of industry is another dark side. People 
are not motivated or do not have capabilities or desire to change. (Researcher, FIN20) 
While some actors intentionally preserved established business models, built environment 
stakeholders struggled to find a BIM value propositions that would unite all ecosystem 
stakeholders, as indicated by the manager (FIN12): 
There are people which are very keen on BIM and sustainability. But how to put them 
together? It seems impossible! […] I do not know why the owners were not involved. All 
the participants in this value chain. It is natural. They look at their own businesses. So, 
what was developed here did not fit to the business model of the owners. There was 
mismatch. This is really a key question. (Manager, TEKES, FIN12) 
The mechanisms set by TEKES did not take into consideration the existing business culture 
and business models of the industry. They extensively relied on the enthusiasm and goodwill 
of ecosystem participants. The intentional preservation of the status quo by ecosystem 
participants is the dark side of open-system orchestration. Even today, business models for 
the design and construction industry remain unchanged and thus constitute the dark side of 
the industry.  
At an international level, TEKES supported the involvement of champions in IAI activities 
by promoting the development of open standards and interoperability between technology 
systems. Whereas the Finnish champions envisioned open modular structures with open 
interfaces to enable BIM practices, their desire coalesced with the established power of 
international software suppliers. There was an opportunity for software vendors, as 
complementors, to support the growth of inter-organisational practices by establishing a 
common open platform for interoperability. This meant that stakeholders could set the 





enable effective processes and the reduction of uncertainty (Laakso and Kiviniemi, 2012). 
However, the study’s evidence suggests that, due to a history of dominance and existing 
competitive dynamics in the software sector, these open standards were not fully 
implemented. There is limited evidence that open standards are supported by the leading 
software suppliers (Howard & Björk, 2008; Laakso & Kiviniemi, 2012). This evidence 
echoes the results presented in the work of Ozcan and Santos (2015). It shows that national 
open-system orchestrators have limited power at an international level to incentivise the 
necessary global complementors to participate.  
Silos: The collective intelligence of social networks and network ties. TEKES had a 
horizontal relationship with the champions, who in turn had an active role in the decision-
making processes. For example, TEKES and the industry champions collectively defined the 
goals of the national technology programmes for BIM R&D and the project selection criteria 
for funding. Programmes typically had steering groups consisting of key industry actors to 
strategically navigate the focus of technology programmes. The industry champions were 
invited to lead the programmes. Indeed, ecosystem orchestrators advised that, to allow 
network members to play important roles in innovation leverage, they should be included in 
decision-making processes, and the dynamic participation of network members should be 
facilitated (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). Small communities, however, are susceptible to 
biases and predisposed cognitive frames (Porac et al., 1989). These biases manifested in 
several ways.  
First, while participating in the technology programmes, the network of champions developed 
digital capabilities much faster than the rest of the industry. The empirical evidence shows 
that the silo of this network led to an increasing gap from traditional industry. The literature 
on networks and competition suggests that this condition would offer a strategic competitive 





Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). However, the empirical evidence suggests that a small group of 
champions fixated on technological development. Consequently, they distanced themselves 
from the traditional actors: 
I would say that the main drivers were idealists - people who believed in it, like [hidden] 
- but really the business drivers, they were lacking. This is my feeling at the moment […] 
They have done this together in different positions. Like me, I have been a very strong 
insider. (Manager, TEKES, FIN12) 
People were interested in technology because of their personal interest. It is, of course, 
true. Especially in Nordic countries like Finland. People can get easily carried away with 
the technology. (Researcher, FIN20) 
The knowledge created in BIM R&D was mostly utilised by the champions (Froese, 2002). 
Although the mechanisms to disseminate the results in the VERA programme were effective 
to some extent, these mechanisms were not widely utilised across all programmes. In fact, 
mechanisms for knowledge capture, management and reuse represent a key issue for national 
technology programmes. The publication of the results was not demanded by TEKES and 
therefore reports were not published at all or published in Finnish. The marketing of activities 
and results is another key issue that would have positively contributed to the Finnish industry 
internationally. As a CEO of the software vendor firm indicated:  
I think we didn’t make much noise out of it, sort of internationally. We did some but not 
very much. It was more like okay, let us just do that. (CEO, Software Vendor, FIN17) 
The size of the country (Finland’s population is 5.5 million) and local culture had created 
certain conditions where the network of champions was too tightly interlinked within the 
institutional structures, as explained by researcher (FIN18):  
We are a small country and I think Finland has a very critical size, and I have seen the 
same happening on many different occasions and different industry sectors. In Finland, 
we always gather around like five people around the table like this and those five 
people would decide what is going to happen in the next 10 years. This really happens. 
[…] Here, it was always possible in many cases to find a consensus. […] I have seen this 
myself in the building sector, nuclear engineering, and mechanical engineering industry. 
[…] This is one of the funny things in this country, people go around. So, once you get to 
know the full team, they may move to other jobs. But you still keep meeting them in 





The literature suggests that success arises when intermediaries primarily support - 
institutionally and commercially - business groups and family firms because of relational ties 
in place of contractual ties (Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009). The strong ties 
were important for the emergence of the ecosystem network, but, perhaps, the entrepreneurs 
struggled to engage the weak ties to expand and create markets outside of Finland (Elfring & 
Hulsink, 2007). Instead, the empirical evidence in this paper suggests that relational ties in 
innovation networks can also lead to false perceptions and biases if the choices made by the 
innovation network core are grounded in what was perceived (by them only) as benefits or 
advantages derived from technological innovation. The members of an innovation network 
were entangled in common beliefs and passions for technologies in a trust-rich environment 
with available resources, digital competencies and support by the orchestrator. 
The interviewees suggested that the built environment sector was a closed community, 
although one informant reported that it is opening nowadays. The afore-mentioned conditions 
defined competitive and cooperative relationships allowing the ecosystem actors to adopt 
technologies due to their technological enthusiasm and not because of the need to compete at 
an international level:  
This is a small country, we are not afraid of international competition, it is possible to 
adopt technology enthusiasm even if it is commercially not profitable in the short 
term. […] But this technological enthusiasm can be dangerous. […] If you invest in the 
technology, which is not yet mature, you might suffer from competition. […] In the 80s, 
we had a number of big brave software companies in a very small market like 
Finland. I assume if people had a little bit more sense, they would not have established 
these companies for such a small market. They were more interested in IT rather than 
business. (Researcher, FIN18)  
The literature suggests that ecosystems emerge from the interactions between multiple 
heterogenous organisations that create new structures for value propositions (Jacobides et al., 
2018; Jacobides et al., 2006). Instead, the findings in this research further suggest that 
ecosystems do not necessarily emerge in some conditions. The study illuminated that open-





consideration of business drivers for technology, the industry context (division of labour, 
capabilities, business model, culture and nature) and the capacity to capture value. In such 
contexts as the design and construction industry, open-system orchestration can be a 
challenging task to bridge value creation with value capture.  
2.5.2 Implications of the Dark Side of Open-System Orchestration 
The current theory on open-system orchestration emphasises the important role of 
open-system orchestrators on the development of institutions by “building loosely coupled 
communities of actors, rather than designing and enforcing a set of contractual 
relationships” (Giudici et al., 2018:p.1395) and helping firms to create their own 
“entrepreneurial identity” (Navis Glynn 2011). Yet, it has a positive angle in promising to aid 
the development of a firm’s capabilities, which would lead to the emergence of new markets. 
Instead, the findings presented in this research show that open-system orchestration can 
create a positive influence on innovation exploration but can fail to yield conclusive evidence 
of the promised benefits of value capture and exploration. In other words, the current theory 
of open-system orchestration provides processes to support value creation but is ill-suited to 
explain how value is captured by ecosystem participants.  
The empirical findings illuminated the dark side of open-system orchestration. The 
manifestations of the dark side observed in this study aligned with the propositions by 
Oliveira and Lumineau (2019). First, the dark side manifested in the mechanisms for public 
funding that incentivised new members to configure to public funding expectations, thus 
generating system exploitation. This allowed for opportunistic behaviours amongst some of 
the participants. However, these incentives coalesced with the notion that the traditional 
design and construction industry is always local. Second, the dark side manifested in the 





international technology supplier levels. The “powerful players from different industries have 
difficulty in reaching agreement on the new market’s architecture due to their history of 
dominance in their respective industries” (Ozcan & Santos, 2015: p.1986). Third, the dark 
side manifested in the business culture that exists in the context of the built environment. 
Individuals intentionally preserved the status quo because of industry-rooted practices that 
drive potential opportunism amongst industry participants (Gu, Kim, Tse, & Wang, 2010; 
Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger, 2008). Indeed, it is widely known that managers of construction 
projects exhibit opportunistic behaviours, thereby damaging innovation practice (Korczynski, 
1996). The failure of business networks to emerge can be attributed to competitive dynamics, 
which are oriented towards the exploitation of established business models with little 
incentive for cooperation for business model innovation. The opportunities provided in 
knowledge ecosystems will not necessary be used to search for new business opportunities. 
Open-system orchestrators are advised to consider the development of missing capabilities 
and mindset shifts by ecosystem participants and offer effective mechanisms for knowledge 
capture, management, and reuse.  
However, the fourth manifestation derived in this research contributes a new understanding 
of the dark side of inter-organisational relations. While the dark side is typically associated 
with opportunistic behaviours and ill-suited intentions (Bizzi, 2013; Oliveira & Lumineau, 
2019; Poppo et al., 2008), the findings show that the good intentions of an open-system 
orchestrator and its ecosystem can manifest the dark side. While the commitment, trust and 
engagement of ecosystem participants were present, the silos of the core hub can manifest in 
biased decisions even if the network of champions extensively cooperate or is open for 
cooperation in a not-for-profit way. The trust of an on-going team has a direct impact on the 
motivation and performance of champions (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007). A desire to aid the 





heterogenous horizontal interactions between the orchestrator and network members can also 
limit the innovative potential of ecosystems. This can also clash with the conflicting goals of 
complementary actors. The results of the dark side of open-system orchestration highlighted 
the need for strategies to tackle the collective intelligence of ecosystem participants.  
The finding draws attention to the role of the open-system orchestrator in guiding value 
creation. The role of the orchestrator in only requiring R&D for technology development but 
not imposing what technology should be created, could be usefully coupled with the 
development of dynamic capabilities and mindset shifts for openness. Collaborative learning 
and engagement can generate positive outcomes (Berkes, 2009), but without knowledge 
management mechanisms these activities can be fruitless in terms of the value capture by 
ecosystem members. Furthermore, open-system orchestrators are encouraged to have a 
“subtler role, by helping members clarify their understanding of own goals and distinctive 
resources” (Giudici et al., 2018: p.1395). In the design and construction sector, actors are 
more likely to preserve the status quo and individual value capture which can limit the 
potential value creation for industry-wide innovation overall. As such, it can naturally lead to 
vicious cycles in the industry when ecosystem members search for the benefits from their 
own established ways of conducting business. This finding indicates that the open-system 
orchestration mechanisms proposed by Giudici et al. (2018) are well suited for individual 
entrepreneurs and not for established industry actors. Thus, this chapter contributed, to some 
extent, to the call made by Giudici et al. (2018: p.1398) “future research may also extend our 
efforts to examine the implications of open-system orchestration on the design of new 
business models (e.g., Baden-Fuller & Haefliger, 2013)”. 
Finally, the case of national BIM deployment in Finland between 1982 and 2018 resonates 
with the case of Scottish knitwear, which also suffered from maturity and cognitive biases 





Westgren, & Sonka, 2009) across the managerial level may be an exception (Porac et al., 
2011) that makes the Finnish design and construction industry case and the Scottish knitwear 
case interesting.  
2.5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
No study is without its limitations, and the efforts to analyse national BIM deployment 
in Finland is no exception. Several limitations were identified within the study that could 
offer future areas of research.  
Timing. The data collected in Finland in 2015 was followed by five follow-up interviews 
between 2016 and 2019. When the researcher entered the field, 2015 was a difficult time for 
the industry in Finland. This was the end of the stagnation period when champions were 
exhausted from a long and intensive journey towards digital innovation in the construction 
industry. The collected interviews were more negative than positive as expectations had not 
been met and industry champions were questioning the history of national BIM deployment. 
Although this paper presents the dark side of open-system orchestration, there were multiple 
positive effects created by TEKES, such as the development of a theoretical and technical 
basis that constituted modern BIM technologies, which consequently led to higher quality 
design and construction processes in Finland, in-depth technological competence amongst the 
champions and the early adoption of BIM in Finland on a global scale. Finland is a profound 
example for other countries that are going through BIM deployment on a national scale.  
A limitation of the data collection is that the data was not collected extensively about RYM 
shock, which was initiated by industry associations and data analysis from the KIRA-digi 
project, rests on the two interviews conducted with the same manager over the course of three 
years. The KIRA-digi participants were not interviewed which offers an opportunity for 





following initiatives to complete the industry evolution and study the effects of KIRA-digi 
mechanisms on the emergence of business ecosystems. Furthermore, other programmes were 
included in the analysis. As most data was published in Finnish or not published online at all, 
this created a challenge in deriving more in-depth analysis.  
Single case. National BIM deployment in Finland is a unique case as there are no globally 
documented cases that focus on the renewal of the design and construction industry in 
national innovation systems. While this study articulated the role of TEKES as an 
orchestrator and its national ICT technology programmes as a knowledge ecosystem, when it 
was established, TEKES did not consider an ecosystem and saw its role as a public funder for 
technology R&D. The business ecosystems only recently caught the interest of the 
government. This study considers the evolution of thinking about ecosystems and its 
importance for sectors. Future research could usefully explore the implications of open-
system orchestration on business model innovation in the sectors, which go beyond 
individual entrepreneurs towards sector-wide innovation. The renewal of mature industries 
with open-system orchestration mechanisms could be a challenging and interesting topic. The 
national mandate and efforts made by the UK since 2016 (HM Government, 2015) on the 
orchestration processes set by the government would be a good case to follow in future 
research.  
Orchestration mechanisms. Several conceptual questions remain open for future studies. 
First, additional research is needed on the orchestration mechanisms that bridge the 
disconnect between knowledge and business ecosystems. Future research could explore the 
nourishing mechanisms for business ecosystem orchestration from a policy maker’s 
perspective (Rinkinen & Harmaakorpi, 2018) and an ecosystem member’s perspective. 
Second, the orchestration mechanisms are set to renew mature industries, as opposed to 





literature on ecosystem orchestration. The implication is that innovating firms can be 
constrained by cognitive and institutional biases that create impediments for self-renewal; 
however, they can also be constrained by the international power relations of complementors 
and the industry context. Third, the concept of context in ecosystem literature can provide 
new insights in grounding relevant mechanisms for the purposes that orchestrators aim to 
achieve. Finally, this research identifies an emerging field that can be usefully researched in 
the future, namely the dark side of open-system ecosystem orchestration.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the role of open-system orchestrators in enabling industry-wide 
innovation with ICT R&D (e.g. BIM technologies). Based on a case study in Finland, the role 
of open-system orchestrators is similar to intermediary organisations, like business incubators 
and matchmakers. Despite similarities in the orchestration mechanisms, the role of the open-
system orchestrator in this research was also inclined to a closed-system approach. The 
insights highlighted the difficult role of the public organisation as an open-system 
orchestrator in bridging the disconnect between value creation and value capture and 
incentivising the participation of necessary complementors. A government organisation can 
have limited power to direct and incentivise the necessary behaviours and be challenged by 
following the approach of an open-system orchestrator. It is possible that combining the 
mechanisms from open and closed-system types of orchestration (e.g. Dyer and Nobeoka 
(2000)) can potentially bridge value creation and capture, but such orchestrators might still 
have limited power at the international level.  
Whereas open-system orchestration is expected to create a positive environment for the 
organisation to capture value for the development of networks, the findings also suggest that 





value capture favouring silos and opportunism. This failure constitutes the dark side of open-
system orchestration. The dark side of open-system orchestration can also pose challenges 
related to the good intentions of actors leading to the failure of value capture and industry-
wide innovation. Ecosystem participants can fail to capture value from the technology push. 
A stronger consideration of industry context, capabilities and business model innovation is 
necessary for value capture. Assuming that the role of the open-system orchestrator is critical 
for the emergence of new business networks, empirical evidence shows that contextual 
conditions can contribute to a disconnect between value creation and value capture. An open-
system orchestrator can fail to assess the industry’s capabilities while setting exaggerated 
expectations. This work has set a new scene to investigate the dark side of open-system 
orchestration in ecosystem research.  
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Chapter 3. CLOSED-SYSTEM ORCHESTRATION:                                                            




Research on business ecosystem orchestration has been the subject of increased 
scholarly interest. Successful examples of business ecosystem orchestration have resulted in 
extensive research on the role of central hub firms and their success stories in value capture; 
this forms a selection bias. In this chapter, I examine the under-theorized failure of a hub firm 
in orchestrating a business ecosystem in the digital built environment sector operating in 
northern California. The analysis reveals that the orchestration processes, with the use of the 
marketing power set by the hub firm, negatively affected sector-wide innovation with 
Building Information Management. Promising directions for future research on the corrective 
mechanisms and the dark side of ecosystem orchestration are discussed.  
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The nascent literature on ecosystem orchestration, an emerging stream, has focused on 
hub-based models where a dominant hub firm successfully leads a business ecosystem to 
bring an innovation to the market (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). 
The success of business ecosystems is often achieved with “network effects” (Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985), which are created by hub firms on top of the platforms they own. Network 
effects can magnify advantages to the platform owner because the value to customers on one 
side of the platform increases with the number of participating complementors on the other 
side thus creating a mutual benefit for everyone in the business ecosystem (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2014; Iansiti & Levien, 2004c; Jacobides et al., 2018). Typical success examples 
are Facebook, Uber and Google.  
While there is a growing understanding of how these hub firms successfully orchestrate their 
business ecosystems (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011), scholars may 
have overlooked several related critical issues. First, scholars extensively focus on the 
successful examples of long-lived business ecosystems. The focus tends to be “lopsided […] 
and directed at “the few” (Jacobides et al., 2019), thus creating “a selection bias” (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994: p.665). This study recognises the need for empirical research to strengthen the 
emerging stream of failed ecosystems (Jacobides et al., 2016; Ozcan & Santos, 2015; Tee & 
Gawer, 2009). Second, current debates on inter-organisational networks further emphasise 
the dark side of inter-organisational relations (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019), which is a 
nascent stream within ecosystem literature. Third, the orchestration mechanisms described in 
the literature (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011) derive from the 
Business-to-Customer (B2C) contexts of successful examples, while the orchestration 





& Ritala, 2017). An open question remains as to the extent to which the theories of business 
ecosystem orchestration developed in B2C contexts can be applied to B2B contexts.  
To address these shortcomings, this study presents empirical evidence of orchestration 
processes set by a global incumbent software vendor. The software vendor successfully 
orchestrates business ecosystems for individual value capture but fails to orchestrate value 
creation and capture by customers in a Business-to-Business (B2B) context. The software 
vendor particularly fails to play a key role in ensuring an equitable value distribution and 
mitigating value appropriability by B2B customers (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). Thus, the 
orchestrated ecosystem is a case of “ego-system” (Jacobides et al., 2019). A specific context 
for the study of orchestration processes set by the software vendor involves the 
implementation of Building Information Management (BIM)-related technology innovation 
(Eastman et al., 2011; Sacks et al., 2018) in the Digital Built Environment (DBE) sector in 
northern California. The software vendor runs Software as a Service (SaaS) business model 
in a B2B context. It offers a platform that incorporates various proprietary software, 
including BIM software, to support design and construction practices to business owners, and 
design and construction service providers in the DBE sector. Thus, it owns a platform but 
also orchestrates a business ecosystem around its platform to increase its membership.  
The literature on ecosystem orchestration assumes that opportunistic and joint benefits from 
the use of platform technologies will open up new business opportunities. By tapping into 
business ecosystem formation, ecosystem participants are expected to shape opportunities 
and gain benefits through joint sensemaking (Nambisan et al., 2017). The case presented in 
this study clearly indicates a limitation of the theory as the opportunistic behaviour by the 
software vendor offers inadequate opportunities for value capture by the complementors, 





It looks as if this orchestrator is different from the successful examples of Google and Intel. 
Successful orchestrators are effective at individual value capture while also offer mechanisms 
for value capture by complementors and consumers. For example, Intel was researched as a 
case by Gawer and Cusumano (2014); it was initially a component maker but became an 
architect that changed the computer sector from a fragmented siloed environment to a 
modular ecosystem. This opened up the ecosystem to enable the creation of innovation by 
complementors and prompted the evolution of the sector. Google offers an open platform by 
first focusing on engagement, which drives value creation to achieve a critical mass amongst 
the platform membership. Then, it uses network effects to drive a distributed monetization 
model. For example, Google allows complementors to use third party tools to create apps that 
connect through APIs to an Android platform while also accepting most of the apps (Greene 
& Shilton, 2018).  
Instead, it seems that the software vendor offers a platform with limitations while indirectly 
but effectively enforcing the customer’s adoption of the platform through marketing power. 
Indeed, the orchestrators influence the formation of the ecosystem through their recruitment 
strategies (Kenis & Knoke, 2002). The software vendor uses marketing strategies to recruit 
customers and increase the membership size in order to maintain its power and status as a 
dominant software provider in California and around the world. The use of marketing 
strategies has a disproportional negative effect on the value capture by customers in the DBE 
sector. It contributes to a restructure of the division of labour by serving those who already 
have power and resources. It therefore favours large, vertically integrated firms whilst 
limiting the potential emergence of ecosystems in the sector. Consequently, its strategies 
reinforce the status quo feedback loops in the sector. It defines value propositions for the use 
of BIM in the sector, thus limiting the sector’s innovative potential. It sets exaggerated 





sector’s clients and B2B customer, and the service providers. The platform offered does not 
act as a platform and has limitations in connecting design to construction practices. This 
evidence constitutes the dark side of ecosystem orchestration by a closed-system orchestrator 
(Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). Consequently, the orchestrator follows an uneasy transition 
from a vertically integrated firm to a platform-based business ecosystem. As such, the 
business ecosystem orchestration context can potentially influence what, how and by whom 
value is created and captured.  
By examining the case of business ecosystem orchestration by a software vendor and its 
impact on the value capture by complementors and customers, this study develops a 
theoretical understanding of the orchestration mechanisms set in B2B contexts while 
describing the contextual nature of such processes. To arrive at a theoretical understanding, a 
theory is built on the work of, and addressed the call by, Nambisan and Sawhney (2011: p. 
55) who stated: “another research implication relates to the characteristics of the hub firm 
and their impact on network orchestration. […] the nature of the processes and their 
implementation likely vary with the structure and power of the hub entity, indicating another 
promising line of future inquiry”. This chapter offers an empirical basis for the grey areas of 
ecosystem orchestration literature, such as failed ecosystems, while contributing to current 
debates on the dark side of interorganisational relations (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). In the 
remainder of this chapter, I first describe the theoretical background pertaining to the 
questions, then discuss the findings, their contributions to literature, and finally provide 
concluding remarks.  
3.2 ECOSYSTEM ORCHESTRATION 
Over the last twenty years, Dyer and Singh (1998) proposed interfirm networks as a 





mechanisms by Toyota have been understood from a relational perspective that proposes 
mechanisms to manage a network of suppliers in one private automotive sector. While the 
Toyota case represents relationships between the hub firm and its complementors, it remains 
an alliance type of orchestrator (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Jacobides et al., 2019). The digital 
economy calls for extended mechanisms on orchestration, which are aimed at value capture 
in ecosystems when technological and innovation complementors are present (Teece, 2018b).  
As a result, the orchestration mechanisms set by a hub firm have become a prominent topic in 
the literature on digital innovation and business ecosystems (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; 
Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Jacobides et al., 2018; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). 
Orchestration by a “hub firm” (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006) is also known as a “strategic 
center” (Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller, 1995), “anchor firm” (Wang et al., 2014), “kingpin” 
(Jacobides & Tae, 2015), “keystone” (Iansiti & Levien, 2004c) or “organisational leader” 
(Sydow et al., 2012). As mentioned previously in this study, I refer to the hub firm as an 
orchestrator. Moreover, Nambisan and Sawhney (2011: p.40) recognize two types of 
orchestrators - an “innovation integrator” and a “platform leader”. A platform leader offers a 
“platform or a foundation for other network members to build on through their own 
complementary innovations” while an innovation integrator “defines the basic architecture 
for the core innovation and then invites network members to design and develop the different 
components that make up this core innovation” (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011: p.41). Thus, 
the software vendor falls into the “platform leader wannabe” category (Gawer & Cusumano, 
2008).  
Orchestrators usually remain central decision makers by occupying bottlenecks (Hannah & 
Eisenhardt, 2019) and managing value creation through cooperation and value capture 
through competition. They set a system goals or collective value propositions, and 





(Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). The ecosystems build on unique mechanisms for value 
creation and value capture. “Greater value creation, in turn, depends on the firms’ ability to 
innovate successfully. To capture the returns from innovation, many firms strive to be 
technology leaders in their industry by being first to introduce new innovations to the 
market” (Adner & Kapoor, 2010: p.306).  
An orchestrator can lead with an open or a closed-system approach. The software vendor in 
this study is categorised as a closed-system orchestrator, which is reflected in its self-
interested orientation. This contrasts with an open-system orchestrator that supports network 
members in search of their own business opportunities (Giudici et al., 2018). However, 
despite the significance of an orchestrator’s role, the way in which an orchestrator facilitates 
value creation and capture remains empirically underexplored (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011).  
Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) further recognise that the orchestration processes occur in a 
dual context, platform design and ecosystem design in B2C contexts. Network design is the 
bridge between platform design and ecosystem design (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). 
Orchestration, or network orchestration, refers to the capability to purposefully build and 
manage inter-firm innovation networks “without the benefits of hierarchical authority” 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006: p.659). As such, the software vendor designs the platform as well 
as the innovative business ecosystem around the platform. Therefore, a platform designed by 
a software vendor falls into a category of an industry platform; this is a technology that is 
offered to the DBE sector as a foundation upon which external innovators can develop their 
complementary services, technologies and building products. It is thus organised as an 
innovative business ecosystem (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). An innovative business 
ecosystem can be characterised as “a community of interdependent heterogenous actors 
coordinated through a co-alignment structure who collectively deliver an ecosystem-level 





Platforms offer several benefits for the orchestration processes. First, platforms play an 
indirect and supportive role in innovation orchestration, thus allowing complementors to 
create their innovative solutions by using the platform as a foundation (Gawer, 2014). As 
such, the platform orchestrators rely on complementors to supply complementary products 
and services that enhance the core of the platform in order to provide better benefits to users 
(Parker et al., 2016a). Second, platforms offer a considerable promise in terms of improved 
value creation and value capture by a heterogeneous network of ecosystem complementors 
through combining knowledge, resources and capabilities to provide value that is bigger than 
any single firm can provide (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Jacobides et al., 2006). Third, an 
orchestrator inverts the production from in-house to outside through the “network effects” 
(Katz & Shapiro, 1985). In the context of platform-based ecosystems, the orchestration of 
network effects is critical to platform survival as complementors are essential to a platform’s 
success (Ozalp, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018). Network effects occur between two and more 
cross-groups of platform users and complementors through mutual symbiosis. The value of 
the platform increases with the number of complementors, which drives the increase of 
customers and drives more value to the complementors (Hagiu & Wright, 2015).  
The growth of platform-based ecosystems depends on the orchestration mechanisms 
deployed by the orchestrator (Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013). Ecosystem orchestration 
refers to the capability to purposefully build and manage an inter-firm innovation network 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) 
theorized about managing knowledge mobility, innovation appropriability and network 
stability. Nambisan and Sawhney (2011:p.42) extended the work of Dhanaraj and Parkhe 
(2006) by theorizing about orchestration mechanisms that “perform several orchestration 
processes, including managing innovation leverage, managing innovation coherence, 





managing innovation appropriability”. Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) focused on three 
mechanisms: managing innovation leverage, managing innovation coherence, and managing 
innovation appropriability. A process of innovation leverage allows members to reuse and 
redeploy the assets of other members to facilitate innovation output (Iansiti & Levien, 
2004c). Managing internal innovation coherence allows for the coordination and alignment 
of members’ output processes while external innovation coherence relates to the alignment of 
goals and outputs in relation to external technology and the market environment. Innovation 
appropriability relates to the key processes by the orchestrator that ensure equitable value 
appropriation amongst members by participation in the ecosystem (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 
2006). Their studies offer useful foundations for the development of grounded theory on 
ecosystem orchestration.  
By presenting the software vendor’s strategy, new empirical knowledge is added to the 
orchestration mechanisms theorized by Nambisan and Sawhney (2011). In particular, this 
study adds new knowledge to the ecosystem orchestration mechanisms that manage network 
membership, manage innovation coherence, and manage innovation appropriability. The 
management of network membership is of particular interest to this study because of its 
significance for complementors. Orchestrators manage the size and diversity of network 
membership through recruitment strategies, which preserve its centrality and status (Dhanaraj 
& Parkhe, 2006; Doz, Olk, & Ring, 2000; Kenis & Knoke, 2002). The formal arrangements 
used by an orchestrator to motivate members depicted in the literature were intellectual rights 
and contractual forums (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2013; Ritala, Agouridas, Assimakopoulos, & 
Gies, 2013), standards and interfaces (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Teece, 2018b), and 
platform dominance and newness (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). Very few scholars researched 





orchestration processes on how the software vendor recruits its members and manages 
innovation coherence and appropriability, this case constitutes failed orchestration process.  
Evidence shows that the process of orchestration can be complex as ecosystems can fail for 
various reasons. For example, ecosystems can fail because of power reorganisation in the 
market (Ozcan & Santos, 2015); a short-sighted agency and blindsided actors with their own 
conception of reality (Porac et al., 1989); power actors intending to retain control of their 
market share (Jacobides et al., 2016), and entrepreneurs who face resistance from incumbents 
(Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). These studies on failed ecosystems offer useful insights to 
ecosystem orchestration. The case explored in this chapter offers new insights on how one 
powerful incumbent can represent a paradoxical case of simultaneous success and failure that 
has not yet been empirically explored in existing ecosystem literature. The case of a software 
vendor contributes new insights to the emerging debate on how and why ecosystems can fail 
while projecting individual success. The incumbent is widely and globally considered one of 
the leading software vendors in succeeding both in business and innovation. This study 
presents a different perspective in demonstrating that the process of successful individual 
value capture does not always lead to the successful value capture by complementors and 
customers. In fact, the orchestration mechanisms set by an incumbent can have serious 
implications for the business of complementors and customers.  
The process of orchestration can be even more challenging when the orchestration process is 
taking place in specific contexts, like the DBE sector. The DBE sector is infamous for failing 
to innovate beyond the intra-organisational boundaries and investing in innovation activities 
(Egan, 1998; Morrell, 2015; Winch, 1998). However, while theorizing a failure by a software 
vendor, it is important to note that the sector holds particularities that influence the strategy 






Furthermore, ecosystem literature tends to focus on a few examples of success in the B2C 
markets while there is ongoing debate regarding the role and value of the ecosystem concept 
in B2B contexts (Aarikka-Stenroos & Ritala, 2017). The software vendor fails as an 
orchestrator because, as a firm, it is successful in individual value capture; however, when 
operating in B2B contexts, its orchestration mechanisms disproportionately influence the 
value capture by platform customers in three distinct ways. First, its recruitment strategies are 
based on the marketing power to increase platform membership and, as such, sets 
exaggerated expectations between the sector’s clients who demand the use of the platform to 
create that value. Second, as mentioned earlier, the platform offers value that does not match 
the exaggerated expectations set by the software vendor, and thus hinders the process of 
innovation creation by customers who are service providers in the DBE sector. Third, the 
software vendor articulates the value propositions for the use of the platform, which hinders 
the innovative potential of SMEs, namely the B2B customers. While an orchestrator defines 
the use of their platform, they limit the customer’s innovative potential and capabilities by 
imposing value propositions on the supply chain in the DBE sector.  
These arguments suggest that ecosystem orchestration is a challenging process that is under-
researched (Ozcan & Santos, 2015). First, orchestrators are challenged by the environment in 
which they operate and are forced to focus on selfish value capture to survive. Second, the 
process of value articulation is largely taken for granted within ecosystem literature. The 
dominating role of the software vendor in articulating the value on behalf of the sector in a 
B2B context offers critical implications for the legitimacy of ecosystem members and for the 
orchestrator’s role (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Third, through the use of marketing power and 
identity-claiming strategies to become a cognitive referent in the sector, the orchestrator’s 
recruitment strategies appear to be critical to the value capture by complementors and B2B 





recruits prospective members by effectively utilizing marketing power while failing 
ecosystem members.  
Thus, an empirical study on the failed ecosystem by a software vendor can positively 
contribute to the call by Aldrich and Fiol (1994: p.646): “Because only a few theorists have 
examined failed industries […] we believe that legitimacy is a more important issue than 
previously recognized.” However, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) specifically called for industries 
that failed completely, this chapter presents the case of an individual orchestrator that has 
succeeded to gain dominance and control but failed the ecosystem members thus presenting a 
case that has simultaneously succeeded and failed while contributing to ongoing debates on 
the dark side of interorganisational relationships (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). In order to 
contribute to ongoing debates concerning the success versus failure of orchestrators, I ask: 
how and why did the software vendor fail the ecosystem orchestration? To which extent can 
the theories derived from the successful orchestration mechanisms in B2C contexts be 
applied to B2B contexts? In addressing these research questions, I articulate the orchestration 
mechanisms deployed by a prominent global incumbent that strives to win the “design to 
make” market while presenting the specifics of its failure in one region.  
3.3 DATA AND METHODS 
New theories can explain the creation of new value propositions when multiple actors 
are involved with complex power relations and are centred around platform innovation 
(Adner & Kapoor, 2016). Thus, this research pursues an inductive interpretivist methodology 
based on the study by Gioia et al. (2013) in order to understand how a software vendor failed 
the ecosystem member’s innovative capabilities through the deployment of orchestration 
mechanisms for individual value capture. Gioia et al. (2013) offers a methodology that 





experience scientifically (Gehman et al., 2018). The methodology applied by Gioia et al. 
(2013) was chosen for its reference to grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) that allows 
the use of a single case to capture, interpret and model an informant’s meanings in order to 
build a process model that fills a research or practice gap (Langley & Abdallah, 2015). The 
interpretivist approach gives voice to interviewers while also interpreting the key issues they 
experience on their journeys towards value capture from the use of the platform. As per 
Strauss and Corbin (1990), interviewees’ interpretations were further structured to construct 
the theoretical perspective grounded in and emerging from the data.  
3.3.1 Case Overview 
This case study is based on an incumbent software vendor who has scaled up based on 
its CAD design drafting technology, which it developed in the 1980s. Since then it has 
expanded its business by acquiring new software for the design, engineering and 
entertainment industries. With the emergence of the BIM acronym in 2002, the software 
vendor has started a new marketing strategy around BIM technologies in order to expand in 
various ways and thus target various supply chain specialties. It markets itself as a platform 
that connects design to construction allowing a frictionless data flow that promises to 
improve collaboration between various disciplines by connecting design and construction 
practices and enabling the digital business transformation of the sector. In the last decade, the 
software vendor made the transition from a traditional, perpetual licensing model with 
diminishing profits to an Internet Software as a Service (SaaS) subscription model that 
enables increased profits. Nowadays, it designs its own SaaS-platform products that are easily 












It is also important to note that the software vendor is a complementor to the DBE sector 
while it acts as an orchestrator. Figure 14 depicts the roles and relationships created in the 
software vendor’s business ecosystem.  
This case is particularly interesting because the digital built environment sector – the 
software vendor’s market segment – is infamous for its slow adoption of technologies and 
innovation (Bygballe & Ingemansson, 2014; Linderoth, 2010; Pries & Janszen, 1995), low 
rates of innovation (Winch, 1998) and was blamed for inefficiencies favouring a short-term 
perspective for sub-optimization (Gann, 1996). DBE incorporates the supply chain of 
Architecture, Engineering, Construction and Owner Operators businesses. BIM technologies 
were offered to the DBE sector to solve the inherent issue of lack of productivity in project 
networks (Björk, 1994; Eastman et al., 2011; Eastman, 1975). One of the promises of 
digitalization with BIM is that it provides mechanisms for collecting, managing, visualising 
and consuming knowledge collectively by the supply chain. BIM offers a set of processes 
underpinned with digital tools that are meant to support these mechanisms (Eastman et al., 
2011). However, despite the widespread adoption of BIM technologies and the regional 
advantage of the case study, its proximity to Silicon Valley and its active involvement with 
the network of top universities, the northern Californian DBE sector suffers from inertia and 
low productivity. The promised benefits of BIM implementation have generated modest 
results.  
This observation of the ecosystem surrounding technological innovation using BIM in this 
sector highlights the importance of the orchestration processes set by a software vendor. The 
software vendor’s platform is a dominant technology in the region. Hence, the dominance of 
the software vendor in the region meansthe orchestration processes it deploys to win the 
market and preserve its power disproportionally influence the sector’s business development 





3.3.2 Research Procedures and Data Sources 
Interviews. The qualitative data comprises interview data as a primary source and archival 
data as a secondary source. A total of 38 interviews were conducted with leading experts 
spreading across six key stakeholders and end-user groups: i) academia; ii) clients; iii) supply 
chain: business & management; iv) supply chain: technology operation; v) start-ups and 
challengers; and vi) the software developer (see Table 9). These 31 interviews were 
conducted in person and seven interviews were conducted over the phone. The first round of 
interviewees was selected by a professor at Stanford University. Subsequent interviewees 
were pinpointed and recommended by these initial interviewees. 
Table 9 Conducted Interviews 




Academia Academia Researchers 3 3 
Clients Silicon Valley  Project manager 2 5 
Health Care Project manager 2 




Architecture Architect 2 13 
General Contractor Business management 2 
CIO 2 
Innovation manager 1 
Engineers Mechanical 2 
Structural  1 
System engineering  2 
Sub-trades CIO mechanical 2 
Consultants Practice expert 1 
Facility management Manager 1 
Supply chain: 
BIM operation 
General contractor Pre-construction manager 1 9 
Superintendent  2 
VDC managers 2 
Project manager 1 
VDC integrator 1 
Architecture Architect 2 
Start-ups & 
challengers 
Ai technology CEO & CIO 5 5 
Software 
Developer 
BIM technology Product management 1 1 
Small scale 
renovation  







The semi-structured interview protocol was originally based on the approach developed by 
McCracken (1988) that proved to be ineffective in the northern Californian context. Some 
interviewees were reluctant to speak unless specific questions were asked. “Floating 
prompts” (Dohrenwend & Richardson, 1956) were used to repeat the key terms of the 
respondent’s last remark, which proved to have a negative result as the interviewees were 
annoyed by hearing a repetition of their own words. The researcher had to abandon the use of 
“floating prompts” during the process.  
Interviewees were free to highlight important issues experienced in their practice from their 
perspective, as suggested by Corley and Gioia (2011)’s problem-driven theory. The following 
questions were explored: 1) How has the sector evolved over the last 30 years in terms of 
BIM innovation? 2) Who are the ecosystem actors that drive the sector and influence sector 
innovation? 3) What issues are the ecosystem actors experiencing in relation to BIM 
practices?  
As the interviews progressed, open questions were directed to emerging themes and cases. 
During the process, key interviewees were interviewed twice, at the beginning and the end of 
the data collection phase, in order to explore and validate the emerging themes. The 
interviews varied in duration but ranged between 30-160 minutes. In total, 30 interviews 
lasted at least 60 minutes and were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Each interview is 
anonymous, and a transcript was provided for interviewee approval; furthermore, every 
transcript was labelled with a unique number identifiable only by the first author of this 
report. Quotes that could potentially identify individuals were eliminated to preserve the 
anonymity of the interviewees.  
Archival sources. In addition to the interview data, relevant literature on the northern 





and internal company documentations to obtain historical evidence of strategic change in the 
sector over the last twenty years regarding BIM implementation.  
During the data collection, I was a visiting scholar at CIFE, the Centre for Integrated Facility 
Engineering, Stanford University. I kept observational notes to complement the transcribed 
interviews. Moreover, I asked additional questions during the sector-related events at CIFE to 
recursively understand the emergent findings and to modify the interview protocol for the 
subsequent interviews. This process allowed me to engage in “gestalt analysis” (Gioia & 
Thomas, 1996) to make sense of the collected data.  
The collected data allowed for triangulation in various ways (Jick, 1979) - by circulating 
between the validated transcripts, archival sources and the discussions with key experts - 
thereby eliminating potential biases and validating the results. During the process, the 
researcher continued to communicate with key interviewees by providing preliminary 
evidence to clarify certain issues. As this understanding progressed, a private report was 
written with findings and circulated among key interviewees to correct any factual errors and 
validate my interpretations.  
Once the data collection process was completed and to maintain the high-level outsider 
perspective required for unbiased theorisation (Gioia et al., 2013), I had ongoing discussions 
with my multidisciplinary supervisory team that circulated between the the collected 
evidence and my observations. Although I have limited sector experience, I collected and 
performed the first data analysis, which was supported by my second supervisor, Martin 
Simpson, who is a structural engineer and familiar with the context of DBE sector. 
Furthermore, Prof. Arto Kiviniemi, who is an architect and my third supervisor, is a 
knowledgeable agent and familiar with the Californian context. He did not participate in the 





discussions. Lastly, the sector context was new to my first supervisor, Prof. Tom Elfring, who 
is a knowledgeable actor in strategic management.  
3.3.3 Data Analysis 
The collected data was inductively analysed as it adhered closely to the guidelines 
provided by Gioia et al. (2013) and to constant comparison techniques (Corbin & Strauss, 
2015). Interview transcripts were used as primary data for the analysis while field notes were 
used to refine the interpretation of emerging categories thereby guiding the integration of 
these categories within an overall framework. First, the aim was to understand and 
characterise the current dynamics of the DBE sector and the evolving relationship between 
the ecosystem actors. Then, I narrowed the research focus to the orchestration processes used 
by the software vendor. Next, I explain how the data analysis process moved from open 
coding to axial coding to grounded theory building.  
In my initial rounds, each interview was coded separately on the basis that each phrase was 
labelled according to the informant’s interpretation. A myriad of codes and themes emerged 
during this process, with each containing a sentence or a sequence of sentences (Weber, 
1990). Then, I reread each interview several times to discern similarities and differences 
between their interpretations. I continued discerning codes by collapsing them into the first-
order categories, employing the language used by interviewees. The abundance of data and 
emerging themes eventually became overwhelming when making sense of them (Gioia, 
2004). As a result of this iterative process, first-order categories were created (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). I iterated between the emerging themes to distil distinct conceptual patterns. 
This process allowed me to create mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive, first-order 
categories. Organised first-order categories illuminated a complex relationship between the 





sector’s dynamics and the use of BIM. The actors and factors that influenced this sector are 
depicted in Figure 15. 
 
 Figure 15 Reciprocal Relationship Between the DBE Sector and the Co-Evolving 
Actors and Environments  
Alongside my observations of these complex relationships and the development of first-order 
categories, the links between them were identified. To ground the knowledge gained and the 
coding, I reread key interview transcripts to further validate my observations. I was able to 
identify the drivers that influenced BIM practices, such as the labour market, increased 
demand, clients’ requirements, increased costs as an industry-wide issue, and the marketing 
power of software vendors. The interviewees highlighted several issues that they experienced 
in using the software vendor’s platform; these concerned its dominance in the area. The 





clients evidently had an impact on the built environment sector-wide innovation using BIM 
technologies and were present across most interviews. At this stage, the research gradually 
progressed to axial coding and then to a theory-driven explanation (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
The axial coding was dedicated to an analysis of the strategies employed by the software 
vendor, at which point I identified a number of issues. One large, first-order category was 
dedicated to the technology environment where the software vendor was the main actor. I 
further iterated once more across all codes; this meant distilling all relevant codes by adding 
them to the selected first-order category of the technology environment. The first-order 
category became a pool of data in which I iterated the open coding process by distilling the 
emerging themes and conceptual patterns dedicated to the software vendor’s activities. New, 
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive first-order categories and aggregated themes were 
created related to the software vendor’s activities. 
Through continuous iteration between this discussion and the data related to the software 
vendor, it was possible to extract the underlying orchestration processes set by the software 
vendor comprising a second-order of axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Through 
iterative refinement, the first-order categories were reduced to 32. This was further reduced to 
the emerging 15 second-order categories while merging them into the aggregated themes.  
Finally, the linkages between these aggregated dimensions were identified in order to build a 
grounded theory model to explain how a software vendor orchestrates DBE for self-benefit 
using a platform-based business model and marketing power. While damaging the innovative 
potential of the specialists in DBE, the use of marketing to recruit members manifested very 
clearly across key interviews and comprised the key findings. The software vendor acts as a 
driver of technological innovation in a mature sector. The iterative analysis resulted in a data 





induced but also generated interpretations of orchestration processes and effects, forming a 
story line between the second-order categories and aggregated themes. Then, the researcher 
returned to the relevant literature and cycled between the data, the emerging findings, and the 
theory to identify the novelty in these findings and to build the final grounded model.  
3.4 FINDINGS  
The competitive advantage of business ecosystem orchestrators rest in how they interact with 
their environments (Piepenbrock, 2009). The research finds that the case study is a very 
successful firm that aims to capture value by interacting with an environment that is 
“privately profitable but socially inefficient” (David & Greenstein, 1990: p.21). Indeed, the 
interviewees have detailed marketing strategies that are effectively used to create perceptions 
amongst decision makers – their clients – in order to push the sector towards their desired 
direction. At first, the research was concerned primarily with the effects of platform 
orchestration on the sector; however, it soon became apparent that marketing strategies have 
negative influences on inter-organisational dynamics between the sector actors and clients. 
This research finds that the exploitative dynamics created by the software vendor  
 






Figure 16. Data Structure Continued 
damage sector-wide innovation. This study also finds that the northern Californian DBE 
sector is a self-organised entity with no identifiable mechanisms to correct the behaviour of 
self-profiting firms. As suggested by Nambisan and Sawhney (2011), the orchestration 






Figure 16. Data Structure Continued 
analysis suggests that the software vendor achieves its success through two main 
orchestration processes: 1) an evolution towards an orchestrator of a platform; 2) the 
orchestration of the environment to build a robust business ecosystem around the platform. In 
this section, a narrative of these strategies is presented, following which the effects of the 







3.4.1 Regional Advantage as an Innovation Driver  
The software vendor’s embeddedness, proximity and co-location within Silicon Valley (SV) 
means successful business ecosystems represent important external drivers for innovation. 
Silicon Valley has an important role in influencing the behaviour of the firms by setting 
certain trends. There is a rapid shift in the technology market towards business ecosystems, 
from “building it all to partnering to provide it all” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30). 
Following the example of Uber, which has challenged the traditional taxi sector by creating 
new rules, the power and resources of SV firms pose a serious threat to the position of the 
software vendor. This accelerates the desire of the software vendor to dominate the 
technology market in the “design to make” sector with an integrated platform for 
collaboration that acts as an internal driver for innovation. Internally, the software vendor 
pursues two goals: the short-term goal is to dominate the construction market with the 
platform which, according to a manager, means that “the sector buys more [software 
vendor’s] software” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30); the long-term goal is to become a 
technology company with a “design to make” brand, like Amazon for “buying goods” and 
Google for “search”, as noted by manager (Software Vendor, CA30) (see selected quotes in 
Appendix C). The firm is currently pursuing market dominance that defines its accelerated 
value capture through orchestration processes; these are described in the following sections.  
3.4.2 Closed Platform Orchestration 
Following certain trends in Silicon Valley, the software vendor is going through a 
business model transformation, by moving towards a platform strategy by integrating with 
complementors, opening an API for start-ups and adopting the SaaS model. Despite such 
integration practices, the software vendor falls into the category of a closed platform 





orchestration process unfolds via two main streams – by designing a platform and by 
designing the platform’s network (see selected quotes in Appendix C).  
Designing Platform  
The software vendor designs a platform that allows external innovators to build 
complementary products, technologies and services (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). Its platform 
integrates authoring design tools that belong to different shareholders; meanwhile, there is 
inherent competition between these shareholders as 80% of revenue is still derived from the 
old CAD technologies that it continues to sell. Following its success in the design sector, the 
software vendor is currently trying to expand its platform offerings towards the construction 
sector, otherwise known as the “make” sector. It aims to achieve its long-term goal of 
becoming a dominant technology provider in the “design-to-make” sector and eventually 
become like Google and Amazon by occupying its distinct niche amongst the Silicon Valley 
giants. To achieve this, it is prospecting new business areas that are adjacent to vertically 
integrated construction firms, as these firms contain large resources and can make large 
investments, unlike SMEs. 
Several years ago, it was going through a business model transformation and transitioned 
towards selling subscriptions as ‘Software as Service’ following the example of the computer 
software company, Adobe. This business transformation was not easy as it previously 
operated as a vertically integrated firm. The transformation has essentially changed the 
feedback loop with its buyers. Although as a minimum, the firm has maintained a traditional 
feedback loop with the sector, a new subscription SaaS model allows for more incremental 
engagements with their customers and provides support that depends on customers’ 
membership subscriptions. The customer support service depends on the membership type 





price” (as frequently pointed out by some interviewees) given the scale of SMEs; therefore, 
the latter typically do not have access to the premium support service. The same interviewees 
emphasised that the software vendor rarely addresses their requests for improvement. Indeed, 
empirical evidence shows that the software vendor favours large, international, vertically 
integrated firms so they can allow the purchase of premium memberships. There is a 
reciprocal relationship between the two “ecosystem species” that maintain silos, namely the 
software vendor and large vertically integrated firms as B2B customers. As an innovation 
manager (CA11_1) explained: 
Speaking of silos, just one last observation that I saw. One of the most advancements that we have 
seen in technological work and methodologies in this sector are from two separate most silo 
groups. One is the software vendors there; they are very siloed. The other is either at the front line 
of construction. You mentioned [vertically integrated firms], all those folks, […] they're doing a 
lot of advanced stuff, innovative stuff, but they are also siloed. (Innovation Manager, GC, 
CA11_1) 
An interesting fact is, since its transition towards the SAAS-platform, the profits of the 
software vendor have risen in the last decade while the DBE sector in northern California 
report a sector-wide problem of increased costs and diminished profits since the recession in 
2007:  
Profits in the US before the recession from 2007 to 2009 were probably between 4 to 5%, do not 
quote me the exact numbers, but after the recession, it was dropped to between 1 and 2%. So, you 
would be building 100 million dollars for 1% fee, right? And then after the recession, that number 
did not move up. (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Managing the Platform 
The software vendor is actively designing its business network by integrating with 
academia, partnering with leading sector firms through academic partnerships, and 
developing varying levels of partnership with complementors that are not in direct 
competition with the platform. They actively organise conferences and workshops to 
propagate their legacy and knowledge and are providing support to the sector through 





vendor uses the identify-claiming mechanisms to become ‘a cognitive referent’ (Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009: p.649) for the “design to make” market and the dominant software provider 
in the DBE sector. The presence of the software vendor in the USA across a diverse set of 
organisations is significant. Through contextual embeddedness and by interacting in the 
technology network’s social structures, over time they have achieved a cognitive 
embeddedness (Dacin, Beal, & Ventresca, 1999) to the extent that network members have 
adopted the vocabulary and value propositions propagated by the software vendor.  
Research by Aksenova et al. (2018) has provided evidence that software vendors compete in 
a ‘war of standards’ thus providing limited support for open standards to prevent 
interoperability in order to win the market. The initial attempts to establish open standards at 
the international level resulted in an inability to agree on goals for data sharing between the 
incumbent international powerful software vendors in the DBE sector as indirectly inclined 
by the key industry BIM experts (Aksenova et al., 2018). Howard and Björk (2008) argue 
that software vendors are a key element in BIM and that they should state their real 
commitment to the implementation of open standards. A similar situation has been observed 
by Ozcan and Santos (2015). By limiting support to open standards, software vendors destroy 
a customer’s trust in the interoperability, and by offering an integrated platform they create 
an incentive for customers – in this case design and construction firms – to buy integrated 
solutions to avoid interoperability issues. In this way, the software vendor preserves its 
established power and dominance in the software market but hinders the open standards 
development and interoperability needed amongst SMEs and start-ups. For example, an 
architect (CA09) explained the difficulty of transitioning from CAD, the traditional practice, 






But there’s a big barrier to entry. Because for some reason, [the software vendor] is not made it 
possible for details to transfer from [the platform’s CAD software] to [the platform’s BIM 
software], you can import them and explode them, but then you pretty much a reworking all of 
them. So, there's a huge gap, a huge transition period that's actually really difficult for architects 
and I imagined it would be the same for small construction firms. The switchover is that they 
would have this challenging transition period and that's actually something I see a lot of in 
California, not through any of my own work but through a lot of my colleagues who called me to 
ask about BIM, who are working in smaller firms, and not. And they all suddenly have projects 
where the clients are requiring that they deliver the building in [the platform’s BIM software], 
regardless if it’s necessary or not. And a lot of these companies are in the struggle where they’re 
kind of stuck between the original CAD world and the [platform’s BIM software] world. 
(Architect, CA09) 
A CEO of Ai start up (CA16) explained the frustration of developing separate workflows for 
each platform for their technology start-up: 
What's going to be the Holy Grail for me is that if there was an IFC, and it had a standardised way 
of sorting 3D information and had a standardised way of having metadata in it. […] The problem 
is these guys [software vendors] don't talk to each other. […] One of the biggest issues with the 
IFC standardisation is that these geographic limitations that you have, [the software vendor] would 
want to cater it just to the American market very well, they don't want to get at the others. (CEO, 
Ai Start Up, CA16) 
An orchestrator has a central role to play by setting the mechanisms for network members to 
appropriate value for their value capture (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). The empirical 
evidence indicates that the software vendor does not hold any responsibility or liability for 
the data created in their software. Indeed, a PM (GC, CA20) reported, “software vendors are 
not responsible and do not want to take any responsibility”. For example, by denying their 
liability concerning the data’s technical quality, thereby increasing the risks that clients take 
on, the software providers act as inhibitors and dilute the benefits of BIM adoption (Mosey et 
al., 2016). This is a critical issue as successful platform owners are accountable for platform 
functions that fail to fulfil their promises (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
Fierce competition between the shareholders of authoring tools inside a platform also has 
consequences for customer productivity. Consequently, by pursuing self-interest, the software 
vendor contradicts the sector’s needs, thus damaging customer innovation appropriability and 





Valley are designed from the software vendor’s perspective without understanding the design 
and construction process. The cycle of technology upgrades is faster than hardware upgrades 
which also creates certain challenges in relation to the design of complex products. This 
process is also much faster than the development of skills and competencies in the DBE 
sector.  
3.4.3 Business Ecosystem Orchestration: Leveraging Marketing Power 
The platform leverage relates to value generation and rapidly increases with the number 
of ecosystem members who use the platform thus creating the network effect. An orchestrator 
is central to the creation of opportunities for innovation leverage in the ecosystem (Nambisan 
& Sawhney, 2011). A key strategic activity of the software vendor is how it interacts with the 
environment. The construction sector is infamous for the slow adoption of technologies and 
inherent inertia at the sector level. Uusers typically receive traditional technical skills in CAD 
while BIM implementation requires a substantial learning curve as the transition from a 2D 
environment to BIM practice can be challenging in terms of changing mental models, 
cultures, routines, and processes (Paalova & Miettinen, 2013). The interviewees reported that 
the low margins of business processes (between 1-10%), “outrageous software prices” (for 
the size of SMEs), and “expensive training” also hinder platform adoption. Therefore, the 
sector’s actors are reluctant to try new digital technologies. To accelerate growth, the 
software vendor has developed an ingenious recruitment process to push the sector towards 
an accelerated adoption of the BIM software offered in the platform. It orchestrates a 
business ecosystem for the “industry platform” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014) by leveraging 
marketing power and “selfishly, [the software vendor] is pushing their agenda” (Manager, 
Software Vendor, CA30). The process that the software vendor adopts to achieve an increase 





Advocating for change. It is important to note that marketing is the core capability of the 
software vendor who uses it effectively for its own advantage. The software vendor is 
astutely listening to its customer’s requests and the trends in the sector. It is actively engaging 
in various activities to market the platform’s capabilities and advocate for change. In 
addition, while it creates a strong marketing campaign by capturing value, it also creates the 
strongest voice in the sector by defining the value propositions for the use of BIM 
technologies. The marketing strategies deployed by the software vendor have damaging 
consequences for the sector’s innovation, as a project manager (CA11_1) explained: 
BIM is something that absolutely needs to be revisited… […] Maybe academics and the sector 
should stop listening to the software vendors and make a big revision of what BIM is. But I 
guess the practitioners are not ready to listen to this from me or anyone else. The problem as I 
see it is the influence that the software vendors have had and are having in defining what 
is BIM and how it should be used, both at the academic level, but also, and maybe mainly 
at the practitioners’ level. I believe that the software vendor’s voice should be just one among 
different voices (and definitely not the most important) that need to be heard when trying to 
define, and mainly implement, BIM. When this is not the case, I believe then that something is 
going wrong. […] the blame is on those advocating for the change. […] I think that the strategies 
from those advocating for change to reach the people with their proposals have not been there 
the best ones. […] So, there is some gap there between those advocating for change, the strategy 
that they use to reach the people. […] usually the gurus and experts and consultants, whoever 
has the technology and the software vendors, especially [the software vendor]. (PM, GC, 
CA11_1) 
Creating perceptions through marketing power. Using marketing strategies, the software 
vendor encourages the perception that BIM equals the BIM software offered in the platform. 
This is a false proposition, as the BIM concept is not defined by specific technology but rather 
as a set of processes and methods that are underpinned by BIM technologies. Various software 
vendors offer digital technologies to support BIM practices in the sector.  
Another inhibiting factor can be attributed to the oligopolistic nature of the software market 
in DBE sector, which is dominated by a small number of vendors. The software vendor 
encourages a perception that competitors’ products have low capabilities, even if they offer 
competitive prices and quality levels. Because of the resulting monopolisation, consumers are 





if they offer competitive prices and quality. Large software companies have “a 
disproportionate control over the terms of market competition, by not only setting prices but 
manipulating product quality in ways that are privately profitable but not socially efficient” 
(David & Greenstein, 1990: p.21).  
Influencing clients to mandate use of the platform to enable collaboration. The software 
vendor markets a “pretty picture” (Manager, subtrade, CA21) of 3D models to sell the idea to 
the clients of DBE sector, and the clients are hooked by the marketing trick. As one manager 
(GC, CA01) pointed out, “some people call this Hollywood BIM”. As a result, clients develop 
the desire to own the software model designed by the software vendor even if “they do not 
know what to do with this model” as manager (Sub-Trade, CA21) explained. Several 
interviewees suggested that the BIM concept has become a “buzzword”, as explained by the 
architect (CA09): 
The owners see BIM as this buzzword that they think is going to make the project better, but they 
aren't highly involved with the knowledge of BIM. […] so, they set exaggerated expectations. 
(Architect, CA09) 
The software vendor further generates a perception of the platform’s importance for 
collaboration. The sector has struggled for a very long time with collaborative practice and 
innovation due to high levels of fragmentation and an established culture derived from a 
short-term project-based environment (Egan, 1998). Furthermore, clients are recognised as 
important drivers of innovation in the sector (Brandon, 2006). The software vendor markets 
its product to clients by setting “exaggerated expectations” of the platform’s capabilities and 
propagating the need to mandate the use of BIM technology to improve collaboration in 
projects. The practitioners find this practice frustrating, and, as an CEO (Structural Engineer, 
CA07) describes, “extremely damaging and counterproductive”. The same engineer further 





and software vendors are intentionally preserving the current status quo as it allows them to 
keep the market share:  
It is forcing the sector into a technological dead end by defining the future in terms of what 
current software products are capable of, perpetuating current limitations, aided and abetted by 
sector leaders who also want to maintain market share without having to change or evolve. (CEO, 
Structural Engineering Firm, CA07) 
The interviewees report that the sector has started to recognise the importance of 
collaboration and that collaborative practice can happen with or without the use of software. 
The use of BIM software is not a determining factor that influences collaborative outcomes. 
Following the value propositions set by the software vendor, clients mandate the use of BIM 
software and offer unreasonable contracts with unrealistic expectations. For example, 
architects report design schedules cut in half although with BIM processes, the design phase 
requires more time than in the traditional CAD environment.  
Silicon Valley is marked by a distinctive collection of people and institutions with 
overlapping associations and with tight links accumulated by networks of interacting 
individuals (Lee, 2000). The interviewees shared that the top management of DBE firms is 
typically involved with clients in informal relations and agree to unreasonable contracts to 
win projects without checking with the operational level whether exaggerated expectations 
can be delivered. The interviewees reported a contradictory culture and power imposition by 
Silicon Valley client representatives in the construction sector. As a result, supply chain firms 
are forced to purchase the platform and agree to unreasonable contracts to win projects as 
sector firms are afraid to lose clients. Considering that Silicon Valley is a privately-driven 
and self-organized microcosm, its culture and goals contradict its adjacent and dependent 







3.4.5 Platform Limitations Contradict the Marketing by the Software Vendor 
Converging evidence from the interviews suggests that the marketing strategies set by 
the software vendor directly contradict the platform’s capabilities in terms of delivering the 
value promised. While top management and clients make the decisions, people at the 
operational level report several issues related to the platform’s capabilities. It is important to 
note that the marketing strategies for platform leverage have damaging consequences for 
sector-wide innovation and, while the platform provides value, it leaves a lot of room for 
improvement in terms of meeting the expectations set by its marketing. Several issues related 
to the platform limitations, as reported by the interviewees, are outlined next.  
The platform’s inadequate capabilities. While the platform has been designed to provide 
value to designers, it has limitations in terms of interoperability, rigidity, the lack of a user-
intuitive interface, an inability to deal with complex geometry and a disconnect with 
construction practices. Surprisingly, interviewees have also frequently reported inadequate 
interoperability and siloed workflow between the platform’s authoring tools, despite 
marketing by the software vendor promising a seamless data flow. The interviewees report:  
[The platform’s CAD software] did not directly integrate with [the platform’s BIM software]. […] 
So rather than being just a disconnected program […], you can do some things, but it's a silo 
workflow. (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
There is a big barrier to entry. Because for some reason, [Software vendor] is not made it possible 
for details to transfer from [the platform’s BIM software] to [the platform’s CAD software]. […] 
The interoperability, as much as they say it is, it's not!” (Architect, CA09) 
Some of the interviewees reported a loss in design functionality in the BIM software since 
2007. The interviewees further reported that the use of the platform’s capabilities by the 
customers is between 10-50%, as a manual input is required that limits individual 
productivity, as pointed out by a sub-trade manager (CA21): 
The problem that we’ve had with [BIM software], we’re having problems getting this 
documentation out of it, fabrication sheets out a [BIM software], they have a lot of manual input 





The construction sector is urgently moving to prefabrication to address on-site labour 
shortages. While the software vendor claims that their platform connects design to 
construction with a seamless data flow, the inadequate system architecture of the BIM 
software has little value in terms of prefabrication and therefore the scalability of the 
solutions.  
Limited platform value for design and construction. The construction firms that undertake 
a prefabrication report revert from BIM technology to CAD technology in the same platform 
because “CAD technology is broken […] but we know where it is broken” and the processes 
are established. There is a disconnect between design and construction although the software 
vendor claims to connect it. To connect design data to construction processes, firms develop 
additional tools to aid the functionality of the platform. Furthermore, the platform’s BIM 
software for design is mainly a document production tool and is therefore intended to support 
the status quo, as explained by a consultant (CA13):  
They are designing software to sell software, they’re not designing software for users, for what 
needs to be used. I didn’t see the connection between the productivity and the software that is 
going to solve it. I didn't really see that connection there. So, the role of this software should be 
to basically create simple technology that enables people, that is friendly to use, that is intuitive, 
that really enables people and is a lever to improve productivity. And I do not see that […] I 
know that it’s just to support basically the status quo! (Consultant, CA13) 
The way the software vendor interacts with the environment and manages its platform has a 
disproportionate influence on the sector’s dynamics in terms of value articulation, value 
capture and the sector’s architecture. It supports the status quo and serves only those who 
already have power and resources. For example, a director of a general contractor firm 
(CA25) picked a team for a new business model innovation with the use of BIM. The team 
members selected a competitor’s BIM software due to its superior functionality and 
interoperability. This team distinguished itself by a collective discovery of its opportunity and 
legitimacy which secured its survival and performance. The same team member reported that 





One of the unique things that endeared me to you guys right away was when I met [an architect] 
for the first time, he told me: “Because I’m not anything… if there’s one thing you learn about 
me if you’ve known me for any period of time, I hate [the software vendor]! Because they are 
the antithesis of what we’re doing! They're not about trying to make things easier to work with, 
they are trying to force people to use their product!” (Superintendent, GC, CA25) 
The strategy of the software vendor mirrors the system behaviour of the leading vertically 
integrated firms, which reinforces the status quo and squeezes out SMEs with innovative 
potential. The reciprocal relationship between two silo groups – namely, the software vendor 
and vertically integrated firms – creates status-quo reinforcing feedback loops that impact 
competitive dynamics in the sector.  
3.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I explore how and why the software vendor failed ecosystem 
orchestration. A grounded model shows how the software vendor takes a lead in 
orchestrating the DBE sector. This forms a business ecosystem around its platform by 
effectively utilising the marketing strategies, which forces B2B customers to purchase the 
platform and thus increases its membership. Indeed, the software vendor is successful in 
capturing value that is “privately profitable but socially inefficient” (David & Greenstein, 
1990: p.21). This happens when an orchestrator adopts strategies from B2C success examples 
and applies them to B2B contexts leaving B2B customers as illegitimate actors and 
hampering their innovative potential. Figure 17 presents the grounded model.  
This in-depth case study shows the self-centred motives of the software vendor who is driven 
(and at the same time threatened) by the success of giant corporations located in Silicon 
Valley. It strives to dominate the “design to make” market by occupying a complementary 
niche to firms like Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon. Therefore, it aims to become a 
“winner takes all” and is a “platform-leader wannabe” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008) type of 
orchestrator. While the software vendor is driven and threatened by giant corporations, the 













on behalf of sector actors and clients. It also markets the need to mandate the platform use in 
a project to enable collaboration, whilst clients mandate the use of the platform in projects by 
putting pressure on the supply chain to deliver exaggerated expectations. This process 
increases the platform’s membership.  
The data shows that playing the “role of an ecosystem orchestrator” is a directed process in 
which a firm can capture value through the creation of feedback loops between the dominant 
ecosystem actors, thus favouring those already with power and resources and extracting value  
from the small-scale niche members. The orchestrator’s role contributes to the failure of the 
emergence of business ecosystems in the sector by squeezing out SMEs with innovative 
potential, and thereby favouring large, vertically integrated firms.  
The next section discusses the implications of the findings for the theoretical understanding 
of ecosystem orchestration by a closed-system orchestrator in one specific sector. 
3.5.1 A Grounded Model for Orchestrating a Business Ecosystem for an Industry 
Platform  
The ecosystem literature suggests that participation in an ecosystem has mutual benefits 
for participating actors by combining complementary resources, capabilities and knowledge. 
Ecosystems are bound and co-evolve around common goals without the need to engage in 
vertical integration; this suggests the importance of the leading hub in propagating rules to 
ensure fair value capture (Jacobides et al., 2018; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Teece, 1986). 
The findings suggest that this potential can be damaged by the mechanisms set by a dominant 
hub if the ecosystem actors do not have a legitimate status. Legitimacy is perhaps most 
relevant to B2B contexts where each actor aims to capture value through monetisation, even 






to create value in their businesses. However, it is necessary to articulate a theoretical 
explanation of the failure of the orchestrator’s role in propagating sector-wide innovation.  
Not managing innovation appropriability for selfish value capture. The research on 
ecosystem orchestration has highlighted the importance of managing appropriability by 
ensuring fair value capture while mitigating appropriability concerns between network 
participants (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). In contrast, the case study shows how a leading firm 
captures value without taking any responsibility and accountability for the impact it has on 
the business of network members, the quality of the data produced in their software, or its 
failure to set fair rules for value capture by B2B customers. By not taking accountability for 
failing functions, it also disrupts trust between B2B customers as professional services 
struggle to realise exaggerated expectations from BIM practice by clients. It also hinders the 
trust of B2B customers in the concept of BIM and the potential it offers. This case exhibits 
the exploitative dynamics of innovation appropriability where a single leading actor profits 
by capturing value.  
According to Iansiti and Levien (2004c), the case falls within a dominator’s role, as opposed 
to a keystone who is essentially encouraging the health of the ecosystem; this does not match 
the definition of a system integrator or platform leader offered by Nambisan and Sawhney 
(2011). The dominators occupy a large number of ecosystem nodes, thus ecosystems become 
unstable and vulnerable to external shocks. Ensuring the success of an ecosystem’s health is 
potentially a critical role for an orchestrator (Iansiti & Richards, 2006).  
Leveraging the network for individual impact by creating negative sector-wide effects. 
An orchestrator needs to find a way to incentivise potential members to participate in the 






vendor to incentivise network members is achieved through marketing power, by directing 
the client’s behaviour to force the supply chain to purchase the platform. The software vendor 
masterfully creates illusions amongst the clients. Clients are considered the drivers of 
innovation in the DBE sector (Brown, Hampson, & Brandon, 2006). “Illusion is the use of 
deception, shielding intentions and exaggerating one’s importance to gain advantage” 
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: p.633). As marketing strategies are complemented by other 
activities, the software vendor signals its leadership and dominance in the software market for 
the DBE sector.  
Moreover, the findings suggest that the value propositions for the use of BIM software set by 
the leading hub hampers the innovation capability amongst B2B customers who are unable to 
propagate their own visions for the use of the platform. This is because the clients of 
construction projects are influenced by the marketing strategies set by a software vendor 
around a platform’s value. By leveraging marketing power and defining the value of BIM 
practice and the use of the platform, software vendors inhibits innovation opportunities 
amongst B2B clients, particularly amongst SMEs. It does not just hinder innovative potential, 
but also damages the profits made by B2B customers by offering a platform with limitations.  
This contradiction is more obvious in SMEs transitioning to digitalization because their 
resources are scarce. By favouring large organisations, the software vendor is entangled in a 
status quo, reinforcing a feedback loop that serves those who have power and resources while 
squeezing out SMEs with innovative potential. This vicious cycle leads to further status quo 
preservation in the sector (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Cooperation between the two most 
siloed and powerful groups – the software vendor and large vertically integrated firms – 






ecosystem inertia and favours closed ecosystems over inter-organisational cooperation 
(Jacobides & Winter, 2012).  
Network effects emerge in B2C contexts but are they effective in B2B contexts? 
Platforms are typically associated with “network effects”; thus, the larger the pool of 
complementors adopting the platform, the larger the value of the platform delivered to 
customers. Furthermore, larger pools of customers mean that more complementors join the 
platform. Through mutual symbiosis, a platform owner achieves network effects. Network 
effects drive diversity amongst the complementary products and services offered to 
customers (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). However, empirical evidence shows that an 
increased pool of B2B customers does not necessary lead to an increase in the platform’s 
value. Instead, interviewees reported reduced functionality alongside the increased popularity 
of the platform.  
The software vendors in the sector are engaged in oligopoly. Historically, they were not able 
to collude and agree on goals for open standards, thus setting prices to maximize their 
individual profits (Teece, 2018b). Implementation of digital innovation is expected to allow 
easy interoperability by integrating products that were previously separated (Teece, 2018b). 
However, this study shows that the existing standard war on the software market in the DBE 
sector and inadequate interoperability even between the platform’s authoring tools 
contributes to a significant loss of productivity by B2B customers. Thus, the marketed 
capability of the platform to provide a seamless data flow is contradicted by this evidence. 
Even if network effects are achieved artificially, the business ecosystems created in B2B 
contexts do not necessarily provide superior value to B2B customers. Indeed, adopting 






3.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DARK SIDE OF ECOSYSTEM ORCHESTRATION 
FROM MANAGEMENT LITERATURE 
The findings suggest that current literature has a positive angle on the outcomes of 
orchestration processes set by a business ecosystem orchestrator (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; 
Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). Although business ecosystem orchestration is more akin to 
centrally managing network relationships, this study indicates that, if there is no corrective 
mechanism for selfish value capture, the leading hub can aim to capture value by enforcing 
its conditions and goals on network members. It does so by controlling the perception of 
value generated by using the platform and effectively utilising marketing power, regardless of 
whether the platform has the capability to enable B2B customers to deliver exaggerated 
expectations. With the use of marketing power, the software vendor effectively interacts with 
the environment but also, selfishly, directs it towards its agenda. It also signals leadership and 
thus becomes a cognitive referent for the claimed market (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). 
This study contributes to theories of power. Resource dependence theories emphasise firm-
level strategies to gain control, and by controlling interdependences the network’s 
collaborative activities increase joint action, trust, and the quality and scope of information 
exchange (Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1981). This study extends current 
theories of power to ecosystem orchestration. First, the study shows that the siloed control of 
interdependence does not necessarily lead to increased collaboration at the system level. The 
dominance and power of the software vendor and the absence of corrective mechanisms can 
lead to an egocentric ecosystem orchestration. Second, the case highlighted that control 
obtained through masterful interaction with the environment and with the use of marketing 
power can reinforce siloes between complementors and co-specialised B2B members. Third, 






by engaging in turf wars. By using marketing power and actively interacting with the 
environment, it preserves control and dominance over one region.  
This study offers new insights over previous studies as entrepreneurial firms were able to 
organise conflicting actors for value creation (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). These studies highlight that firms were able to resolve conflicts by inviting 
necessary complementors to commit to shaping the market. In contrast, the prominent firm, a 
complementor, contributes to the market by organising the environment around its own 
selfish agenda in a silo. Innovative SMEs have limited power to create countervailing power, 
define their value propositions or persuade the software vendor to cooperate with them if 
their goals contradict those of the vendor. SMEs take two routes: either by adopting a new 
business model innovation with an alternative platform (which is rare) or by continuing to 
follow current practice by losing profits (the majority of SMEs).  
The study offers an explanation as to why, in some contexts, ecosystems might not emerge. 
This study aligns with research by Ozcan and Santos (2015), which showed that 
interdependence and inter-industry collaboration requires prominent firms to collaborate to 
establish a new market as turf wars between prominent firms can cause market non-
emergence. While Ozcan and Santos (2015) illuminated a difficult relationship between 
prominent firms, which is similar to this study, this study further showed that the context for 
market emergence can also significantly impact the behaviour of prominent firms. The 
specific context of the built environment sector coupled with turf wars incentivises 
competition for selfish value capture. New markets are even less likely to emerge in such 
contexts. It should be noted that the consideration of the context is an important prerequisite 
for market and ecosystem emergence. Ironically, the use of marketing power can be 






historically, actors are reluctant to try new technologies. The practice illuminated paradoxical 
tensions (Smith & Lewis, 2011) between the orchestrator’s efforts to push the DBE sector 
towards digital transformation through its platform and the simultaneous preservation of the 
status quo which favours large, vertically integrated firms. This paradox creates vicious 
cycles (Masuch, 1985) where prominent firms enforce the sector for technology investment. 
By favouring large, vertically integrated firms and by heavily investing in recruitment with 
marketing strategies that require the relocation of resources from the development of the 
platform to the marketing department, the software vendor limits the opportunity to create 
network effects and innovation by B2B customers who are SMEs. As result, through its 
deployed mechanisms, it reinforces the status quo and contributes to a lack of business 
ecosystem emergence by SMEs.  
It is important to note that the sector sees value in the digitalization of the built environment 
sector with BIM technologies. However, two interviewees (CEO, structural engineer, CA08; 
CEO, architect, CA17) pointed to the inability of actors in the sector to define and articulate a 
value proposition through the use of BIM technologies because they lack the capacity to 
sense and seize new technological business opportunities (Teece, 2007). Thus, ecosystem 
inertia is simultaneously preserved by large and small firms. However, the influence of the 
software vendor and regional informal relations between northern Californian actors in the 
DBE sector are profound as this evidence shows they constitute the dark side of ecosystem 
orchestration. This study highlights the important role of the sector context for ecosystem 
emergence and orchestration that has previously (and largely) been taken for granted 
(Jacobides et al., 2006). 
This study contributes to literature on closed-system orchestration. Orchestrators have an 






mechanisms for equitable value creation and capture (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). In 
particular, the study presented a unique mechanism of how a software vendor manages a 
network membership. The concept of value proposition is an important element of a 
recruitment strategy; however, ecosystem literature takes for granted the value proposition of 
the platform. Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) did not extensively discuss the role of the 
orchestrator in defining the value propositions. Indeed, such companies as Intel embrace open 
innovation by articulating the value of collective value creation at the system level. However, 
it does not articulate and impose the value of the platform for the customer but rather allows 
for the discovery of their own business opportunities, thus enabling open innovation creation 
(Chesbrough, 2003).  
Important questions arise as to who can legitimately define and enforce the value 
propositions in a B2B ecosystem, and do B2B customers have a legitimate status in co-
defining and co-articulating value? The results of this study suggest that the software vendor 
is illegitimately leading the sector-wide digital transformation with BIM due to its business 
model and role in the DBE sector. To support interoperability and innovation in the sector, 
policy makers should address the issues associated with liabilities of data created in BIM 
software and open standards. As empirical evidence shows, the value proposition is critical to 
value capture and can direct behaviours towards change. However, the northern California 
case is a self-organised entity in which policy makers hold a minimal role in driving 
industries; thus, due to the varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), the corrective 
mechanisms in such contexts remain a grey area. Indeed, ecosystems thrive in unregulated 
markets (Jacobides et al., 2019). The findings draw attention to the critical role of corrective 
mechanisms and countervailing power relations with policy implications. Perhaps, in 






primary task is to ensure the creation of public good. For example, some studies indicate that 
Norwegian public clients can hold that role (Divella & Sterlacchini, 2018). However, 
following the results detailed in Chapter 2, public clients can struggle to take such a role and 
it seems that the legitimacy of orchestrator roles depends on the variety of capitalism. Public 
organisations are better suited to coordinated market economies while liberal market 
economies offer opportunities to private organisations, like the software vendor, to take 
advantage by leading their own ecosystems.  
Overall, this study contributes to an understanding of how the strategies deployed in a 
platform-based ecosystem orchestration can contribute to the non-emergence of business 
ecosystems at the convergence of industries. The process described in this study resonates 
with the work of Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) and the dialectic tensions noted by Van de 
Ven (1992: p.178) where individuals and organisations “exist in a pluralistic world of 
colliding events, forces, or contradictory values, which compete with each other for 
domination and control”. In this study, the software vendor adopted a strategy for growth and 
survival whilst threatened by co-located global giants; however, it also found a niche that 
does not directly compete with these giants. Moreover, by fiercely trying to survive, it creates 
siloes and negative effects in the sector by abusing its power for domination and control. It 
competes by creating the illusion of technological progress in the sector. In doing so, it 
behaves as a dominator in order to extract value by damaging the health of the sector. In this 
context, the logic of dominance incentivises prominent actors in the ecosystem to adopt silos 








3.6.1 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
This study has some limitations. Firstly, the data is collected from sector participants, 
mainly B2B customers, who have both close and distant interactions with the software 
vendor; through their observations, I understood the profound effect the vendor has on the 
sector’s competitive dynamics, innovation outcomes, and value capture by B2B customers. 
Through discussion with my supervisors, I managed to understand the orchestration processes 
of the software vendor by assembling often oddly shaped but interlocking and tessellating 
pieces of evidence in a jigsaw puzzle while building the grounded model. The original focus 
on the digital transformation of the sector with BIM has shifted towards a focus on the 
software vendor’s impact on digital transformation in the sector.  
The literature review showed that management scholars are increasingly focused on examples 
of success. However, such examples involve leading firms that orchestrate their ecosystems 
and platforms without considering the effects on their stakeholders and on sector-wide 
innovation. Thus, this study contributes to ecosystem literature by offering new insights in 
highlighting a case of failure. Failed orchestration processes and corrective mechanisms 
could constitute an emerging field and offer an important contribution to knowledge in this 
field. Although it is difficult to pinpoint failed industries affected by orchestration processes, 
this research calls for replicative studies on failed ecosystems. Here, further work should 
investigate more specific questions for consideration in future research, which could extend 
these findings. I observed that the current literature tends to focus on how ecosystems are 
evolving without considering how they, and the environment, co-evolve; this aligns with 






Firstly, this research calls for studies on how orchestrators co-evolve with stakeholders and 
ask whether there are differences in value articulation, creation and capture. Following this, it 
is necessary to explore the impact of this co-evolution on society. Secondly, following the 
argument on value propositions, definition and imposition, and value capture by the software 
vendor, this study highlights the need for more work to study corrective mechanisms for 
failed ecosystems. Anti-trust literature previously reported the successful correction of 
Microsoft’s behaviour when the government stepped in (Economides, 2001). There may be a 
need for new research with new propositions to tackle complex modern global issues. 
Thirdly, very few scholars have researched the rules governing membership and relationships 
(Jacobides et al., 2018). This chapter provides specific empirical knowledge on how an 
orchestrator recruits prospective members with the use of marketing power. The use of 
marketing power is underrepresented in ecosystem research and requires further research. 
Finally, the process model presented in this study shows that orchestration processes can 
cause a failure in terms of sector-wide innovation. It also illustrates how it can slow down the 
sector’s evolution by favouring large, vertically integrated firms in order to pursue self-profit. 
Assuming the role of the leading hub is a central issue in setting the mechanisms for value 
capture, therefore, future research could explore the legitimacy of the leading firms in 
orchestrating ecosystems. This highlights methodological issues around hierarchy, power and 
agency in a sector’s evolution. Inquiries into this possibility should address both the strategic 
choices set by the leading hubs and the role of feedback loops in relation to industrial 
evolution, which echoes the call by Jacobides and Winter (2012).  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to the understanding of failed ecosystem orchestration while 






effects on sector-wide innovation in B2B contexts. In doing so, this research has set the stage 
for future research on the dark side of ecosystem orchestration (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). 
The results highlight that prominent firms could preserve control and dominance through 
marketing power was not widely discussed in the ecosystem literature. Through power and 
dominance, prominent firms can selfishly aim for solo value capture, which abuses their 
status over SMEs. The study shows that a history of dominance amongst prominent firms can 
further influence the strategies adopted by incumbents, which contributes to the lack of inter-
organisational and inter-industry collaboration. This opportunistic and selfish value capture 
can seriously damage the innovation capability amongst entrepreneurial SMEs. A nascent 
market is less likely to emerge as an ecosystem provides the incentives to preserve the status 
quo. It should be noted that these findings are generalisable to the literature on ecosystem 
emergence and orchestration.  
In terms of the contribution to practice, this study offers useful insights on how the software 
vendor orchestrates their environment, thus creating awareness amongst executives in the 
sector. For executives, this study is a stark lesson on the dark side of the marketing strategies 
deployed by prominent firms in power. By following their lead and not listening to the 
operational level concerning innovation management, executives can seriously limit value 
capture by their own firms when making decisions. Thus, by learning about the dark side, 
decisions makers can make meaningful choices in relation to digital innovation with BIM 
technologies. It might be that executives develop capabilities to organise the dark side in an 
effective way (Zyglidopoulos, Hirsch, Martin de Holan, & Phillips, 2017). However, a 
tension arises if clients impose their views on digital innovation in the sector and the 






whether to continue with the current status quo or meaningfully apply persuasive capabilities 
to change a client’s views. 
Policy makers can address the issue of corrective mechanisms in the sector. The challenge is 
that prominent global firms have the power and resource to impose their views. For policy 
makers, these findings serve as a reminder that new ecosystems can fail to emerge if global 
players are not incentivised to collaborate, and if they perceive any change as a high-stakes 
game. Policy makers must ensure that the leading firms take responsibility for the data 
created in their platforms that also largely contributes to the failure in value creation and 
capture, and thus impact productivity, trust and innovation amongst SMEs. To conclude, this 
study posits that ecosystems may fail to emerge in certain contexts that are dominated by 
firms with power and no corrective mechanisms. The findings of this chapter offer a step 
forward to a deeper understanding as to why and how ecosystems might fail to emerge in 
certain contexts.  
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In this inductive multiple-case study set in the built environment sector, which is going 
through a digital transformation with emerging technologies (e.g. Building Information 
Management (BIM)), I investigate how and why the sector is failing to make a qualitative 
digital transformation with BIM. The failures in this sector were compared to successful 
transformations in the automotive, taxi and semiconductor sectors while testing the critical 
components and constructs of the success and failure for ecosystem emergence and 
orchestration. The comparison illuminated that the components and constructs fall into three 
categories - failing, enabling and building elements. The findings show the importance of the 
sector’s nature and the context for ecosystem emergence and orchestration. The findings 
contribute to the emerging field of the dark side of ecosystem orchestration and are 
potentially important steps in showing how and why ecosystems fail and succeed.  
KEYWORDS: sector context, critical constructs and components, ecosystem orchestration, 









4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Over the last two decades, scholars have shifted their interest towards the ecosystem as 
a new way to form interdependent cooperative relations with competitors and complementors 
in dynamic environments. These cooperative relations displace vertically integrated supply 
chains and traditional markets (Iansiti & Levien, 2004a; Jacobides et al., 2018; Moore, 1998). 
As a result, there is an increased interest in understanding the processes of ecosystem 
emergence and orchestration (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Navis 
& Glynn, 2010; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009).  
Prior literature extensively examined the key orchestration mechanisms of successful firm 
strategies in established ecosystems focusing on the evolution of technologies, markets and 
products (Adner & Kapoor, 2016; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011) with little consideration of 
the sector evolution (Jacobides et al., 2016). Some success examples of business ecosystem 
orchestration are Google, Facebook, Intel and Uber. However, most works have discussed the 
positive effects of ecosystem orchestration mechanisms, partly from a firm perspective and 
mostly based on the limited empirical analysis of success cases while only a few studies have 
examined failed sectors and ecosystems (Jacobides et al., 2016; Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019; 
Ozcan & Santos, 2015). Systematic empirical research in this area also remains limited 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014) while some evidence shows that 
ecosystem emergence can be a difficult process (Ozcan & Santos, 2015). Indeed, ecosystems 
and platforms more often fail than succeed (Cusumano et al., 2019). 
Debates around the success of ecosystem creation without a rigorous analysis of failed 
ecosystems suggest a “serious form of selection bias. […] Indeed, only by comparing the 






the relative importance of the forces.” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994: p.665). Therefore, I extend the 
prior research by examining one sector in the context of failed business ecosystems and 
systematically comparing the failures in one sector to successful examples in other industries. 
Based on the available literature, this is the first research that attempts to compare the 
empirical evidence of failure in one sector to documented success examples of ecosystem 
orchestration processes while testing the conditions (e.g. importance of sector context, 
structure-agency relation and business models as structural innovation) of ecosystem 
emergence.  
These arguments are empirically grounded in the contexts of Building Information 
Management (BIM) implementation (Eastman et al., 2011) in the digital built environment 
(DBE) sector, as focused on two geographical contexts - Finland and California. The 
previous two chapters illuminated the failure cases of orchestration mechanisms for BIM 
implementation in Finland (Chapter 2) and California (Chapter 3). The Finnish case 
presented the evolution of innovation ecosystem mechanisms for BIM research and 
deployment at the national level, as led by an open-system orchestrator and public funder, 
which was aimed at the public good. The Californian case presented the orchestration 
mechanisms of a business ecosystem for BIM software innovation in the sector, as led by a 
closed-system orchestrator - a software vendor - which aimed at selfish value capture. Both 
cases are contrasted in terms of the orchestration mechanisms and contexts in which they 
operate. However, despite these contrasts, two distinct orchestration processes resulted in 
similar outcomes and failures. The failures were the preservation of the status quo by key 
sector actors while favouring large, vertically integrated organisations and the lack of 
business ecosystem emergence. Thus, the logical question posed in this chapter is: how have 






similar results and failures? Empirical evidence from the two previous chapters suggests that 
the orchestration mechanisms are not the only reason for failure, pointing to the importance 
of the sector’s context, which has not been explored in the previous chapters. Indeed, 
ecosystems are shaped by the industry architecture, which defines its division of labour, and 
through feedback loops between the agency and structure that in turn develops capabilities 
(Jacobides & Winter, 2012). To investigate this observation, this chapter explores the critical 
components that contribute to success and failure, with a focus on the sector’s context and 
whether it matters for business ecosystem emergence and orchestration. 
Given the limited research on the topic, I use a multi-case, multi-level, inductive theory 
building approach to identify, generalise and analyse the similarities of failure between two 
sectors. The focus is on the similarities between the two failures because the differences seem 
to be implausible drivers of failure. The similarities manifested at three levels: the micro-
level focuses on individuals (agency), the meso-level on organisations (processes, 
capabilities), and the macro-level on a system basis, e.g. sector-wide network, (business 
models, culture, complementors, sector-wide structure). These levels have reciprocal 
relationships that form feedback loops that drive system dynamics and echo the theory 
developed by Jacobides and Winter (2012). The generalised similarities of failure are then 
compared to success mechanisms documented in the published literature on Uber, Toyota and 
Intel. These successful examples were frequently mentioned and suggested for comparison by 
the interviewees. To systematically compare examples of failure and success, I used the same 
multi-level design to collect and triangulate data at three levels. 
A key contribution of this chapter is the extension of the overlooked theory of failed 
mechanisms of ecosystem orchestration in order to provide a deeper understanding of why 






traditional focus of the literature on successful firm strategies that highlights critical 
conditions for ecosystem failure in relation to sector context. Indeed, there is sufficient 
knowledge on how individual organisations become leaders of successful business 
ecosystems, but there is little understanding about the failure of sector-wide inter-
organisational innovation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Jacobides et al., 2016). This chapter 
provides a detailed empirical consideration of a multi-level analysis of one failed sector and 
compares it to successful ecosystems in other sectors. The empirical findings contribute to the 
growing interest in cognition and frames at the sector level and business model innovation 
(Jacobides et al., 2016; Kaplan, 2011; Porac et al., 1989), and the dark side of ecosystem 
orchestration (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019).  
4.2 COMPONENTS AND CONSTRUCTS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN 
ECOSYSTEM ORCHESTRATION 
Interorganisational networks offer multiple benefits and opportunities to their 
participants in terms of access to resources, knowledge and learning (Ahuja, 2000; Dyer & 
Nobeoka, 2000; Powell et al., 1996). Thus, modern firms are increasingly moving to 
collective value creation and capture in ecosystems (Jacobides et al., 2018). The concept of 
ecosystems as a network of cooperating and competing firms emerges from the interactions 
between multiple heterogenous organisations that create new business structures to bring 
focal value propositions to existing markets or create a totally new market (Adner, 2006; 
Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Moore, 1993). Ecosystems are ultimately a new form of network 
organisation that gives companies a strategic scale advantage to enable a digital economy 
(Jacobides et al., 2019). They are viewed as new ways to produce goods and values in the 
Twenty-First Century, also offering numerous benefits for participants (Teece, 2018b). Thus, 






2011; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013; Valkokari, Seppänen, Mäntylä, & Jylhä-Ollila, 
2017) and industry efforts (Jacobides et al., 2019; Kelly, 2015; Lang et al., 2019; Sengupta et 
al., 2019) have emerged to identify and articulate the orchestration mechanisms of successful 
leading firms. Governments have also invested great efforts in searching for effective 
mechanisms to enable ecosystem emergence and thus contribute to the digital economy 
(Rinkinen & Harmaakorpi, 2018; Rytter Sunesen, Henriksen, Kantanen, Dressler, & 
Buhrmann, 2019). This literature has an optimistic angle in presenting the success stories of 
singular firms that have created new digital markets by putting traditional industries at risk of 
extinction. 
While the majority of publications are dedicated to successful examples based on limited 
empirical analysis, few scholars dedicated rigorous empirical work to failed cases (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; Jacobides et al., 2016; Ozcan & Santos, 2015). This suggests that ecosystems can 
generate successes as well as failures, or a success in one context and a failure in another. For 
example, a successful mobile Internet service created by the Japanese mobile network 
operator, NTT Docomo, failed in the EU context (Tee & Gawer, 2009). Cusumano and 
Gawer (2002) attributed its success to platform leadership and ecosystem orchestration in the 
Japanese context, while Tee and Gawer (2009) explained its failure in the EU context 
suggesting that there are distinct differences in the industry architecture (Jacobides et al., 
2006). Failure can also be attributed to ecosystems becoming “ego-systems” (Jacobides et al., 
2019: p.17), or a double-edged sword exhibiting an inequitable distribution of value share by 
leading orchestrators (Jacobides & Tae, 2015). Indeed, scholars have fixated on success 
stories overlooking the failed cases of both ecosystems and industries that attempted to make 






The review of existing literature on the orchestration mechanisms of successful examples 
revealed its lack of clarity on the critical components of success and failure. However, despite 
the lack of an integrated view on ecosystem orchestration, some claim that modularity leads 
to ecosystem emergence (Jacobides et al., 2018), while others suggest the important role of 
leadership (Iansiti & Levien, 2004c; Müller-Seitz, 2012) and governance or orchestration 
mechanisms (rules, coordination, roles, leverage, and etc.) for ecosystem emergence 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). Platform leadership and design 
interlinked with modularity is also attributed to the success of individual heroic cases, like 
Google and Intel (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). Firms that are able to resolve and control 
technical and strategic bottlenecks can capture significant value by controlling the 
performance of an ecosystem. The concept of bottlenecks explains why some platform 
leaders are able to capture disproportional value (Baldwin, 2015; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 
2019). Some studies highlighted the importance of the capabilities of leading firms in 
orchestrating the ecosystem (Dagnino, Levanti, & Mocciaro Li Destri, 2016; Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2018; Teece, 2018a), while others suggest that capabilities are developed 
through experience as the case of Intel showed (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). Capability 
development, however, is largely affected by the feedback loops provided by the industry 
architecture that also guides agency and capability development (Jacobides & Winter, 2012; 
Tee & Gawer, 2009). The business models, as structural innovations, guide firm-specific 
choices in the context that also determine the evolution of capability development (Jacobides 
& Winter, 2012). Some studies described the complexity of power relations between 
organisations (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Jacobides et al., 2016; Ozcan & Santos, 2015) 
explaining why ecosystems fail in certain industries. Few studies mentioned cognition, 






Jacobides et al., 2019; Porac et al., 1989; Smith, 2006). Despite its importance for agency 
development, evidence of serious studies examining cognition, frames and mindset in relation 
to failure is scarce across the ecosystem literature. Together, the findings of these studies are 
consistent with the importance of many different factors that contribute to failure and success 
in individual cases.  
Thus, the presented constructs and components of the success and failure of ecosystem 
emergence (modularity, leadership, orchestration, bottlenecks, capabilities, industry 
architecture, agency, business models, power relations, platform and cognitive frames) are 
organised across three levels: individual, organisational and system. They constitute a basis 
for the systematic order of critical components presented in the literature on heroic examples 
of success and failure. Each published study considers the components that contributed to 
failure and success. Table 10 presents the analysis of studies that documented the success 
studies and Table 11 presents the analysis of failure studies.  
The systematic order of components revealed that the success of ecosystems is largely 
attributed to leadership and orchestration mechanisms. The review of failure cases shows 
three critical constructs that contribute to failure: cognition and mindsets, industry 
architecture and power relations. It seems that different types of component hold certain 
functions for ecosystem emergence and orchestration. However, the surplus of studies 
exploring the cases of failure and success is increasing; a large proportion of studies lack 
empirical evidence offering ad hoc explanations of success with limited consideration of the 
sector’s context of ecosystem embeddedness. These studies offer little insight into the order 
of underlying components of failure and success and leave questions open about the 






 Table 10 Systematic Order of Components and Constructs of Successful Ecosystems, Derived from the Literature 11 
   Critical components of ecosystem success    
 Levels  1 2 3    
N Components of success derived from 
literature 
A B C D E F G H I J K Sector Type of 
ecosystem 
Summary 
1 (Parida, Burström, Visnjic, & Wincent, 2019)  1    1   1   Manufacturing  Business 6 manufacturers are transforming business models & orchestrate 
ecosystem for circular economy 
2 (Roundy et al., 2018) 1   1  1      - Entrepreneurs
hip 
Entrepr. Ecosys. Emerg.: intentionality, coherence of activities, 
and injections of resources 
3 (Teece, 2018a)  1  1     1   Uber Business Business model innovation is not a guarantee of success; 
dynamic capabilities define success 
4 (Giudici et al., 2018)  1    1      Business Incubator Innovation Open-system orchestrator builds a network’s capabilities 
5 (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018)  1  1        - Platform Expanded Teece (2018), dynamic capabilities are critical to 
platform leaders 
6 (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Nätti, 2018)  1  1        - Innovation Leaders need capabilities to be able to orchestrate  
7 (Dattée et al., 2018)  1   1 1  1    Tech-based firms Platform Firms orchestrate the complementors while uncertainty 
8 (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2019)  1   1 1      Residential solar  Business Presented strategies of several firms, capabilities are not given 
but built through experience 
9 (Dagnino et al., 2016) 1 1  1  1   1   - - Multi-level analysis of intentional governance of network 
10 (Van Alstyne, Parker, & Choudary, 2016)  1  1  1   1  1 Apple Business Two-sided market with value built on the network effects 
11 (Jacobides & Tae, 2015)  1  1 1       Computer sector Business Firms with superior capabilities holding a higher share of the 
market can become a bottleneck capturing most value 
12 (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015)      1    1  Pay TV Business Entrants can frame their product as complementary to the 
incumbents, and in alignment with the dominant frame of the 
regulators. Groups that create a ripple effect to influence 
institutional actors 
13 (Levén et al., 2014)  1    1      Process IT govern. 
programme 
Innovation Emphasised the importance of hub and orchestration processes 
14 (Libert et al., 2014)      1   1  1 Uber Business New business model and agency to change regulation, and 
become a tech-firm 
15 (Thomas, 2013)  1  1       1 Telecommunications Business Process of ecosystem emergence involves resource, 
technological, institutional and contextual activities 
16 (Gawer, 2000; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014) 1 1    1 1  1  1 Intel Platform, 
innovation 
Intel’s leadership & capabilities in propagating a change across 
the whole sector towards modularity  
 
11 Individual level: A-Agency, B-Leadership C-Cognitive frames/Mindsets; Organisational level: D-Capabilities, E-Bottlenecks, F-Orchestration 
 System level: G-Modularity, H-Industry architecture I-Business models, J-Power, K-Platform 






Table 8 Continued 12 
  Critical components of ecosystem success    
 Levels  1 2 3    
N Components of success derived from 
literature 
A B C D E F G H I J K Sector Type of 
ecosystem 
Summary 
17 (Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013)  1    1      Industrial Symbiosis Business Hub builds the capacity for orchestration 
18 (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013)           1 Video game Platform Role of positioning & strategy is driving competitive advantage 
19 (Gausdal & Nilsen, 2011)      1      Health Innovation Innovation Parker’s orchestration process is enhanced with eco-health 
20 (Batterink et al., 2010)  1    1      Agri-food sector Innovation  Innovation network 
21 (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011)  1    1      Salesforce, Boeing Business  A hub firm is orchestrating the ecosystem 
22 (Piepenbrock, 2009)  1    1      Auto, Airline, Airplane Business “Sources of superior firm performance lie […] in the network 
architecture of the firm's extended enterprise.” (p.59)13 
23 (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009)   1       1  Comput. & telecom. Business Agency and logic rest on the rationale of power 
24 (Li, 2009)  1    1   1  1 Cisco Business Heavily relied on external partnerships for symbiosis 
25 (Iansiti & Levien, 2004c)  1    1     1 - Business Keystones and dominators that take it all 
26 (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002)  1    1     1 Mob. internet service Business Success is attributed to the platform strategy leadership 
27 (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002)  1       1   Xerox Business Employed an effective business model for tech. 
commercialisation 
28 (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000)  1  1  1   1   Toyota Business Alliance network orchestrated the supply chain 








12 Individual level: A-Agency, B-Leadership C-Cognitive frames/Mindsets; Organisational level: D-Capabilities, E-Bottlenecks, F-Orchestration 
 System level: G-Modularity, H-Industry architecture I-Business models, J-Power, K-Platform 1- Success, 0- Failure 
13 “Sources of superior firm performance lie neither exclusively within the firm, nor in its industrial environment, but in 
how the firm interacts with its environment - i.e. in the network architecture of the firm's extended enterprise.” Piepenbrock, T. F. 2009. Toward a theory of the evolution of 






 Table 11 Systematic Order of Constructs and Components of Failed Ecosystems, as Defined in the Literature 14 
  Critical components of ecosystem failure    
 Levels  1 2 3    
N Components of failure derived from literature A B C D E F G H I J K L Sector Type of 
ecosystem 
Summary 
1 (Heikkilä & Heikkilä, 2019)    1  1  1 1 1 1 0 Taxi Business Deregulation of taxi sector has led to increased tax evasion, 
traffic congestion, reduced use of public transport by 6-7% 
2 (Almpanopoulou, Ritala, & Blomqvist, 2019)   0     0  0   Energy sector Innovation Set of regulative, normative, and cultural–cognitive barriers 
that restrict the emergence of ecosystems 
 (Mele et al., 2018) 0            - Service Dark side of agency (opportunism, conflict, ambiguity) 
3 (Jacobides et al., 2016) 0  0    0 0  0   Automotive sector Business Modularity was dropped to preserve the hierarchical control 
over the supply chain  
4 (Ozcan & Santos, 2015)   0       0   Mobile payment 
service 
Business Participants in distinct global industries cannot agree on the 
market share with a history of sector dominance  
5 (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015)        0  0   Pay TV Business Our comparison of one failed and one successful attempt to 
introduce pay TV in the U.S. Failed strategy to enter the field 
with powerful incumbents in a regulated market  
6 (Helper & Henderson, 2014)   0          General Motors  Business GC failed to copy Toyota’s orchestration practices 
7 (Clarysse et al., 2014)  0    0       Start-ups, govern. 
Programme 
Knowledge Business ecosystems need global large players; the knowledge 
ecosystem failed to attract business leaders to form business 
8 (West & Wood, 2013)   0      0    Symbian Platform Had solutions much earlier than iPhone and Android but failed 
to agree within the firms. Issue was managerial and 
organisational 
9 (Tiwana, 2013) (book)       0       Smartphone Business Failed to recognise that nature of competition changed to 
ecosystem orchestration  
10 (Davis & Higgins, 2013)   0      0    Blockbuster Business Outdated Business Model while missing opportunity to 
purchase Netflix 
11 (Libert et al., 2014)   0          Taxi  Business Taxi drivers: “we are not a technology firm”. Ownership 
model (traditional taxi) over intangible assets (Uber), control 
over orchestration 
12 (Tee & Gawer, 2009)  0      0   0  Mobile internet 
service 
Business i-mode successful in Japan but failed in the EU due to the 
sector structure and the inability to persuade complementors  
 
 
14 Individual level: A-Agency, B-Leadership C-Cognitive frames/Mindsets. Organisational level: D-Capabilities, E-Bottlenecks, F-Orchestration 






Table 12 Continued15 
  Critical components of ecosystem failure    
 Levels  1 2 3    
N Components of failure derived from literature A B C D E F G H I J K L Sector Type of 
ecosystem 
Summary 
13 (Lucas & Goh, 2009)   0          Kodak Business Culture and rigid, bureaucratic structure hindered a fast 
response to new technology – Innovator’s dilemma 
14 (Benner & Tripsas, 2012)   0 0         Digital cameras Business Perception based on sector affiliation; mindset can be driven 
by capabilities  
15 (Porac et al., 1989, 2011)   0 0      0   Knitwear  Business The mental models of strategists form a critical link  
between group-level and firm-level dynamics. 
 
15 Individual level: A-Agency, B-Leadership C-Cognitive frames/Mindsets. Organisational level: D-Capabilities, E-Bottlenecks, F-Orchestration 






This chapter aims to fill this gap by empirically examining the sector’s context and the 
components that contributed to the failure of ecosystem emergence while comparing them to 
the success stories. The chapter answers the following questions: (1) What is the role of the 
components and constructs in contributing to the success and failure of the ecosystem 
orchestration? Is there an order to these components and constructs? (2) How and why does 
the sector’s context matter for ecosystem emergence and orchestration? 
4.3 METHODS AND DATA 
Given that the failure mechanisms of ecosystem orchestration are underexplored 
empirically, this research pursued an inductive interpretivist methodology with an unbiased 
perspective (Gioia et al., 2013). The methodology adopted by Gioia et al. (2013) is used in 
this study to explore the similarities of failure mechanisms in two case studies at three levels - 
individual, organisational and system level, e.g. sector-wide network, - and to contrast these 
similarities with the successful mechanisms provided in existing literature. Gioia et al. (2013) 
offers a methodology that captures the meaning of people’s experience of a given 
phenomenon and theorised this experience scientifically (Gehman et al., 2018). As per 
Strauss and Corbin (1990), interviewees’ experiences are interpreted and structured to 
construct a theoretical perspective that is grounded in, and emerges from, the data. 
Considering that the well-established template of Gioia et al. (2013) often focuses on single 
cases to build a compelling story, Gehman et al. (2018) suggests that the method can be 
customized and modified for a particular research context to find the theory-method fit.  
While Chapters 2 and 3 presented contrasting open and closed-system orchestration 
mechanisms and their effects on sector-wide innovation, this chapter ignores the systemic 






software vendor, varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), market size, geography and 
standardisation as irrelevant drivers of failure. Instead, the focus is on the similarities 
between the two failures because this research suggests that the potential explanation for the 
failures in two cases is grounded in similarities. Considering the richness of the data 
collected, the methodology developed by Gioia et al. (2013) was used to construct the 
grounded model that was based on similarities between two cases. From this basis, the 
emergent data structure was contrasted with existing success stories to make a contribution.  
4.3.1 Empirical Context: Case Selection and Overview 
The research setting is the implementation of Building Information Management (BIM) 
technologies in the northern Californian and Finnish digital built environment sectors. I refer 
to the digital built environment sector as a general term describing the supply chain and its 
wider network of co-evolving actors who adopted BIM technologies.  
The setting is attractive to this research for several reasons. First, two cases were chosen 
because of their contrasting varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), their early 
adoption of BIM, their extensive sector and research collaboration for BIM R&D, their 
openness to innovation, collaborative cultures and the presence of high-tech communities that 
exhibited a strong interdependence between various actors in the ecosystem of the sector. The 
significant difference is in the orchestration mechanisms within the two contexts: while 
Finland had 37 years of national development of BIM led by a governmental public funder, 
the northern Californian built environment sector is orchestrated by the software vendor 
which is co-located and intertwined with Silicon Valley actors and a network of top local 
universities. There is a distinct regional advantage in both cases. Both cases exhibit complex 






crucial for the development of relationships. Furthermore, actors from both contexts have a 
long-term international collaboration and exchange of knowledge for BIM R&D.  
Second, despite the systemic differences, these cases have produced similar results, such as 
the lack of business ecosystem emergence, a preference for vertical integration, the 
preservation of status quo and the inability of the sector actors to capture the promised 
benefits from BIM implementation while adopting BIM under old business practices. 
Previous chapters presented the failed orchestration mechanisms set by a public funder to 
support BIM implementation in Finland and the software vendor that orchestrates the 
ecosystem for its sector platform in California.  
4.3.2 Data Collection 
Interviews. The collected qualitative data is comprised of interview data as a primary source 
and archival data as a secondary one. A total of 25 interviews were conducted in Finland in 
2015 and 37 interviews were conducted in California in 2018. The interviews were conducted 
with the leading experts across six key stakeholders: i) academia (FIN:6; CA:3); ii) clients 
(FIN:2; CA:5); iii) supply chain: business & management (FIN:8; CA:13); iv) supply chain: 
technology operation (FIN:4; CA:9); v) other (FIN:5; CA:7)). The other actors comprised 
software vendors, start-ups, individual public organisations and institutional communities. 
The juxtaposition of different viewpoints on technological development brings into focus 
contrasting perspectives on socio-technical change. Such integration has provided contrasting 
pictures of the same processes without nullifying these differences (Van de Ven & Poole, 
1995). The interviews varied in duration but ranged between 30-160 minutes. A total of 62 






interviewees were generous in sharing their insights as the data collection was rich and 
fruitful.  
The original semi-structured interview protocol was based on the approach developed by 
McCracken (1988). The following questions were explored: (1) How has the sector evolved in 
relation to the use of ICT and BIM? (2) What is the current state of the sector’s adoption of 
BIM? (3) What are the critical challenges that the sector is currently experiencing with BIM? 
As the interviews progressed, open questions were directed at emerging themes and cases.  
However, the approach by McCracken (1988) was useful in the Finnish context and proved to 
be irritating to the Californian interviewees. As long as the interviews continued in 
California, I adjusted my methods to direct the discussions towards specific questions by 
allowing the interviewees to freely highlight the important issues, as experienced in their 
practice and based on the problem-driven theory developed by Corley and Gioia (2011) .  
When the data collection was completed, each interview transcript was provided for approval 
by the interviewee while every transcript was labelled with a unique number identifiable only 
by the researcher to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees. Quotes that could potentially 
identify individuals were eliminated to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees.  
Archival sources. In addition to the interview data, relevant literature on the Finnish and 
Californian built environment sectors in the form of reports, published articles, news articles 
and internal company documentations were collected to obtain historical evidence of strategic 
change in the industries in relation to technological implementation over the last 20 years. 
Furthermore, successful orchestration mechanism cases were also collected to build an 
understanding of how successful firms orchestrate their ecosystem and what mechanisms 






network). The cases were selected because the key interviewees frequently pointed out that I 
should compare the case of the DBE sector with those of Uber, Intel and Toyota.  
The richness of the collected data allowed for triangulation in various ways (Jick, 1979), by 
circulating between the validated transcripts, archival sources and the discussions with key 
experts, and thereby eliminating potential biases and validating the results. During the 
process, I continued to communicate with key interviewees informally by providing 
preliminary evidence to clarify certain issues. This process allowed for the engagement in 
“gestalt analysis” to make sense of the data (Gioia & Thomas, 1996: p.377). 
4.3.3 Data Analysis 
The interviews provided the primary data for analysis while the archival sources were 
used to refine interpretations of the emerging categories. The analytical process allowed for 
the construct of a theoretical model through a disciplined examination of the emerging 
competing explanations by considering similarities between two empirical cases. As the 
research progressed, the emerging categories, as drivers of failure, were contrasted with the 
existing literature. Thus, the data were analysed in accordance with the methodology 
provided by Gioia et al. (2013) in which my empirical observations were connected to extant 
theoretical ideas (Langley et al., 2013). A simplified sequence of steps is presented through 
multiple, intertwined steps that were repeated a number of times.  
Step 1: Event analysis and open coding. Although the cases were analysed in the previous 
chapters, this chapter required the coding of data to focus specifically on the sector context 
rather than the orchestration mechanisms. Therefore, the analysis started with the open 
coding by systematically reconstructing the myriad codes and themes, each containing a 






reading of the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) building a large database of two in-vivo codes 
and following the guidance provided by Gioia et al. (2013). I frequently iterated between the 
emerging categories and the creation of the first-order categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Then, I further refined the first-order categories by merging them and forming second-order 
categories that presented issues related to the sector context. In this step, more than 50 
different second-order codes emerged for each case.  
Step 2. Axial coding. In the next step, the analysis progressed to axial coding. First, I further 
continued to refine the emerging second-order categories by reducing and merging them into 
aggregated themes (Gioia et al., 2013) for each separate case. Then, I started to eliminate the 
categories dedicated to the software vendor, the public funder’s orchestration mechanisms 
and the specific issues related to BIM implementation leaving all the remaining categories. 
As the research progressed, the continuous circulation and iteration allowed for further 
refinement of the categories and themes by reducing their number to a mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive number of second-order categories and aggregated themes and 
dimensions (Gioia et al., 2013). This step has been performed iteratively by making extensive 
use of notes and discussions to interpret the data.  
This generated two different data structures that were still messy; however, they were telling 
a very similar story. The remaining categories and themes in each case were clearly pointing 
to the issues related to the sector’s desire to preserve the status quo and its inability to evolve 
beyond the established business practices. These issues were mentioned in the previous 
chapters, but this data points to the dark side of the sector suggesting that orchestration 
mechanisms were not definitive factors in the failed emergence of business ecosystems 
despite their significant influence on sector-wide innovation. The final refinement of the 






dynamics. These were related to individuals, sector structure and processes, and the inter-
organisational relations between conflicting sector actors and actors from outside the sector, 
e.g. software vendors, government, academia, clients, insurance firms, etc. The data further 
suggested feedback loops between the sector structure, the agency of individuals, and the 
capabilities behind the inertial forces echoing the theory of Jacobides and Winter (2012). This 
highlighted the role of context and high-level casual forces driving the system dynamics at 
three levels: individual, organisational and system. At this stage, two data structures were 
generated and merged into one. This iterative process resulted in a data structure Figure 18 
(see Appendix D for the full version). The research gradually progressed to a theory-driven 
explanation (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
Step 3. Contrasting the success examples and building a grounded model. The articulated 
themes and aggregated dimensions provided a basis for building the grounded model by 
identifying the linkages between the aggregated dimensions. This helped to explain the sector 
dynamics and why it preserved the status quo. I have not only induced the categories but also 
generated interpretations of the observed phenomenon to form a storyline between the 
second-order categories, aggregated themes and dimensions. These interpretations described 
the processes and phenomena under investigation, and the so called “deep processes” in their 
relationships (Gioia, Price, Hamilton, & Thomas, 2010).  
Then, I collected all quotes related to the suggestions provided by the interviewees in order to 
compare the BIM implementation in Finland and California to successful examples in other 
industries. Uber, Toyota and semiconductor industries were frequently mentioned by 
interviewees. Moreover, through the analysis of the history of the semiconductor sector, I 
identified that Intel played an important role in orchestrating the sector. Thus, I selected 







 Figure 18 Data Structure  
The published literature provides an overview of the orchestration mechanisms set by these 
firms. Finally, I contrasted the empirical insights generated in this study and the successful 
mechanisms derived from the Toyota, Uber and Intel. I continuously cycled between the 
empirical evidence of failure and the published literature, constructing a dynamic image of 














Figure 18 Data Structure Continued 
I aimed to understand if there is an order to the components that contributed to the failure and 
success and whether the sector context mattered in this case. In doing so, I was able to build 
an understanding of the order of components and their importance for ecosystem emergence 
and orchestration. The emergent relationships between the components were organised in 
order of the function and importance they hold at the three levels. This order and the 








4.4.1 Exploration of The Sector Context for Ecosystem Orchestration  
Following the evidence provided in the previous chapters, this study explores the sector 
context on ecosystem formation by identifying similarities and critical issues that emerged 
from the failed cases of ecosystem orchestration in Finland and California. Following the 
inductive analysis of the interviews in Finland and California, similarities manifested at three 
levels: individual, organisational and system. At an individual level, an aspect of agency 
varies from individual to individual which aligns choices with capabilities and incentives 
provided by the organisational and system levels. The organisational level is concerned with 
the constraining areas of capability and resource deployment across the whole sector, which 
are dependent on the system level. The system level was largely taken for granted (Jacobides 
& Winter, 2012); however, this study suggests that the system level is a critical issue that 
builds capabilities and influences the strategic choices and agency of individuals, which 
aligns with the findings of Jacobides and Winter (2012). The dynamics of the sector can be 
viewed as exploitative. The sector actors who hold power favour the status quo for power 
preservation as the sector’s ecosystem disincentivises them from innovative practices. 
Evidence shows that individuals are blindfolded by their predisposed beliefs of success and 
failure because there are no effective measures to prove overwise. There is clear evidence 
that the sector is struggling to move beyond the established practices due to the absence of 









Have you read the innovator’s dilemma? So, it sounds as much as it's a closed innovation. 
So, you remember the three pillars, he says, it needs disruptive innovation, right? So, you 
need a simplifying technology; there is not a single simplifying technology that's out there. 
[…] So, the Apple Music that was a simplifying technology. So, the second thing is, you 
need a new business model, right? We do not have that… And then most importantly, 
you need a value network… and we don't have that because no one wants to play nicely. 
Everyone wants to kind of say, this is mine and I'm not changing, but you can do whatever 
you want. (CEO, Ai Consultancy, CA17) 
This quote suggests that the sector’s organisational structure remains traditional. The next 
sections will present the interview results at three levels - individual, organisational and 
system - considering the details of the collected data in two cases presented in previous 
chapters.  
Individual Level  
The literature on inertial properties and the agency-related forces of change are under-
represented (Jacobides & Winter, 2012). Considering the complexity of relationships along 
the value chain of the DBE sector, the analysis indicates that the agency of individuals and 
their attitudes to the same issues vary. Variabilities in attitude are found in individuals 
within and between firms, who react differently to the same challenges. Researcher (CA38) 
who promoted BIM to general contractors explains: 
Three companies but with different attitude[s] to BIM. First, [hidden] rejected [the] idea of 
BIM and did not see any opportunities to learn. Second, […] three top project managers saw 
BIM as [the] holy cow and saw the future, then they have become CEOs of the same 
company driving it. Third, [hidden] did not have a bad attitude to BIM but did not see any 
strategic opportunity. (Researcher, CA38) 
The variability in attitude is related to the capacities and competencies of individuals. The 
individuals have been referred to as smart and capable but wanting to stay in their comfort 
zones, thus suggesting inertial forces. These inertial forces constitute power preservation, the 






While some interviewees referred to individuals as “no one wants to play nicely” (CEO, Ai 
start up, CA17) and that some are “totally against anything” (CEO, structural engineering 
firm, CA07) suggesting an ego-centric attitude amongst some actors who hold power, these 
behaviours are explained by others as a risk management strategy that protects their 
businesses from loss, e.g. survival strategy. This evidence suggests that structure plays an 
important role in driving individual choices (Jacobides & Winter, 2012). As a risk 
management strategy, some individuals intentionally seek change orders in the construction 
processes. Change orders offer the possibility to occasionally “win money” (FIN20) to cover 
the inherent losses from the lowest bid procurement strategies. The systemic issue is that, in 
order to win projects, during the procurement phase firms submit proposals based on a lowest 
bid strategy. Invariably the lowest bid always wins. The change of orders can potentially 
cover some losses from the lowest bid strategy. However, this strategy is more of a gamble. 
The risks are associated with unforeseen transactions costs as the manager of a health care 
client explains:  
What happens is your general contractors are on the job and they are really nice, everything's 
going well for them, they're checking how much money they can make but once they get to 
a point they start to lose money then they make the calculation and ask do I want to stay in 
a good relationship in this or not? And to the extent that they want to stay in a good 
relationship they will just lose margins to keep the owner happy. They even can make a 
small loss on the project because they really want the next job or there is a benefit to being 
in this relationship, but at some point, they will switch, right. It may be early, may be late 
but then they will start to bury the project in change orders, because they have been 
stockpiling paperwork through the project so they can use it when they need. So, it is really 
a risk mitigation tool. I understand how hard it has been for us to build systems to get 
people to really accurately project the final cost of the work. (Manager, Health Care Client, 
CA08) 
The issues associated with this strategy arise from the fact that individuals lack system 
thinking, as no single person understands how the whole sector functions and has no 
definitive measures of value capture. Individuals also end up with a reductionist view of what 






protect themselves from losses while dealing with the established norms (e.g. lowest bid 
culture) of construction practices by acting in a silo. This vicious cycle negatively reinforces 
the status quo.  
While this behaviour is associated with construction professionals, designers were viewed by 
general contractors and clients as professionals who “build hours […] by overdesigning” 
(CEO, VIF, CA32). The interviewees suggest that this behaviour exists to protect individuals 
from associated risks. The interviewees stated that clients tended to cut hours from the 
contract in the design phase. Clients typically assume that the use of BIM technologies allow 
designers to be more efficient and are therefore not willing to pay for hours above the 
established industry norm. The status quo associated with the designer’s fee structure is a 
norm that can be observed in the built environment sector in both contexts. However, 
designers use the given hours to produce safe designs and meet regulation needs. Therefore, 
within the given time, designers can utilise only workable solutions that are safe. The use of 
BIM also requires more time in the first design phases, which are typically misunderstood by 
clients. While clients cut the designer’s hours, they also reduce their innovative capabilities, 
as they tend to stick to existing solutions thus producing conservative designs under time 
pressures. By working within a limited timeframe, designers overprotect themselves and are 
not typically willing to take liability for the design or to share their models. The disintegrated 
process reinforces protectionism, the status quo and traditional practices thereby 
disincentivising disciplines for innovation, as explained by a CEO of a VIF (CA32): 
The sector has all these different handoffs, and everybody overdesigns everything, you 
know, to protect themselves. The architect is a separate company from the engineers, the 
general contractor is a separate company, and subcontractors. And so, the whole process 
with a bunch of different companies, they're unrelated that work together. […] They have 






The protectionist attitude is explained by the tension that individuals experience in projects. 
The tension arises between the individual’s need to protect themselves from the risks 
associated with the design and the opportunity to innovate. This arises from the unresolved 
contractual issues associated with liabilities and responsibilities. However, as the CEO of the 
structural engineering firm (CA07) pointed out, “contracts represent only 5% of what is 
happening in the construction”. Therefore, individuals and organisations focus on their siloed 
survivability strategies while no-one focuses on the whole life cycle costs, e.g. “no one is 
focused on total dollars” (Manager, GC, CA11). The empirical evidence suggests that the 
ecosystem conditions disincentivise individuals to innovate and make different strategic 
choices at an individual level. The complexity of choices arises from the dependence on the 
organisational and system levels. 
Organisational Level  
The empirical evidence shows great variance in the capabilities and capacities of 
organisations in the sector, which is also limiting and slows BIM implementation processes in 
the sector. Indeed, the empirical evidence on competence and capability variability in any 
sector exhibits substantial performance differences amongst organisations (Gibbons & 
Henderson, 2012). Organisations lack the business and financial capabilities while holding 
technical but traditional competencies. Interviewees further reported that traditional 
competencies are also diminishing in the sector. For example, superintendent (GC, CA22) 
stated: “the skills of the tradesmen have diminished. That's a big problem too”. Sector actors 
have different levels of knowledge and understanding, such as the understanding of their own 
business model and business model innovation. For example, research on the role of business 
models in Finnish design and construction firms by Pekuri, Pekuri, and Haapasalo (2013) 






VDC, Lean, etc.) in limited terms or interpret according to established frames of reference, as 
explained by a VDC manager (CA11_1): 
A lot of people when you start talking to them and you start asking questions about virtual 
design and construction, … can respond in the conversation with you but I'm not sure that 
they actually understand virtual design and construction in the way that CIFE would explain. 
You think that you are gathering information on this topic and you're talking about the same 
thing but you're not talking about the same thing. (VDC Manager, GC, CA11_1) 
Following the evidence presented in the previous section, risk management strategy and 
financial projection in the sector are poorly understood. For example, some supply chain 
actors do not understand whether they are making money or not in projects, as explained by a 
client (CA36): 
I just assumed that companies were a lot more sophisticated in financial projection 
capability. And we found that some companies are very sophisticated, we found that some 
big companies have absolutely no idea if they're making money or not, believe it or not, 100 
million company in annual revenue has no idea if they're making money or not. So, we've 
uncovered the things that, in a lonesome agreement or a GMP, you would just never be 
exposed to that. But once you run a job, basically you open the book with profit and risk and 
profit sharing, all of a sudden, you start to go like: “WOW, this sector is a lot more 
dysfunctional than I thought.” (PM, Health Care Client, CA36) 
Despite a limited understanding of novel concepts, interviewees frequently admired the 
existing capabilities of sector actors; for example some suggested that people are capable and 
hardworking, “contractors are really good at getting stuff done in adverse conditions” (PM, 
software vendor, CA30), and “that people know how to do what they've been taught to do and 
what they have done” (Innovation manager, GC, CA11). However, “being busy, it doesn't 
mean that you're productive, or that you're efficient” (Consultant, CA13). This poses serious 
challenges for changing the system as the hard conditions that actors are used to also 
constrain them. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section entitled ‘System 
level’.  
A lack of skills, talent, diversity and the diminished labour market have been identified as 






they are unable to compete with organisations in other industries that offer better 
opportunities and prospects. This is validated by the existing literature (Farmer, 2016). 
Moreover, a lack of diversity reinforces biased decisions and established views, thus 
producing an echo chamber effect.  
The deployment of resources is also an issue as interviewees frequently refer to the low profit 
margins of supply chains, which range between 1 and 10%,; the sector is “culturally 
challenging and therefore financially challenging” (CEO, start up, CA35). The low margins 
coupled with high risks and the inability of organisations to manage the risks effectively were 
frequently linked to the established culture of the sector. These conditions have become an 
accepted norm and were published in sector-recognised reports as early as: Constructing the 
team published by Latham (1994); Rethinking construction report published by Egan (1998); 
the UK Government construction strategy published by the Cabinet Office (2011), and 
Construction 2025 report published by HM Government (2013). According to Designing 
Buildings Wiki16, Alfred’s (1934) book, ‘Building to the Skies: The Romance of the 
Skyscraper’, offered one of the first major criticisms of the UK construction sector’s standard 
of performance. The structural conditions of modern construction remained similar to those 
observed in the 1960s (Wood, 1975).  
Low margins further create limited investment within R&D and innovation. For example, 
“the outrageous price of personnel training and the cost of software licences” (Manager, sub-
trade, CA21) could be seen an obstacle from the firms with low margins that try to invest in 
staff training. The cost of training in the sector is not well established. Overall, the sector is 
ill-equipped to deal with changes and systemic innovation (Katila et al., 2018); in particular, 
 






the learning curve as a whole in the sector is noted as very slow. An important question 
arises: if key decision makers in this sector recognised these issues as early as the 1960-70s, 
then why does the process remain unchanged and why has it evolved incrementally? This 
question will be answered in the next section. 
System Level  
System exploitation. Empirical evidence supports the importance of system incentives to 
support innovation in the sector. It clearly indicates that the system disincentivises 
individuals and organisations to invest in innovation. The system generates feedback loops 
that incentivises the preservation of the status quo and the established norms of practice. 
Consequently, powerful sector actors exploit the system for self-preservation, and particularly 
exploit the inbuilt system inefficiencies.  
As the sector structure and practices have remained unchanged since the 1960s (Wood, 
1975), “the rules of the game have been established […] people do not need to change” 
(Innovation Manager, GC, CA11). The appropriated established rules create certain barriers 
for innovators as “changing any rule is seen a risk” (CEO, Ai Start Up, CA). The established 
sector rules dictate the governing cooperation, competition and outcome.  
An acknowledged fact is that the existing “business models [of the sector] are from the 80s” 
(Consultant, FIN04). Interviewees further suggest that whilst actors can take different routes, 
the outcome remains the same as “at the end of the day, we still deliver a building” (PM, Sub-
Trade, CA21) and it is their main business. The accepted profit margins (1-10%) have 
remained low since the economic crisis in 2009, “getting more money out of the construction 
process is like squeezing a stone with current constraints” (PM, Software Vendor, CA30). An 






existing business models. The existing constraints were appropriated into the established 
business models as PM (Software Vendor, CA30) shares a conversation with a group of 
general contractors: 
What are the constraints on the construction sector? What are the things that are keeping the 
construction sector from being efficient? What if we removed them? And, the contractors 
all hated it [removing the constraints] and it was not like a definitive sample of it. And, the 
contractor’s feedback quite strongly was you should not be removing these constraints, you 
should be helping us with these constraints. And I thought that was really interesting because 
essentially, they have incorporated these rules into their business model. And so, while these 
rules are holding them down, and holding them down to that 4% profit, or that 1% profit, 
they are also keeping these constraints in the sector that are keeping them down, but 
they're also keeping them relevant. (PM, Software Vendor, CA30) 
This statement suggests that some leading key sector actors (e.g. consultants17, contractors 
and sub-trades) are intentionally preserving established business models. This constitutes “the 
dark side of the status quo in that the sector creates money from the waste and some people 
do not want that changed” (Researcher, FIN20_1). 
The socio-cognitive factors, like mindsets and cognitive frames, guide the sector actors in 
preserving current constraints while justifying their relevance. As a result of the preservation 
of the status quo, innovative efforts in the sector are incremental and were mainly dedicated 
to technology development to improve intra-organisational productivity. Results derived from 
the Finnish and Californian studies exhibited a strong technology push instead of a market 
pull.  
However, one PM (GC, CA11) suggested that an innovation of a business model could 
potentially lead to capability development and a mindset shift as it could offer incentives for 
new value creation and capture, and eventually prompt an evolution of practice:  
 
 






When the business deal is different, then that's when you begin to see a deeper change and 
getting different answers to your questions. […] But it seems if you can make different 
offers in the market and creating [the] capacity to do that, you end up changing a lot, you 
change, you use technology differently, you may invent, create technology, your social 
organisation, the way you organise the work and the way people in that place, work and 
relate to each other, it can be very different than what you see on most construction sites. 
(VDC Manager, GC, CA11_1) 
The important parts of business models, such as contractual relations and procurement 
models, also remain unchanged (Cabinet Office, 2011; Mosey et al., 2016). Although some 
actors, like Sutter Health in California, have implemented Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) 
that changes the business models of projects (Ashcraft, 2011), empirical evidence shows that 
the IPD model is not necessarily changing the rules and established practices of sector actors 
despite the observed benefits of improved collaboration. Client leadership in governing IPD 
projects becomes of utmost importance in correcting behaviours. However, client leadership 
typically fails because they do not have the capabilities to lead projects as noted by the 
interviewees.  
Unchanged rules, business, contractual and procurements models constitute the dark side of 
the construction sector ecosystem. A risk-averse culture is propagated across the whole 
system including amongst owners. One of the explanations as to why the sector preserves the 
status quo and confirms its difference from other sectors is because construction business 
models are dependent on location. Two different buildings in the same location can be bought 
for a similar price, which leaves little incentive for sector actors to invest in innovation. The 
price of a building is largely dependent on the value of the land and not the quality of the 
building or the process of delivery. The location determines the willingness to pay for a 
building product as end users incentivise sector actors to aim at optimising internal 







It is a part of system exploitation and business models. It is good to remember that there are 
no products where the price of the product would have anything to do with the production 
costs. Every product, the price for the phone is the willingness to pay. And the same with 
the houses; the price of the house has nothing to do with the production cost, it has 
everything to do with the market price. What people are willing to pay. The mobile 
phones, there is no such thing as the location for a phone; you buy phone because of [the] 
reputation and quality of the product, so these companies have to invest in innovation. But 
in the building sector, the quality of [a] product, as long as it is good enough to be bought. 
[…] But as long as the clients are willing to pay [the] asking price, but you do not try 
to develop it better because it does not pay back. It is part of [an] ecosystem, because 
it cannot be changed. No matter what we do. If you are able to reduce production costs you 
can save money […]. Then, I do not think it is realistic to think that the construction 
sector will ever be like [a] car manufacturer or mobile phone. The situation is so 
different. (Researcher, FIN20) 
Power of received traditions. Both the cognitive and structural elements constitute the 
building blocks of new ecosystems (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). Interviewees have identified 
the sector culture as a barrier to innovation. Interviewees from both contexts agreed that the 
issue of innovation in the sector is not the issue of technology or money, but of culture, as an 
engineer (CA23) explained: 
In my experience, the biggest problem is not a technical one but more of a cultural one. 
There is sort of established norms on how people work, and people are so used to it and it is 
so ingrained that people do not question it anymore. (Optimisation Engineer, VIF, CA23) 
The power of received traditions dominate the decision-making process suggesting a short-
sighted culture amongst sector actors. The established mindset is an important part of culture, 
which guides sector actors and has a negative connotation, as explained by a consultant 
(CA13):  
I think that one of the worst mindsets that we have in construction … has been inherited 
from project to project, from generation to generation is the mindset of fighting fires. […] 
they're very short in the mindsets…there's no leadership, there's no role modelling, 
right? The mindset says […] you have to suffer and to sweat blood, because we don't learn 
from project to project […] each project is unique […]. And actually, I think that one of the 
worst mindsets that we have in construction is this has been inherited from project to project, 
from generation to generation is the mindset of fighting fires, right? We have to be busy all 
the time. And being busy, it does not mean that you're productive, or that you're efficient. 
[…] We have to move from the fighting fires mindset to the look-ahead mindset. 
(Consultant, CA13) 
The issue of the established mindset is derived from the history of the sector’s evolution 






organisational communication. Culture provides the established norms that sector actors do 
not question, as “Why would you question the practice that you have been taught to and have 
been doing most of your career?” (Innovation Manager, GC, CA11), and “I have always done 
it and will continue doing it” (PM, Software Vendor, CA30). A few interviewees further 
suggested that the sector actors “are used to bad business” (Researcher, CA37) and referred 
to them as “the fish is the last one to discover the water” (Innovation Manager, GC, CA11).  
Sector complementors. Finnish and Californian sector actors have pointed to the important 
role of universities in building mindsets and the sector culture. However, according to 
interviewees, the conservatism, low R&D standards and the traditional siloed methods of 
teaching are also relevant to the top world universities. Thus, disciplinary education 
contributes to the development of the mindset of individuals by educating them via traditional 
methods in silos. The CEO of an Ai start-up (CA35) observed: 
It is [a] chicken and egg problem: education defects [the] mindset of [the] sector and [the] 
sector does not use education to push the boundaries of what is possible. […] Conservative 
sector and is trained in a very conservative way. (CEO, Ai Start Up, CA35) 
The interviewees pointed out that some educators trained in the past and have limited sector 
experience; they often do not know how the sector functions and may intentionally preserve 
the status quo. The data also indicates that some lecturers and professors are afraid of 
digitalisation, which could potentially lead to the loss of established position and power in 
traditional methods. Academic success is measured by the number of academic publications; 
therefore, research does not need to be implemented in the sector, which contributes to a 
disconnect between academia and practice. The interviewees in both contexts noted that the 
disconnect between academia and practice are critical. Educational institutions are key 






to self-transform or support a sector-wide transformation. These conditions negatively 
reinforce the sector’s status quo. 
The surprising fact is that, despite the co-location of the Californian construction sector with 
the network of top universities and Silicon Valley, the sector is “still on the conservative 
side” and similar to other countries, as explained by the CEO of a start-up (CA35) and a 
consultant (CA13): 
Silicon Valley is not a construction sector, I am talking about the construction sector; SV is 
like [a] little microcosm. We have [a] few start-ups here, but they are not there yet, and it 
takes time. (CEO, Ai Start Up, CA35) 
I can say that I've been in projects all over the world. And there's no difference between a 
project in South America to a project in the Middle East, or in Africa or in Europe. 
The mindset is... and sometimes I tell people, it looks like they were cut out by sisters, 
right? That they're out of that cookie cutter thing. They're equal…their mindsets are equal. 
Well, the way they behaved [is] equal, the way they treat people [is] equal. […] California 
is slightly more on a progressive side. (Consultant, CA13) 
The role of software vendors as strategic partners has also been emphasised in both contexts. 
However, evidence shows that, although software vendors and technology providers can 
become strategic sector partners and complementors, they pursue selfish interests for self-
benefit. Thus, they have a disproportional influence on the sector dynamics by preserving the 
power and control, and reinforcing the status quo feedback loop. An example of the software 
vendor’s influence was discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
Inertia is observed across all sector actors while the diversity of the sector remains low. 
Essentially it falls under the category of “a closed group” (CEO, Ai Start Up, CA17; 
Innovation Manager, FIN21). The sector consists of siloed groups with protectionist attitudes 
(Morrell, 2015). For example, architects have been resistant to any technological change 
because supply chains were unable to agree on the division of labour, profit and liabilities. 
The established designer’s fee structure is a status quo while architects are unwilling to lose 






leadership has shifted from architects to general contractors. The closed-systems in 
conjunction with conflicting power relations related to the industry architecture hinder the 
sector’s digital evolution. Consequently, sector actors are not able to renew themselves as 
they are dependent on other competing actors in the ecosystem, e.g. academia, software 
vendors, insurance firms, regulations, clients, etc. Indeed, “the nature of innovation 
challenges [are] confronted by external partners” (Adner & Kapoor, 2010: p.307). 
Selection of sectors for comparison. On the recommendation of key interviewees and 
scholars who were familiar with this work, a number of sectors were selected for comparison 
as part of the research design. Finnish key scholars suggested that I should conduct 
substantial comparisons between the failures and successes in the built environment sector 
with examples in other sectors. While interviewing experts in California and Finland, some 
experts compared the BE sector with other successful firms and their business ecosystems. 
There is a discrepancy in the literature as to which constructs and components do in fact lead 
to success; thus, there is currently no appropriate theory to explain this (Lussier & Halabi, 
2010). An understanding as to why ecosystems fail and succeed is crucial for the 
development of theory, namely Why do some ecosystems succeed, and others fail? 
The general observation and agreement amongst key sector actors were that the sector is not 
able to evolve on its own and disruption has to come from the outside, whether by 
challengers like Uber or by government initiatives. Three sectors have been mentioned by 
experts and scholars: 1) the traditional taxi sector and the disruptor Uber; 2) Toyota and the 
case of General Motors; 3) the evolution of the semiconductor sector.  







Look at Uber, they just kind of moved into cities with their lawyers and they said, we do not 
do medallions, we do not need to follow the rules because of XYZ. So, it is not like, you 
know, the taxi companies not under threat from another taxi company, it's under threat from 
something completely different. (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Overall, I was advised by the manager at TEKES (FIN12) to look at the business drivers of 
Uber to understand the sector dynamics: 
What is the key driver for Uber? You should study that. […] Customer value – they will 
pay for everything + Scalability. When you are doing a doctoral thesis, I would strongly 
recommend you compare other business areas. And Uber is an excellent example. Very 
traditional business, all over the world, very regulated and when you look at other areas, you 
can find thousands of those. Then, when you have a little bit of imagination, you can think 
about similar cases in construction as drivers. (Manager, TEKES, FIN12) 
The traditional taxi sector was compared to the traditional construction sector. The CEO of a 
VIF (CA32) questioned the traditional taxi sector pointing to the issue of incentives: 
Why didn't the taxi companies invent Uber? It's because they didn't have an incentive to 
invent Uber. (CEO, VIF, CA32) 
Toyota was referred to as the example of an actor with an orchestrator’s capabilities while 
the issues that actors in the sector experience are similar to those of General Motors:  
This sector has a long way to go to reach Toyota's level of collaboration. […] But the 
interesting thing about Toyota was that they were open to receive visitors from Ford, 
Chrysler, all their competitors got to see what Toyota was doing, but their competitors had 
the fish problem. […] They literally didn't believe what they saw. Because they knew it 
could not be true. They were like the fish. They just, they could not understand anything 
other than the environment they were in. There was no other way to build cars than to 
have a giant factory. (Innovation Manager, GC, CA11) 
Numerous attempts to change the project delivery following Toyota’s example have been 
made by clients in California who own large building assets. Clients compared themselves to 
General Motors who have been failing because of misaligned incentives in the contractual 








You have to have a financial business deal that supports teams working in the interests 
of the project; the team needs to know that they are collectively at risk. […] Everyone 
has the same story. I tried to do it without that [business deal]. And then I had projects that 
kept failing. I think General Motors has been through the same thing, I think [client] as 
well. […] they need to be incentivized to work together to make the project well […] but 
the business deal still doesn't make it all work and just creates an environment which 
everything else seems to make sense to everybody because in order to win, you need these 
other things. But if you don't have that it's all about goodwill and intention, which when 
a project hits, and hits really hard, there is a very high risk of just falling apart and everybody 
will default to “I got to save my own company”. (PM, Health Care Client, CA08) 
Intel was cited as an example of industry transformation that did not happen in the built 
environment sector. Interviewees who worked previously in the silicon chip sector noticed 
that the built environment sector architecture today is similar to the silicon chip sector’s 
architecture 30 years ago in terms of the fragmented and complex multidisciplinary design 
and product development, which functions by “throwing drawings over the wall” (Engineer, 
VIF, CA23). An engineer explains that the semiconductor sector was forced to rethink its 
production:  
… 30 years ago, chip design was similar to the building sector in the sense that many teams 
were involved in designing all kinds of chips. […] and they all had their own tools, and they 
did their own thing. Again, in the end, the chip was put together. The particular thing about 
chip design is that once it is designed, think of it as it goes to the oven, the outcomes are 
either it is working or [an] inexpensive piece of glass. It was very hard to design a chip that 
worked first time. And that, also coupled with how costly it was to design something new, 
you had to stop the whole factory to try [the] new thing. The chip fabrication these days 
costs like 2 billion. So, if you don't use it for a week, that's a tremendous amount of your 
resources. They were forced to rethink, and they were forced to go out of their silo 
environment where everyone used to their own thing and throwing things over at each other. 
Construction these days, it is about throwing it all over the wall. (Engineer, VIF, CA23) 
Thirty years ago, the manufacturing sector also had to rethink its production “that whole 
thing has been standardised, that all the standardised pieces come together in a unique way.” 
(Engineer, VIF, CA23). While one interviewee (PM, GC, CA17) suggested thinking about 
potential disruption from manufacturers and to answer the following questions: “What if 
manufacturers entered the building sector? What if they made the entire building? How 
would they change the entire ecosystem?” There are vertically integrated firms whose top 






environment sector to deliver the whole building to the client. However, there is no evidence 
that vertically integrated firms are changing the ecosystem yet, as they co-exist with 
traditional firms. A question is, what can affect a digital transformation in the ecosystem? 
Why do some ecosystems succeed, and others fail? 
The cases of Uber, Toyota and semiconductor manufacturing were selected for comparison 
because they were mentioned by interviewees and offer excellent examples of ecosystem 
orchestration that changed their sectors.  
4.4.2 Comparison of Successful Ecosystems to the Failures in the BE Sector 
Following the recommendation of interviewees, the success cases -Toyota, Uber and 
Intel - have been compared to the empirical findings. Table 13 summarises the critical 
constructs and components in the success of Toyota, Uber and Intel and the failure of the 
built environment sector. These constructs and components were discussed in the Section 4.2 
Components and Constructs of Success and Failure in Ecosystem Orchestration. The analysis 
showed that leadership and orchestration are important for the success cases and for change 
in the industry architecture while the built environment sector failed at multiple levels. An in-
depth analysis of each success case is depicted in  
Table 14. The analysis of the critical components in relation to the success cases of 
Toyota, Uber and Intel are presented below.  
Success of Toyota’s Orchestration 
Several scholars mentioned Toyota as a successful ecosystem orchestrator (Gobble, 
2014; Schrage, 2013). While its orchestration mechanisms align with the ecosystem 






Jacobides et al., 2019). Toyota is regarded a successful example of network management 
(Womack, Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1990) that proved useful for this research.  
Table 13 Systematic Order of Successful Orchestration Mechanisms Contrasted with 
Failures in the DBE Sector18 
N Case 
studies 







 Levels  1 2 3 
 Compon
. 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
1 Toyota  1  1  1   1   Car 
Manuf. 
Alliance Run the worst plant in 
the USA successfully in 
3 months 
2 Uber  1  1  1   1  1 Taxi Business Uber offered disruptive 
business model 
3 Intel 1 1    1   1  1 Computer  Innovation Intel changed PC’s 
industry architecture 









Failed ecosystems and 
platforms 
 
The analysis of Toyota’s orchestration mechanism shows the importance of managerial 
practice as well as its supporting business structures. Toyota’s leadership and orchestration 
mechanisms were supported by the relational contracts that defined the business model. In 
this way, Toyota effectively managed its value creation and capture by the suppliers.  
The success of Toyota is confirmed by the findings provided by the VDC manager (CA11_1) 
who stated, “when the business deal is different then that's when you begin to see a deeper 
change”. Meanwhile, the PM at the health care client (CA08) suggested “the business deal 
 
18 1- Success, 0- Failure  
Individual level: A-Agency, B-Leadership C-Cognitive frames/Mindsets 
Organisational level: D-Capabilities, E-Bottlenecks, F-Orchestration 







still doesn't make it all work and just creates an environment which everything else seems to 
make sense to everybody”. This advocates the corresponding proposition:  
 
Table 14 Comparison of Uber, Toyota and Intel Across Components  








DIGITAL BUILT  
ENVIRONMENT 
SECTOR 
Source  (Cramer & Krueger, 





(Dyer & Nobeoka, 
2000; Helper & 
Henderson, 2014) 
Empirical evidence 
presented in this 
thesis 











creating a new 
business model 








Failing or currently 
emerging 
Location factor 
in nature of the 
business 











value is defined by 
the location 
Business type B2C B2C B2C B2B 
Open/closed open open closed closed 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Agency Agency activated 
from the need  
Intentionally 
initiated sector 
evolution from the 
need to evolve 
- Cannot evolve 
without an 
orchestrator or a 
need  
Leadership Not documented Yes Yes  Failed  
Cognitive 
frames/Mindset 
Taxi sector was not 
able to evolve 
Computer sector 
was not able to 
evolve 




Capabilities Yes, capabilities are 
a factor  
Did not have 
capabilities but built 
them during the 
process 
Yes, capabilities are 
a factor  
Low, business and 
financial capabilities 
are inadequate 
Resources Had resources Had resources - Low, 1-10% 
Prof.Mar. 
Competencies Was a top 
entrepreneur  
Was a top supplier  Was a top 
manufacturer 
Low, traditional 
Bottleneck - - - Non-existent or not 
articulated 
Orchestration  Does not follow any 
rules, changed 
regulation and 
interacted with the 
environment 






























Changed structure  - Failed to change 
Platform  Yes  Open standards - Failed 
Business Model Business model is a 
competitive edge 
- Relational contracts 
to provide the basis 
of a business fee 
structure 
Failed, unchanged  










Culture Avoided dealing 
with existing culture 
of the taxi sector 
Changed culture of 
the sector 
Culture is not a 
factor as Japanese 
managers managed 
the worst factory in 
the US 
Strong factor in 
guiding the sector  
Proposition 1. The business model defines the environment providing a structure 
and necessary incentives for the development of the agency and capabilities of the 
ecosystem participants. The business model is a building construct. 
While analysing Toyota’s orchestration mechanisms, the case of General Motors’ failure 
became apparent. Toyota’s success is best understood in relation to the history of General 
Motor’s inability to imitate Toyota’s practices (Helper & Henderson, 2014). General Motors 
(GM) was regarded as the best-managed and most successful firm in the world (Helper & 
Henderson, 2014) and yet it failed to adopt the managerial practices of Toyota. When GM 
established a joint venture, NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.), with Toyota, 
to enable an insight into its capabilities, GM allowed Toyota to manage its worst plant that 
had been already closed for two years (Brown & Reich, 1989). Despite the worst possible 
conditions for management, Toyota was able to effectively match the efficiency and 
effectiveness of this US-based plant to Toyota’s Japanese plants in just three months 
(Womack et al., 1990). Helper and Henderson (2014) argued that the mental models and 






This case suggests that the mindset and cognition of managers are critical to innovation while 
“Japanese culture or governance, or the uniquely recalcitrant nature of GM’s union and 
workforce […] are implausible” (Helper & Henderson, 2014: p.53).  
Proposition 2. The culture of the sector is an implausible factor in failure as it can 
be changed with self-reinforcing business model innovation and leadership. The 
mindset is critical to innovation and is a failing component.  
Success of Uber’s Orchestration 
The analysis of Uber’s success has illuminated a new type of digital orchestrator that, 
with the use of a disruptive self-reinforcing business model, innovated the supply-demand 
mechanisms threatening to displace the traditional taxi sector (Teece, 2018a). The business 
model of Uber is built on facilitating a business ecosystem orchestration by relying on 
intangible assets by not-managing and not-owning assets; this contrasts with the traditional 
taxi sector. The founders of Uber had the capabilities and resources to spot a new business 
opportunity that matched the demand of passengers with the supply of drivers. Uber did not 
only provide value to the driver-passenger but drove deregulation in the taxi sector (Libert et 
al., 2014).  
An interesting fact is that traditional taxi drivers were not moving into the technology market 
because they considered themselves non-technology firms (Libert et al., 2014). In line with 
the traditional taxi sector, design and construction actors are clearly distinguishing 
themselves as non-technology firms “as they are not built to become a technology firm” 
(innovation manager GC, CA11). Furthermore, Uber does not seem to be concerned with the 
health of the ecosystem exerting control over the community (Sundararajan, 2014). This 






Heikkilä and Heikkilä (2019) present the negative side effects from the Finnish government’s 
deregulation of the taxi sector to support emerging digital businesses in the taxi sector, as in 
the case of Uber in Helsinki. They further report the negative effects of these processes, such 
as tax evasion, domination by powerful global firms and the reduced use of public transport. 
It seems that the case of Uber is an individual success as well as, some may argue, a public 
failure.  
Proposition 3. The culture of the leading hub and sector is not a determining factor 
for success. An outsider’s innovative business model can challenge the established 
industry architecture and status quo. Successful firms actively change the 
environment to their needs. The industry architecture is a failing construct if the 
sector is old and mature.  
Teece (2018a) further argues that Uber’s business model innovation is not a guarantee of 
success as there is no best way to organise a business (Hofer, 1975), while dynamic 
capabilities are necessary for ecosystem orchestration. Therefore, dynamic capabilities seem 
to be important for ecosystem orchestration, while Intel’s case shows otherwise.  
Success of Intel’s Orchestration 
Contrasting evidence of the need for capabilities is provided by the example of Intel 
who had no experience in orchestration and had to develop capabilities to orchestrate 
conflicting actors in one of the most complex and fragmented industries - the PC sector - 
through trial and error (Gawer & Henderson, 2007). The case of Intel shows how a highly 
competent component maker can become a strategic leader by facilitating sector-wide 
platform innovation (Gawer, 2000). This suggests the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. Capabilities can be built during the process of ecosystem 






The computer sector and Intel were not able to evolve on their own; a symbiotic co-evolution 
was needed. Intel’s initiative started with a few top managers who saw an opportunity. They 
identified the sector’s limitations in delivering value to the end-users. The limitations were 
the system architecture and the absence of strategic leadership. New uses of a computer 
platform were needed to increase demand, but different technical bottlenecks in the system 
architecture slowed the evolution. The failure of established computer manufacturers to 
address this issue created an opportunity for Intel to become involved in the design of 
industry architecture (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). Intel took the lead in governing the 
ecosystem for a technology evolution and in managing business relations within the 
ecosystem by becoming “a catalyst for innovation in the sector” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002: 
p.424). Intel had the “need” to evolve and, therefore, became an example of an ecosystem 
orchestrator who intentionally transformed itself and the surrounding environment. It led the 
sector transformation from a vertically owned mindset towards a heterogeneous network of 
actors without a hierarchical chain of command and from a disintegrated industry architecture 
towards a modular structure. It provided incentives by articulating a value proposition at a 
system level to conflicting sector actors while offering an opportunity to define value 
propositions at the individual level (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). By articulating the value 
propositions, Intel secured a shared agreement from these actors to restructure the industry 
architecture. This sustained innovation across the network (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). The 
lesson learnt from Intel’s success is that the existing culture and the fragmentation and 
complexity of the sector are not prerequisites for failure while capabilities can be built during 
the process.  
Proposition 5. The existing culture, and the complexity and fragmentation of the 






can re-organise the industry architecture by articulating new value propositions to 
direct collective efforts. Value articulation is critical to value capture. Value 
articulation and leadership are enabling components. 
The case of Intel shows that the PC sector went through a structural transformation of the 
traditional sector in order to become the high performing sector of today. According to 
interviewees and the literature, the transformation the semiconductor sector was previously 
similar to the traditional built environment sector. The differences between the PC and BE 
sector are presented in Table 15. The presented characteristics of the BE sector are similar to 
those of the PC sector thirty years ago. Such differences as value proposition, co-evolution, 
transparency, feedback loop, interdependence and modularity have been propagated by Intel 
across the ecosystem. The structural transformation that Intel achieved in the PC sector 
clearly indicates that the system architecture and leadership are critical to the emergence of a 
new ecosystem. Under certain conditions, leading firms can propagate sector-wide 
transformations. These findings indicate that the slow evolution of the built environment 
sector is linked to a lack of leadership, the system architecture and value articulation at the 
sector level.  
 Table 15 Distinctions Between the Computer and Built Environment Sectors 
              PC sector               Built Environment Sector 
• Value is defined by the end-user’s demand 
• Scalability 
• Co-evolution 
• Feedback loop 
• Learning 
• Interdependence 
• Science-based decisions 
• Transparency 
• Predictability  
• Global market 
• Modularity 
• Value for the end users (B2C) 
• Value is defined by the location  
• Unique project, prototype 
• Temporary structure 
• Lack of feedback loop beyond projects 
• Lack of learning beyond projects 
• Lack of interdependence beyond projects 
• Ad-hoc decisions, creativity 
• Assumptions 
• Unpredictability 
• Local market 
• Customized, unique design 






• Mobile object 
• Explosion (user centric) 
• Immobile object dependent on location 
• Implosion (efficiency, firm centric) 
 
 
4.4.3 Contrasting the Success of Toyota, Uber and Intel with Failures in the DBE Sector 
It is important to establish why some sectors succeed in digital transformation while 
others fail, and what can be learned from a comparison of failed with successful sectors?  
Best practice management is one of the main streams of management research and was 
inspired by the work of Peters, Waterman, and Jones (1982) on excellence in private sectors. 
The scholars extensively looked at the characteristics of successful and innovative 
organisations and used them as a basis for case studies. The sole focus on successful cases is 
prone to biases and has some critiques. First, even successful cases today can become a 
failure tomorrow, like the case of General Motors; for example, some predict that Uber could 
fail in the near future (Cusumano et al., 2019). Second, scholars tend to test either cases of 
success or failure but rarely construct frameworks around the two streams (Borins, 2001). 
Third, the knowledge of variables that separate success from failure would provide ecosystem 
leaders with corrective mechanisms; “only through a direct comparison of successes with 
failures will the variables that differentiate the two be identified” (Cooper, 1979: p.94). 
Studying the digital transformation of the sector by comparing successful and failed cases can 
offer an opportunity to construct meaningful, grounded conclusions.  
Scholars in the same sector have extensively studied the systemic issues of the built 
environment sector in relation to the adoption of information and communication 
technologies. Thus, one sector was studied as a failure, as theories were presented on why it 






conducting a study on the digital transformation of one sector in two contexts and then 
comparing the results of this failure to the successful cases in other sectors, it was possible to 
eliminate and refine the critical issues of failure in the built environment sector. The process 
of comparison is particularly useful for this study because it helped to identify the multi-level 
and multi-dimensional factors of failure, thus offering an integrated unbiased view with 
generalisable propositions. 
Following the comparison, it became apparent that successful orchestrators actively interact 
with the environment in order to alter it for self-benefit. For example, Intel led the traditional 
sector towards its structural transformation to open the path for self-evolution while Uber 
ignored the traditional taxi industry and influenced policy by deregulating the taxi industry 
and enabling a platform and start up economy following its success (Heikkilä & Heikkilä, 
2019). The successful examples show that the leadership and orchestration mechanisms are 
critical to the success as well as the context of ecosystem orchestration, while the failed cases 
of ecosystem orchestration from the Finnish and Californian BE sectors illuminated that 
orchestration and leadership cannot be potential drivers of failure. This conflicting finding 
further illuminated that the presented empirical cases were failing leadership and 
orchestration mechanisms suggesting the legitimacy of leading organisations in leading 
sector-wide innovation. This chapter further argues that leadership and orchestration are 
important but other components must be also taken into consideration when looking at the 
failure or success of ecosystems.  
The critical drivers of failure in the built environment sector seem to stem from the sector 
leader’s inability to articulate values, mindsets and sector context (architecture, nature, 
sector-wide business model and maturity). Value is an important concept of business models. 






ecosystem orchestration. In fact, value articulation or demand articulation were not included 
as an orchestration mechanism by Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) nor by (Nambisan & 
Sawhney, 2011), although this is of critical importance to the success of orchestration 
processes (Batterink et al., 2010; Howells, 2006; Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2008). The value 
proposition, according to empirical evidence derived in this research, is a foundation for 
ecosystem emergence and orchestration. The empirical evidence shows that the software 
vendor is defining the value propositions for the sector while the sector actors fail to 
articulate the value propositions with emerging technologies, as explained by the PM of a 
sub-trade (CA21) and an innovation manager at GC (CA11):  
Is there a value proposition? So, my question to the owners: where's the value? If I give 
an owner right now a full 3d model that has all the stuff in it, most of them don't know what 
to do with it anyway. (PM, Sub-Trade, CA21) 
If you want value, you have to define value and you have to make value flow. It's simple 
as I told the owners, they have first to define what value is. Many customers in [the] 
building sector don't actually do that very well. And, they're not helped by the professionals 
they hire, by the architects. […] And it's [success] mostly because you have experienced 
people who are willing to trust each other. And you hear stories about this all the time. And 
we have plenty of examples in [the firm], we've taken the same people and put them on 
the different projects, and they failed because the owner didn't know what she wanted 
or something happened or their partners were not there. […] Then we have many 
owners that ask to build the cheapest building possible. They don't even think about 
value, they can't describe what value means to them. So, we are responsible for 
ourselves including the customers we work for in every business. (Innovation Manager, 
GC, CA11) 
If the value proposition is not clearly articulated, then value capture in the ecosystem is 
failing as no definitive measures of success can be deployed, as explained by a PM at a health 
care client (CA08) and an innovation manager at GC (CA11):  
If you include project delivery owners and stakeholders, clearly defining the value of the 
building, the value definition phase, I think that that's really not a well understood phase. 
The phase before the start of design is a phase of value definition, which is “why”, what 
problem we are trying to solve, what do we want out of the building on a long term. There's 
this thing called value capture at the end, which is also not in a traditional thinking process, 
which is like you're looking backwards to the beginning of the project and asking: are we 
capturing the value? […] all these phases, value definition and value capture, might help to 
identify the gap. Because the biggest rework cycles are driven by imperfections and 






If you don't understand what value is, you have no good measurement system for the 
chances of giving them value are quite low. A lot of what is delivered today, its value is 
accidental. (Innovation Manager, GC, CA11)  
This evidence suggests the following proposition: 
Proposition 6. A well-articulated value proposition provides an incentive for the 
emergence of an ecosystem and enables effective value capture while driving value 
creation. Value articulation is an enabling component.  
A value definition or proposition can emerge from the need to evolve or start a business. 
Uber and Intel’s initiatives commenced with “the need” to initiate a change and by doing so 
they provided a well-articulated value proposition to define why complementors should tap 
into their business ecosystems. A number of interviewees emphasised “the need” (CA11_1, 
08, 13, 17, 32) as an important component in changing the mindset and inertia. The 
interviewees also referred to “the need” as “a business deal” (CA11_1) that provides 
business incentives or “the need”(CA13) to engage in a change process activating the agency 
of individuals and driving the development of capabilities:  
Proposition 7. A business need with a well-articulated value propositions at the 
firm and sector level provides an incentive to build the necessary capabilities to 
engage with the environment and tap into the formation of an ecosystem. A business 
need and an incentive are enabling components while agency is a building 
component.  
Business models provide an important financial structure and incentives that align conflicting 
stakeholders and constitute the financial environment necessary for agency development. A 
review of the orchestration mechanisms set by Toyota, Uber and Intel illuminated critical 
distinctions of the nature of these industries and the built environment sector. Uber, Toyota 






and construction industry, is a B2B context. The market value of the building product in the 
design and construction sector is defined by the location, which is a critical distinction to the 
other industries. Uber, Toyota and Intel are not bounded by the location of their products 
although the traditional taxi industry is bounded by location. As Jacobsson et al. (2017) 
discuss, the building product is immobile while construction sector “factories” are mobile, 
which is the reverse of both the automotive and computer industries. The location factor 
appears to be a critical driver in the failure of innovation initiatives in the built environment 
sector, as explained by the researcher (FIN20_1):  
People are not investing in innovation, part of that is coming from the fact that the price of 
your product is dependent on the location and not on the quality of the product. 
Investment into innovation will not necessarily pay back; it might be that land is becoming 
more valuable because then you can make money, and this is something we cannot change. 
[…] It is good to remember that there are no products where the price of the product would 
have anything to do with the production costs. Every product the price for a phone is the 
willingness to pay. And the same with houses, the price of a house has nothing to do with 
the production cost; it has everything to do with the market price. What people are willing 
to pay. The mobile phones, there is no such thing as the location for a phone; you buy a 
phone because of reputation and the quality of the product, so these companies have to invest 
into innovation. […] But as long as clients are willing to pay the asking price, but you 
do not try to develop it better because it does not pay back. It is part of an ecosystem, 
because it cannot be changed. No matter what we do. If you are able to reduce production 
costs you can save money, and of course from the client’s side so that there are no big 
construction mistakes made when you own the house, that of course the client wants to 
match the price with the product. Then I do not think it is realistic to think that the 
construction sector will ever be like a car manufacturer or mobile phone. The situation is so 
different. (Researcher, FIN20_1) 
The built environment sector has systemic limitations affecting the menu of business model 
innovation, which suggests the following statement: 
Proposition 8. Business model innovation can be hindered by the systemic 
limitation of the sector’s nature, the context, if the value proposition is not 
articulated. The sector context matters for ecosystem orchestration. The sector 







4.4.4 Critical Constructs and Components of Ecosystem Orchestration Success and 
Failure 
In prior sections, I presented the components that emerged from the data through which 
the built environment sector failed to qualitatively change. I further contrasted these findings 
with the examples of successful ecosystems. The contrasting cases offered corresponding 
propositions in relation to the importance of the constructs and related components for 
ecosystem orchestration, as presented in the previous section. I summarise these in Table 16.  
Table 16 Examination of the Critical Constructs and Components in Relation to Their 
Functions 19 
Components T U I D Y/N Findings  Functions 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Agency - 1 1 0 N Is activated by the business need Building  
Leadership 1 1 1 0 Y Can propagate change across the sector Enabling 
Cognitive 
frames/Mindset 
- - - 0 Y Is a significant factor in failure  Failing  
ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL  
 
Capabilities 1 1 - 0 N Are important but can be built during the process Building  
Bottlenecks  - - - - N Can provide a strategic advantage to owners Building 
Orchestration  1 1 1 0 Y Is critical for success  Enabling 
SYSTEM LEVEL 










1 1 1 0 Y A business model is a definitive factor in the 
success of ecosystems as it provides a financial 
incentive structure for value distribution and 




1 1 1 0 Y Value propositions enable ecosystem emergence  Enabling  
Power  - - 1 0 Y Power contributes to failure, but the case of Intel 
showed that incentives in the ecosystem can align 
conflicting stakeholders 
Failing 





 T- Toyota; U- Uber; I- Intel; D- DBE Sector  
1-Success, 0-Failure 






Culture 1 - 1 0 N Culture is dominant if leadership and orchestration 
are inadequate. Cases of GM, Intel and Uber 
proved that culture is not a definitive factor in 
failure 
Failing  
Education - - - 0 Y Education contributes to the development of a 
mindset. It can accelerate innovation but is not a 
critical factor  
Failing  
Diversity - - - 0 Y The construction sector is a closed-system with low 
diversity amongst actors. It contributes to failure, 
but it is not a definitive factor 
Failing 
More specifically, I order them according to the three levels - individual, organisational and 
system - following the data analysis. The components are further marked across the cases 
demonstrating success (Uber, Toyota and Intel) and failure (DBE sector). Occurring across 
multiple levels, these constructs and components hold different functions and importance for 
ecosystem orchestration. I further distinguished them as enabling, building and failing 
constructs and components of ecosystem orchestration. Enabling components are components 
that drive the ecosystem emergence and orchestration and, according to the results derived in 
this research, appear to be critical to ecosystem orchestration. Building components are 
important but not critical and can be developed during the orchestration process. Failing 
components are those that are critical to failed cases.  
In the next section, I discuss potential contributions of the findings derived in this research.  
4.5 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I explore the roles and order of constructs and components for 
ecosystem orchestration and emergence. The core theoretical contribution is empirically 
grounded in a relatively integrated framework of the order of components and constructs for 
orchestration processes. This framework is summarised in Table 17. The components and 
constructs were ordered according to function: enabling components (components that enable 
ecosystem emergence), building components (components that are dependent on the context 






(components that contribute to the failure of ecosystem emergence). Collectively, they 
explicate important relationships between different components that contribute to the failure 
and success of ecosystem emergence and orchestration.  
Table 17 Framework for the Order of Constructs and Components for Ecosystem 
Orchestration20 
Levels ENABLING ecosystem 
emergence  
BUILDING during the 
process of ecosystem 
orchestration 




Leadership directs collective 
efforts and provides 
corrective mechanisms. It can 
also change the industry 
architecture (Proposition 3,5)  
Quote: “If something's not 
working, you have to address 
it, you don't just get a crappy 
job and then blame it on the 
person who wasn't 
performing. […] That's 
another thing owner doesn't 
do well.” 
 
Agency is influenced by 
the embeddedness in the 
structure (Proposition 7) 
Quote: “Three companies 
but with different 
attitudes to BIM. First, 
[GC firm 1] rejected BIM 
[…]. Second, [GC firm 2] 
saw BIM as the holy cow 
and saw the future, […] 
Third, [GC firm 3] did 
not have a bad attitude to 
BIM but did not see any 
strategic opportunity.” 
Leadership can fail by setting 
inadequate mechanisms or by 
aiming at selfish value capture 
(Failure case of BE sector) 
Quote: “We cannot evolve unless 
government helps us.” 
“In construction, leadership does 
not exist…” 
Cognition, Frames, Mindset are 
critical contributors to failure 
(Proposition 2) 
Quote: “this is more about a 
mindset rather than specific tool 




with leadership are critical 
for success (Proposition 5) 
Quote: “But the business deal 
still doesn't make it all work 
and just creates an 
environment which 
everything else seems to 
make sense to everybody.” 
Business need provides 
incentives, shifts mindset 
and builds capabilities 
(Proposition 7)  
Quote: “Why does this matter 
to us? […] now we need to 
Capabilities can be built 
during the process 
(Proposition 4) 
Quotes: “Owners don't have 
the capabilities to drive 
the change? […] You 
need to work on 
changing those things. 
Like if the laws don't let 
you do it, change the 
law. […] There are 
excuses and there are 
results. Get results.” 
Lack of necessary capabilities 
reinforces the status quo 
feedback loop (Proposition 4) 
Quotes: “Can we say that the 
construction industry lacks skills 
of business development and has 
low levels of education? - I 
would say that. I would say that 
they are not using education to 
push the limits of what’s 
possible. Unfortunately, the 
education defects the mindset of 
all people in the industry.”  
“People were neglected for many, 
many years and for many 
 







do something, now we need 
to be more efficient. There's 
a need, there's a reason why 
I want to do it. Before I 
didn't care!” 
different reasons. […] we don't 
invest in people.” 
System Business model as a structural 
innovation (Proposition 1) 
Quote: “when the business 
deal is different then that's 
when you begin to see a 
deeper change” 
Value propositions provides 
incentives (Proposition 6) 
Quote: “A phase of value 
definition, which is “why” 
[…] that's really not a well 
understood phase.” 
Incentives are necessary for 
innovation (Proposition 1) 
Quote: “Why didn't the taxi 
companies invent Uber? It's 
because they didn't have an 
incentive to invent Uber.” 
 
Culture can be changed 
with business models 
(Proposition 2) 
Quote: “Japanese culture or 
governance, or the 
uniquely recalcitrant 
nature of GM’s union 
and workforce are 
implausible factors of 
failure.” 
Platform for innovation 
can be built during the 
process, the case of Intel 
and Uber (Proposition 4) 
Industry architecture can 
be changed with leadership 
and orchestration - the case 
of Intel and Uber 
(Proposition 3, 4) 
Modularity can be built 
during the process, the case 
of Intel (Proposition 4) 
Power relations at the global 
level can hinder the process at 
the sector level (Turf wars in a 
failed case of the BE sector) 
(Proposition 8) 
Quote: “There are some drivers 
against it, […] This is natural; 
they [software vendors] are the 
market leader. Why would they 
support standard when their 
system cannot be a standard?”  
Industry architecture as an 
existing structure can provide 
incentives to preserve power 
within the status quo 
(Proposition 3, 8) 
Quote: “The rules of the game 
have been established […] 
people do not need to change.” 
Sector’s nature can hinder the 
process (Proposition 8) 
Quote: “The price of your product 
is dependent on the location and 
not on the quality of the 
product” 
Existing business model, as an 
existing structure can provide 
economic incentives to preserve 
the status quo (Proposition 3, 8)  
Quote: “They have incorporated 
these rules into their business 
model. While these rules are 
holding them down to 1-4% 
profit, they are all so keeping 
these constraints in the sector 
that are keeping them down but 









A fundamental contribution of this chapter is the reinvigoration of the importance of context 
for ecosystem orchestration, providing new empirical evidence to current debates around 
business model innovation. This chapter highlighted that the emergence of the ecosystem can 
be seriously affected by the systemic limitation of the sector’s nature. In the case of the built  
environment sector, this limitation appears to be the location factor that defines the value of 
the building product. As Jacobides and Winter (2012) argued, the industry architecture 
defines the structure of the division of labour, rules and roles within the sector that can affect 
the ecosystem emergence. Indeed, the industry architecture defines the power relations and 
fee structure that also can hinder the ecosystem emergence, as evidenced in this study. This 
chapter further adds new knowledge by providing empirical evidence of the importance of 
the nature of the sector, which has been taken for granted. The location factor is specific to 
the built environment sector but is often an irrelevant factor for other sectors. Indeed, the 
definition of a product’s value by location is irrelevant in the examples of successful 
ecosystems. In fact, successful ecosystems are global entities and are not bounded by any 
single sector, country or location (Jacobides et al., 2018). The location factor combined with 
the B2B practices complicate the process of business model innovation. B2B ecosystems 
appear to have a higher chance of failure and a shorter life span than B2C ecosystems 
(Cusumano et al., 2019).  
As such, the contribution of this chapter is to highlight that the sector’s nature can hinder 
business model innovation and contribute some answers to the question posed by Jacobides 
and Winter (2012: p.1376) “what exactly constrains the existing menu of business models?”. 






2000), the issues faced by the Finnish and Californian sectors are very similar, as evidenced 
in Chapters 2 – 3. This evidence suggests serious implications for the strategic choices that 
are shaped not only by individuals, organisations or sectors, but by a wider system-level 
network of actors and most importantly by the context of implementation. It explains why 
two contexts with different building systems and varieties of capitalism are surprisingly 
similar in how the sector evolves and makes strategic choices. Specifically, I find that, while 
the location factor constrains the menu of business model innovation, the existing business 
model constrains actors’ strategic choices whilst simultaneously providing incentives to 
powerful actors to preserve the existing status quo. Vicious cycles (Masuch, 1985) were 
created and matured in the building sector, which constitute an intriguing result that deserves 
further study and theorizing. Therefore, this study addresses the call by Navis and Glynn 
(2010) for the study of failed ecosystems in order to offer novel explanations of why 
prominent firms in mature sectors struggle to create new ecosystems at the convergence of 
conflicting disciplinary co-specialised firms and complementary inter-sectors.  
The empirical evidence further suggests that the limitation of the sector’s nature for business 
model innovation can provide additional challenges to the sector in terms of value 
articulation at the system level. The component of value articulation and its importance for 
value capture was also largely taken for granted in the ecosystem literature. The inability of 
leadership and sector actors to articulate value contributes to the failure in value capture 
while value creation can occur with or without a clearly articulated value. Empirical evidence 
shows that the built environment sector is failing to capture value from emerging 
technologies, e.g. BIM, because “the WHY” (engineer, VIF, CA31) is not clearly defined by 
the mainstream sector actors. As Chapter 3 showed, due to its inability to articulate value, the 






use of BIM technologies on behalf of the sector. The phase of value articulation, e.g. the why 
of innovation, is a promising line of inquiry for future research.  
In this study, I find that difficulty of business model innovation also relates to the desire of 
actors with power and resources to preserve the status quo. As such, while actors with power 
and resources influence the environment to fit their capabilities (Penrose, 1959) they also 
intentionally preserve the status quo and hinder the development of capabilities for business 
model innovation. I further find that such components as leadership and its capability to 
intentionally shape the environment largely depends on the scale of the leading firm. 
Empirical evidence highlighted that innovative SMEs in the built environment sector are 
struggling to be heard or have little influential power to direct open innovation in the sector, 
while large firms steer innovation with a closed-system approach in siloes for self-benefit. As 
open innovation practices by SMEs have been neglected (van de Vrande, de Jong, 
Vanhaverbeke, & de Rochemont, 2009), future research could investigate the interactions 
between SMEs and large firms in terms of the components of business models that influence 
innovation dynamics in the sector.  
By exploring multi-level interactions, the results of the study show that firms are favouring 
vertically integrated structures to maintain control over the supply chain instead of profiting 
from disintegrated co-specialised ecosystem strategies. In fact, while other sectors profit from 
ecosystem strategies, the built environment sector reintegrates by closing its organisational 
boundaries with BIM technologies. If successful firms depend on how they interact with the 
environment (Piepenbrock, 2009), then such firms are those that integrate the whole supply 
chain in siloes. The critical question that deserves further research is, if ecosystem strategies 
offer superior benefits to firms, then why is the built environment sector moving in the 






The multi-level qualitative approach also contributes to debates on cognition and power and 
their influence on the emergence of ecosystems in the sector (Porac et al., 2011). In this 
study, I find that the sector operates in a practice of cognitive biases, established mindsets 
and competitive logics. A failure to articulate new value by leading firms and a failure to 
envision value beyond established business models is largely linked to the existent cognitive 
biases in the built environment sector. While these biases guide the sector’s strategic choices, 
they have also matured because of the long history of the sector’s evolution and its 
established way of doing things. Cognition, frames and mindsets are critical contributors to 
the failure of the emergence of ecosystem in the built environment sector. Although 
cognition, frames and mindsets are significant in this particular sector, I further find that the 
sector’s architecture is dependent on a wide range of stakeholders that shape collective 
feedback and, more importantly, on the economic incentives that dominate this sector. The 
established business models disincentivise firms with the power and resources to innovate 
suggesting that business model innovation is a complex context-dependent issue. A critical 
contribution of this chapter is the understanding that, while the industry’s architecture drives 
the sector’s capabilities (Jacobides et al., 2006), the business model drives the incentives that 
stimulate the sector’s innovation dynamics and outcomes that can also be dependent on the 
actors beyond single industry architecture.  
Overall, I extend the study by Jacobides and Winter (2012) by offering specific observations 
of the built environment sector. If the existing industry architecture drives sector capabilities 
(Jacobides et al., 2006), then empirical evidence shows that the industry architecture fails to 
drive the necessary capabilities for business model innovation, thus contributing to the failure 
to articulate the value propositions and value capture. The shortcoming of creative insights to 






Therefore, this study offers another critical insight that ecosystem literature assumes value 
proposition as a given component while extensively focusing on the processes of value 
creation. I argue that ecosystems can have effective value creation mechanisms but still fail at 
value capture if the value propositions is not articulated at the firm and system levels. This 
insight constitutes the key contribution of this chapter.  
The final substantive contribution is the multi-level analysis of sector-level systemic issues. I 
argue that, to understand the process of change, I have to ground the analysis of one failed 
sector within the success of other sectors. This analysis is consistent with the call by Aldrich 
and Fiol (1994) and Navis and Glynn (2010) to study ecosystems that did not emerge and 
failed. Only by contrasting examples of failure and success, the relevance and importance of 
examined ecosystem components can be comprehended. By deriving them inductively from 
the failed cases and validating them in the successful cases, the findings were generalised to 
provide the order of the constructs and components. The presented framework is based on the 
specific constructs and components that rest on the nuances of the ecosystem literature. It is 
thus uniquely suited to the understanding of orchestration mechanisms and explains why and 
how some ecosystems fail to emerge and fail during the orchestration processes, while 
contributing to the emerging stream of literature on the dark side of ecosystem orchestration 
(Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). I complemented the research by offering new insights which 
not only confirm that the power distribution in the sector matters (Jacobides & Tae, 2015) but 
that such components of business model innovation as value articulation for value capture 
and the sector’s nature and context are critical components that should be taken into 
consideration for ecosystem emergence and orchestration. In comparison, there is little 
empirical knowledge on the drivers of sector dynamics; I found that the specific components 






level relationships between the components for ecosystem emergence and orchestration. This 
chapter, in fact, may constitute a foundation for the future research on multi-level framework 
of ecosystem orchestration mechanisms.  
4.5.1 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitations of this study suggest future research opportunities. First, the study 
provides an inductive framework based on a broad overview of one sector and specific 
success case studies. While I have been able to provide a detailed account of the conditions of 
failure in the building sector and documented successful examples of ecosystem orchestration 
processes by careful triangulation, further research is needed to establish the generalisability 
of the results and to expand the list of constructs and components. Future research could take 
specific components of failure and success to systematically test them within a wider 
selection of cases. For example, Yoffie, Gawer, and Cusumano (2019) contrasted 209 failed 
platforms with 43 successful platforms in the US context and identified reasons for failure. 
However, they did not explore the components of ecosystem orchestration nor concrete 
results were published yet. Second, individual components of the framework can involve 
narrower and deeper qualitative, and possibly quantitative research to provide a 
comprehensive, relatively integrated framework of the relationships amongst the components. 
Third, while I allude to the importance of components and present a relatively integrated 
order of constructs and components, the relationships between the components were not 
visualised. Finally, I presented how and why the ecosystem actors intentionally preserve the 
status quo while blindfolded by the established cognition, mindsets and frames. Although 
these sector actors are traditional professions, there is an emerging stream of outsiders that 
offer Ai-based start-ups, which act as emerging digital ecosystems. A limitation of this study 






actors can be documented to provide novel insights into the process of emergence in a mature 
sector.  
Despite these limitations, I believe this chapter offers important contributions to the literature. 
By shifting the focus towards a multi-level framework and looking at technological change in 
a failed sector, I can identify the critical constructs and components of ecosystem 
orchestration. This contributes a more fine-grained analysis of the constructs and components 
that can fail, be built, and enable ecosystems. The analysis shows that the sector, or sector 
context, is an important factor in the process of ecosystem orchestration as it affects the 
strategic choices of decision makers. The framework constitutes one of the few systematic 
efforts to explore failed ecosystems (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) – an underexplored phenomenon 
and the dark side of ecosystem orchestration (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019); it is of critical 
significance to progress the ecosystem field. It thus illuminates an interesting and 
understudied aspect of ecosystem emergence and orchestration.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This study has offered a relatively integrated theoretical framework based on a 
comparison of success and failure cases across different sectors to determine the critical 
constructs and components of ecosystem emergence and orchestration while indicating the 
critical role of sector context. In the process, I identified that constructs and components hold 
different roles in the process of ecosystem orchestration. I showed that the components can 
be used to enable ecosystem emergence, sustain ecosystems by building the necessary 
components during the process, and determine the critical components of ecosystem failure. 
By explaining this process, I uncover the critical roles of components that make up 






role of the nature of the sector by presenting examples of the elements in a sector’s nature 
that can constrain business model innovation menu. Overall, this study offers an important 
step in showing how and why ecosystems fail while contributing to the emerging field of the 
dark side of ecosystem orchestration.  
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Chapter 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of ecosystem orchestration and emergence. 
The review of prior studies in Chapter 1 highlighted important theoretical and practical 
limitations that have been discussed in the empirical chapters of this thesis. This concluding 
chapter discusses the main findings of the three empirical chapters; it starts by presenting the 
main questions and then summarizes the contributions of each chapter. The theoretical 
implications of the whole thesis are then discussed in an integrated way, and these are 
followed by the managerial implications, which summarize several recommendations for 
practitioners and policy makers. The chapter concludes with the main limitations and 














5.1 MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In the previous chapters of this thesis, I discussed the findings of the individual 
empirical studies while developing insights on the dark side of ecosystem orchestration from 
open-system and public (Chapter 2), and then closed-system and private (Chapter 3) 
approaches. The critical constructs and components of ecosystem orchestration were then 
theorised and grounded in the empirical data by focusing on the sector’s context of ecosystem 
orchestration (Chapter 4). Table 18 presents the research questions and the main findings and 
contributions of the individual chapters.  
 Table 18 Research Questions and the Main Findings per Chapter 
Chap. Research Questions  Brief answers  




with the national 
efforts for BIM 
R&D in Finland? 
 
(2) How did the dark 
side manifest in 
open-system 
orchestration led 













(1) The design and construction industry in Finland co-evolved with the 
national programmes set by the public funder, TEKES, to support 
knowledge creation for BIM technology development and 
interoperability in the sector. The national BIM technology programmes 
represented a technology push instead of a market pull. The process of 
the industry’s BIM evolution between 1982 and 2019 resulted in distinct 
phases that contributed to industry-wide digital innovation.  
 
(2) Open-system orchestration processes can manifest the dark side. 
Open-system orchestration relies on the good will and entrepreneurship 
of participants in creating their own business opportunities, which can 
also incentivise participants to exploit the system instead of seek 
business opportunities on a global scale. While open-system 
orchestrators aim at open innovation, ecosystem dynamics can adhere to 
siloes even if actors aim for the public good. Public organisations can 
have a challenging role in succeeding in the exploration and value 
creation, but the industry can fail in value capture and exploitation of 
created value. The context of ecosystem orchestration matters as system 
dynamics determine the behaviours and decisions of industry actors. 
 
• (3) Public organisations play an important role in the creation of public 
good and leading knowledge ecosystems. The function of a public 
organisation impacts on dynamics in the ecosystem; for example, open-
system orchestrators can be ineffective in enabling the scalability of 
newly created digital businesses if global players are not incentivised to 
participate and support the initiatives. Thus, actors with power at both 
industry and global levels can hinder the evolution of a knowledge 






(4)  • failure of value creation by public organisations and value capture by the 
industry actors.  
3 (1) How and why did 
the software vendor 
















(2) To what extent can 
the theories derived 
from successful 
orchestration 
mechanisms in B2C 
contexts be applied to 
B2B contexts? 
(1) Although a software vendor is successful in private value capture, it 
sets exaggerated expectations in the sector from the use of a platform 
thus inhibiting value creation and capture in the sector. Network 
membership strategies utilising marketing power drive successful direct 
network effects but damage innovative capabilities and trust in the 
sector. The software vendor does not take responsibility or 
accountability for the data produced on its platform as there are no 
corrective mechanisms in the sector to address this issue which further 
impacts on value creation by B2B customers. Powerful actors within 
ecosystems can stifle value creation and capture by B2B customers in 
order to maximize their individual control and value capture. The 
context of ecosystem orchestration matters as the software vendor 
orchestrates the environment for the sector’s platform thus artificially 
creating direct network effects while intentionally preserving the status 
quo by favouring large vertically integrated firms. Vicious cycles of the 
status quo are created between the siloed firms in power and the 
orchestrator.  
 
(2) The articulation of value propositions by the business ecosystem 
orchestrator on behalf of B2B customers in B2B contexts is taken for 
granted. Orchestrators should allow B2B customers to articulate value 
for their businesses while providing the basic infrastructure for value 
creation. By doing so, orchestrators might risk lost value capture. 
Therefore, they are further incentivised to act in siloes for selfish value 
capture. In doing so, the legitimacy of the orchestrator and the customers 
in B2B contexts to articulate and orchestrate value should be taken into 
consideration.  
4 (1) What components 
and constructs 
contribute to the 
success and failure of 
ecosystem 
orchestration? Is there 







(2) How and does why 
the sector’s context 
matter for ecosystem 
emergence and 
orchestration? 
(1) The critical components and constructs of ecosystem orchestration 
were identified, such as the sector’s context and nature, business models, 
industry architecture, cognition and mindsets. Ecosystem orchestration is 
a multi-level complex issue that incorporates a number of different 
factors that contribute to success and failure. Thus, the proposed 
components and constructs were ordered according to their functions: 
enabling, building and failing. This order is organised across three 
levels: individual, organisational and system. Some components and 
constructs can hold several functions. For example, capabilities can 
enable ecosystem orchestration whilst a lack of them can contribute to 
failures in value articulation that further contributes to the lack of 
business model innovation or ecosystem emergence.  
 
(2) The sector’s context and nature in ecosystem literature was largely 
taken for granted. Factors such as location-based business models are 
specific to only a few sectors, which were not specifically studied by 
management scholars. The location factor constrains the menu of 
business models. The maturity of long-established practices that generate 
established mindsets coupled with the industry architecture and location 
factor can seriously limit the menu of business models and possibility of 






5.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, key findings of the empirical chapters are discussed in light of the 
contributions of this thesis and how they relate to each other. Some broader theoretical 
implications of the empirical studies are also explored, which are linked to the main 
contributions presented in Section 1.2. Overall, this thesis contributes to the literature on the 
strategy, organisation of ecosystems, and the dark side of inter-organisational relationships 
(Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019). Theoretical implications and contributions are discussed 
around literature on Ecosystem Orchestration, The Dark Side of Ecosystem Orchestration, 
The Importance of Industry Context for Ecosystem Orchestration, and The Critical 
Constructs and Components of Ecosystem Orchestration. These implications and 
contributions are discussed below.  
5.2.1 Ecosystem Orchestration 
Thus far, research has focused on various aspects of ecosystems, while only limited 
empirical research has been performed on ecosystem orchestration. However, the processes 
of ecosystem orchestration are vaguely understood (Dattée et al., 2018; Jones et al., 1997; 
Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011).  
Existing research on ecosystem orchestration has largely explored the successful, long-lived 
ecosystems that are enabled by powerful leading firms or/and technological platforms. 
Ecosystem literature emphasised the importance of a single powerful firm or a hub in leading 
ecosystems. For example, Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995: p.146) emphasised that “it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that those networks that are not guided strategically by the 
“center” [leading firm or hub] are unable to meet the demanding challenges of today’s 






intentionally and purposefully influence and manage networks (Nambisan & Sawhney, 
2011). Indeed, there is an observation of the dominance of central hubs at the core of inter-
organisational networks that intentionally direct its networks and construct the environment 
to ensure the competitive environment favours those firms and their networks (Astley & Van 
de Ven, 1983). This thesis proves the emphasis on leading firms is disproportional to the 
other components of ecosystem orchestration.  
Building on multiple bodies of literature, which published successful examples, scholars have 
offered frameworks that describe the innovation processes deployed by powerful leading 
hubs and from the perspective of singular firms. To date, the only substantive frameworks of 
ecosystem orchestration are that of Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) and by Nambisan and 
Sawhney (2011), while some consider specific contributions to these frameworks (Batterink 
et al., 2010; Gausdal & Nilsen, 2011) and others offer new frameworks of ecosystem 
orchestration (Aarikka-Stenroos et al., 2017; Planko, Chappin, Cramer, & Hekkert, 2017; 
Reypens, Lievens, & Blazevic, 2016; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Valkokari et al., 2017). 
However, scholars rarely define the concept of “ecosystem orchestration” and focus on the 
processes of orchestration, while the relationship between the ecosystem structure and the 
orchestration processes remains unclear. As such, ecosystem orchestration theory is often 
incomplete and disintegrated. By considering the increased scholarly interest in long-lived 
ecosystems and how they are orchestrated, this thesis offers contributions to the literature on 
ecosystem orchestration and the work of Nambisan and Sawhney (2011).  
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) and Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) clearly distinguish network 
design from network orchestration while emphasising the orchestration processes and the 
relationship between these processes. Less attention is given to the relationship between 






in this thesis, it became apparent that both design and orchestration are equally important. 
Through this empirical observation, the thesis illuminated that the design of business model 
innovation is equally important to the leadership and orchestration mechanisms and the 
success of ecosystems. There is a reciprocal relationship between what is designed and how it 
is orchestrated. As evidenced in this thesis and published literature, ‘good’ design with a 
‘bad’ orchestration approach can still succeed as the context determines which organisational 
forms survive and dominate in an environment. Thus, badly orchestrated ecosystems can also 
be long-lived (Piepenbrock, 2009).  
Design can be characterised as ‘an intent for a result’; it is composed of various components 
and constructs that are intentionally integrated in a creative way to achieve a result.21 The 
design intent utilises ‘instrumentation’22 to arrive at a certain structure that should produce a 
desired result. Instrumentation is not explicitly discussed in the network orchestration 
literature and constitutes a contribution by this thesis. Instrumentation determines the choice 
of components and constructs that are measured collectively. The concept of instrumentation 
can be a useful addition to the frameworks of Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) and Nambisan and 
Sawhney (2011). This thesis offers a first step in comprehending the components and 
constructs of instrumentation as they are critical to orchestration processes (see Chapter 4). 
Instrumentation determines what is orchestrated, design determines how ‘what’ is composed 
or designed for a result, and orchestration determines the actual processes of realisation of 
how and what. The critical components and constructs and their order (presented in Chapter 
 
21 As Piepenbrock (2009: p. 48) referred to the morphology and physiology of organisational forms, morphology 
can refer to network design and physiology to the orchestration processes: “The form or species provides a first-
order explanation of performance. In biology and business, whether in organisms or organizations, morphology 
trumps physiology - i.e. species type trumps the health of the beast. A weak cactus will typically outlive a strong 
oak... in a desert.”.  
22 The concept of ‘instrumentation’ is used for the first time in this thesis and is widely used term in the 
orchestra. However, this term is usefully added to the design and orchestration in this research and can 






4) represent the first step in the development of an integrated theory of ecosystem 
orchestration. Specific contributions and implications to the critical constructs and 
components of ecosystem orchestration are discussed in Section 5.2.4. However, these 
findings offer a view of components and constructs that contribute to the success and failure 
of ecosystems which offer a new theory to ecosystem orchestration illuminating the 
limitations of the existing frameworks.  
One of the key contributions of this thesis is a presentation of empirical evidence that the role 
of orchestrators is closely related to other components of ecosystem orchestration. For 
example, while some scholars emphasise the role of capabilities as critical to ecosystem 
orchestration (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; Teece, 2009), it is empirically evident in this 
thesis that capabilities can be built during the process and are context-dependent (see Chapter 
4). 
Empirical evidence shows that one of the principal factors in ‘good’ ecosystem orchestration 
is an equal balance of ‘tone’ in the orchestrating instrumentation and design. As such, 
ecosystem orchestration is a creative process that supports the methods of design, direction 
and coordination of value articulation, creation and capture by heterogenous complementors 
and customers. Thus, instrumentation, design and orchestration are inseparable. Good 
instrumentation and design are prerequisites to good orchestration. It is not simply an art to 
select the mechanisms of orchestration but the choice of instrumentation, design and 
approach to orchestration ‘colourises’ the ecosystems; undoubtedly, ‘the devil lies in the 
detail’. Perhaps this is why the evolutionary processes of ecosystem emergence exist in a 
variety of forms (Thomas, 2013). Indeed, ecosystem dynamics are distinctive across the cases 
as logic, structure and approach differ across ecosystems. The processes of ecosystem 






Smith, 2005). Besides the natural dynamic processes of ecosystem orchestration, which 
depends upon the orchestrator, such processes are only partially designed and intentionally 
organised (Jacobides et al., 2018). More importantly, however, is the empirical finding that 
the process of successful orchestration is contextualised and partially self-organised. Through 
structural, spatial and temporal bounded rationality, orchestrators are enabled and constrained 
through adaptation to the context and as a political coalition, ecosystem actors continuously 
negotiate and bargain about value (Piepenbrock, 2009). As such, ecosystems are not only 
orchestrated (directed, coordinated and managed) by orchestrators, but also partially 
designed. Design of ecosystems is an evolutionary process, same as orchestration processes. 
Ecosystem design and orchestration should leave room for creativity, serendipitous 
discoveries and, ultimately, emergence.  
Value co-creation is non-linear (Moore, 1993) indicating that linear prescriptive models for 
ecosystem orchestration are ill-suited to address ecosystem dynamics and its complexity in 
orchestration (Dattée et al., 2018; Thomas, 2013). For instance, the software vendor adapted 
its ecosystem strategy to the BE sector as its evolution is constrained by the structure and 
culture of the sector (Chapter 3). However, it is simultaneously enabled by large vertically 
integrated firms and the processes it deploys in organising the environment to fit its 
capabilities. As such, the marketing power and complementors are components of 
instrumentation; while a ‘vision’ of how a platform will function and what value it will 
provide are part of the design, the actual use of the marketing power to direct clients in 
construction projects is an orchestration process. The efforts by a national public agency with 
an open-system orchestration approach are also constrained by powerful international firms 
and the context of orchestration (Chapter 2 and see Clarysse et al. (2014)). While the national 






were also constrained by the structure and culture of the sector and the networks in which 
they were embedded. Thus, existing frameworks missed a process of adaptation to the 
context by ecosystem orchestration and the relationship between instrumentation, design and 
orchestration. This implies that ecosystem orchestration should be distinguished from linear 
firm-level top-down views of it as ecosystems are “fundamentally new organisational 
species” (Piepenbrock, 2009: p.47) that are non-linear, horizontal and dynamic.  
The other potential area of advancement for ecosystem orchestration is based on the 
understanding that the process of value proposition articulation is potentially one of the 
critical components of ecosystem orchestration and business model innovation. Value 
propositions remain critical to the design and orchestration of ecosystems across 
heterogenous networks of complementors with conflicting goals. The composition of value 
propositions is negotiated in ecosystems. Orchestrators hold strategically challenging roles in 
bargaining and negotiating value propositions at the individual level of those complementors 
while directing the ecosystem towards the collective value proposition. Empirical evidence of 
this thesis and practice-based research indicates (Pidun, Reeves, & Schüssler, 2020) that 
value propositions are also context-dependent. It also explains why eBay’s business model 
failed in China, while Taobao has succeeded (Cusumano, Gawer, & Yoffie, 2019) and why 
business ecosystem emergence in the built environment sector is a difficult process. 
However, it is not always possible to articulate clearly value propositions to compel the 
others to commit to a de novo ecosystem due to lack of visibility and high uncertainty. 
Therefore, articulation of emerging value propositions is a collective discovery and an 
evolving matter (Dattée et al., 2018). Dattée et al. (2018) explored such orchestration 
processes by multinational technology firms that were navigating through uncertainty 






ecosystems where a leading firm is familiar with the ecosystem strategy, has resources and 
capabilities to operate in dynamic digital environments and clearly made a decision to build 
an ecosystem around emerging technologies with unclear value propositions. To extend their 
work further, this thesis presents the context where the firms operate in mature sector with 
limited resources, lack of capabilities, B2B service business models and strong cultural 
resistance to newness. The findings indicated that in such contexts the ecosystem emergence 
is a difficult process. The process of value articulation requires a firm to recognise the 
business need in order to proceed with such a difficult task. Some sectors might be unfamiliar 
with the ecosystem games, as a class of distributed strategies, and may be incentivised to 
preserve the established practice due to the existing incentives in the sector’s business 
models. This constitutes a valuable contribution of this study.    
Building upon the empirical findings derived in this thesis, the existing frameworks of 
ecosystem orchestration are limited in nature in depicting the complexity of their processes. 
Existing frameworks also consider that orchestrators are typically legitimate actors with good 
intentions to ensure equal value distribution, which is an optimistic and positive view of their 
role. To conclude, the theoretical articulation of the importance of instrumentation, design 
and orchestration hold the promise of a novel analytic lens. In particular, new theories of 
ecosystem orchestration should address the relationships between these three mechanisms 
that are more context-dependent and grounded in empirical evidence.  
The following sub-sections present implications and contributions to the dark side of 
ecosystems, including industry context and the importance of constructs and components of 







5.2.2 The Dark Side of Ecosystem Orchestration 
Thus far, research has focused on long-lived, successful ecosystems (Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009) with only limited exploration of the sectors that have failed to generate 
ecosystems. For instance, previous research largely focused on individual firms that failed the 
transition to ecosystems and, therefore, lost the market to competition, such as BlackBerry, 
Blockbuster, Nokia, Kodak, Symbian, etc. The other stream explored ecosystem strategies 
that failed during the orchestration, thereby illuminating the dark side of inter-organisational 
dynamics (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Ozcan & Santos, 2015). Overall, many studies addressed 
ecosystem strategy and organisation from the perspective of single firms (Ceccagnoli, 
Forman, Huang, & Wu, 2012). This thesis has provided insights into the dynamics of why 
existing ecosystems fail and why business ecosystem emergence is challenged in certain 
contexts. 
A specific contribution of this thesis is the exploration of the dark side of inter-organisational 
relationships (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019) in one failed sector from the perspective of the 
ecosystem rather than a single firm, and the contribution to emerging research streams on the 
dark side of ecosystems. The dark side of ecosystems was depicted in the work of: 
Dellermann, Jud, Lipusch, and Popp (2018), who illuminated the importance of control 
mechanisms to mitigate the risks associated with the deviant behaviours of ecosystem 
members; Guerrero and Urbano (2017), who illuminated that institutional conditions, such as 
government, market, and society, negatively affect entrepreneurial ecosystems; Mantovani 
and Ruiz-Aliseda (2016), who showed that when a leading firm loses market dominance, 
complementors become trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma; Mele et al. (2018), who 
highlighted the dark side of the actor’s agency, namely opportunistic behaviour to achieve 






(2019), who showed that, from a public perspective, deregulated environments can be a 
failure while, from the perspective of individual global firms, they are considered a success. 
These studies confirm that successful ecosystem formation is a complex issue, and the 
success of individual firms cannot be taken for granted.  
This thesis offered empirical evidence that enhances our understanding of the dark side of 
ecosystem orchestration and how it can manifest in various forms; it therefore contributes to 
the work of Oliveira and Lumineau (2019). The empirical findings presented in Chapter 2 
highlighted that open-system orchestration processes can manifest the unintended dark side. 
By supporting ecosystem members to pursue their own business interests, open-system 
orchestrators can support siloed R&D thereby reinforcing the status quo. In the long term, 
they can fail to bridge value creation in knowledge ecosystems with value capture in the 
industry, thus also failing to create public good. The overreliance on strong ties between 
ecosystem members tends to develop isolated, siloed groups that are not well integrated with 
the rest of the sector and contribute to the failure to translate the knowledge created for 
sector-wide innovation (Granovetter, 1983). The level of structural embeddedness (Jones et 
al., 1997) and the collective intelligence of ecosystem members becomes important. Open-
system orchestration can also incentivise opportunistic behaviours amongst ecosystem 
members to capture value for their individual benefit while preserving the status quo. Since 
the role of open-system orchestrators is to support members, there is a tension between the 
expectation of value creation from the use of public funding and the outcomes of those 
processes. Overall, while this case study was successful in knowledge creation, the 
mechanisms deployed in the national programmes did not effectively support knowledge 






mechanisms are not the only reason for failure, but that the dark side of the sector dynamics 
also contributed.  
The study of closed-system orchestration (Chapter 3) contributed to the discussion on what is 
a success and failure in ecosystems; thus, it aimed to illuminate the dark side of individual 
successful firms. Indeed, leading firms can simultaneously represent an individual success in 
value capture, and a failure to support value creation and capture by ecosystem members, 
thus forming an “ego-system” (Jacobides et al., 2019). The dark side of an orchestrator 
manifests in opportunistic selfish value capture and by doing so, damages the value creation 
by ecosystem members. The use of marketing strategies to change an environment to fit its 
capabilities perhaps presents a story of a successful, masterful and wicked orchestration 
processes executed by a closed-system orchestrator. To my knowledge, the use of marketing 
in ecosystems to drive direct network effects and the adoption of a platform to increase its 
membership has not yet been documented in ecosystem literature. As the mainstream built 
environment sector is infamous for its slow adoption of digital innovation, it is possible that 
the closed-system orchestrator had no choice but to orchestrate the environment with the use 
of marketing power in order to survive. As empirical evidence shows, successful firms can 
exhibit a disproportional power over ecosystem members by extracting value from the 
ecosystem, while others can be ambidextrously successful in supporting individual and 
collective success. However, the findings also indicate the importance of context for 
ecosystem orchestration. Taking the analysis further, the empirical findings present the 
duality of the observed phenomenon, as no ecosystem is “black” or “white”. The success and 
failure of ecosystem orchestration depends on the perspective one takes and what is a success 






A key finding of Chapter 4 is that the failure of the open-system orchestrator (presented in 
Chapter 2) and the failure of the closed-system orchestrator (discussed in Chapter 3) largely 
depends on the orchestration context, namely the sector that is failing to produce ecosystems. 
Specifically, empirical results illuminated the intentional preservation of the status quo by the 
sector’s actors with power and resources, thus contributing to the discourse on power. An 
ecosystem orchestration can fail if the business models established in mature environments 
disincentivise actors with the power to innovate and evolve. These findings support the work 
of Ozcan and Santos (2015) on the turf wars between established but interdependent players 
who can disagree with the market architecture because of their history of industry dominance. 
However, the findings of this thesis extend their work by shifting the focus from dominant 
firms from different industries towards coalitions between co-specialised disciplinary 
communities within one mature sector; furthermore, it notes the importance of established 
business models in the sector as a structure of incentives, and thus the sector’s context. This 
insight suggests that it may be difficult for ecosystems to emerge, particularly when dominant 
firms with power and resources are blindfolded by established beliefs and the misconception 
of profit gains in the sector while the inefficient and ineffective business model at the sector 
level is also established as a norm. It leads to conflict between innovative SMEs and the 
intentional preservation of the status quo by dominant firms.  
Overall, this thesis presents an important empirical foundation in order to understand of how 
and why ecosystems fail to emerge, and to shed light on the darker side of ecosystem 
emergence and orchestration. The studies presented in this thesis highlighted that the mature 
sector could fail to support the emergence of ecosystems because of inherent system 
characteristics that also incentivise opportunistic behaviours. Although past work considered 






perspective of individual firms (Davis & Higgins, 2013; Lucas & Goh, 2009; Tee & Gawer, 
2009; West & Wood, 2013), the findings of the present thesis looked at how different sector 
actors and segments interact and why they try to preserve established business models even if 
they are inadequate. While previous studies largely contribute to the theories of power, this 
thesis emphasises business models at the system level, which suggests factors, such as system 
incentives, value articulation, and the need for change and cognition, as important as 
documented power relations and industry architecture. The findings support the assertion that 
actors in the sector adopt industry recipes as cognitive templates (Jacobides et al., 2016; 
Porac et al., 1989; Spender, 1989) but also confirm that the success and failure of individual 
firms are largely the extent of the system that drives and constrains actions of interdependent 
actors. Thus, this thesis expands the understanding of what drives a sector to preserve the 
status quo while failing to organise itself around a new ecosystem or to support emergence of 
new ecosystems.  
5.2.3 The Importance of Industry Context for Ecosystem Orchestration  
This thesis contributed to an understanding of the importance of context for ecosystem 
emergence and orchestration. A lot of emphasis in ecosystem literature has been placed on 
the role of a powerful leading firm and an enabling platform to organise an ecosystem with a 
top-down approach (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Moore, 2006; 
Piepenbrock, 2009). Some scholars recognised the importance of context and its influence on 
a network’s structure and outcomes (Möller & Halinen, 2017), very few have explored 
empirically it in depth (Piepenbrock, 2009).  
The other stream has theorised the structural properties of the industry architecture that also 






2012). In particular, the work of Jacobides and Winter (2012) clearly indicated that the 
industry architecture does not assume the presence of ecosystems but also does not eliminate 
the possibility of their presence. Jacobides and Winter (2012) explored the interplay between 
determinism and choice and provided an alternative focus on industry architecture to guide 
the agency and the constraints placed by the feedback structure of the system. The results 
presented in this thesis align with the work of Jacobides and Winter (2012). Indeed, I find 
that the division of labour and profits drive the capabilities of the sector.  
While the industry architecture is an important concept for ecosystem orchestration, in this 
thesis, I find that additional contextual conditions also greatly influence the emergence and 
orchestration of ecosystems and business model innovation. First, I find that ecosystem 
emergence in B2B contexts is more challenging than in B2C contexts, as most successful 
companies tend to operate in B2C contexts and then extend their business to B2B contexts by 
becoming a “hybrid company” (Cusumano et al., 2019: p.19), e.g. Google, Amazon, 
Salesforce, etc. Second, although the industry architecture determines and guides both agency 
and capability development, I find that business model exist at two levels: individual firm and 
its ecosystem and the sector. The established business model at the sector level 
disincentivises individual firms from innovation and influences the decisions of individual 
firms. This suggests additional constraints on the process of ecosystem emergence and 
orchestration. A critical condition of the context illuminated in this thesis is the nature of the 
sector. I find that many businesses do not have a location factor that limits the business model 
menu, or a business model that depends on a larger network of actors outside the sector (such 
as the value of land, economy and highly regulated environments), or the need to deliver one 
expensive immobile building product to one client. The BE sector is the largest sector in the 






to the sector’s innovation potential in terms of organising the whole sector. Indeed, successful 
ecosystems thrive in deregulated environments (Jacobides et al., 2019). Furthermore, the built 
environment sector is one of the oldest sectors. The maturity of the sector also greatly 
influences the choices made by decision makers. The established routines develop 
capabilities amongst those decision makers that in turn can also blindfold them. This forms a 
general sector culture that limits the possibility of new ecosystem emergence. I find that 
leading actors in mature established sectors can lack the capability to articulate value at the 
sector level, and to lead and organise necessary complementors towards a new business 
ecosystem. Thus, a vicious cycle is created where the industry architecture and the nature of 
the sector reinforces existing capabilities that further drives the mindsets and decisions to 
preserve the status quo while the nature of the sector limits business possibilities.  
One specific contribution is that the complexity and fragmentation of the sector is an 
insignificant factor in the emergence of ecosystems and orchestration, as successful and 
motivated firms actively interact with the environment by building the necessary capabilities 
(Piepenbrock, 2009) or by changing the environment to fit its capabilities (Penrose, 1959). 
For example, Intel is an excellent example of a component maker that has become an 
effective orchestrator while learning about its leadership role through trial and error. Intel has 
organised a complex fragmented sector towards platforms and complementors. This suggests 
an important implication for ecosystem orchestration as other contextual factors pose 
significant challenges. For example, Gawer (2000: p.296), who extensively studied Intel’s 
orchestration processes, proposed that “every industry that offers complex assembled 
products can potentially become organized in terms of platforms and complements”. While 
the built environment sector offers one complex assembled building product that lasts 






questions whether every sector can be organised in terms of platforms and complements. 
While the computer and automotive industries have been able to progress with both digital 
transformation and platforms since the 1960s (Jacobides et al., 2016), the mainstream built 
environment sector actors have struggled to self-organise towards open business model 
innovation at both individual and sector levelwith platforms and complements as the 
empirical evidence shows. Perhaps the built environment sector shares similarities with the 
taxi industry; the taxi industry exhibits low capabilities, maturity, high fragmentation, the 
location factor and is an old industry, which is similar to the characteristics of the built 
environment. Nevertheless, the analysis indicated that a sector could be organised in terms of 
platforms and complements if certain conditions are created to support this transition, as 
evidenced by the case of Uber in the taxi industry and Intel. Although this thesis presents 
several constraints, it is agnostic and considers ecosystem emergence and orchestration an 
open-ended process where these constraints do not necessarily determine the outcome 
(Stacey, 1995). Further research is needed to determine the necessary conditions for 
ecosystem emergence as evidence of one closed platform-based business ecosystem clearly 
indicates the potential for more ecosystems to emerge in the future. This thesis laid the 
foundation for future work on the critical factors that hinder ecosystem emergence and 
orchestration.  
5.2.4 Critical Constructs and Components of Ecosystem Orchestration  
A final theoretical contribution of this thesis is the exploration of critical concepts and 
components of ecosystem orchestration by introducing a multi-level perspective. Prior 
research has tended to attribute the success of ecosystems to the role of leading firms, 
platforms and their orchestration processes, thus confirming a success bias in case selection 






different specific aspects of ecosystem orchestration, such as bottlenecks (Hannah & 
Eisenhardt, 2019), platform leadership (Gawer, 2000), capabilities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 
2018), industry architecture (Jacobides et al., 2006), organisational forms (Piepenbrock, 
2009), cognition (Porac et al., 2011), agency (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009), and power (Ozcan 
& Santos, 2015). Although these specific constructs and components are critical, their 
relationships were vaguely articulated, as different studies examined specific components in 
isolation. By identifying these key elements of ecosystem orchestration, this thesis has made 
a step towards integrating, organising and positioning how they influence the outcome of 
ecosystem orchestration.  
As such, this thesis builds on existing ecosystem literature, as a relatively integrated 
framework was developed in Chapter 4 to describe an order for the critical concepts and 
components, which add to the success and failure of ecosystem orchestration processes. Thus, 
this framework moves the locus of the discussion from a single component perspective 
towards a multi-level perspective while introducing institutional, structural and contextual 
facets, such as normative and cognitive factors. Moreover, the empirical framework 
demonstrates that concepts and components can be organised at three levels - individual, 
organisational and system - and while some can enable ecosystem emergence, others can be 
built during the process or can fail the ecosystem emergence and orchestration. To my 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to order the constructs and components of ecosystem 
orchestration in a systematized way with a specific focus on what constitutes the mechanism 
of orchestration.  
While most studies on the failure of ecosystems attribute this to the role of cognitive frames, 
mindsets, industry architecture and power relations, I find that failures mostly happen at the 






and organisational levels. Thus, a related contribution is to highlight the difficulty of 
predicting whether ecosystem will fail or succeed. In particular, literature on network 
orchestration emphasised the importance of a “strategic center” to hierarchically structure 
and strategize value creation by its partners and reflect its conscious decisions (Lorenzoni & 
Baden-Fuller, 1995). As a result, a number of articles emerged offering descriptive 
mechanisms of how strategic centres or orchestrators achieved their successes. However, this 
runs contrary to the empirical evidence presented in this research. While many leaders who 
try to consciously get ahead may in fact succeed, many more will fail. The influence of a 
leading hub, or a strategic centre, is overestimated and holds an optimistic view on 
orchestration mechanisms set by an individual firm. The results of this thesis suggest that the 
success of an individual firm is largely the extent of system dynamics as firms are 
simultaneously constrained and enabled by the sector, its context and ecosystems. The 
empirical findings derived in this thesis highlight contradictory evidence that orchestration 
processes and leadership are not just critical to success but also can constitute a failure; 
moreover, the sector as the context of implementation plays a critical role too. Although 
evidence highlighted this contradiction between the literature and empirical evidence, it is 
important to note that the orchestrators presented in Chapters 2 and 3 do not seem to be 
legitimate for sector-wide innovation. A critical question that requires further research is who 
can be an orchestrator in the built environment sector? Overall, the analytical contribution of 
this framework should permit a deeper insight into the orchestration processes while laying a 
foundation for future research that aims to understand how other components of ecosystem 








5.3 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis also implicates practice in several important ways. The findings of the three 
studies imply key issues regarding failed ecosystem orchestrations. Based on the empirical 
results and conclusions, I offer several key recommendations for practitioners. A distinction 
is made between the recommendations for top management, who find themselves 
increasingly engaged with ecosystem strategies, and the recommendations to decision makers 
in the built environment sector regarding the deployment of BIM for sector-wide digital 
innovation.  
5.3.1 Recommendations for Top Management 
As the landscape of how firms organise themselves in the global digital economy has 
changed, top management find themselves challenged with digital disruption. This thesis 
offers insights into the critical constructs and components of orchestration mechanisms that 
leaders must consider while orchestrating their ecosystems. These constructs and components 
can enable, build and fail ecosystems, as presented in Chapter 4.  
One general insight from this thesis is that ecosystems can fail and succeed for different 
reasons. Typically, the success of ecosystems is attributed to leadership and orchestration 
mechanisms, while failure is largely attributed to mindsets, leadership cognition, power 
relations and industry architecture. The notion of success and failure is also mixed when 
firms identify themselves as successful leaders but their complementors and customers may 
think otherwise. Successful firms may prefer to measure success factors from an ecosystem 
perspective to an individual firm perspective. As a result, top management must strategize 
within a broader context. In other words, in order to succeed they are challenged to 






component. The ability of single firms to articulate, create and capture value largely depends 
on the success of their partners in the same ecosystem and whether they do the same in 
return. Mutual support for ecosystem benefits can potentially change the feedback loops. 
A related contribution is to highlight that individually successful firms can interact with the 
environment and, by doing so, they can utilise marketing power. However, those firms that 
use marketing power for self-benefit should be beware that their strategies can be potentially 
damage ecosystem actors, as exemplified in Chapter 3. In successful platform-based 
ecosystems, firms might not need to use marketing strategies. Another consideration is 
whether strategies adopted from B2C contexts are effective in B2B contexts. As further 
research is required, this thesis identified an important understanding that firms should be 
careful in adopting strategies from one context in another.  
One specific insight is that, when creating ecosystem strategies, top managers, must 
anticipate the history of the sector, such as power relations, existing system incentives and 
established business models. In some contexts, established business models can be a strong 
motivator in preserving the status quo as in the cases of the built environment sector and the 
taxi industry. In such cases, successful ecosystem examples might create new markets 
without interacting with traditional sectors. Awareness of the institutional issues in specific 
contexts can prepare top management for uncertainty and to thus seek alternative strategies.  
While powerful established actors in the built environment sector pursue the status quo, the 
top management of SMEs with their innovative potential can struggle to organise themselves, 
as they are typically dependant on the larger network and structure of the sector. Although the 
sector’s nature and structure limit the menu of business models, there is evidence of 






changed their business models through interdependence and an internal platform without the 
need for a contractual relationship. New forms of business models are possible, even in 
traditional contexts with systemic constraints. The case of inter-organisational cooperation is 
unique and rare in this sector, as major players tend to organise themselves as large, vertically 
integrated firms to preserve control and power. Although this case was not presented and 
discussed in this thesis, it offers important validation of the potential of the networked forms 
of self-organisation in the traditional environments. 
5.3.2 Recommendations for Decision Makers in the Built Environment Sector 
The findings of this thesis offer useful insights into the systemic issues of the sector’s 
struggle to innovate with BIM. It is possible that some decision makers would not agree with 
the evidence presented in this thesis when considering the complexity of the evidence studied 
and potential biases that can potentially occur during the analysis. However, major 
disagreements with the results are not expected as the empirical chapters were extensively 
discussed in various ways (privately discussed, presented and published). As cultural 
resistance is common in the built environment sector, some top managers might not be 
committed to accepting unfamiliar recommendations (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). However, 
I believe that the recommendations presented will be useful for policy makers and decision 
makers who want to make a change in the built environment sector. Therefore, several 
recommendations are offered.  
Highlighting the importance of the maturity of the built environment sector and its 
established practices, cultures and mindsets, one of the common beliefs amongst practitioners 
is that the sector is highly complex, fragmented and unique, and is founded on a project-






(Katila et al., 2018; Taylor & Levitt, 2004). However, by researching the evolution of other 
sectors, it became apparent that each sector identifies itself as unique, complex and 
fragmented. These characteristics influence the innovation outcome but do not determine it. 
This thesis provides empirical evidence on the importance of context. Indeed, the built 
environment sector has unique features that limit the menu of business model innovation but 
do not eliminate its potential. It is argued that ecosystems might emerge despite the limitation 
of location-based business models if the many components of ecosystem orchestration are 
taken into consideration. This thesis strongly recommends the careful consideration of the 
development of firm capabilities for leadership and context-dependent orchestration.  
A more careful consideration of the constructs and components in the development of 
strategies is also necessary. Empirical evidence shows that, as long as the value propositions 
remains poorly articulated at the system level, effective legitimate leadership is absent, 
orchestration mechanisms are not context-dependant and the business incentives are not 
addressed, ecosystems in the built environment sector might continue to fail. As the manager 
of a health care client (CA08) indicated, the “why” at the beginning of a project is not 
typically well articulated, which is also relevant for “why BIM”. The sector fails to measure 
the success of project outcomes. A key finding is that the failure to measure success and to 
capture value from investments will continue to persist as the “why” and value propositions at 
the system level are vaguely understood. A well-articulated “why” allows for the effective 
measure of project outcomes. As the interviewees reported, nowadays value capture in 
projects by disintegrated co-specialised teams is largely accidental. It is argued that a clearly 
articulated value incentivises disintegrated parties to encourage collective, rather than 
individual, value creation. The failure of the software vendor to define value on behalf of the 






another general insight into how much individual firms and decision makers are influenced 
by marketing strategies and the competitive dynamics of powerful incumbents.  
Another important insight is the legitimacy of the actors who take a lead in the sector. The 
empirical findings illuminated that powerful international incumbents could have a 
disproportional influence on the market emergence in the sector. The challenge for leading 
firms is to change their attitudes from the desire to solely dominate the market to instead take 
a role in propagating mutually beneficial visions and trust in the ecosystem. Considering that 
prominent incumbents might not agree to such terms, these findings serve as a reminder to 
policy makers that new ecosystems might not emerge under certain conditions, such as turf 
wars between prominent firms (Ozcan & Santos, 2015), while established business models 
could disincentivise the sector’s actors to innovate. Specifically, policy makers should 
investigate the corrective mechanisms for actors in power. Perhaps policy makers are faced 
with a difficult decision in ‘choosing the winning side’ and thus allow large, vertically 
integrated firms to dominate the market. This thesis also offers a reminder that the built 
environment sector does not stand on its own but is dependent on many complementary 
sectors and, as such, the decision makers must open their boundaries to adopt a wider 
perspective on how one sector is dependent on the wider proponents of an ecosystem. The 
sector will benefit from a shift from siloed thinking to open thinking by partnering with 
sectors that can offer complementary resources, know-how and capabilities. Interestingly, 
until recently, complementary industries were largely disinterested in the built environment 
sector. 
I observed that challengers, typically the outsiders, in the built environment are attempting to 
accelerate digital practices to become an information-intensive sector in the next ten years 






further suggests that, if the system level incentives and feedback loops continue to act for the 
status quo, the investments made in the sector’s digitalization by firms and governments 
worldwide might prove to be incremental and fruitless. A number of scholars have indicated 
and called for a structural change in the sector (Taylor & Levitt, 2004; Winch, 1998); 
however, evidence derived from this thesis strongly recommends an integrated view of the 
critical issues that collectively hinder structural change. As such, these issues are leadership, 
context-dependent orchestration mechanisms, mechanisms for mindset and cognition change, 
capability development and the most important new business models with clearly articulated 
value propositions for fair value distribution and capture. The case of Intel clearly indicates 
that, with effective leadership and investment in the development of capabilities (e.g. Intel 
and its complementors, partners) and by forming tight trustworthy relationships, the sector 
can make significant structural changes. To conclude, only those firms that actively seek 
cooperative relations to create value beyond their own interests can win. However, the 
behaviours of firms that seek individual value capture are largely guided by structural 
properties, e.g. established markets, mindsets and business models at the sector level.  
5.4 LIMITATIONS 
There are a number of limitations to this empirical research. The data collected on the 
Finnish and Californian ecosystems were initially dedicated to the implementation of 
Building Information Management in design and construction projects. Although the 
questions were dedicated to BIM implementation, the collected data were rich highlighting 
the dominant roles of TEKES in Finland and the software vendor in California. The evidence 
was compiled from the collected data and completed with an extensive literature review. 
However, additional data collections with specific foci on TEKES and the software vendor 






example, in the case of TEKES, a leader of the SARA programme was not interviewed but 
this interview appears to be critical to understanding the failure of business model innovation 
in the sector. As such, the analysed evolution of Finnish national BIM deployment lacks an 
understanding of the activities in the SARA programme. However, the lack of information 
published online justifies the absence of data which would have helped to understand the 
SARA programme. In relation to the data collection in California, only one anonymous 
interview was conducted with the software vendor. The orchestration processes were 
constructed through the analysis of the software vendor’s B2B customers and their 
involvement. Considering the siloed nature of the software vendor, it is possible that a further 
data collection on the orchestration mechanisms of the software vendor would have been 
impossible or fruitless.  
There are also methodological limitations. First, the use of grounded theory has several 
limitations that are also associated with any qualitative research. Trustworthiness is a major 
limitation in accurately reflecting the integrity of the research study (Watt, 2007). It is the 
researcher’s responsibility to take measures to validate the results (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). 
Although measures were taken to promote the validity and reduce biases, the case studies 
presented in this thesis are highly complex for one researcher to tackle. Moreover, studying a 
phenomenon, such as the evolution of one sector over a period of 37 years (the Finnish case), 
is prone to a subjective view of history that relies on published literature and interviewees’ 
memories. This may have potentially biased the outcome or provided incomplete results.  
Another limitation is that the failure bias in the cases may have painted a subjective picture of 
ecosystem orchestration, as failure and negative cases are prone to subjectification. By 
investigating failure cases, the researcher may gain insights from small pieces of data that 






empirical data to depict the failure cases, the researcher must follow the case from its genesis 
to its failure in real time. Although a detailed consideration of one context does not offer 
generalisability in a statistical sense, such generalisability is not the goal of qualitative 
research; its subjectivity and context-specificity are considered strengths rather than 
limitations (Willis, Jost, & Nilakanta, 2007).  
The thesis draws its conclusions on purely qualitative data and the researcher’s interpretations 
of the events. Although the researcher has extensively sought validation from external experts 
in the field, the study would have benefited from a mixed method approach by integrating 
system modelling, a configuration approach or statistical analysis. Overall, considering the 
limited evidence of failure cases and the emergent theory of ecosystem orchestration, the 
adopted interpretivist method based on grounded theory was appropriate to help the 
researcher develop and contribute new theories.  
5.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
A few areas were identified for further research, both theoretical and empirical. The 
thesis explored two failed ecosystems in one sector and juxtaposed the results with successful 
ecosystems in other sectors. A number of critical constructs and components of ecosystem 
orchestration were identified and tested. The tested list of constructs and components is not 
exhaustive. Although these results may be generalisable, there are other constructs and 
components that could be usefully tested to provide a fully integrated view. Furthermore, 
with the continuous diffusion of ecosystem strategies across many sectors and the associated 
use of platform strategies, it is feasible that other constructs and components could be critical 
depending on the ecosystem type and context. Future research could provide a more complete 






that attempts to create links using a configuration approach. Grounding and testing this 
framework empirically in specific contexts could thus extend and refine the work with more 
granulated and context-dependent orchestration mechanisms. It is expected that ecosystem 
differences may account for more variance in both long and short-term evolutions, and in 
B2C and B2B contexts affecting the performance (and therefore the survival) of ecosystems.  
Despite the importance of mechanisms for value creation and value capture as recognised 
areas of inter-organisational relationships, this thesis empirically illustrated the importance of 
the logic of value articulation that was largely taken for granted in studies on ecosystems and 
platforms. The majority of research to date has not directly explored mechanisms for value 
articulation nor its direct relationship with value creation and capture within ecosystem 
contexts. This thesis made the first step to present empirical evidence that failure in value 
articulation directly contributes to the failure in value capture by some actors. This has laid a 
foundation for future research on the exploration of mechanisms that link value articulation, 
value creation and value capture. Given the importance of mechanisms for value articulation 
in ecosystem contexts, the further development of a more coherent and detailed formation of 
how these two concepts are theoretically and empirically linked would aid both academic and 
practitioner understanding.  
The adoption of other theories to understand the critical constructs and components for 
ecosystem emergence and orchestration can be usefully researched. Indeed, ecosystems can 
be viewed as culturally, historically and geographically organised social phenomena. As 
such, a cross-national comparison of ecosystems that emerge in different contexts could be 
researched with the use of the comparative method offered by Ragin (2014). Ragin (2014) 
offers a technique that uses Boolean algebra to perform a comparative analysis of qualitative 






This technique is particularly useful in addressing questions that result from multivariate and 
conjectural evidence and when different conditions produce similar and contradictory results, 
such as the cases presented in this thesis. Other failed and successful cases of ecosystems 
could be added to the list for comparative study.  
I observed that the characteristics of ecosystem concept and project networks in the built 
environment sector are surprisingly similar. The definitions of ecosystems provided by 
scholars perfectly fit the definition of project networks and the design and construction 
industry in general. For example, the definition provided by Jacobides et al. (2018:p.2264) 
that, “An ecosystem is a set of actors with varying degrees of multilateral, nongeneric 
complementarities that are not fully hierarchically controlled”, can be used effectively to 
describe the networked nature of design and construction projects. The characteristics of 
ecosystems and projects also share a great number of similarities, such as co-specialisation, 
value creation and capture, complementarity, simultaneous competition and cooperation, and 
loosely coupled structures. The characteristics of ecosystems could be revisited in the context 
of the project-based organisation of the built environment sector. Perhaps existing knowledge 
about project networks in the DBE sector could provide useful insights into ecosystem 
concept in order to refine its definitions and theories. This thesis calls for a more 
contextualised definition of ecosystems as well as evidence of the generalisability of 
ecosystems across different sectors. As such, the concept of context could be further 
empirically researched in B2C and B2B ecosystems.  
Another empirical observation is that, over the last two decades, an increasing number of 
industries have evolved from vertical integration to more horizontal structures, e.g. ecosystem 
strategies. In comparison, the built environment sector is re-integrating with BIM 






towards vertical integration in the built environment sector while other sectors actively shift 
towards ecosystem types of organisation is an interesting phenomenon that requires further 
research. Future research could explore questions such as: Why does this sector behave 
differently to other sectors? Why is this trend so different from other sectors when ecosystem 
strategies benefit other sectors? 
Future research could explore emerging business ecosystems in the built environment sector. 
With increased investment in the digitalisation of the sector, a number of start-ups have 
emerged. Future research could follow their evolution to understand how ecosystems emerge 
in heavily standardised industries with low investments. Considering that most research on 
ecosystems is from a focal hub firm perspective, research that analyses evolution from a 
small firm perspective and its relationship with global networks could provide a novel 
perspective with contributions to the discourse on power and growth of ecosystems.  
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, this thesis has investigated the orchestration mechanisms of failed 
ecosystems; this is a topic within ecosystem research that has not been well examined to date. 
Theoretically, a failed open and closed-system approach to orchestration led by public and 
private organisations was explored and the research theorised about critical constructs and 
components for ecosystem orchestration. These constructs and components have a clear order 
of functions that can enable, build and fail ecosystems. Empirically, this thesis explored two 
contexts with distinctively different conditions and orchestration mechanisms that manifested 
similar results and thus pointed to the importance of the sector’s context. Empirical evidence 






sector can seriously limit the menu of business model innovation. This thesis further 
contributed to the discourse on the dark side of ecosystem orchestration.  
Theoretically and empirically, this thesis contributes to an understanding of ecosystem 
emergence and orchestration. It also offers important managerial implications for policy 
makers and practitioners in relation to sector-wide digital innovation with BIM. I hope these 
findings will be useful for scholars researching ecosystems and innovators attempting to 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
A.1: Invitation Letter: Finland 
Dear [Name], 
I am writing to you on behalf of the whole team participating in the project ‘A Study of the 
Quebec-Finland Gap in Building Information Modelling (BIM) deployment: A Critical 
Perspective Approach’. You were identified with the help of Arto Kiviniemi as one of 
individuals who played a prominent role in shaping BIM practices in Finland. We sincerely 
believe that your participation in this project will contribute to better understanding of the 
specific mechanisms that explain the success of BIM in Finland on the one hand, and slow 
adoption of BIM in Quebec on the other hand. We intend to compare BIM deployment in 
Finland and Quebec at four levels: academia, government, industry and individual work. 
Therefore, we kindly invite you to participate in an open face-to-face interview in Helsinki 
during the period of 23-29 of February or 7-15 of March, 2015 to support this project. The 
project is led by prof. Albert Lejeune at Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) in 
Montreal, Canada, where I serve as a research assistant. 
I, Gulnaz Aksenova, am a research associate at Management and Technology, ESG – 
UQAM, The Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), in Montreal, Canada. I will be 
coming to Helsinki on 23 of February – 15 of March, 2015 to conduct a series of interviews 
and we believe that your participation is extremely important for this research. 
The interview will take approximately 90 minutes of your time. The place and time of the 
interview will be agreed with you if you decide to participate. 
If you feel that you are unable to participate for some reasons, or you think that someone can 
provide us better insights or fits better to the research, please, feel free to forward this email. 
Any help and advice are very much appreciated. 
Thank you for your time and kind perusal of this email. We will be looking forward to a 
positive consideration of our proposition and your reply. 
Yours Sincerely, 









A.2: Invitation Letter: California 
Title: An empirical study investigating a strategy for value co-creation with BIM in 
business ecosystem of AECO industry  
Ph.D. candidate: Gulnaz Aksenova  
School of Architecture, Department of Digital Architecture, University of Liverpool, UK 
Email: Gulnaz.aksenova@liverpool.ac.uk  
Ph.D. started on 1 February 2016 and due to be completed on 1 February 2020 
 
Keywords: business ecosystem, design and construction industry, Building Information 
Modelling  
Dear [Name], 
I am writing to you on behalf of the whole team participating in the project ‘[Title]’. You 
were identified with the help of [Key contact] as one of individuals who played a prominent 
role in shaping business ecosystem in [name of the organisation]. We sincerely believe that 
your participation will contribute to a better understanding of mechanisms that facilitate 
and/or hinder the implementation of BIM in the business ecosystem of the construction 
industry in [California]. Therefore, I kindly invite you to participate in an open face-to-face 
interview in [to be decided] during the period of [to be decided, example: 23-29 of February 
or 7-15 of March, 2018] to support this research project. Your role as a committed member of 
the construction industry in [California] is particularly important for this research project 
where we intend to compare strategies for value co-creation in business ecosystem with BIM 
in Finland, UK and California. 
I, Gulnaz Aksenova, am a second year PhD candidate under the direct supervision of prof. 
Arto Kiviniemi (University of Liverpool, UK) at the University of Liverpool, UK. I will be 
coming to [California on 23 of February – 15 of March, 2018] to conduct a series of 
interviews and we hope for your participation. The interview will take approximately 60-90 
minutes of your time. The place and time of the interview will be agreed with you if you will 
decide to participate.  
Your participation is extremely important to us to fulfil the posed aims. If you feel that you 
are unable to participate for some reasons, or you think that someone can provide us better 
insights or fits better to the research, please, feel free to forward this email. Any help and 
advice are very much appreciated.  
Thank you for your time and kind perusal of this email. I will be looking forward to a 
positive consideration of this proposition and your reply. 
Yours Sincerely, 






A.3: Consent Form: Finland 
 
      
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
TITLE OF THE PROJECT: A Study of the Quebec-Finland Gap 
In Building Information Modelling (BIM) deployment: A Critical Perspective Approach 
PREAMBLE: 
You are invited to participate in a research project which aims at explaining the gap between 
the BIM adoption in Finland and Quebec. Before agreeing to participate in this project, please 
devote your time to read the information below carefully. If there are words or sections that 
you do not understand, do not hesitate to ask questions.  
IDENTIFICATION: 
Project leader: Albert Lejeune 
Tel: (514) 987-3000 
Department: Management and Technology, ESG - UQAM 
Email: Lejeune.albert@uqam.ca 
Address: School of Science and Management, Université du Québec à Montréal 
Case 8888, succursale Centre-ville Montréal, (Québec) H3C 3P8 
Members of the team: Daniel Forgues (ETS), Hamid Nach (UQAM) 
Associate researchers: Hannele Kerosuo (The University of Helsinki), Arto Kiviniemi (The University of 
Liverpool) and Lauri Koskela (The University of Huddersfield) 
Research assistants: Gulnaz Aksenova, Marie-Claude Plourde, Mamadou Diallo and Georges Rizkallah 
Coordinator: Marie-Claude Plourde 
Interviewer: Gulnaz Aksenova (PhD candidate, ETS) 






• To present the general and specific objectives in clear and accessible language to the 
participants. 
• This project receives financial support from CRSH, Program for Development of 
Knowledge (2014-2016). 
PROCEDURE OF TASKS REQUESTED FROM THE PARTICIPANT:  
Your participation includes an open interview with the researcher assistant and/or with 
research assistants. You will answer to the several questions that will identify the 
mechanisms that encourage or discourage the implementation of BIM technology in Quebec. 
The interview will take approximately sixty to ninety minutes of your time and is digitally 
recorded with your permission.  
POTENTIAL BENEFITS: 
Your participation will contribute to the advancement of knowledge through a better 
understanding of the mechanisms that facilitate or hinder the implementation of BIM In the 
ecosystem of the construction industry in Quebec.  
ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY: 
It is agreed that all the information collected from the interview is strictly confidential. Only 
research team will have access to the audio and transcript files. All research material and 
consent forms will be kept separately in a secure place at the office of the project leader for 
the duration of the project.  
In order to protect your identity and privacy, your name will be identified with an 
alphanumeric code. The code of your name will be known as Finland_1 (and etc.). Digital 
recordings will be erased after two years, and your information and consent form will be kept 






I agree that excerpts from the interview will be disseminated through the scientific meetings 
or training, future scholars and that these excerpts will not identify me in any case.  
☐ YES ☐ NO 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW THE 
INTERVIEW: 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. It means, that you agree to participate in the 
project without any external pressure. You are free to stop or withdraw your interview at any 
time during the course of the research without any justification or prejudices of any nature. In 
this case, unless over wise stated, data associated with you will be destroyed.  
Your agreement also implies that you accept the use of data collected from you for the 
research purposes such as articles, student thesis, conferences or any other kind of research 
and scientific papers. In this case, any information identifying you will be disclosed unless 
explicit consent is signed by you and over wise stated.  
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND OTHERS: 
It is understood that you will not receive any financial support as a compensation for your 
participation in this research.  
LIABILITY CLAUSE: 
By agreeing to participate in this research, you are not giving up any of your rights, nor 
discharging the researchers, the granting agencies or the institution from their legal and 
professional duties. 






After the completion of the project, we would like to keep the data for the period of two years 
to support other research projects as well. The ethics of this research also apply to the long-
term preservation of the data. You are free to refuse the secondary use of the data.  
☐ I accept that my data will be used for other research projects  
☐ I do not accept that my data will be used for other research projects 
FOR FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROJECT AND/OR YOUR RIGHTS: 
If you should require any further information about the project, your participation and/or 
rights as a participant of this research, or you would like to withdraw your interview from the 
project, you may contact:  
PROF. ALBERT LEJEUNE, responsible for the project 
(Name of the contact person / position) 
Telephone: 514 987 3000 (extension number # 4844) 
Email: LEJEUNE.ALBERT@UQAM.CA 
The Institutional Ethics Committee for the Research Involving Humans of UQAM has 
approved this research project. For the information conserving the research team and terms of 
ethics involving humans, or to make a complaint, you may contact the president of the Ethics 
Committee by phone: 
+1 (514) 987-3000 (extension number # 7753) or through email: CIEREH@UQAM.CA 
ACKNOWLEDGELEMENTS: 
Your participation is very important for the realisation of this project and the research team 
would like to sincerely thank you for your participation, effort and time. If you would like to 








a) I have read this information and consent form; 
b) I voluntary consent to participate in this research; 
c) I understand the objectives of the research and my involvement in the project; 
d) I acknowledge that I had a sufficient time to consider my decision for the participation; 
e) I also recognise that the interviewer has answered my questions satisfactory; 
f) I understand that my participation in this project is totally voluntary and I am free to 
terminate and withdraw the data at any time without any justification or penalty.  
 
Signature of the participant:      Date:    
Name (print) and contact: 
I, hereby, declare: 
a) I have carefully explained the participant what his/her role and rights in this research 
b) I have received the consent form for my personal hold; 
c) I have responded to my best knowledge to the questions regarding this research project 
during the interview 
Signature of the interviewer:                                                     Date:   
Name (print) and contact: Gulnaz Aksenova 











A.4: Consent Form: California 
  
Title of Project: 
 
 
PhD Thesis: An empirical study investigating a business 
ecosystem strategy for value co-creation with BIM in the 











Researcher: Gulnaz Aksenova (B.Arch, M.Sc., PhD candidate in Digital 
Architecture) 
School of Architecture, University of Liverpool Leverhulme 
Building, Abercromby Square L69 7ZN, UK 
T: +44 (0) 55 3398 9288  
E: Gulnaz.Aksenova@liverpool.ac.uk 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 10/04/2017 for 
the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions 




2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving any reason, without my rights being affected. In addition, should 




3. I understand that, under the Data Protection Act, I can at any time ask for access to 
the information I provide and until the data has been used in any publication I can 










     




   
        Gulnaz Aksenova                                                    Date                      Signature 











4. I understand and agree that my participation will be audio recorded and I am aware of 
and consent to your use of these recordings for this research. 
 
5. I understand that I will not be identified in this interview and any subsequent 
publication or use. 
 
6. The information you have submitted will be used in the PhD dissertation and may be 
used in journal and/or conference articles. Please indicate whether you would like to 
receive a copy of all publications where your information has been used. If you leave 



















A.5: Participant’s Information Sheet: California 
 
1. Title of Study:  
An empirical study investigating a business ecosystem strategy for value co-creation with 
BIM in AECO industry  
2. Version Number and Date 
Form N 2110. Version 2.2 – 19/04/2018 
3. Invitation Paragraph 
You are being invited to participate in a research study. Before you decide whether to 
participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and feel free to ask 
us if you would like more information or if there is anything that you do not understand. 
Please also feel free to discuss this with your friends and/or relatives if you wish. We would 
like to stress that you do not have to accept this invitation and should only agree to take part 
if you want to. 






4. What is the purpose of the study? 
A central purpose of this research is to explore, describe and explain how evolution of new 
business ecosystems in AECO industry, as both the individual organisations and its 
environment (e.g. ecosystem that includes industry, markets, and institutions) are co-evolving 
creating and capturing value with the adoption of BIM to sustain ecosystem’s health where 
each member of the ecosystem benefits from the adoption of BIM. 
5. Why have I been chosen to take part? 
You were identified as one of individuals who played a prominent role in shaping business 
ecosystem in your organisation. We sincerely believe that your participation will 
contribute to a better understanding of mechanisms that facilitate and/or hinder the 
implementation of BIM in the business ecosystem of the construction industry in your 
country/state. 
6. Do I have to take part? 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. It means, that you agree to participate in the 
project without any external pressure. You are free to stop or withdraw your interview at any 
time during the course of the research without any justification or prejudices of any nature. In 
this case, unless otherwise stated, data associated with you will be destroyed.  
Your agreement also implies that you accept the use of data collected from you for the 
research purposes such as articles, student thesis, conferences or any other kind of research 
and scientific papers.  







Your participation includes an open interview with the researcher. You will answer to several 
questions that will identify the mechanisms for value co-creation with BIM in the business 
ecosystem of your organisation. The interview will take approximately sixty to ninety 
minutes of your time and be digitally recorded with your permission.  
8. Expenses and / or payments 
The interviews will be conducted at any venue chosen by you. This is to ensure the comfort 
of the participant for the study.  
You will not receive any financial support as a compensation for your participation in this 
research.  
9. Are there any risks in taking part in the research? 
You are free to withdraw your participation from the research at any time. If you feel any 
discomfort during the interview, you are free to stop it at any time. You can also refuse to 
answer any questions you don’t want to answer.  
The interviews will be transferred to the university’s protected hard drive as soon as possible 
after the interview and after that destroyed from the original recording device. Only the 
researcher and her supervisors will have access to the original data 
10. Are there any benefits in taking part? 
Your participation will contribute to the advancement of knowledge through a better 
understanding of the business ecosystem strategies and value co-creation with BIM in AECO 
industry. You can also get the final PhD dissertation if you want. 
11. What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem? 
Research Governance support for the University of Liverpool has approved this research 






Arto Kiviniemi by email a.kiviniemi@liverpool.ac.uk. If he cannot help you or you want 
more information concerning the research team and terms of ethics involving humans, or you 
want to make a complaint, you may contact the Ethics Committee by email: ethics@liv.ac.uk. 
When contacting the Research Governance Officer, please provide details of the name or 
description of the study (so that it can be identified), the researcher involved, and the details 
of the complaint you wish to make.  
12. Will my participation be kept confidential? 
All the information collected from the interview is strictly confidential. Only the researcher 
and her supervisors will have access to the audio and transcript files. The audio file will be 
transcribed by the researcher. All research material and consent forms will be kept separately 
in a secure place at the office of researcher for the duration of the project.  
To protect your identity and privacy, your name will be identified with an alphanumeric code. 
Digital recordings will be erased after the PhD is accepted. 
13. What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results from this study will be used in the researcher’s PhD dissertation and possibly also 
in journal and/or conference articles. All published information will be anonymised. 
14. What will happen if I want to stop taking part? 
Participants can withdraw from the study without any explanation until the results have been 
used in any publication. Results that have not been published may be used up to the period of 
withdrawal only if participants agree for that to be done.  






If you should require any further information about the project, your participation and/or 
rights as a participant of this research, or you would like to withdraw your interview from the 
project, you may contact:  
Gulnaz Aksenova  
Teaching Assistant, B.Arch, M.Sc.,  
PhD candidate in Digital Architecture 
 
School of Architecture,  
University of Liverpool  
Leverhulme Building,  
Abercromby Square 
L69 7ZN, UK 
 
T: +44 (0) 55 3398 9288 
E: Gulnaz.Aksenova@liverpool.ac.uk 
Prof. Arto Kiviniemi 
Professor of Digital Architectural design 
 
 
School of Architecture,  
University of Liverpool  
Leverhulme Building,  
Abercromby Square 






Your participation is very important for the realisation of this project and the research team 















A.6: Expert Interview Guide: Finland and California 
The following interview guide was used for data collection in Finland and California. 
The interviews included open questions and were partly based on the long interview process 
undertaken by McCracken (1988). The interview thread followed a similar procedure for 
each question but was not limited to it. For example, the first question is posed about the 
evolution of ICT in the industry from the beginning of the interviewee’s career. The 
presented perspective was then contrasted with the “interviewee’s organisation and other 
organisations”, “before BIM and after BIM” or any other relevant comparison. As the 
interviewee presents their perspective on the evolution of ICT, I allowed them to speak freely 
about their observations while asking them to clarify specific terms that they used while using 
“Floating prompts” (Dohrenwend & Richardson, 1956) to repeat the key terms of the 
respondent’s last remark.  
Interview guide is presented below: 
Background information about the project. 
• The project introduction. 
• Interviewer introduction. 
• Request to sign consent form. 
Background information about the interviewee. 
• Could you tell me briefly about yourself and your position in your organisation? 
• What is your present position in this company/organisation? 
• What are your major responsibilities in the company/organisation? 
• How many years have you worked in the industry?  
First question: The historical perspective on the evolution of ICT in the sector and the 






• Could you tell me about the importance and evolution of ICT in your organisation, 
industry and ecosystem from the years 1990-2000 and until the arrival of BIM? 
According to your perspective, from the start of your career how did it evolve? 
• Contrasts:  
o What is the difference between what you call "X" and the other category 
"Y"? (X and Y were introduced by the informant) 
• Categories:  
o Can you give me an account of all the formal characteristics of the point 
under discussion - key players, key actions, key events, etc.  
• Memories of incidents were used when an incident was mentioned by the 
interviewee, such as a “strange event” or a “surprising event” in order to show 
cultural categories and their interrelationships (McCracken, 1988). 
o What was striking?  
o What was surprising?  
o This contradicted what?  
• Stimuli – a timeline is presented with key events identified in the published 
literature to trigger memories. 
• Additional questions were asked if the conversation was not evolving: 
o Who were the key individuals and stakeholders? How did they help to 
initiate the programme in practice? 
o How do you see the role of institutions in industry renewal? 
o Where do you see the risks or hindrances in the ecosystem? 
Second question: The emergence of BIM in the industry. 
• Could you tell me about how BIM has emerged in the industry and your organisation? 
• Contrasts:  
o What is the difference between what you call "X" and the other category "Y"? 
(X and Y were introduced by the informant)  
• Categories:  
o Can you give me an account of all the formal characteristics of the point under 






• Memories of incidents were used when an incident was mentioned by the 
interviewee, such as a “strange event” or a “surprising event” in order to show 
cultural categories and their interrelationships (McCracken, 1988). 
o What was striking?  
o What was surprising?  
o This contradicted what?  
• Stimuli – a timeline is presented with key events identified in the published literature 
to trigger memories 
o Additional questions were asked if the conversation was not evolving: 
▪ Back to your first experience with BIM, can you tell me how this 
technology has become important to your organisation?  
▪ What was the main motivation behind the adoption of BIM? 
▪ Which barriers did you experience and what caused them?  
▪ Which challenges did you experience and what caused them?  
▪ Which benefits did you experience and what caused them?  
▪ Which elements contributed to the emergence of BIM?  
▪ Why was BIM important in your organisation?  
▪ Which projects were successful/not successful and why?  
Third question: The current state of BIM in the industry. 
• What is the current state of the industry adoption of BIM?  
• Contrasts:  
o What is the difference between what you call "X" and the other category "Y"? 
(X and Y were introduced by the informant)  
• Categories:  
o Can you give me an account of all the formal characteristics of the point under 
discussion - key players, key actions, key events, etc.  
• Memories of incidents were used when an incident was mentioned by the 
interviewee, such as a “strange event” or a “surprising event” in order to show 
cultural categories and their interrelationships (McCracken, 1988). 
o What was striking?  






o This contradicted what?  
• Stimuli – a timeline is presented with key events identified in the published literature 
to trigger memories 
• Additional questions were asked if the conversation was not evolving: 
▪ What are the diffusion mechanisms and how they can accelerate the 
implementation of BIM? 
To conclude: 
• What surprised you the most about the sector? 
• Is there anything else of importance you would like to add? 
• Is there anything that we did not talk about that appears relevant? 




















APPENDIX B: DATA STRUCTURE FOR CHAPTER TWO 
The following are selected quotes of qualitative data for the discourse & textual analysis within 
Chapter 2. 
Aggregated dimension: Phase 1. Technology Innovation:  
The Emergence of the Knowledge Hub with Pioneers, 1965-1983 
Aggregated Themes Second-Order 
Categories 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Categories 
Period 1. The 




in the industry 
 
 Focus on the computer simulations at the universities 
“We did not have any laboratories, so, in order to do exercises - instead of doing laboratory 
exercises and tests - we did computer simulations from early on. I did my first computer 
graphics program in 1968, which generated 3-D stereo images. I did everything with 
computers from the very beginning. […] We were getting better and better. Not, of course, 
all the time. And all the time we did a lot of software development with students. At least 
some of us, I was one of them. […] when I visited universities, I saw a lot of students in the 
laboratories, physical testing, and so forth… We did not do much of it. So, this is one of the 
main reasons. We did not know what was really happening in other countries. From my point 
of view, it is the main explanation that I can think of.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
The industry was motivated to speed up standardisation to create efficiency after 
IIWW 
“We had official collaboration also when it came to building models, led by the Finnish 
building information foundation (Rakennustietosäätiö). Rakennustietosäätiö was around 
from the Second World War and they were founded by Finnish companies to take care of 
standardisation in the Finnish construction industry. Because, after the war, we had to rebuild 
a lot and it had to be very efficient. And it made sense to do standardisations of certain 
processes, definitions and specifications.” (Consultant, FIN04) 
Open opportunities for start-ups with low competition 
“There is a whole generation of people who started that [software development] in the early 
80s and late 70s. They still are alive. Of course, many of them are coming up to retirement 
age. And they are selling these companies. I think some of them work with original 
management. Obviously, there was a kind of time window. If you want to set up such a 
company, you could do it in the 80s and nobody had this huge competition; everybody was 
more or less on the same level, the same position. Most of the companies these days would 
not be able to survive. Nowadays, it would not be possible to set up such a company because 
it would need a big investment.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Emerging product data models amongst industry visionaries 
“The group of companies - architectural, engineering, and structural - were working together 
with the software company called Tekla. And they have established a project which was 
called ALVISR. These projects got a working system, and they did a couple of real models 
with that, which was totally done with computers, and it had a product data model inside. 
But it was not commercially valid because computers and networks at that time were not 
powerful enough. They had a connection with graphical terminals and mainframe computers 
(VAX750) with modem connections; it wasn’t practical for use. But in theory, everything 









Forming a hub with high-tech champions (engineers) 
“When I look backwards, I think that roughly my generation, when we got out of the 
university, we produced ICT everywhere in the industry. We were the first ones who had 
access to the computers. Once these people went into the industries, they changed 
everything.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Champions challenge the industry with new technological developments in 1965 







 “Tekla was established in the late 60s. The name Tekla comes from structural analysis, it 
worked for structural analysis. So, I think it is also very important; they have developed 
software for structural analysis, dimensions, columns, whatever... They had software for 
everything. Most of the structural engineers had used that software already in the 60s. The 
company I think was established originally by several consulting engineering companies, 
who were shareholders and wanted to establish its capability to use computers in civil 
engineering. So, they were already visible in the 60s and, of course, having this company led 
to the fact that all consulting engineers were using computers and Tekla. Originally, there 
were some large computer centres here. Companies did not have their own computers; I 
think, in the early stages, I think they operated from abroad.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
“I was borrowing these computers, they wanted to develop their software and they sold my 
software to Hewitt Packett. We were trying to commercialize this; we had quite modest 
results. I was providing some services to companies to generate 3-D images for 
advertisement. For instance, we used to make commercial images of buildings.” (Researcher, 
FIN18) 
Finnish pioneers developed advanced systems comparing to AutoCAD 
“In the early 80s, Autodesk started to launch some software, like AutoCAD, which was a 
lousy system in those days. I remembered very well because I was a CEO of a small software 
company. We have looked at it and it was not good. We decided to do our own and we did. 
Then, of course, in the long run, AutoCAD became very powerful. But it came to the market 
in the early 80s and it was really bad those days.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Extensive development of CAD systems by pioneers in small firms 
“I think Tekla was one of the first who then introduced a service-based CAD system. It was 
called DOGs, Drawing-Oriented Graphic System, and they provided it from the service 
centre to remote (….?) And this became quite popular in the early 80s. It was basically the 
first widely used CAD system. […] Then, I want to mention a new company, which is 
Progman. They developed a System for heating and ventilation systems. I think it started 
probably from the design of ducts, which takes a lot of space in buildings. Later on, they 
added thermal simulation to do both 3-D dimensional CAD Design and also a simulation of 
the ventilation system. I probably have mentioned the main pioneers. For some reasons in 
Finland we have got quite a few small software companies, which were developing CAD 
systems at that time. Which is an interesting thing.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Developing internally tools for engineering services and precast cost and material 
calculation  
“Some of us developed programs for construction analysis. Now, you are lucky, people get 
to learn commercial software, but many of us developed these programs ourselves. […] So, 
people developed small CAD systems to do drawings in the late 70s. […] I think we used 
these technologies to design single family houses. Factory houses around the very late 70s. 
This was probably the first CAD system developed in Finland for the construction sector” 
(Researcher, FIN18) 
Technology enthusiasts were focused on technology more than business investing 
into immature technology 
“If you invest in technology that is not yet mature you might suffer from competition that 
might hit you. Something that is really strange, if we look backwards. Here in the 80s, we 
had a number of big brave software companies in a very small market, like Finland. I assume 
if people had a little bit more sense, they would not have established these companies for 
such a small market. They were more interested in IT rather than business. […] I think 
it was technology; it was so fantastic even to think about what you could do with these 
technologies; how much better you could do with it! I was really enjoying when I was able 
to develop some software that people use in their jobs. Certainly, software development is 
extremely powerful. Almost no limits what you can do with it. But it is so expensive, but 
maybe the next step should be the business development.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Enthusiasts adopted technology even if it was commercially not profitable because 
of absence of international competition and culture enthusiasm for technology 
“We are technology freaks. […] I think also that to some degree, it is because this is a small 






enthusiasm, even if it is commercially not profitable in the short term. […] In Finland, unlike 
in international markets, we did not have international competition. As long as everybody 
thinks that playing with BIM was fun, everybody did it and they did not suffer from 









American CAD systems entered Finnish market in the late 70s 
“Finland was attacked by international vendors, like CAD systems; nobody knew about them 
before. In 79 it had just landed in Finland; they were all over the place, getting their market 
share. They were looking for companies and trying to sell systems to these companies. 
Construction sector companies could not afford to buy these American CAD systems, like 
Bentley and so forth. It was just too expensive. A single workstation cost more than a single-
family house - up to three times. […] The reason why some of the industrial companies could 
afford them was because [….] they saw the potential of this technology and they knew that 
prices would definitely come down. But if we invest early and we can learn, then we can 
stay ahead of the competition. It makes perfect sense. But, for construction sector it was not 
nearly impossible.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Industry realised the incompatibility between developed tools slows 
standardisation 
“But the competition also meant that, if one architect was using one system and then I was 
using another system, the designs were not to be compatible. That dilemma also sped up 
standardization.” (Consultant, FIN04) 
Government set 
up TEKES to 
drive high-tech 
society 
Government established TEKES to drive high-tech development in the country 
“One important thing really to mention here is TEKES; TEKES was probably established in 
83. […] The setting up of TEKES caused turmoil in Finland. Fuss, everybody got 
excited…. There was a lot of money coming in because people had read in the newspaper 
that TEKES had a budget for that. It was brilliant. No one really knew what it was going 
to do, but the budget was X million FIN mark to support technological development in 
Finland. It was not totally new because previously the Ministry of Trade Industry did 
provide resource funding for institutes. But TEKES was something more visible, so this first 
type of innovation enthusiast, including people like myself and other guys, got very 
enthusiastic and started to see money in that.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
TEKES was a driver in motivating industry to start national R&D 
“TEKES shows how much importance technology has been given in Finland.” (Researcher, 
FIN05) 
“Really, TEKES’s investment, or actually industry investment through TEKES’s support, 
made it possible to really develop early.” (Manager, HVAC, FIN10) 
“TEKES provided some money to companies that otherwise would not be doing it at all.” 
(Researcher, FIN01) 
TEKES was stimulating the focus on technology R&D for business development 
“Simultaneously, we had TEKES, the National Technology Agency, which started to fund 
universities and public companies and not private companies in the 1980s. But they changed 
their mind in the early 1990s because Finland had to create new businesses so we could get 
more work and a better reputation and possibilities on the market. That meant we could get 
support from the government for R&D work.” (CEO, HVAC, FIN23) 
VTT was driving the research agenda in engaging academia & industry for R&D 
activities  
“The relatively large size of VTT and its resources for efficient technology transfer has been 
another such factor [driving force].” (Björk, 1994) 
Aggregated dimension:  
Phase 2. Concept Development. Formation of the Knowledge Ecosystem for Knowledge diffusion, 1983-2002 
Aggregated Themes Second-Order 
Categories 







TEKES established the RATAS research program to study the building product 
modelling concept 
“At the same time, there were some resource programs; it was not only TEKES but also the 









building, a Finnish word. […] The real development started in RATAS 2. This was the main 
breakthrough period and everything else was built on these.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
RATAS was a unique programme globally 
“RATAS was unique at that time. Of course, Georgia Tech with Chuck Eastman was on top 
of the world for a long time, but in most places, it was totally new for industry actors.” 
(Researcher, FIN20) 
Important role 





RATAS helped VTT researchers to develop vision and theory of concepts  
“RATAS was a theoretical exercise for thinking about the possibilities of building 
product modelling. At that time, there were no computers or tools powerful enough that 
could be useful for big projects, and the group that was doing it was very small and visionary; 
relatively theoretically-oriented rather than industry-focused. Another main difference was 
the amount of resources. VTT research was creating a critical mass of theoretical 
understanding of this [concepts].” (Researcher, FIN20) 
VTT was crucial in creating a common understanding of BIM and Finnish 
national standards between TEKES, the industry and research institutes 
“VTT had a lot of competent people who really knew about BIM and its possibilities, 
its technologies and so forth. […] VTT was in RATAS programme and was creating a 
common understanding of BIM in Finland. VTT’s role was absolutely crucial. Most BIM 
experts in the early 90s were working in VTT. But VTT also had a very close collaboration 
with the industry; there would not be any project where industry would not be involved. 
There was always a discussion going on between them about what would be the common 
goal. The main problem in RATAS was that they tried to develop the Finnish standard for 
the building product model but […] the software industry is global and we can’t have national 





Engaging in international collaboration through research institutes like VTT 
“RATAS did not have much international collaboration. VTT had some connections with 
Stanford but, to my knowledge, not so much related to RATAS but research institutes and 
exchanges.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Establishing international collaboration with BIM experts in the USA and EU 
(Björk, 1994) 
Building collaborative engagement with Nordic countries and the USA (Björk, 
1994) 
Sponsoring awareness of cutting-edge developments extensively through sharing 
in publicity and events 
“We had reports where we explained the concepts and structures and we had a lot of events 
those days. […] In those days, there were often events where hundreds of people participated. 
Several times a year. Some people, once they developed something, they would present their 
developments for those who were able to follow up these developments. Even during the 
80s, if you would go to any place in Finland, or a consultancy organisation, they would know 
all the news about these technologies. This is quite exceptional, I think, compared to other 
countries. Twenty years ago, a consulting engineer or architect would know in this country. 
They did not have a deep knowledge, but at least they knew something. And I can’t think 
how it would have happened unless TEKES was showing some money.” (Researcher, 
FIN18) 
Paving the way for integrated computer-aided building design (Björk, 2009)  
Involving architects (Björk, 2009) 
Involving public client, Senate Properties, as an industrial partner 
“Senate Properties (SP) was active in VERA from the beginning but also they were industrial 
partners in RATAS programme. They have been following the development for a very long 
time. They had big resources; the problem was that it was not necessary that technically 
qualified people were in those roles. They had little resources to do things, they had project 
managers, and everything related to R&D, only if they had the time. […] In SP, it was not 
that important; they wanted to be involved but did not want to put a lot of resources into 
that.” (Researcher, FIN20) 






“Also, going back into the history, in the late 80s, during the time of RATAS, we had a 
construction delegation, we went to talk to the Ministry of Trade, the Principal and the Rector 
of Alto University. We spoke about the need for a proper education in this country in the 
construction sector. It took 30 years to make it happen. Until now, we have got only three 
professors at the University of Alto, almost 30 years later. Academia in Finland has been 
lacking some of the academic side of BIM activities.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Encouraging member’s exploration for complementarities without force 
“It was up to the companies themselves if they want to cooperate. You cannot force them. It 
would be a forced marriage as someone is selecting a husband that you do not want to marry. 
In construction, it is about collaboration and should be based on a feasible relationship. There 
must be real interest on both sides. […] Seminars we were organising, companies were 




Developed a concept of Building Product Data Modelling, which was renamed by 
Autodesk to Building Information Modelling in 2002 
“Before 1993, I knew very little about BIM. We called it Building Product modelling. The 
BIM name came in 2002 when Autodesk started to use this term.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Created breakthrough concepts that data could be used in many different 
intelligent ways 
“RATAS was the main breakthrough period and everything else was built on this. I do not 
see major steps forward. It is thinking, the results were not something like software. Of 
course, we did some prototypes. It was more like specific concepts. So it was more about 
clarification to everybody that you can use computers in an intelligent way, not just for the 
creation of drawings but to create data, which you could use in different ways. As long as 
you have a structural data you can view it in different ways and you don’t need to generate 
new data if you want, for example, to have another view. It was not rocket science but to 
make people understand this possibility, I think it was fundamental. (Researcher, FIN18) 
Disciplinary firms saw benefit in collaboration with the use of building product data 
modelling technologies 
“In the 1990s, when PCs became mainstream and AutoCAD was mainstream also, many 
Finnish companies started to think that now we want to collaborate. It was evident from the 
beginning that everybody wanted to collaborate between disciplines.” (Consultant, FIN04) 
Key leading firms established internal strategies to identify business opportunities 
with technologies 
“During this period, two of the largest building contractors in Finland, Haka Oy [Laitinen 
1992] and Puolimatka Oy, defined company-specific CIC development strategies. An 
important ingredient of these strategies is to identify the business opportunities that CIC can 
offer for the firm in question. Haka has, in particular, stressed the importance of the building 
product model approach in such a strategy. Partek Oy, the market-leading manufacturer of 
building materials, has been one of the driving forces behind the TELERATAS system.” 
(Björk, 1994: p.18) 
“On the level of professional associations, the contractors' association carried out a fairly 
explicit CIC strategy via its funding of R&D. The association of building clients founded a 
separate information technology committee, which defined its own strategy. The architects' 
interests were being looked after by the CAD-SAFA association.” (Björk, 1994: p.18) 
RATAS network developed shared consensus of the importance of international 
open standards for technology development 
“It is absolutely crucial to have open standards and if you do not have open standards, you 
cannot share data. It was the late phases of the RATAS project; everyone who was involved 
in RATAS understood it. It is like a historical development, you understand, this does not 
work and then you think, why this does not work, and you start to understand that there was 
a strong consensus that we have to go international.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Industry saw benefits in connecting building information to facility and property 
management 
“Yes, we started in the early 1990s, because we saw that we are building information during 
















Architects were threatened by the restructuring of the division of labour in industry 
with the building product modelling technologies 
“I participated under the confidentiality agreement for the strategic agreement with some 
architectural associations, somewhere here in the early 80s. They got anxious about their role 
with this technology: is it beneficial to them or is it dangerous, and so on? If there are any 
ways to benefit from this technology, companies usually do not do that, because they would 
rather stay in something they have always done. It takes a lot of courage to change how the 
system works.” (Researcher, FIN18)  
Exploring unsuccessfully the mechanisms to break the barrier of status quo 
sharing  
“Many people believe that to break this barrier [status quo of sharing], there is only one 
solution to make owners meet these requirements. But the problem is that the owner himself 
doesn’t need it. But the structural engineer and contractor, they need it. They do not have a 
contract with the architect, so why would the architect serve contractors and clients? I left a 
client who required it and there was no point. But this was an early problem and we had 
already realized it in the early 80s.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
TEKES mechanisms for funding of R&D incentivised public funding exploitation 
for self benefit  
“The money itself is not a key thing, but people would do anything to avoid paying some 
taxes or get some public funding. It does not really proportional to the money itself, but it 
has some kind of impact, but this legal support would get them far. You can see that people 
can avoid a lot of trouble paying these taxes.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
“Funding comes partly (usually 40-45%) from TEKES and partly (60-55%) from the 
industry. All projects are public on the headline level (name, subject, main partners), but the 




Setting expectations that SMEs would merge to create powerful international 
vertically integrated organisations 
“For instance, scenarios like multidisciplinary design consultants led by architects, that did 
not happen. In Finland we have different disciplines in different companies. It is like 
architects in one company, structural engineers in another company, HVAC engineers, 
telecommunication engineers, or information engineers – all these are different companies. 
The work would be much easier if they had technology, like BIM, to work with; it would be 
easier if they were in one company. And this is what was expected to happen in the early 
80s, 30 years ago. So, in order to exploit these technologies, such companies would be set 
up. But this has never happened. But they are exactly what they were 30 years ago.” 
(Researcher, FIN18) 
Setting expectations that contractual relations and liability issues will be solved 
“There are also liability issues. Why would I give to somebody a BIM model if this person 
finds an error and he can sue me for that?! So, it is safer to give him a drawing. I do not 
understand this any other way, only if the client becomes more demanding. In the 80s by the 
way, 30 years ago, we did expect things would change much more, really.” (Researcher, 
FIN18) 
Setting expectations that interoperability will be solved in five years 
“Another problem is that interoperability with CAD systems would all be solved in 
something like five years, but this was thirty years ago. If I needed to update this vision, I 
would say that interoperability problems would be solved in five years so, the business stays 
the same, just time goes on.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Setting expectations that a business would scale globally 
“It is one of the latest trends, at least in Europe, that there is a lot of focus on business models 
nowadays. Because technologies are there and they are not used effectively in this kind of 
business. It is beneficial to some companies, if they don’t pay somebody.” (Researcher, 
FIN18) 






“TEKES saw the potential in creating a platform to support the link development with the 
technology contributing to the biggest cluster of all. Big expectations have been placed on 
the construction sector to self-renew with the networked technology and services based on 
them.” (Uusikylä et al., 2003: p.12) 
Setting expectations that open standards would solve the issues of interoperability 
“In the 80s, we thought we could solve all the problems with interoperability between CAD 
systems, which we had in those days. Also, those people who were buying positions, those 
who were buying systems, they were giving information about standards. Those days, it was 
the ISO step. After those steps, it evolved to IFC. So, people expected that IFC would solve 
these problems in a few years, but it’s something that didn’t. […]. In the sense, this is a 
controversial statement for me; a standard can have a negative impact compared to what it 
aims to do. So, the development of interoperability standards can be the biggest a barrier to 
solving these problems. It has a local market in that way. […] But the commercial companies 
do not want to see a standard, the leading companies, they do not want to have a standard. 
[…] Software companies assured that this couldn’t be done. It is not a technical problem for 
interoperability; you just need a little bit of programming. But there is really a conflict with 
commercial service to create a standard, because certain companies didn’t want to have it.” 
(Researcher, FIN18) 
Setting expectations that technology firms would be merged and form powerful 
international software companies 
“I think that we were expecting that, in the 80s, the small companies were focusing on 
different subdomains of the construction industry like heating and so on. They would 
gradually be merged and become powerful international software companies. This has never 
happened, which is quite amazing. […] 30 years of enthusiastically working, first in the 
world, it will just go away. This is the big drama of this pioneering... I thought that Sweden 
was much better in business; they would come here and buy these software companies, 
merge them and invest some capital into that stuff, competing with the world players, which 
would go to CAD, Bentley and other software companies. It would be possible with the 
knowledge, which we have in this country, but all these companies, which are software 
developers in the small market, some of them sell abroad, but they are not major players in 









Industry lost knowledge through diminishing labour market and bankruptcy of 
firms 
 “People change; knowledge disappears from the organisation and there is one very 
important reason. In the early 90s, a lot of companies disappeared completely, some 
companies, which used R&D stuff, so people were fired. Many people in the front had to 
leave and search for other jobs, so this knowledge has just disappeared. This was very 
dramatic. I think we needed to redo a lot of stuff in the 90s because people disappeared. […] 
Well if you look at the history, what happened here is that more or less knowledgeable people 
from the industry had disappeared and basically things had to be redeveloped because we 
had just lost people.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Dramatically changing business environment 
“Depression was kind of dramatically changing the whole business environment in Finland. 
People were not studying and not going into the construction industry because there were no 
jobs. And nobody saw the future.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“Many construction companies went bust.” (Researcher, FIN19) 
“The companies were suffering too much those days” (R&D CEO, general contractor, 
FIN08) 
“In 1994, the situation was still very grim. The recession in the early 1990s had very deep 
impacts on the Finnish AEC sector. Many companies, including some of the largest 
construction companies, were bankrupted and only very few companies were able or willing 
to invest in that situation. […] Many people lost their jobs, design offices became very 
small.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Accelerating adoption of CAD 
“To be able to survive, you had to be more efficient. The way to increase you design 






up the adoption of CAD. So, the few architects who still had design jobs adopted use of CAD 
at that stage much faster than it would have been happening without the depression.” 
(Researcher, FIN20) 
Depression time was a shock that pushed the industry for change 
“In the beginning, everyone was very enthusiastic to change the industry, because people 
still remembered bad times from 1991-94. It was only about two years later, people wanted 
to do something so it would not happen again.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Key leading 
firms shifted 





Key leading firms invested in the development of digital capabilities as a survival 
strategy during the depression 
 “TEKES was providing funding for R&D; they never fund anything 100%, so the companies 
must use also their own money or borrow it. As the R&D culture in the AEC industry is very 
weak, very few companies used that possibility. The main survival strategy in early 1990s 
was to reduce activities and lay off people. Granlund was one of the very few exceptions. 
They wanted to keep their best people and started significant R&D efforts as investments in 
their future, and also got significant funding from TEKES. As we now know, it was paid 
back later very well, although in the early 1990s most people in the AEC sector thought that 
Reijo Hänninen, Granlund’s CEO, was crazy and were sure that the company could not 
survive with such a bold strategy. […] They did not fire people but rather invested in the 
development of programming capabilities because they understood that, while there are no 
jobs, they can learn and invest in the future be ahead of everyone.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“For our company it was critical because, when we had those severe days, we could work 
for the future and then, of course, what happened when the recession was over we had the 
ability, and BIM was one thing of that somehow, although it was not called BIM then. We 
had some ability to grow faster than the competitors. […] Then we started to invest more in 
the development. (CEO, HVAC firm, FIN10) 
Firms differentiated with new business ideas around digitalisation and expanded 
the scope of traditional businesses 
“When we had a recession in the early 90s - a depression here. Many architects had to come 
up with new business ideas, and our company [hidden] came up with the development of 
facility management.” (Consultant, FIN04) 
Forward looking firms shifted their businesses to software development 
“My own company, which I founded in 1989, focused mainly on CAD education and 
consultancy. Because of depression, which we had in Finland, my company changed to 
software development in 1991. So, in 1991-1996, I was working mainly on software 
development in an AutoCAD environment and was basically developing architectural 
applications on top of AutoCAD.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Firms were actively developing technological tools internally 
“There was one guy who programmed that; he made a program and made it in several 
months. He was really working on it all the time, they really wanted to have the system and 
they’ve put in money to make this happen. […] It was an example; there is a limit, how 
reasonable it is to use your effort to make your own IT system. There are many people in 
Graphisoft, which are developing things. So, it is a cool thing to do that in your own office.” 








TEKES increased investment into the R&D 
“The depression time was a very interesting thing in the sense that it had several effects on 
our industry. At that time, the Finnish government made a very clever move, in my opinion. 
They were increasing the funding of TEKES and universities. Finland was investing more 
into research, development and education.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES and depression time pushed the Finnish industries to become a high-tech 
society 










Industry was enthusiastic about the future with BIM 
“I think that everyone in Finland believed that this is something that will change how the 








developments, which were done in software companies during those years.” (R&D CEO, 
general contractor, FIN08) 
TEKES was actively collaborating with the industry champions and VTT to find a 
common goal for R&D  
“There were really close relations, a network of some peers was close in sharing ideas and 
discussing things. It is difficult to put a border between TEKES and champions, because 
there were constant interactions between them, like business and friendship interactions. It 
was not so that TEKES was totally inventing the idea of VERA, but it was collaborating with 
the industry. We made a lot of interviews; we tried to find the common goal that the industry 
could agree on. So, it was not one side that would be doing things; all sides were trying to 
find the common goal, it was heterogenous. It was TEKES, champions and VTT, who also 




Establishment of VERA Technology programme in 1997 -2002 with a vision 
“management of information through the entire life cycle of the built environment” 
“It is necessary to get interoperable information from all participants in the process, because 
that would enable real as-built information and also an evaluation of the building's life cycle 
properties already in early phases of the design process. The Programme Steering Group and 
TEKES estimated that the realization of the Programme vision would have a positive impact 
on the AEC/FM cluster and on the whole of society on a national level. […] When VERA 
started in 1997 the industry was very eager to invest in new technologies. One of the main 
motivations was to avoid similar impacts in possible future recessions.” (Researcher, FIN20)  
VERA programme was a framework with defined criteria to fund projects that fit 
to the criteria 
“VERA’s outcomes were projects. And I would say that the important thing was that the 
Finnish construction industry took BIM as critical part of a strategy and it had happened 
already in 2002 when VERA was still running. Some of the projects were running after 
VERA as part of the programme. The whole concept of these technology programmes is 
complex and unique. It is like a framework and you are funding projects that fit your overall 
goals. Programme defined criteria. But all the proposals were coming from industry.” 
(Researcher, FIN20) 
VERA focused on technology development hoping it would eventually lead to the 
creation of processes and services – Technology push instead of market pull  
“In addition to creating technology itself, there is a need to create services and work 
processes related to new technology. The way that AEC/FM projects are managed may 
involve significant differences from current practices if integrated model-based approaches 
become widespread, and various new information management services may be required. 
The VERA projects interviewed did not place much focus on these areas, but the need for 
work in this area will grow as technology enters mainstream use. […] Some pilot projects 
are beginning to address the issue of adapting work processes to better fit new technology, 
but there has been very little progress in this area to date.” (Froese, 2002: p.12) 
VERA created demand and supply for the development of tools 
“We were able to create demand and supply, basically hand in hand. One of the problems is, 
for example, if somebody makes a software product too early, there is no demand for that, 
there are no users. The company is dying because nobody is buying the product, because 
people do not really see the value of that. On the other hand, if people are interested but you 
do not have the tools, people very quickly give up, because they think that `this is a very 
good idea, but I cannot do it, because there is no practical way to do it`. And providing the 
balanced development of these two things was very crucial in the VERA program. So, people 
at the same time decided to do tools to do what was the goal, and it was very important at 







Vera champions and TEKES demanded IFC implementation in Finnish software 
development 
“[hidden] made a decision that those that get funding from VERA must implement IFCs. It 
was one of the criteria. If a software vendor is not interested in IFC implementation, then 






Piloting the world’s first integrated IFC project with Senate Properties, a public 
client, and the first test of Solibri model checker 
“HUT600, the world's first IFC project maybe, but there has also been development in the 
early days but that was not so widely used. For example, maybe architects were using IFC 
and we were using it, but not structural designers, and so on.” (BIM manager, HVAC, FIN11) 
Significantly supporting the development of International Open Standards for 
model-based interoperability (e.g. IFC) 
“The VERA programme contributed significantly to the development of international 
standards relating to model-based interoperability, specifically the Industry Foundation 
Classes. These standards are critical to the success of the VERA programme’s vision and the 
IAI was significantly strengthened through these contributions.” (Froese, 2002: p.12) 
Actively 




Participating in the development of international standards by actively engaging 
with the International Alliance for Interoperability (IAI) 
“The main reason [participating in IAI] in that was that if you wanted to make interoperable 
software you could not make interoperable software at the national level, especially in a 
small market like Finland. Interoperability requires international standards. And that was the 
main reason. The whole software industry is basically international; you cannot have a 
successful software development in a small market. It is too small. That was something that 
I realised when I left my company and moved to VTT. Doing that kind of small-scale 
software development at a national level, the time was over at that time for it. You really 
need to think globally when you think about software, and standards even more so. […] The 
main problem in RATAS was that they tried to develop the Finnish standard for building 
product models but then, when VERA started, people started to realise that the software 
industry was global and we couldn’t have national Finnish standards and it was a key success 
factor of VERA; we had very good international collaboration in IAI, we had very strong 
role in there. That was helping Finnish companies.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
IAI was connecting USA and Finnish actors 
“IAI was connecting things. We had a lot of events when we had people from Stanford 
coming to Finland to our seminars and I also made several presentations in Stanford. Senate 
Properties met GSA in Stanford. GSA has learnt what Senate Properties were doing and also 
wanted to do something similar. And, for example, the first HUT report was written by 
Calvin Kam. It was the first time that Calvin was involved in BIM but later he was the person 
behind GSA’s implementation.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Establishing formal arrangement to participating in IAI through Nordic chapter 
between Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland 
“It was a very important phase, we actually had the Nordic chapter of IAI. We had one 
meeting in Helsinki after the first meeting in London. All Nordic countries are very small, 
and we decided we had much more if we established the Nordic chapter, so that Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway were in the same chapter. And that has continued in that way 
for a long time until, I would say, around 2002. Norway became really interested in 
buildingSMART… until that time they were not really interested. Sweden and Denmark, and 
Finland were active at the beginning. Norway was looking from the side. Then, Norway had 
a big delegation in Singapore, I think it was about 2000. They became interested and started 
to put a lot of money in these activities, like VERA was earlier. They wanted to have Building 
Smart Norway as an independent entity. Now the Nordic buildingSMART consists of 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland. Iceland joined much later. Norway is now 
independent inside Building Smart. But, inside Nordic buildingSMART, we call national 
entities forums. And the importance of that was that national developments related to this 
were happening inside the IAI development of the standard, the international implementation 
and the demonstration of interoperability. It was a very important part of activities in the late 
90s and early 2000, and we were showing interoperability potential at different events for 
data exchange between different software. For example, how it could make the design 
process more efficient. So, it was one of the vehicles to inform people.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Creating 
international 
Creating international networks for collaboration  
“A very good example is the founding of IAI. So, we had an excellent international network 








construction ICT programs that TEKES had been running. The only TEKES programs which 
have been on the same level of international collaboration, were in space research; not even 
mobile programmes were as international as VERA.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“The VERA programme placed a high priority on international participation. This was 
particularly true with respect to the support given to the development of the Industry 
Foundation Classes data standards by the International Alliance for Interoperability, where 
VERA was one of the largest supporters and participants. VERA was also well represented 
in other international forums, such as conferences.” (Froese, 2002:p.6) 
Establishing active research collaboration with Georgia Tech and Stanford 
“There was a lot of international collaboration with Chuck Eastman and Stanford; active 
interaction started in VERA programme. IAI was connecting things. We had a lot of events 
when we have people from Stanford coming to Finland to our seminars and I also made 
several presentations in Stanford.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Building long term relations with international software developers like GraphiSoft 
and VISIO 
“Influence on international development: (+) in addressing the development of the core 
technologies required to attain its vision, the VERA programme carried out several activities 
related to international development efforts. These included, for example, extensive 
participation in the International Alliance for Interoperability, research programmes, such as 
the Center for Integrated Facilities Engineering at Stanford University, and relationships with 
foreign software developers, such as Graphisoft and VISIO. This influence on international 
activities appears to have been productive, since VERA projects have been able to exploit 






TEKES increased investment into the program because of industry’s high interest 
in the technology 
“When the Programme started in 1997 the planned total volume was expected to be 28 M 
euro, of which 12 M euro was planned to be funded by TEKES and the rest by the industry. 
However, the industry interest on R&D projects in this area was so strong that the final 
budget increased during the Programme to almost 47 M euro, of which about 22 M euro was 
funded by TEKES. Four M euro of TEKES funding was used in the projects of universities 
and research institutes, and about 18 M euro in industrial projects. In total, the Programme 
initiated 161 projects, of which 48 were research and 113 industrial projects, which almost 
doubled, so, it is a huge increase of budget and that is very unusual. I do not know any other 
TEKES programs, which were in such a situation that the budget would be increased so 
dramatically. Very often, the budget is slightly smaller than originally planned. And I think 
this is very good evidence of interests in the results. There are several things in the VERA 
program, which I did very differently from all other managers of programs.” (Researcher, 
FIN20) 
Heavily invested into IFC development 
“IFC development - Finland was very active in IFC development in those days. All this 
thanks to TEKES because they were funding this work.” (R&D CEO, general contractor, 
FIN08) 
Implementing three stage feasibility reviews  
“It was my role to evaluate whether the projects were feasible or not. I did not make 
decisions; they were always made by TEKES. So, I make recommendations for the steering 
group and the steering group made recommendations to TEKES. I have never had a situation 
where TEKES would make a different decision to my decision. Usually, what I said to 
companies, I could not guarantee that you would get the money but if it was not a good 
proposal, I could guarantee that you would not get the money. It was important for people to 
understand that I was not decision maker. But if I had a negative evaluation of the proposal, 
it was 100% that TEKES would not fund it. Overwise, the whole role of TEKES would be 
absolute. Why would you negotiate with the companies if your word was absolute? 
(Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES built holistic understanding of industry trends and advancements 











Extensively showcasing interoperability potentials at the different events 
“The importance of that was that national developments related to this were happening inside 
IAI’s development of the standard, international implementation and the demonstration of 
interoperability. It was a very important part of the activities in the late 90s and early 2000, 
and we were showing interoperability potential at different events for the data exchange 
between different software. For example, how it could make the design process more 
efficient. So, it was one of the vehicles to inform people.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Building awareness using emails and newsletters 
“Sending emails about or newsletters of where we were going to, like informing people 
where we were and when were the deadlines for next applications. For research projects, 
there were strict deadlines but for the industry there were no deadlines; they could make 
funding whenever they were ready. For research proposals, you had to have deadlines to be 
compared.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Disseminating the industry with knowledge through 4-6 specialised seminars per 
year 
“Many of the people interviewed pointed to the VERA seminars as one of the most positive 
features of the programme. These seminars have had an effect of “seeding” the industry with 
a good base of people that have a basic understanding of the technology and the way that it 
works.” (Froese, 2002:p.12) 
 “TEKES programmes had one conference a year. So, it was general, and no one was 
interested in that. In VERA, there were theme seminars that were focused on something like 
looking at the project that succeeded in that area. Then we had 4-6 conferences per year and 
had a huge amount of (300) people, which was totally unheard of in TEKES projects. Nobody 
was interested in the whole programmes, as it was too abstract, but people were interested in 
some respects. (Researcher, FIN20) 
“We had a lot of communication and seminars. We had 200-300 people participating; all the 
companies were very excited to participate, and they all wanted to know more about BIM. It 
was a big thing.” (R&D CEO, general contractor, FIN08) 
Heavily investing in publicity and marketing to create awareness and matchmaking 
of stakeholders in the BE sector 
“The widespread publicity of these things started from the VERA program, and TEKES gave 









TEKES was a matchmaker for building networks 
“Funding is far more important and the other one is finding good partners. When you have a 
wider network, you know who might be interested in that. It is like a professor I can 
recommend people to help you interview. So they know a lot of people.” (Researcher, 
FIN20) 
Bi-directional import & export of expertise from Finland and to Finland 
“TEKES places a strong priority on increasing international connections through technology 
programmes. However, the connections have been unilateral in many cases, importing 
expertise into Finland. Only the latest programmes (especially VERA) have the direction 
become truly bi-directional. The strong domestic character of the construction and real estate 
industries has not opened up many quick and easy avenues for wide internationalisation yet. 
On the other hand, international connections have remained strong on the programme level, 
in the form of seminars and other general activities. Concrete support in creating 
international connections are needed at the project level.” (Uusikylä et al., 2003:p.41) 
TEKES created tight collaboration between industry and research institutes by 
demanding the involvement of a research institute or university as a partner for any 
industry project 
“Most people, almost everyone who was developing anything with IFC, were from VTT. 
VTT had their own budget like and any research institute could apply for funding for TEKES, 
but basic rules were, if it is an industry project, you must have a research institute or 
university as a partner. And for research institutes they had to have industrial partners. A 
feasibility study is that industry is interested, and ambition level is high enough for research 






of TEKES funding, creating this tight collaboration between industry and research 






TEKES projects were a risk funding projects 
“One of the rules where you should not fund projects that will surely succeed. That was a 
risk funding. One of the interesting things, quite often the first version of applications, was 
about risks. People were saying there are no risks and it is a big mistake. No risk, you can go 
to the bank and get a loan. This is meant to be a risky project. TEKES did not have clear 
rules on how to evaluate risks. But other research funders indicated, if more than 20% of the 
projects were succeeding, you were funding the wrong projects. There should be some risk 
and potential to succeed. I would say work in IAI was really successful. But not everything. 
But it was not supposed to be successful at everything.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES funded only domestic firms 
“International collaboration for projects - there were some but not many. The reason is that 
it is very difficult to put research funding internationally. Any research funding is available 
only for domestic companies. TEKES could not fund companies in the USA. The 
mechanisms for funding decisions had very different schedules. It is very difficult to 
coordinate so both sides can have funding at the same time on both sides/only way to do that 
was directly fund that it was possible to buy research resources outside of Finland but if we 
can prove that it does not exist in Finland but only for the research and not for the industrial 
partners at all.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES funded only firms linked to the programme goals 
“We have anyone who had connection to AEC and software companies were participating. 
If the companies were not linked to AEC then it was difficult for TEKES to fund it. There 





Largest public client in Finland, Senate Properties, and the USA, GSA, were 
collaborating to develop BIM guidelines  
“If you would look at Finland from United States perspective, Finland is a very tiny place 
and most of the people in USA do not see any difference between e.g. Hungary or Finland. 
If we have demands to have that in BIM files and everyone to have their voice heard by 
software developers in United States, nobody would listen to what Finland says. Small 
market area, they can do whatever they want. But, by joining forces with GSA, which is a 
big player in United States, they are managing all public buildings like White House, 
courthouses and so on. Whatever is in the United States. They are a big property owner. 
When Finland and GSA are united and they harmonize BIM requirements, it is not Finland 
and Senate Properties asking for those things, so, everybody would listen to what GSA 
wants. So, this has helped us to make a step forward. Not just trying to influence from 
Finland, so now, we have a big partner in US. That is why it was meaningful to harmonize 
these requirements.” (CEO, software vendor, FIN17) 
Largest public clients signed an international agreement to support BIM with open 
standards to influence the BIM requirements  
“Like Autodesk, Bentley, and Graphisoft. […] that was in 2005 if I remember correctly. […] 
They are big owners of properties in Europe which are joining in, there is actually a very big 
group now. Property owners can really make these mandates, construction companies want 
to have work and if their clients saying that we want you to do these things this way, they 
will listen. And this is one of the reasons why this mandate had been done in many countries. 
[…] When you have these mandates, it brings these things forward faster.” (CEO, software 
vendor, FIN17) 
Sharing knowledge and developing first BIM guidelines for the GSA, public client, 
in the USA in 2003 
“In 2003 we did BIM requirements for General Services Administration (GSA) in United 
States (GSA). You can Find that from their website at 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/105075. The first requirements BIM Guide 02 – Spatial 
Program Validation, which we have written, were about spatial requirements.” (CEO, 









VERA developed positive vision and acceptance with little scepticism 
“There was surprisingly little evidence of scepticism among participants. […] The VERA 
programme should take some of the credit for creating a very “positive” attitude towards the 
whole area.” (Froese, 2002:p.12) 
VERA programme positively contributed to the development of knowledge and 
expertise in the technology area  
“Another very positive outcome of the VERA programme is that it contributed significantly 
to the overall base of knowledge and expertise in this area of technology in Finland. This 
was achieved primarily through the VERA seminars and other presentations by VERA 
participants, and by the involvement of large numbers of people in the numerous VERA 
projects.” (Froese, 2002: p.12) 
Fostered and supported “chicken and egg” cycle of creating demand for technology 
development  
“One of the strong features of the VERA programme was that it was able to foster and 
support a large amount of technology development: the middle phase of the research, 
development, and adoption lifecycle. […] One of the biggest barriers to technological 
innovation is the lack of support for the development phase of the research, development, 
and application lifecycle (as discussed earlier). Industry users won’t adopt the technology 
before a fully developed suite of high-quality software applications are available, yet 
software developers won’t invest the very large resources required to develop these tools 
until they have some confidence that the market wants the tools. This creates a “chicken 
and egg” problem that has stymied advancement in many countries. (+!) The VERA 
funding appears to have been significant in allowing many companies to break out of this 
cycle and develop new technologies with manageable degrees of risk. Many companies 
stated that they would have carried out little, if any, of their development without the VERA 
funding. The provision of funding to allow companies to pursue development projects that 
they would not otherwise attempt is probably the biggest single benefit of the VERA 
programme. (Froese, 2002: : p. 14:p.14) 
Success of the VERA programme created positive technological environment for 
the development of new, globally competitive products 
“Finland has a reputation as one of the leading countries in this area with many recognized 
world class experts, and the whole industry cluster with advanced use of ICT as a key role 
in its strategy - is of course very fruitful for the development of new, globally competitive 
products. Thus, it is obvious that the central results of VERA are many innovative software 
products, which have also gained wide international interest. In most other countries, the 
development has not been started on the same level, because the market potential has not 
been recognized yet. Analogy to mobile technologies is possible; a strong and advanced 
home market can enable early development and high competitiveness, also internationally. 
Time will tell if the software products for the AEC/FM industry can meet this challenge. The 
technological basis for the success has been created.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Finland gained an international reputation as a world leader in technology and in 
leaving positive impact on the progress of IAI’s IFC 
“The programme established Finland’s reputation as a world leader in this area of technology 
and helped to create international business opportunities for Finnish technology companies. 
Perhaps the most important international aspect is that the technological vision is based on 
the creation of standards for exchanging project information, and this is necessarily an 
international task. Support and input from the VERA programme had a significant positive 
impact on the progress of the International Alliance for Interoperability (IFCs).” (Froese, 
2002:p.13) 
The Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries adopted BIM as a part of 
the technology strategy in 2002 
“As a result of that (PROIT), the Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries has 
adopted BIM as a part of the technology strategy in 2002.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Achieved a widespread adoption of the Product Model Concept as a part of the 






“The most significant impact of the VERA Programme has been the industry consensus 
about the importance of ICT and about the role of product model technology in the 
development of AEC/FM clusters. The industry as a whole recognises the central role of 
information management to improve productivity, quality and processes and identifies the 
use of product model technologies - changing from the traditional management of separate 
documents to a more holistic information management based on product models - as an 
important element in this development. This is, at the moment, a globally unique situation 
because, in other countries, this idea is accepted only in the research community, but not as 
a strategy of the industry.” (Accessed in 2015 via 
http://cic.VTT.fi/VERA/Documents/documents.htm) 
VERA advanced the technological knowledge base and expertise in Finland 
“Another very positive outcome of the VERA programme is that it contributed significantly 
to the overall base of knowledge and expertise in this area of technology in Finland. This 
was achieved primarily through the VERA seminars and other presentations by VERA 
participants, and by the involvement of large numbers of people in numerous VERA 
projects.” (Froese, 2002:p.2) 
The VERA programme was successfully led nationally and internationally. The 
leadership role is recognised as an important driver 
“By all accounts, the Programme Manager, Arto Kiviniemi, exerted a very strong and very 
positive influence over the VERA programme. He was an excellent champion, both 
nationally and internationally, actively promoting the programme with an infectious 
enthusiasm in 40 or 50 presentations per year. His administration of the programme appeared 
to be very good. Of particular note was his active participation in helping to establish many 
of the projects, and his leadership role within the International Alliance for Interoperability 
(which was particularly beneficial during a difficult time for the organization). (Froese, 
2002:p.16) 
Big firms made a change towards BIM implementation internally after VERA 
“The task was to change industry. Of course, it can be argued that change was not necessary 
industry-wide, but the big companies definitely made a change. I think that the results of the 
VERA programme were very good. A change of industry culture so BIM became a core part 
of it. People have accepted the idea of moving away from 2D. It is a slow process to change 
the industry and especially the construction industry; there are a lot of laggards. They would 
not make any changes unless they had to. It is still spreading well. Nowadays, using BIM in 
Finland is business as usual. So, I would say that it was succeeding.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
The results of digital transformation were expected to happen in 2013 after VERA 
happened 
“Basically, when it started, the programme (TEKES) told me that the real results will be seen 
10 years after the programme ends. Which means they did not expect feasible results before 
2013! In fact, it has exceeded, the SP guidelines and CoBIM were created in 2012.” 
(Researcher, FIN20) 
VERA affected industry-wide innovation 
“When VERA started in 1996, […] now, the change is huge.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
VERA produced leading software  
“Definitely, the Solibri model checker or MagiCAD would not exist without that funding. 
Without any doubt some software would not have happened without TEKES funding.” 
(Researcher, FIN20) 
National efforts influenced the Finnish design industry to become the earliest 
adopter of BIM globally 
“BIM adoption would be on the same level without having created awareness. I think that 
Finland would be in the same situation as the UK before the mandate. After that, it was rapid 
but before that, there was nothing happening. There was no interest in BIM at all. But again, 
it is something trying to measure the benefits of BIM, so many factors affect success of 
projects and it is very difficult to isolate the reasons and claim that these are the reasons for 
success. In the same way, it is difficult to say because of TEKES’s funding, Finland was 






unique. Five years after the programme, the situation globally was unique in terms of the 
wide adoption of BIM and the use of advanced techniques.” (Researcher, FIN20) 






Gap between the research and the implementation 
“I think it is the biggest challenge in any national system. For some people, making 
applications and getting research money is the main business. I can see at the EU level, loads 
of professionals are making money from R&D. It is not always about results. If I am genuine, 
it is seldom about the results. It is almost anywhere. Mostly, researchers are interested to get 
good results for publications, but they are not interested in helping companies to implement 
the results. Very often, the end result of research is a research report that you put on the 
bookshelf and that’s it. It is almost impossible to start controlling that; as I said, the research 
money should be risk funding. If you start measuring results and require all projects to get 
results, you are moving into a bad area. You have to accept that some projects do not get 
good results. The problem is how to bridge the gap between the research and implementation. 
Because research never creates innovation, or very seldom. It is usually business that creates 
innovation. And now a lot of, and even sometimes, good results can be forgotten or 
disappear, and no one will remember them. And Silicon Valley has been a very good example 
because the universities have been a good mechanism to bridge that gap. How to move the 
research results from start up to business. Not perhaps in construction but in other areas. For 
example, Google - they have been building it. How to bridge gap between research and 
implementation – mechanisms as a gap for future research?” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Firms were avoiding taxes by subsidising R&D 
“Problem with TEKES system: even if you are avoiding subsiding the work, TEKES was 
strict. They are not paying for pilot projects or any project cost - they invest in the 
documentation of the results but still, even given money for R&D, can lead to a situation that 
companies do it for the money and not for the results. […] Trying to get as much research 
funding as possible and tax avoidance is one part, trying to subsidise R&D to get funding for 
that. I know some companies even though research funding is partial funding, it is never 
100% but some companies are misusing the system again so they can record hours to do the 
research project at the same time. In some cases, they get more money than they are using 
for the work to conduct the research. Again, it is difficult to prove because no one speaks 
about it.” (Researcher, Fin20) 
“The cost of research was deducted from taxes as any business costs or travel, you do not 
pay taxes for that. People would go far to avoid some taxes, but it is crazy, it means that your 
business results are lower before your taxes are lower and you are never paying 100%, so 
you are eating the profitability of the company. […] Taxing has nothing to do with TEKES; 
companies did tax reports, but it was an incentive. By putting money in TEKES’s project, I 
can reduce it. TEKES was only making funding decisions.” (Researcher, Fin20) 
TEKES had no effective mechanisms for the collective body of knowledge to be 
captured and transferred to the thorough the industry 
“Although it was a strength of the VERA programme that it was able to advance and 
disseminate a knowledge base in the target technology areas, at the same time, it is perhaps 
one of the largest weakness that there was no effective means of capturing the large, 
cumulative body of knowledge generated through all of the projects, and transferring this 
knowledge throughout the industry through detailed documentation, in depth training, etc. 
This appears to be a weakness of the TEKES technology programmes in general, rather than 
of VERA in particular, since the mechanism of company initiated, commercial R&D creates 
no incentive for this type of knowledge capture and, in fact, intellectual property and 
confidentiality issues can provide a strong barrier to knowledge transfer. Still, a vast amount 
of knowledge developed through VERA will be “lost” because of this weakness. One 
specific mechanism that could have helped to address this issue would be stronger ties with 
University researchers and with University and Industry based training programmes. There 
appears to have been little of this within the VERA programme, partly because this is not the 
mandate of the TEKES programmes and possibly because there may not be an appropriate 
faculty within Finnish Universities for this topic area.” (Froese, 2002:p.2)  






“In some projects there were people that were looking at the experience in other projects, but 
it was on a project level and if the project wanted to benchmark their processes, but it was 
not on a programme level. It is challenging - you can’t. It is difficult to compare construction 
and airplane technologies. There were some projects, but not widely. In many applications, 
people, do not do their homework, they do not check where we are now in this area.” 
(Researcher, FIN20) 
Unfocused project selections with loose connections to the programme’s objectives 
“The programmes may become loose collections of development projects without a clear 
understanding of how the programme-level objectives are to be achieved. Consequently, in 
practical terms, individual organisations have trouble in linking their development needs to 
these general formulations. There appears to be a risk that project selection becomes 
unfocused.” (Uusikylä et al., 2003:p.41) 
Forming informal communication with the interested parties in projects not 
knowing the overall objective of the programme 
“There were many instances where there was good interaction between individual VERA 
projects; for example, between companies developing software tools and companies using 
the software to design and manage buildings. On the other hand, many of the project 
participants did not have much of a sense about how their projects fitted within the overall 
programme.” (Froese, 2002) 
Project identification mechanisms were informal and provided a great deal of 
flexibility for companies to define projects to fit their own business needs and 
opportunities without targeting specific work of high strategic importance  
“In identifying individual projects to fund, there can be a trade-off between the goals of 
individual projects and the goals of the overall programme. […] The programme may have 
suffered because it did not have any mechanism to target the specific work of high strategic 
importance. For example, some additional work on supporting software components (such 
as model servers), or work on capturing and recording the overall body of knowledge arising 
from the collection of projects may have improved certain programme outcomes 
significantly, even if they created no particular business opportunities for any one company. 
The VERA programme would have benefited from some mechanisms commissioning a 
small number of important strategic projects rather than responding only to projects 
submitted by others.” (Froese, 2002:p.16) 
Lack of university involvement despite the TEKES strategy 
“The integration of research organisations into the programmes has been strongly 
emphasised by TEKES. However, there has been and still remains a certain reticence towards 
academic research within the industry. The research input and the involvement of 
universities and research institutions has not met all expectations. Combined with the thin 
research basis, this partly explains the lack of collaboration between enterprises and research 
institutions in the real estate and construction technology programmes.” (Uusikylä et al., 
2003:p.41)  
VERA struggled in activating facility owners because the focus of technology was 
on new construction while most buildings are retrofit 
“One of the central goals was not achieved. The VERA Programme could not activate 
sufficiently the facility owners to participate in R&D projects. Thus, the impact of the 
projects was too much focus on the production of new buildings, and one identified output – 
the modelling of the existing buildings - was not achieved.” (Accessed in 2015 via 
http://cic.VTT.fi/VERA/Documents/documents.htm)  
Lack of support from top management  
“The challenge was that we never got this support from top management in business. It 
started as a technology push. It was a technology push more than a pull of business.” (CEO, 
research org FIN14) 
The industry was exploiting the system and existing business models 
“Is it a part of system exploitation and business models. It is good to remember that there are 
no products where the price of the product would have anything to do with the production 






houses, the price of the house has nothing to do with the production cost, it has everything 
to do with the market price. What people are willing to pay.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Inherent system inertia that people were not willing to change the status quo 
“Culture of the industry is another dark side. People are not motivated or do not have the 
capabilities or desire. Many people want to live in their comfort zone. You might be risking 
your job or career if you make something new and it proves to be a mistake. Many people 
keep the status quo; the status quo is a very strong motivator.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Small group of visionary champions distanced themselves, by virtue of their 
networks, from traditional industry 
“Finland is visionary and started from friendships. The development started from knowing 
each other and trusting each other and not from friendships. In that sense, it was leading to 
this small group of people that are moving much faster than the industry and the gap was 
increasing. It can be a problem [when] you have small group of champions that support each 
other. It can be also dangerous. […] And when you have a group of enthusiasts, of course 
everyone wants to move as quickly as possible. People are not necessarily thinking or 
recognising risks. In that sense it is the dark side.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
The champions learnt the importance of business models for technological 
implementation 
“The technological part was absolutely necessary but not so today. I did not know how 
important contractual relationships and business models are. We were thinking about 
processes but if we do not change the contractual models, it is not going to succeed. It was a 
huge learning curve for everybody involved in the process.” (Researcher, Fin20) 
Aggregated dimension: Phase 3. Stagnation: Maturity Building, 2002-2015 
Aggregated Themes Second-Order 
Categories 








projects as part 






Realising the world’s first IFC integrated project delivery, including customers in 
AURORA project, that become standard practice across all projects 
“In the AURORA project, I used BIM. It was a real BIM project. But, I think after that it has 
been the same thing, we had different BIM projects; all the projects have been done in the 
same way, even if they’re not exactly BIM projects. When we don’t have money, in any way, 
we use the same kind of system, but we would make it more precise if we got paid for that. 
But I think it has been happening during the last 10 years in the same way. Maybe you can 
say we have developed a routine here.” (CEO, architect, FIN16) 
Developing the world’s first common product modelling guidelines at the industry 
level in the PROIT project in 2002-2005, extending them in 2007, while involving 
Senate Properties, a public funder and collaborating internationally  
“We started this ProIT. The purpose of that was to start developing common guidelines for 
BIM. […] We made several guidance manuals for architects, structural engineers, HVAC 
and for construction companies. […] This was our big successful project in Finland. And we 
used BIM in different ways. We have tried to develop and implement BIM on site as well. 
(R&D CEO, general contractor, FIN08)  
PROIT project demonstrated benefits of BIM to the industry worldwide  
“It was very important in that sense that it was demonstrating the benefits of BIM in a very 
concrete way to the construction industry.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
The dark side 







Establishment of the SARA program to develop businesses and contracts were 
unsuccessful 
“SARA wanted to continue development on business models, but I really do not think that 
SARA was successful to the same extent as VERA. You will not find much information 
online.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
SARA failed to change business models and contracts 
“The main thing did not happen was changing business models and contractual models. This 
was something to be part of SARA programme. VERA was creating processes and 
technologies, and SARA was expanding business models. So, its dark side of national 
development that business models are unchanged. Probably, it is more difficult to change 
business and contracts than changing technology, as people see more risks in that and if the 
clients do not see the benefits of having different contractual models, they are not willing to 






benefits. Show me the money is a very difficult notion when you are adopting something. 
That’s one of the main challenges, how to prove that something is useful if no one has used 
that?! It is almost impossible!?” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“I think it is the biggest problem, the contractual conditions. Personally, I have never seen 
any problem, which could not be solved by information technologies or even theoretically 
impossible. It would always be done. But changing contractual relationships in the 
construction sector seems … impossible. because it has a huge tradition of status quo that 
the architect’s fee cannot be represented at an extra cost. The traditional contract says that 
architects must deliver drawings. So how do you put BIM there? You would need to change 
contractual structure completely. We had one of the projects, which was called ‘Ellegal’; it 
was a funny name. So, we have studied these barriers, but we did not find any mechanism to 
break those barriers. (Researcher, Fin18) 
Personality of SARA’s project manager influenced the development 
“Much less activities in SARA and less impact, impossible to find the recorded results of 
SARA. It is the personality of the programme manager. The person who was running SARA 
from TEKES wanted to stay in a comfort zone. It is 95% type of person who does not feel 
that he should work more. A successful programme leader must be very active. […] It is not 





The industry realised the business benefits are not moving forward, entering 
stagnation period between 2002-2015 
“We felt that things are not going forward, so we have a kind of stagnation. I do not know 
why that happened and would it ever have been done differently. […] After these years of 
stagnation between…2002-2015, even in RYM, pre-stagnation was visible there. Loads of 
projects but results were not significant.” (Manager, FIN21) 
Slowing down the development  
“The development in Finland was slowing down during the SARA program. […] There were 
some companies that continued in SARA. All in all, interest was reduced and there was a 






the change in 
Finland 
Senate Properties mandated BIM for all public projects above 1ml euro 
“We have here our pilot projects that we had from 2007; mandatory to use BIM in our 
projects. First, it was in architectural models only. […] We do not have our own designers, 
contractors - we hire them. And we cannot say to them what kind of technologies they should 
be using. So basically, we tell him what we want, so, we kind of hope that they will be using 
it. But we cannot make them.” (Manager, Senate Properties, FIN15) 
“In 2007, when Senate Properties made use of BIM mandatory, also Skanska started to use 
BIM widely in their production, and increasingly other construction companies also 
followed. So that was really a practical implementation on a wide scale. So, it became a kind 
of standard tool and a standard method in the industry. (Researcher, FIN20) 
“The only mandate that was implemented by Senate Properties (the largest public client in 
Finland) was in 2007 for public projects above 1 million euro. As a result, Senate Properties 
implements around 50 BIM projects per year. The number is constrained by the nature of the 
properties owned; 83% of all projects are refurbishments of existing buildings and often very 
small. (Aksenova et al., 2018:p.13) 
Senate Properties invested into the development of national guidelines for BIM 
implementation 
“Guidelines 2007; SP funded guidelines in 2007 with a budget over 100,000 euros. This was 
small money for SP.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Finnish forum in IAI was transformed into BuildingSmart Finland 
“IAI, we had a Finnish forum inside the Nordic chapter and the Finnish forum was 
transformed to BuildingSmart. Its function in those days it was not very active immediately 
after VERA or 2005; it was reactivated in 2010 -2011. Tomy Hentinnen took over as a 
chairman and became active. In last years, it was quite active. It was developing CoBIM 
based on SP guidelines and did the same thing in the infra sector. It was a very slow 
development at one point.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES is 
changing the 










hope in the 
construction 
industry  
“To be honest, the system has been changing a lot many times. TEKES was criticised - 
Finland in the mid 90s by all studies had the best innovation system in the world. From the 
mid 90s to early 2003. Around that time frame. Then, they started to change the system; they 
started to put the same criteria on all projects regarding the industry. They did not think about 
the different natures of the industry. Partly, I understand that because some of the results in 
the construction industry were not that encouraging. It was difficult to defend them inside 
TEKES. Partly, some big companies did it just because of TEKES’s money. And they were 
never really implementing results in practice. And when you see it from TEKES’s side, it is 
a waste of money. Nevertheless, the changes they made were also destroying something that 
worked well at its best. I am not sure if it is wise. What they did, they fixed something which 
was not broken.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES lost hope in the built environment sector 
“TEKES has been actually quite critical towards BE in Finland. They kind of have been 
given a lot of resources for these different BIM-based projects and at some point, they lost 
their hope; they felt that there are not enough results coming from the resources given, so 
they lost hope in the construction industry. We are not going to give many resources 
anymore. Shocks were different, that was a huge amount of money. BE was very lucky to 
have shocks, but the same attitude was still around from TEKES’s people. It was like:” I do 
not think they will produce any results, but we need to give them money…”. It was 
challenging and it has been like that for a while. TEKES’s focus was shifting more and more 
to global growth to support companies that have global visions. They did not see those kinds 
of players in BE. But I see now it is changing because of excitement that was built in half a 
year in KIRA-digi and because of Fira. Fira was showing TEKES that it was possible to do 
things differently. And loads of opportunities within this kind of sectors. Fira was showing 
the way. The attitude of TEKES has changed to a more positive one. We have been 
discussing recently with TEKES that these successful projects from KIRA-digi can get 
funding from TEKES.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN211) 
TEKES was sponsoring projects “for redoing things” 
“At VTT, I had some frustrating experiences. A new generation comes and reinvents what 
was already done and this also happens a lot in research, and even organisations as TEKES 
fell into this trap, they gave to people money to redo what others had done before. The 








Industry lost interest in R&D and is not ambitious  
“I do not know if people are just tired from the long process and relatively slow progress and 
they are not so eager to do anything about it.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Leading firms adopted practical implementation on a wider scale with other firms 
following them 
“And then I would say that the third phase started from 2007 when Senate Properties made 
use of BIM mandatory; also, Skanska started to use BIM widely in their production, and 
increasingly also other construction companies followed. So that was really a practical 
implementation on a wide scale.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
The adoption of mobile tools on the construction site accelerated processes 
“But now during the past one or two years, I’ve seen a significant increase in speed, and I 
think the main reason for that is that there are these mobile tools that are becoming more and 
more popular, and they are easy to use.” (CEO, Business Management, FIN07) 
 “So, if we look at the last 10 years, I think that everything else has been quite stable and 
mature; people were not searching for new directions but just improving little by little.” 
(Researcher, FIN18) 
Shifting trends 




Depth of development shifted to the width of adoption and maturity building 
“That progress is more about the ‘width’ of how many people I was able to engage instead 
of the ‘depth’, how far we could stretch the knowledge and theory because the fundamental 
ideas are quite... […] Information technologies have mainly become cheaper, not better but 
cheaper, so more people can afford to use this kind of technology. It is not that technology 
gets better, but it is getting cheaper. I told you about my first computer in 68, it was about 
stereographic images. Of course, you can do that jillions times faster, but fundamentally 






development goes downwards and not upwards. It goes downwards in the sense that more 
people are engaged, and fewer people knew before. It is not that knowledge gets more 
sophisticated. It is a very characteristic of the technology, very calm and stable. Nothing 
fundamentally changes. Things are getting only cheaper and faster.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
A focus shifted to user interface and training  
“I think that now people have to focus on quite different things: development, training people 
which don’t have a burning enthusiasm for this technology, because here everyone who has 
been working with BIM have been very enthusiastic about it. Now it is really for everybody 
including people, which do not really care. So, it is a general trend in information 
technologies, more and more all technologists focus more on improving interfaces to make 
systems easier to use. […] Nowadays, it is not possible, so many people are using these 
things, so the main focus today is only on the user interface.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Establishment 
of the RYM pre 
centre and end 
of stagnation 
RYM centre was established as centre for excellence  
“Establishment of RYM and other centres. I never understood the logic - what is the added 
value of the organisation in between if it cannot make decisions, it will have same system as 
you had before with programmes but under this organisation missing direct connection with 
TEKES which does not make much sense.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
TEKES stopped sponsoring the construction sector because it realised it is not 
getting evident benefits from investments 
“But it turns out to be so that the industry doesn’t seem to be very eager anymore to do that. 
Because last year RYM had two proposals for construction research programs, and very 
large, and TEKES rejected them. TEKES said that these programs were not ambitious 
enough, or something like that, and refused to fund them. And this got the industry partners 
very upset. Because they had used a lot of money to prepare these programs, proposals and 
now were not getting any public funding." (Consultant, FIN04) 
Absence of a strong driving force increasing dominant stagnation in the industry 
“It is a kind of stagnation in the Finnish construction. […] There is no strong driving force 
at the moment.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
End of stagnation: Phase of stagnation was visible from 2002-2015 
“When I came to [firm] in 2008, we talked about the same things as we talk today, so I think 
the journey has been relatively slow.” (CEO, Business Management, FIN07) 
Aggregated dimension: Phase 4. Reconfiguration, 2016-2019 
Aggregated Themes Second-Order 
Categories 











The private built environment sector is not able to renew on their own 
“We can see that those players in the built environment sector cannot renew themselves alone 
because if they could, they would have done it already.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
“So, BIM was raised from the bottom to the top and now we should need our government 
also. We are ready for that and we cannot go further if the government does not come to help 
us.” (BIM manager, HVAC, FIN11) 
The industry is motivated to continue the evolution but seeks help from the 
government 
“It is kind of incredible, everybody just wants to do something. […] What I have heard from 
the planning stage where organisations were involved. Everybody was so excited, eager to 
do new things. That it is a kind of movement started going and was impossible to stop.” 
(Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Ongoing discussions around the roles of the public (government) and private 
sector 
“It is kind of a discussion of what the government should do and what the private sector 
should do. There is a blurry line between them. This discussion is constant.” (Manager, 
Innovator, FIN21) 
Lessons learnt have re-configured the thinking process in the industry and 
academia to search for new mechanisms to enable innovation  
“The whole industry started thinking what to do now so it can be significant without the 
funding. Then, the private sector with RYM, shocks ended and in collaboration with 






“The private sector and folks at buildingSMART Finland and associations, they were 
planning their own project. Previous funding from TEKES was stopped. There was a period 
of not having any funding mechanisms or efforts from the government towards the building 
sector. They realised something has to be done and they suggested this new programme 
for the Ministry of Finance and at the same time, the Ministry of Finance felt that “hey, we 
are focusing on the same thing, maybe we should do this together”. They kind of forced the 
Ministry of the Environment and associations and the private sector to start discussing 
together and plan joint projects. And KIRA-digi was formed.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21)  
TEKES joined FinPro to form Business Finland  











Ministry of Finance established KIRA-digi project, a neutral communication 
platform, for public and private engagement to link everything that is connected to 
Build Environment 
 “In the beginning of 2016, the Ministry of Finance decided to put two streams together 
[Ministry of Environment and BE]. Finally, we had a project where all the significant parties 
of the project development started to work together: government and ministries + cities, 
digitalities + private sector. We could be at the same table and develop things together. This 
has never happened before. The Ministry of Finance was leading it because it initiated the 
project. […] This is a challenging environment. I do not know how much you know about 
municipalities. In Finland, municipalities and cities have a lot of power and government. 
This means the relationships between them can be very challenging at times. If we look at 
the BE and the information processes from the public sector side, the government wants to 
unify as much as possible so everything will be similar but because we have strong Finnish 
cities that can do whatever they want... So, we have different processes, so from information 
management, it is really challenging. And because they had so much power and whenever 
the government started to make any new developments, cities do not like it because they 
want to keep their power. They want the public sector to be more like an enabler of 
flourishing business. They want the government to serve the public sector. […] The overall 
aim is that we could develop together the foundation of BE information management in a 
way that all of this is successful. In a way, that the first part of Unified Information 
Management (IM) is about. We are looking at sub-projects that will develop certain things 
that we will have problematic things better. There are a lot of connections that 
BuildingSMART can do. But KIRA-digi can be an easy platform to bring the problematic 
stuff and have a good discussion how to solve it.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21)  
KIRA-digi was a new communication platform for collaboration between public 
and private sectors 
“KIRA-digi period – I think a open collaboration ecosystem is key in this period. It is not 
only between companies but also between the public and private sector. Kira digi was the 
first project when public municipalities and the government were collaborating. That’s a 
huge thing and we understood what should be continued in the future and that’s why the Kira 
hub was continued coordinating that collaboration.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Structure of KIRA-digi was streamlined like Private-Public Partnership 
“KIRA-digi was much better; it was not permanent and funded by government, it was much 
more streamlined.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“The structure of the organisation was built like PPP project. The government with different 
ministries, cities and municipalities and private sector and associations. All three parties had 
an equal stake in the decision-making process. They wanted to organise this thing in a way 
to have a project office in the middle as neutral as possible. They would not have any tight 
or historical relationship to any of these parties.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
KIRA-digi was a neutral matchmaker and an innovation initiator 
“KIRA-digi is a community, innovation initiator or a matchmaker for building new 
partnerships through different kinds of activities. KIRA-digi are neutral facilitators of 
innovation ecosystems of BE bringing new funding opportunities, making ecosystem more 
visible and helping to scale new solutions. And also making the data flow across systems.” 






Joint discussions between ecosystem stakeholders were not easy 
“It was not easy at all because the private sector and the Ministry of Environment had a lot 
of disagreements over the years. Finding a joint vision and goals. I was not involved in that 
part, I heard different stories, but it took quite a while, at least 1 year to get that going.” 
(Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Resolving conflicts through open discussion by the neutral actor, Kira-digi 
“For us, it was easy; we were truly a neutral body in the middle and everything was open. 
Any issue that resulted in a conflict we were able to make an open discussion and have an 
open way of handing that. It evolved in a way that Kira digi was a platform to bring these 
issues to be jointly discussed and developed further; open discussion bringing conflicts to 
the surface. (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Success of KIRA-digi is related to the manager’s personality 
“Teemu was a project manager. Kira digi is a success related to Teemu’s personality. He is 
good at networking, proactive. It is crucial that the person who is leading should like to 
speak, present and have strong opinions. Can convince people about ideas. […] It is equally 
important anywhere in the world. People need to have charisma. The most important is to be 
proactive. Typically, in many programmes a CEO is missing. You require all pieces in the 




KIRA-digi followed three objectives: unifying building information management 
across built environment, changing legislation to enable digitalisation, and 
experimentation 
“Three different plans of a project, like unifying building information management across 
the building environment, the idea to fund focused projects that would help to harmonise 
how to manage it in different processes, and starting to open data to the public. The second 
was legislation and the government’s part; they both wanted to understand how to change 
legislation to enable digitalisation in a bigger picture within the built environment. And how 
governmental processes and systems should support it. And the third biggest part was 
experimentation; there was a lot of funding for it. That would embrace new digital 
opportunities and services. Then we started executing these three parts. The project office 
was small; there was only two people. We had really close collaboration with the Ministry 
of Environment because a part of funding came from there. That was a starting phase.” 
(Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Mechanisms 
set by Kira-digi 
Setting mechanisms for the mindset change: Openly communicating about project 
results to set the right environment and shifting mindset towards open 
communication  
“So, the main goal was to get as much new experimentation as possible and as widely as 
possible. Of course, the review was based on the criteria of: 1) feasibility, is it realistic; 2) 
impact; 3) accessibility and openness; 4) innovativeness, creativity and originality. Based on 
those criteria reviews scored. The overall objective was to get companies and organisations 
to try new things. To develop approaches, the tool can provide new value. Some differences 
in focus as technical experiments and business models, operating models, process 
experiments. Basically, the key thing in the success was openness. It has to be communicated 
to all. The results will be open to everyone and even the competitors can read it and start 
utilising those learnings. It was a key thing. It was a process of mindset change, from a closed 
to open and collaborative mindset. There is still a lot of work to on that. but it was a good 
start. Symptoms to be seen that the mindset has changed a lot.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
 “We actually openly communicated about the projects and results; there was a phenomenon, 
organisations wanted to start showing off these new things that they are doing, and they let 
new business and collaborations afterwards. It has positively set the environment. and that 
has changed the operation within companies as well. They started to communicate a lot more 
themselves. The situation used to be that many companies do great things, but they are really 
poor in communicating that. Even in Finland, we do not really know, or people know but it 
is not widely communicated. Widespread public do not know how good Finnish companies 
are at the international level. It is one shift in the mindset that we did open communication 
and we input a lot of resources and money into communication. We hired parties to do 






communication. Not just in Finland, but globally. They also started to do English 
communication about their projects and R&D innovation activities. That is one thing.” 
(Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Eliminating any corrective mechanisms to focus on carrots than sticks to embrace 
experimental culture and open learning 
“Not really, the whole project was embracing experimental culture. That’s one mindset that 
we wanted to change; traditional R&D in this industry has been a plan and you follow a plan 
and you stick to it and hope for the best. But in experimentation it is different. When you 
have an idea, you are actually trying in practice as [much as] possible with minimal costs. 
Come in with a solution on a day and try with minimal resources to get some results and then 
you learn whether it will work or not and learn where to put resources. In a sense, we wanted 
to embrace that mindset that there is no failure; it is only learning, and learning is a result. 
Other results do not matter as long as you learn. We did not have any sticks. If projects did 
not go as planned and if you learnt why it did not go as planned and utilised this learning in 
the next step. Or we had 6-7 projects that stopped already in the beginning because of some 
disagreements between partners or organisational changes or whatever and that’s fine. We 
wanted to embrace that learning mindset and that’s why we did not have any sticks. I think 
that is also Finnish overall culture that we do not punish people for bad results.” (Manager, 
Innovator, FIN21) 
Demanding the results to be open while providing only 30-40% of funding to cover 
project costs 
“We did not have any other incentives but kind of, it was how we operated the projects. The 
project funding was one mechanism with 30% of total costs but the requirements are that 
everything is open; we did not give them much choice. That really worked for us and them. 
That was needed to start changing these minds.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Opening opportunities for other industries to collaborate with BE to challenge the 
status quo in the built environment sector through Kira-Digi 
“We identified some strategic partners we wanted to join. We selected key players, kind of. 
One of the goals, we wanted players from other sectors, like IT and digital service providers, 
that have never done anything in BE but have something to give because we can see that 
those players in the BE sector cannot renew themselves alone because, if they were, they 
would have done it already. We wanted new players to challenge the status quo. We started 
to involve that kind of player more and more. Digital services are growing, like Solida IT, 
and those kinds of players are going global themselves. Also, we welcome the outside 
companies that have something to give. We also want to increase [our] understanding of 
what is going on. Companies do not really know what is going on so those partnerships of 
the ecosystem could emerge.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
 “One example emerges from collaboration from games from the BE sector; there were 
experiments in trying AR, not just for visualisation but also integrating actually design and 
manufacturing processes for that. And some companies that have a long history in the 
gaming industry and the development of hardware, and through Kira Digi they found a way 
to collaborate with the BE sector. The companies, like Vario technologies that are building 
VR hardware that is actually you can experience VR with human eye resolution, and it is the 
first device in the world. Then, VR gaming, called Vake production, collaborated in other 
projects with BE players. They started to experiment with an approach where their expertise 
will be remote anywhere and you can realise this through the platform developed with VR 
and AR. You can have any person in the field and then you can utilise any expertise remotely, 
being a guide for the work to be done in the field. That was successful.” (Manager, Innovator, 
FIN21) 
Complementing missing capabilities in the industry 
“We have seen that there is a lot of need for other kinds of capabilities. It is mostly 
engineering and technical out there. There is a lot of need for a capability for conceptualising, 
marketing, modelling end user perspective, service design, business model design. There is 
a huge need for these kind of capabilities in this field. If we can bring in more of that, I mean 







“With every project, we had a communication partner that helped them to rephrase their 
projects. Initially, project players wrote those contents themselves - what are the objectives, 
expected results. It was from a technical engineering perspective. It was not understandable. 
If you take people from the streets and show it and ask, do you understand what this project 
is about, probably 99% will say I have no idea! We had a communication partner who worked 
with all the projects that helped them to write those contents in a format that anyone could 
understand. That was one thing. Then, we also realised quite fast when those people are 
doing projects, when they are pitching, there was also a lot of need to improve how to 
communicate the results. We had a lot of pitching training. And in the end, we had results 
sessions when they pitched the end results. There was rehearsal and feedback and support to 
become better at that. (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Establishing WDBE conference to generate mechanisms for global discussions  
“Of course, we are trying to do this on a global level as well to have these discussions in the 
global network; that’s why we organise this WDBE conference so we could discuss it 
annually to help building a global ecosystem in this topic and also make things that happened 
elsewhere transparent for the Finnish ecosystem. I think it is important to have mechanisms 
and processes to give that discussion and evolution understanding on both a Finnish and a 
global level.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Generating opportunities to embrace the strategy of platforms and ecosystems in 
the BE sector 
“The biggest opportunity is related to platforms and a platform economy. How can we utilise 
that in the BE sector? That also provides global growth opportunities; we have experiments 
with digital platforms in KIRA-digi that can be scaled globally.” (Manager, Innovator, 
FIN21) 
Establishing different funding mechanisms for each phase 
“Implementation phase. The initial phase was to do part 1 then 2 then 3. But that did not 
work. The challenge was that the funding mechanism was different in each part. […] 60% 
was private money and 40% was public money.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Attracting venture capitals to cover private investments 
“The private money came from venture capital firms and they wanted to invest more into 
scaling those results.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Selecting projects based on a point-based system with the help of the experts as 
reviewers 
“We had this pull of experts as reviewers. Usually, we had 10-15 people to read through all 
the applications and give them points based on those criteria. Then we had a meeting when 
we had all the applications in the order of how they were reviewed. Then we had a certain 
amount of money on each round to give away. The order was from 1-5. We ended a value 
tree as the level of quality. We would not finance any project that got less than 3.0. Then 
from that, the limit was basically on the amount of funding available; it was straightforward.” 
(Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Establishing a clinic service for quick legislation to support experimentation giving 
Ministries a good overview of the challenges in the field and accelerating the 
process of development 
“In part 2, the legislation part, we ended up having a law clinic service for last year (2018) 
that served all experimental projects. Many of them started experimenting with new digital 
tools and services from scratch. So, they ended up having the limits of current legislation; 
for example, a start-up started to disrupt a real estate agency. It started to get agents out of 
the picture totally. They started to automate everything they do. They have AI for setting up 
the price of the apartment and automating documents and basically to automate everything 
that is possible. With that, they were able to lower the fee of consultants; for example, the 
normal fee is 4%. And with this digital service it lowered significantly to 0.74%. That was 
disruptive, like the UBER phenomenon in the taxi industry; they did the same to real estate 
agents. But there were some legislation issues there; for example, their service was based on 
the idea that the real estate agent does not go to the apartment him or herself but based on 
current legislation it was required. So the law clinic has helped to guide those projects with 






future legislation as well. It was free for anyone dealing with the digitalisation sector in the 
BE. At the same time, it was a free service; companies used that and the Ministry got a really 
good overview on the challenges in the field. Other examples are from a platform economy 
approach on electricity. We had an experiment on E-charging devices and platforms that 
anyone can start selling electricity to anyone else with their own price with this local device 
and digital platform. The electricity market is so heavily regulated, so it had issues. So, it 






Established Kira-Hub as an innovation hub to continue developing industry 
capabilities 
“Kira hub is a BE innovation hub; in Helsinki, we are looking at how can we bring and help 
develop those capabilities. […] Kira digi, as a project, has ended officially at the end of 2018 
but we still have some things going on. […] We have got funding from industry associations 
to continue the work.  
As a Kira hub we are now starting to initiate new programmes. We had new elections, so the 
government is changing. So, the Kira digi fund came from the government. So now we are 
suggesting a new government with 25 million programmes for BE and hope that it will go 
partially to Kira hub to coordinate that programme.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Setting the spin over effect for BE actors that want to be a part of the innovation 
hub 
“500 firms participated officially but even more unofficially attended events; one result was 
also spin over the effect in what we did. There was a lot of companies that did not get KIRA-
digi funding or did not apply but they also started to experiment with new business models 
and wanted to become part of a community and bring/communicate those as well. It was an 
interesting phenomenon.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Established funding mechanism for experimentation was successful 
“In experimental part 3, EU funding mechanisms for experimental development, in a sense 
the project cost 40%, was coming from the government and 60% was coming from the 
private sector. It was an initial source of 8 million of the overall budgets. It was simple to set 
up.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
BE sector started to invest into the experimentation themselves 
“One result has been many of the companies from BE have, through these experiments, … 
started investing more in digital transformation themselves and they recruited new kinds of 
competencies in house. That’s also one result happening during the projects with the 
companies in Kira digi.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
The shift from closeness towards openness opened opportunities for inter-industry 
collaboration and ecosystem formation  
“The sector was so closed; it was difficult for outsiders to come in and offer their services 
and competence. So basically, we started opening up this communication; outside players 
also, it was easier for them to start communicating. The Kira digi experimental instrument 
allows outsiders to apply for experiments. And that kind of also made it visible for the field 
and new collaboration to happen. Other industries from ICT - companies that would bring 
competence on digital service side mostly.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Established wide scope for phase 1 and 2 that did not reach all goals but produced 
good results 
“Part 1 and 2, probably at the end of the projects, they did not reach all the goals that were 
set up for them. But that still delivered good results. The scope of the projects was so wide 
and large, you would not expect to solve everything in two years anyway. There is still a lot 
of work to do.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Experimenting in projects was embraced by the industry 
“We had six different open calls for applications. There was a process of review of 
application based on a pool of experts from different fields to go over these applications and 
give points to these projects. We did it from the beginning all the way six times until last call 
ended. It was an ongoing process of getting applications, reviewing, starting and beginning 
a new call. It worked really well. It was the biggest thing in the project; in the community, it 






Experimenting in projects made legislation issues and unified information 
management more concrete 
“The experiments started to go very fast and it was good because experimental projects made 
those issues more concrete. They gave a lot of input to parts 1 and 2. There were so many 
issues, so it is difficult to speak about all of them.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Thinking about 




Challenged by scaling the results from the experimentation to make an impact on 
a wider ecosystem 
“The biggest challenge at the moment is to start scaling these new tools and solutions as 
widely as possible. In Kira digi, we had experiments, and many have succeeded, but it is 
only small fraction of the industry, so the question is how to scale it to make a huge impact? 
We did an assessment of impact of Kira digi and the result was quite nice. So basically, the 
government funding was almost five million euros in two years, and the own funding part 
was eight million, and those projects were led by Kira digi led to another 22 million euro and 
it almost doubled in the project. Sixty percent was private money and 40% were public 
money. Public funding was from Business Finland continuation projects. The private money 
came from venture capital firms and they wanted to invest more to start scaling those results. 
That was a nice result already during Kira digi.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Positive potential impact from scaling the solutions  
“And started to analyse the underlying impact if we were able to scale it as widely as possible 
in Finland, what would that mean? So, we discussed with all the projects. Everybody tried 
to analyse and assess what it would mean. One project, Eerad, provided a digital platform 
for renting construction equipment so the realisation rate of construction equipment would 
be higher [with] a tracking feature of where that equipment is so nothing would get lost; 
based on an experimental project, they estimated that, with that approach, they could 
construction equipment management with 20% more efficient than the current process. The 
construction equipment market in Finland is 30 million, so 20% of that would be 600 million 
yearly. So, we did a rehearsal and did an estimation; if just these results would be 
implemented, we would have 5.5 billion annually. Now we are discussing to get that next 
level funding.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
The scalability of solutions can aid the productivity leaps and digital disruption 
“We are now on the verge of actually realising some of those productivity leaps. Everybody 
is seeing those charts with decreased productivity but now I see some signs that it will change 
quite soon and that some projects were embracing lean and tactile digital solutions, they are 
getting already of 30-40% of productivity in singular projects. So, when we find a way to 
scale that, we can see a change in the next 5-10 years.” (Manager, Innovator, FIN21) 
Embracing digitalisation to scale globally 
“The fact that Finland is a small factor does not bother anyone. Everybody says that 
construction is local, but now we are adding digital layers and absolutely bringing digital 
layers to everything that we do to user maintenance and equipment, so solutions are 
becoming more global and it is not only a digital layer but also a physical layer is becoming 
more global; manufacturing and different materials are global. There are so many 
opportunities are coming in the next following years; there are so many challenges, like 
carbon neutrality and climate change, circular economy. We start embracing it and we think 










APPENDIX C: DATA STRUCTURE FOR CHAPTER THREE 
The following are selected quotes of qualitative data for the discourse & textual analysis 
within Chapter 3. 
Aggregate Dimension: Regional advantages as a driver for innovation 
Second-order 
Categories 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Categories 
External drivers of 
innovation 
Co-location with Silicon Valley incumbents drives internal innovation 
“My personal suspicion is that it [transition to a business ecosystem] would have taken [the software 
vendor] a lot longer to get there, had it not been sitting next to Silicon Valley, and had it not seen 
like, the sort of local pressure of everybody integrating with everything. It's an interesting thing to 
ask if [the software vendor’s] proximity to Silicon Valley or was it also something that [the software 
vendor’s] customers were specifically asking for? And, so it may very well be that.” (Manager, 
Software Vendor, CA30) 
Following a trend: a rapid shift in the technology market towards business ecosystems 
“We're trying to envisage that (building a business ecosystem) […] but that's the idea. It's the trend, 
right? If you look at Salesforce, it is a platform, everybody is integrating with everybody. There is 
a rapid shift in the software sector away from building it all to partnering to provide it with all.” 
(Manager, Software Vendor, CA30)  
Internal drivers of 
innovation 
Desire to dominate the software market in “design to make” sector with an integrated 
platform for collaboration  
“[The software vendor] wants to take over the world, we want to do that by being the software that 
allows for business transformation through the use of technology. […] They're pushing the agenda 
they want, which is like this centralized collaboration platform from design to make. And we don't 
want to help you manage conventional processes better, we want to help you make a business 
transformation through leveraging technology.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
“This is what we have, we have monopolies.” (Consultant, CA13) 
Perception of threat from disruptive innovations like Uber and Silicon Valley giants 
“What if Google or Facebook or one of those companies that are sitting on several billion dollars of 
cash reserve, and it's just spinning out money to do little test companies in the building construction 
market and just use it to dominate the supply chain? I think it's more threatening than a company 
that does some other CAD product because we understand it, we're playing on the same rules. Look 
at Uber, […] the taxi companies are not under threat from another taxi company, it's under threat 
from something completely different. If we are not innovating, not changing or we're not moving 
towards this vision of connected project delivery, we are not moving towards this vision of big data. 
Who will get there first? It's not going to be Nemechek; it's not going to be Trimble. It is going to 
be Google.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Vision of Future 
Long term goal: Strives to become a technology company with brand “design to make” 
like Amazon for “buying goods”, and Google for “search” 
“The logo for Google, and they're like, okay, if you think search, you don't think search and search 
for something, we're going to Google it. And then they showed the logo for Amazon. It's like, if you 
don't think I'm going to buy something, you think, okay, I'm going to go to Amazon, right? Go to 
Amazon Prime. And then, you show the [software vendor’s] logo. And they're like, we want [this] 
to be similar to that. [The software vendor] has been really pushing the future of making things, 
make everything into a slogan.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Short term goal: market dominance 
“In the short-term play, we're looking to become the dominant construction platform. And that, 
frankly said, that the sector buys more of [the software vendor’s] software. That's just market 
dominance right now.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Aggregate Dimensions: Platform Management 
Second-order 
Categories 






Designing Platform  
Selling integrated platform for collaboration that provides a number of tools 
“[The Software vendor] is building design authoring tools and project management tools. And 
they're building fundamentally a collaboration platform. […] And [the software vendor] doesn't 
want to help you manage conventional processes better, it wants to help you make a business 
transformation through leveraging technology.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30)  
Owning authoring tools (a collection of tools that form platform) 
“[The software vendor] have this huge opportunity because [it] also owns the authoring programs. 
[The software vendor] can start creating this common platform that allows collaboration.” 
(Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Authoring tools belong to different shareholders 
“[The software vendor] makes 80% of its money off of [Software 5].” (Manager, Software Vendor, 
CA30) 
Prospecting new business areas for platform integration  
“[The software vendor] is looking to broaden its markets. […] And the question is, where can 
[software vendor] be successful? What are adjacent industries to vertical construction that [software 
vendor] can be successful in?” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Expanding services from design to construction allowing collaboration between 
disciplines 
“[The software vendor] have moved into document management and are trying to move into project 
management.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Monetizing process 
Business model transformation towards Software as a Service 
“In the past three years, [the software vendor] has been going through a business model 
transformation and is basically moving from selling the seats of software perpetual licenses to 
selling subscriptions as Software as a Service. And that's a shift to becoming a modern software 
company. Look at Salesforce; Salesforce was kind of born in the cloud, was one of the first one in 
the clouds, “I've always been doing this.” But [the software vendor] had to go through a 
transformation.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Customer support service depends on membership type and is a matter of scale 
“[The software vendor] has various pathways depending on who the customer is and essentially 
how much they buy. […] it's a matter of scale [of firm]. [Firms] who spend that much money tend 
to be international integrated firms. And these firms do in-house architecture, engineering and 
construction management; they're doing it around the world and they're doing the mega projects and 
they're doing probably infrastructure and oil and gas, they have different divisions, they just like the 
volume of people, they have just outsized any sort of national level kind of company, right. […] If 
you are just buying a little bit of software, you don't get much support. Unless you are really, really 
high level.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Reducing the volume of feedback with new business transformation 
“We actually have probably more incremental engagement with these customers than we did with 
these traditional perpetual licensed products.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Maintaining the traditional feedback loop using customer service  
“We have all the traditional feedback loops which are like the product team is talking to the 
customers.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Focusing on large vertically integrated firms market segment 
“And this is in basically predominantly focusing on vertical construction, predominantly 
the US with some of the EU components into that.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Monetization model through open API is nominal 
“[Software vendor] have some sort of monetization platform. Frankly, it is nominal right now.” 
(Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Complex integrated platform is sold for outrageous price 
“That's one of the things, the cost of the licenses is outrageous!” (Consultant, CA13) 
“You need a simplifying technology; there isn't a single simplifying technology that's out there.” 
(CEO, Ai start-up, CA17) 
Managing Platform 
Network  







“One of the most advancements that we have seen in technological work and methodologies in this 
sector are from two separate silo groups. One is the software vendors there, they are very siloed. 
The other is either at the front line of construction.” (VDC Manager, GC, CA11_1) 
Opening APIs for companies to build on their platform 
“We're now essentially building on the forge platform, which is a set of company, essentially instead 
of [the software vendor], API’s. And the idea is that each of the products builds on these common 
API's so that there's more interoperability between these products. And it's also easier to integrate 
with, or build on top of, these core API's.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Integrating with academia 
“[The software vendor] is dominant in design [platforms] in the US, right? It's taught in schools, if 
we pretty much have the corner on the market.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Partnering with leading sector firms through academia partnership 
“They are a partner for us. Yes, there is a strategic relationship that we have with [the software 
vendor], but they are different. All these technology organisations of any size have known how 
important it is to create partnerships. So, it's an integration model, essentially.” (Manager, GC, 
CA11) 
Developing varying levels of partnerships with complementors 
“[The software vendor] have varying levels of partnership with varying levels of people. Within 
[software 3], [software vendors also] work with other cloud computing companies that do 
construction solutions. And then some of them are smaller than [software vendor], some of them, 
very few of them, are equal size, but they get larger or an equal volume of construction business. 
[...] [The software vendor] has partnerships with, like, other sector organisations, like there was a 
partnership with Ads rate, which is a GIS mapping. [The software vendor] also has, like, thought 
leadership partnerships [and] a lot of partnerships, I can't even keep track of them all.” (Manager, 
Software Vendor, CA30) 
Providing support for the advancement of leadership thought in the sector 
“[The software vendor] is doing some activities to advance leadership thought, or examples or 
supporting projects that have advanced viewpoints.” (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Engaging with the sector through engagement program 
“[The software vendor] has a quite a program, a robust program of engagement with the sector 
[participants]. (Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Competing in a 
standard war 
Limited support of open standards to prevent interoperability and to win the market  
“What's going to be the holy grail for me is that, if there was an IFC, and it had a standardized way 
of sorting 3D information and had a standardized way of having metadata in it.” (CEO, start-up, 
CA16) 
Software vendors’ inability to agree on a market share in order to establish open 
standards 
“The problem is these guys [i.e. the software vendors] don't talk to each other. There isn't a common 
language between… there isn't a common language with which these guys can talk to each other.” 
(CEO, start-up, CA16) 
Preserving the power through limited support of open standards 
“They do, but it is not very effective. For example, [the software vendor] also supports IFC; it 
supports IFC, yeah, but it doesn't work well. It is not there yet. One of the biggest issues with the 
IFC standardization is that these geographic limitations that you have, [the software vendor] would 
want to cater it just to the American market very well; they don't want to get at the others.” (CEO, 
start-up, CA16) 
Domination of the software market 




Avoiding taking any responsibilities for the quality of data produced using their 
software 
“Software vendors are not responsible and do not want to take any responsibility. (PM, general 
contractor.” (PM, general contractor, CA20) 
Astutely listening to the end-user’s requests to maintain the status quo  
“I don't want to defend them, but I do think that [the software vendor] was forced by the customers 













“I agree that software can be a strategic player, but when it comes down to it, it wants to make 
money.” (CEO, Ai consultancy, CA17) 
Designing software to sell, albeit not for end-users  
“They are designing software to sell software; they're not designing software for users, for what 
needs to be used.” (Consultant, CA13) 
Designing the technology from the software vendor’s perspective 
“Sometimes all these big software vendors, they are creating all these tools from the technology 
perspective, but not really understanding the construction process.” (Business Manager, GC, CA04) 
They make mistakes though; they see things, not the way we see them.” (Manager, GC, CA11) 
Cycle of technology upgrade is faster than the hardware upgrade and even faster than 
the development of user’s skills 
“The speed of developing this thing is faster than the speed of the hardware that you're using for it. 
And all this is faster than the adoption rate of the users. And all of this is faster than the skills of the 
user.” (Consultant, CA13) 
Aggregate Dimensions: Ecosystem Orchestration 
Second-order 
Categories 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Categories 
Advocating for 
change 
Marketing the platform that connects design to construction, allowing frictionless data 
flow 
“Think about what [Software vendor] does. It does design, and then it takes it to make. It wants that 
to be as frictionless a process as possible. [The software vendor], they’re providing the connection 
between design and construction and allowing data to flow from design and construction. […] It 
does design, and then it takes it to make. We want that to be … as frictionless a process as possible.” 
(Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Push the sector for change to buy more software 
“[The software vendor] wants to dominate the market [and it] very much wants to see the 
sector change. […] And, so the reason why [the software vendor] really wants to see change or is 
pushing for change in the sector is so that the solution that they're building is more applicable. […] 
And that, frankly, said that the sector buys more of [the software vendor’s] software”. (Manager, 
Software Vendor, CA30) 
Advocating for change through marketing is creating the strongest voice, thereby 
defining what BIM is 
“The problem, as I see it, is the influence that the software vendors have had and are having in 
defining what is BIM and how it should be used, both at the academic level, but also, and maybe 
mainly, at the practitioner’s level.” (VDC Manager, GC, CA11_1) 
Defining value of BIM and technology use 
“The problem as I see it is the influence that the software vendors have had and are having in 
defining what BIM is and how it should be used, both at the academic level, but also, and maybe 
mainly, at the practitioners’ level. I believe that the software vendors voice should be just one among 
different voices – and definitely not the most important. When this is not the case, I believe then 





marketing power  
Establishing a perception that Building Information Management is equivalent to 
[platform’s BIM Software]  
“BIM itself is obviously just a tool [Software 1] to achieve certain ends.” (Optimization engineer, 
CA31) 
“We even get contracts and proposals that, like, require a Revit file at the end of the project because 
people wrote that and that means for them BIM. That is what they have as a BIM.” (VDC Director, 
GC, CA25) 
Establishing a perception of a platform’s importance in terms of collaboration 
“BIM is a powerful tool architects, structural engineers, and mechanical and plumbing engineers 
are probably at the forefront of. Digital technology integration [is] simply based on the value that 







Establishing a perception of the low capabilities of a competitor’s platforms  
“My current firm was exploring ArchiCAD, … which I think is perceived a lot in California as 
being something outdated and no longer used. So that there's that perception.” (Architect, CA09) 
Establishing clients’ exaggerated expectations of platform capabilities  
“I'd say, the expectations on the client side can become exaggerated because of the salesman nature 
of the BIM world, and what they've been doing to promote themselves.” (Architect, CA09) 
Influencing clients 
to mandate the use 
of the platform to 
enable 
collaboration  
Promoting a “pretty picture” to sell the idea 
“They [software vendors] are out there boasting that ‘Hey, that software can do all this stuff in 3D’. 
And they’re showing all these pretty pictures that look like photographs. And they're selling that to 
the owner. And the owner sees that and says, I want that!” (Mechanical engineer, sub-trade, CA21) 
“Some people call this Hollywood BIM.” (VDC manager, general contractor, CA01) 
Clients develop a desire to own the model designed in the software of the software 
vendor 
“The owners see BIM as this buzzword that they think is going to make the project better, but they 
aren't highly involved with the knowledge of BIM. And so, having clients with a high desire and 
knowledge of the buzzwords of what BIM is, it creates an expectation that may not be reasonable.” 
(Architect, CA09) 
Establishing a perception of the need to mandate software use amongst clients to enable 
collaboration 
“A collaboration platform is only limited good. And like speaking, capitalistic, allow only limited 
stickiness if the contractual structures don't allow people to collaborate in an open environment.” 
(Manager, Software Vendor, CA30) 
Clients design unreasonable contracts with unrealistic expectations 
“I would say, marketing strategies have made it into the client’s understanding in how they write 
contracts. And then, when the architects and contractors are ready for contracts, they may not be 
checking with their tech group or BIM group. Even putting themselves into all kinds of very 
unreasonable requirements.” (Architect, CA09) 
Clients require use of platform 
“It's just become the standard in west coast California, the standard for documentation for large-
scale projects from the owner standpoint, from the owner's requirements. […] The client isn't going 
to do anything with it, but they want you to deliver it.” (Architect, CA09) 
Top management agrees to unreasonable contracts to win projects  
“And then, when the architects and contractors are ready to sign contracts, they may not be checking 
with their tech group or BIM group. Even putting themselves into all kinds of very unreasonable 
requirements. [….] they're all the bosses that are older and have years of experience, and they go to 
sign their contracts and do whatever, and they go to their baseball games with the client, and so 
that's just not a concern for them. They're not individually incentivized; they're not going to see the 
problems that arise from a disconnect between the expectations of what you can do with BIM and 
the realities of how that relates to construction.” (Architect, CA09) 
The supply chain is incentivized to purchase the platform 
“They use it as a marketing tool for winning projects.” (Architect, CA09) 
Clients are paying the software vendor to improve the platform tools for the sector 
“I think that, even the clients, they're paying a lot of money to [Software vendor], so they would 
listen to what we say like in terms of improving their tool.” (Business Manager, GC, CA04) 
Aggregate Dimensions: Platform Limitations are Contradictory to What it was Marketed for 
Second-order 
Categories 




Design capabilities of tools are limited 
“[Software 1] is offering benefits in terms of the production of drawings, I think, when it comes to 
using it as a design tool, there are still limitations there. Designers on my team, they often complain 
that [BIM Software 1] is rigid.” (Architect, CA33) 
Inadequate interoperability between the platform’s tools  
“There's a big barrier to entry. Because for some reason, [Software vendor] has not made it possible 
for details to transfer from [Software 2] to [Software 1]. […] The interoperability, it's as much as 
they say it is; it's not!” (Architect, CA09) 






“[Software 1] didn't directly integrate with [Software 2]. […] So, rather than being just a 
disconnected program, […], so you can do some things, but it's a silo workflow,” (Manager, 
Software Vendor, CA30) 
Inadequate seamless data flow between all digital tools 
“When I think of BIM, I always think of data, like a seamless data flow. […] I think that would be 
a very interesting workflow to see. Yeah, I have not used any workflow that talks about seamless 
data flow. You would use multiple tools from extracting data from one tool to another then add-ons 
are developed to extract that data. But for now, I've not seen a very efficient workflow that shows 
seamless data transfer.” (VDC Integrator, GC, CA12) 
Additional tools are developed by the sector to achieve seamless data flow 
“So, some additional tools are being developed as well to utilize the availability of data, but I've not 
seen a very efficient workflow that shows seamless data transfer.” (VDC Integrator, GC, CA12) 
Loss in design functionality since 2007 
“We tell [the software vendor] about the problems we see in their products. And about [the] loss 
of functionality. And we are frustrated and… but we keep trying because that's their business.” 
(Manager, GC, CA11) 
“You can end up with really large models, and it's only really loading the information that's relevant 
to what you're working on. [Software 1] isn't built that way, right. So, you end up with really large 
file sizes, and you're not able to kind of effectively navigate or like operate the model.” 
(Optimization engineer, CA31) 
Inadequate system architecture for prefabrication and, therefore, scalability 
“Market leading BIM packages, like [Software 1], don't support fabrication directly. […]  
Revit isn't really designed to be used for that purpose [prefabrication]. It hasn't been architected in 
a way that makes it scalable”. (Optimization engineer, CA31) 
“Is that we have to dumb it down to make [Software 1] work. That just means, [Software 1] has a 
bad architecture. It's bad management of data.” (CEO, Structural Engineer, CA07) 
Limited value of 
platform for design 
and construction  
Limited value for prefabrication  
“Everybody wants Revit or Revit isn't developed enough for us to take what we do over here and 
actually produce all the stuff we need. It cost us more time and effort.” (PM, sub-trade, CA21) 
Limited use of software by sector actors 
“So, they [the sector] use that software between 25 to 50% of its capabilities. If you go to 80% of 
construction projects, users [of platform] will probably use 25% of the capability of the software.” 
(Consultant, CA13)  
“[The] whole [platform] suite is excellent. By far, you wouldn’t use 90% of the programs currently.” 
(Architect, CA09) 
Disconnect between the design and construction  
“And so, we still have this gigantic chasm. There's a disconnect between design and construction.” 
(PM, Health Care Client, CA08) 
Supporting the status quo 
“Software and technology that we have in construction are specifically designed to support the status 











APPENDIX D: DATA STRUCTURE FOR CHAPTER FOUR 
The following are selected quotes of qualitative data for the discourse & textual analysis within 
Chapter 4. 





Selected Evidence on First-Order Categories 
Agency Variability 




Variability in attitude to the same problem: “holy cow”, “saw no 
opportunities” and “saw opportunities but did not pick up on the 
challenge” 
“Three companies with different attitudes to digitalization. First, [hidden] rejected 
the idea of technologies and did not see any opportunities to learn. Second, […] three 
top project managers saw BIM as the holy cow and saw the future, then they became 
CEOs of the same company driving it. Third, [hidden] did not have a bad attitude to 
BIM but did not see any strategic opportunity.” (Researcher, CA38) 
 “There are companies that are willing to cooperate and those that are totally against 
it and want to do their own thing”. (CEO, structural engineer, CA07) 
Variability in attitude is related to competencies  
“Agency and capabilities are closely related. Variabilities are closely related to 
competences and skills. Typically, your attitude to the challenges is also affected by 
your knowledge and competences.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“Probably because people have different priorities, thinking and technical 






Conflicting inward-looking business goals of suppliers 
“No one wants to play nicely. […] People want to say: it is mine, but you can do 
whatever you want.” (CEO, Ai start up, CA17) 
Disintegrated and disincentivised stakeholders who tend to protect 
themselves 
“The industry has all these different handoffs, and everybody overdesigns everything, 
you know, to protect themselves. The architect is a separate company from the 
engineers; the general contractor is a separate company, and the subcontractors. And 
so, the whole process with a bunch of different companies, they're unrelated, you 
know, that work together.” (CEO, VIF, CA32) 
Sector’s stakeholders are not interested in the total cost of projects 
“The architect they're focused on their dollars and everybody's focused on their 
individual dollars but not the total dollars! Nobody is focused on the total dollars.” 
(Innovation Manager, GC, CA11) 
“The last thing they want to know is what it actually costs, right. And it's the same 
with everybody. The general contractor, the subcontractor, yeah, everybody had to 
present, everybody blows it up.” (CEO, structural engineering firm, CA07) 
Changed orders derived from inefficiency are used as risk management for 
self-protection  
“What happens is your general contractors are on the job and they are really nice, 
everything's going well for them, they're checking how much money they can make 
but once they get to a point they start to lose money then they make the calculation 
and ask do I want to stay in a good relationship in this or not? And to the extent that 
they want to stay in a good relationship they'll just lose the margin to keep the owner 
happy. They even can make a small loss on the project because they really want the 
next job or there's a benefit to being in this relationship, but at some point, they'll 
switch, right. It may be early, may be late but then they will start to bury the project 






so they can use it when they need. So, it's really a risk mitigation tool. I understand 
how hard it's been for us to build systems to get people to really accurately project 






Clients and other stakeholders fail to lead innovation in the sector 
“If you want value, you have to define value and you have to make value flow. It's 
simple as I told the owners, they have first to define what value is. Many customers 
in [the] building sector do not actually do that very well. And, they're not helped 
by the professionals they hire, by the architects. […] Then we have many owners that 
ask to build the cheapest building possible. They don't even think about value, they 
can't describe what value means to them. So, we are responsible for ourselves 
including the customers we work for in every business.” (Innovation manager, GC, 
CA11)  
“My general observation is that usually, clients do not have the capability to drive 
innovation. The developers are financial people. I mean, they don't have IT people 
or manufacturing people or supply chain people, they don't have any of those people 
in their companies. So, they can't do what we are doing.” (CEO, VIF, CA32) 
“Leadership in construction does not exist from my point of view. […] I see a 
lack of leadership every time that I go to the projects all around the world. […] There 
is a big problem with leadership; leaders in construction, they do not really 
understand what their role is. When we talk about leadership, people understand 
leadership as ‘Hey, I am the boss and I tell you what to do’.” (Consultant, CA13) 
“People at the top are bombarded with problems. So, they're not necessarily the 
people who are willing to try things. Typically, that's true in every organisation.” 
(Innovation Manager, GC, CA11) 
“It would require somebody to really have the passion and position where he or she 
can really be driving things forward. […] It requires that this person gets this position 
where he or she can really make the change. […] I think that too many people want 
to be in their comfort zone. They do not want to fight and struggle all the time. But 
if you want to make a change, then you have to do it. You have to defend your views. 
You have to be very confident.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“There are so many developments which somehow seem relevant for construction, 
but there is no vision for how to capitalize on these new possibilities, and what 
should be the next steps.” (Researcher, FIN05) 
“The problem in companies now is to organise management and leadership. 
Now when we started here [program], we had the background, software, technology 
but we didn’t have those business managers who really create new ways of organizing 
businesses. […] We need top management in companies that understand professional 
leadership and management for the foresight and insight of management.” (CEO, 
public agency, FIN14) 









Established competencies to work in adverse conditions hinder innovation 
“Contractors are really good at getting stuff done in adverse conditions.” (PM, 
software vendor, CA30),  
“People know how to do what they've been taught to do and what they have done.” 
(Innovation manager, GC, CA11). 
“That progress is more about ‘width’ of how many people I was able to engage 
instead of ‘depth’, how far we could stretch knowledge and theory because the 
fundamental ideas are quite... I would say ‘simple’, but quite difficult for many 
people to understand because of their background and the way they have been 
working always before. But, if you have some theoretical background, I’m not 
surprised to see the progress.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
“The gap that somehow people still don't understand and are afraid of. That we do it 
as it has always been done, and if we do something otherwise everything would go 











Biggest problem is lack of skills & talents, & expensive training 
“The outrageous price of personnel training and the cost of software licences. […] 
We don't have enough talent here. But it's also learning the talent that works for you, 
and where their strengths and weaknesses are, and how to partner with them, with 
people to make a stronger product.” (Manager, Sub Trade, CA21) 
“This situation between people, skills, and technology, there's a big gap that we have 
to breach.” (Consultant, CA13) 
“It's easier to write the software to integrate it than it is to train people to use a tool 
that is not familiar in the industry.” (Engineer, vertically integrated firm, CA31) 
“Efficient use of BIM requires changes to the design and construction process. More 
efficient design tools lead to increased confusion in a multidisciplinary design 
process. The possibility to rapidly make major changes in design requires more 
efficient information exchange capabilities. The tools at hand are not up to the task. 
Efficient collaboration is hard to achieve and requires too much technical 
knowledge/skills. This breaks the process. The short-term answer is to facilitate 
collaboration.” (PM, public client, FIN15) 
“Then this creates problems for companies; we kind of know what we need but we 
do not have resources to do that or experts to do it just the way they need to.” (PM, 
GC, FIN24) 
Variation in the capacities and capabilities of individuals 
“I just assumed that companies were a lot more sophisticated in financial projection 
capability. And we found that some companies are very sophisticated. We found that 
some big companies have absolutely no idea if they're making money or not, believe 
it or not. A 100 million company in annual revenue has no idea if they're making 
money or not. So, we've uncovered the things that, in a lonesome agreement or a 
GMP, you would just never be exposed to that. But once you open the book with 
profit and risk and profit sharing, all of a sudden, you start to go like: “WOW, this 
sector is a lot more dysfunctional than I thought.” (PM, health care client, CA36) 
“Don't have the full capabilities, the full understanding of the capability of the 








Industry actors do not fully understand the concept of innovation (VDC, 
BIM, Lean, IFC, etc.) 
“A lot of people when you start talking to them and you start asking questions about 
virtual design and construction, they can respond in the conversation with you but 
I'm not sure that they actually understand virtual design and construction in the way 
that CIFE would explain. You think that you are gathering information on this topic 
and you're talking about the same thing but you're not talking about the same thing.” 
(VDC manager, GC, CA11_1) 
“Especially in this domain people have different levels of understanding of 
knowledge.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Marketing strategies by “Evangelists” (e.g. for VDC, BIM, Lean and etc.) 
articulate value propositions on behalf of the sector 
 “So, I will tell this from my academic foot because I guess that the industry maybe 
will expel me if I say this today. BIM is something that absolutely needs to be 
revisited… so, it's like a Greek mythology; we got monsters with three heads, this is 
a monster with millions of heads, it has taken so many paths that now it's a big 
monster. Maybe academics and the industry should stop listening to the software 
vendors and make a big revision of what BIM is. But I guess practitioners are not 
ready to listen to this from me or anyone else. The problem as I see it is the influence 
that the software vendors have had and are having in defining what is BIM and how 
it should be used, both at the academic level, but also, and maybe mainly at the 
practitioner level. I believe that the software vendors voice should be just one among 
different voices (and definitely not the most important) that need to be heard when 
trying to define, and mainly implement, BIM. When this is not the case, I believe 
then, that something is going wrong.” (VDC manager, GC, CA11_1) 






“Architects do not understand the difference between revenue and profit”. (CEO, 
architect, CA24)  
“I do not know how it changed how we make money… How we make money is how 
we perform the job right?” (PM, GC, CA20) 
“There seem to be as many definitions and purposes for business models as there are 
managers in construction. The results of the interviews indicate that the managers in 
construction neither understand the concept properly nor exploit any similar value 
creation analysis in their business. The interviewees had significant problems 
describing their companies’ business models and value creation logic, pointing out 
the lack of analysis and understanding of customer values and needs in the project 
delivery process.” (Pekuri et al., 2013: p.21) 
“In many organisations in the construction industry, change management is not really 




Low margins (1-10%) and low investment into R&D  
“Their margin is very low. So, they may have, 4 billion dollars of revenue per year, 
but if their margin is only 2%, so they made $40 million, right, Intel typically makes 
50% margin”. (CEO, Ai start up, CA17) 
“Low margins that do not create enough incentives to invest into R&D and as a result 
it does not create a return”. (CEO, start up, CA35) 
“Probably most large construction companies in the US do support research. I'm not 
sure to what degree whether it is that much.” (Innovation manager, general 
contractor, CA11) 
Cost of licences is outrageous 
“I try to push technology from time to time, ‘hey, you know, why don't you guys go 
test this out?’ But the cost of the licenses is outrageous.” (Consultant, CA13) 
Training each individual is costly for singular firms 
“This is a very good idea, but I cannot do it, because there is no practical way to do 
it”. (Researcher, FIN20) 
“We kind of know what we need but we do not have resources to do that or experts 
to do it just the way they need to.” (Consultant, CA13) 













People are not motivated to innovate 
“From a system point of view, I don't think people are motivated to innovate. I mean, 
to be honest, people are motivated to make money and they're not motivated to do 
things completely different.” (CEO, Ai start up, CA17) 
“To think about incentives to make people work in a different way.” (Researcher, 
FIN20) 
“I think that people don’t like the change and that’s one thing.” (CEO, software 
vendor, FIN17) 
Process is built with unrelated parties that have no incentive to be efficient  
“Everybody who's in the industry have an incentive to be inefficient and so they are. 
[…] developers are our customers and then you have architects, engineers, general 
contractors and subcontractors and all of those parties cost. So, say it's in their best 
interest for things to be inefficient because the less efficiency the more hours they 
tend to build. So as a consequence, they don't make any effort to make things more 
efficient because it just takes money out of the developer’s pocket.” (CEO, VIF, 
CA32) 
“The architects, engineers, the general contractors and subcontractors, they make 
more money the more inefficient things are, so they're not going to be the ones who 
drive efficiency as they are not incentivized to do it.” (CEO, VIF, CA32) 
“It has been a competition; contracts are separated, and everyone is selfish. That has 
been a situation on the market until now.” (CEO, HVAC, FIN23) 













The established rules of the game 
“The rules of the game have been established […] people do not need to change.” 
(Innovation Manager, GC, CA11). 
“It is very hard for outsiders to play according to new rules if 99.9% of the industry 
does not play by those rules and innovators are seen as a risk.” (CEO, start up, CA16) 
The system is broken but I know where it is broken  
“AutoCAD is broken, too. But we've been using them for 20 years. We know where 
they're broken. My guys every single day are doing workarounds in the software 
because of the software shortcoming. But it's part of our process. And they've been 
doing it for so long. They do it without thinking. And they don't even know that 
they're doing it because the software is broken.” (Manager, sub trade, CA21) 
The status quo is a strong motivator 
“Many people want to live in their comfort zone. You might be risking your job or 
career if you make something new and it proves to be a mistake. Many people prefer 
to keep the status quo; status quo is a very strong motivator.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“It comes down to people being afraid of losing their jobs by giving the technology 







There are different routes, but the outcome is always the same 
“At the end of the day, we still deliver a building.” (PM, sub-trade, CA21) 
Business models with emerging technologies remain the same 
 “Business models [of the sector] are from the 80s.” (CEO, structural engineering 
firm, FIN04) 
“With the birth of technology, in this particular industry, all of the processes in the 
industry are exactly the same as they were in 1976”. (CEO, Structural Engineer, 
CA07)  
“We have been developing technology, but the culture and the business processes 
have not been developed. […] the business models we have are from the 80s”. 
(Consultant, FIN04) “New tools are introduced but basic practices have not 
changed.” (CEO, software vendor, FIN17) 
“We earn money in the same way. That change is not dramatic.” (Innovation 
Manager, GC, CA11) 
“You need a new business model, right? We do not have that…[…] We do not have 
a new business model for disruptive innovation.” (CEO, Ai start up, CA17) 
“I am surprised to say relatively little progress has been made in the past ten years on 
BIM in the industry.” (PM, client, CA28) 
 “I am saying that BIM is not a key area of the business.” (Manager, public agency, 
FIN12) 
“Maybe it is because we have been developing technology, but the culture and the 
business processes have not been developed. We always say that if this was just a 
way of developing a technology and not changing processes, you would never get the 
whole benefits that you should be able to get. I guess it has been the problem. We 
have been focusing too much on technology, which is enabling. […] So, you have to 
develop your business model in a way that can make it possible to use a technology 
efficiency. Because your business model is from 1980s.” (Consultant, FIN04) 
 “Now we have to look at the business model. It should change the thinking.” (CEO, 
Public Organisation, FIN14) 
“Things have not changed much in construction.” (Researcher, GIN05) 
Getting more money out of the construction process is like squeezing a 
stone with current constraints 
“Getting more money out of the construction process is like squeezing a stone with 
current constraints.” (software vendor, CA30). 
Existing constraints were appropriated into the business models 
“The dark side of the status quo is that the industry creates money from waste 






companies that make profit from changed orders and they would hate the situation 
when there are no changes to orders, because their main business model is to find 
contradictions in design documents. […] Building design is so complex and in the 
traditional design, it was almost impossible to avoid mistakes. Definitely, there are 
partners who are benefiting from waste and mistakes and it is difficult to change, it 
is part of the industry culture.” (Researcher, FIN20_1) 
“They are used to the current contract system. They know that there will be mistakes. 
So, to get to projects they have to make the lowest bid, but then they have to believe 
that they can profit if there are mistakes. Of course, it is risky if designers are doing 
a good job and it might not happen. In the long run it is casino, in the short run you 
can lose money, but in the long run you can win money”. (Researcher, FIN20_1) 
“What are the constraints on the construction sector? What are the things that are 
keeping the construction sector from being efficient? What if we removed them? 
And, the contractors all hated it [removing the constraints] and it was not like a 
definitive sample of it. And they basically said, the contractor’s feedback quite 
strongly is that you should not be removing these constraints, you should be helping 
us with these constraints. And I thought that was really interesting because 
essentially, they have incorporated these rules into their business model. And so, 
while these rules are holding them down, and holding them down to that 4% 
profit, or that 1% profit, they are also keeping these constraints in the sector 
that are keeping them down, but they're also keeping them relevant.” (PM, 
Software vendor, CA30) 
“Seriously, that's how the industry is set up. It's set up to manufacture change 
orders; that's what's taught in school, how do you track change orders and it's 
amazing. […] If your entire process is set up based on fake stuff, you cannot improve 
it!” (CEO, structural engineering firm, CA07)  
“It had been so clear for a very long time that it is beneficial to use this kind of 
process. […] The process where you kind of waste 30% of costs is not so that 
somebody is burning the money, money just disappears. Somebody is making 
business out of that, out of these problems. Many construction companies are doing 
change orders or if you need to make a new element from the factory, so of course 
they would charge you to do that in a hurry. If work on site is late on schedule, they 
then need to work overtime. So, it would cost more, but people can be happy because 
they get paid more for doing over time. It is not always showing that money was 
wasted, someone is getting benefit out of that. In some cases, in the United States 
[…] if you don’t make any change orders, you get an invoice, and you see that your 
business is not going very well. […] It is a traditional business that you would 
make more money from waste; it is still business. […] I have been wondering 
myself why this is not going faster, because there is a lot of money wasted and energy 
wasted. The environment is wasted because of all these problems. We have all the 
tools; it is just a matter of using it.” (CEO, software vendor, FIN17) 
Established fee structure: designers are paid by the hour and adhere to this 
model 
“Designers get paid by the hour. […] Even when you set up a shared risk-reward 
model, that designers are not necessarily willing to give up hours, they still want to 
build the hours. […] I think the design business model has to change in order for the 
outcome to really get more efficient.” (PM, health care client, CA36) 
“Compensation model is for the number of hours spent or square feet measured.” 
(CEO, start up, CA35) 
“It is a huge tradition of status quo. The architect’s fee cannot be represented at an 
extra cost. […] You would need to change the contractual structure completely.” 
(Researcher, FIN18) 
Business deal is an incentive for change 
“When the business deal is different then that's when you begin to see a deeper change 
and get different answers to your questions. […] But it seems if you can make a 






a lot. You change, you use technology differently, you may invent, create technology, 
your social organisation, the way you organize the work and the way people in that 
place, work and relate to each other. It can be very different than what you see on 
most construction sites.” (VDC manager, GC, CA11_1) 
“Now we have to look at the business model. It should change the thinking.” (CEO, 
public agency, FIN14) 
Conflicting business incentives of supply chain actors 
“From a business point of view, what really seems to be the big issue is that the 
objectives of the general contractor and owner are not aligned. The objective of the 
contractor is to maximize the money that they can make on a project.” (CEO, start 
up, CA16) 
“There are people who are very keen on BIM and sustainability. But how to put them 
together? It seems impossible!” (PM, public agency, FIN12) 
“We, as a mechanical designer, we do not have a partner to discuss our problems with 
and how we want to proceed. There is a gap of understanding when we are talking to 
each other. Of course, because we are at the bottom of the food chain in the project, 
it is a hard task for us because nobody can understand us. Not in every project, but it 
has happened also that we are trying to say something, that we should go like this and 
nobody wants to listen to us and then they do how they want to do it and then we are 
in trouble afterwards.” (BIM manager, HVAC, FIN11) 
“If you do BIM, it makes life easier for structural engineer, as he can read your data 
easier. And you question yourself, why should you do something for them? So, why 
should I make an investment if it goes over there and I do not benefit?!!” (Researcher, 
FIN01) 
“We have a collection of, let’s say, independent actors who probably have slightly, 
overlapping interests. It is not about the creation of a building model for the end-
customer for use to the end of the lifecycle. That’s far from it.” (Researcher, FIN19) 
“The designer and contractor should be friends, but the world it is not like so. The 
contractor wants to make money and the designer wants to make good buildings and 
there is always conflict.” (BIM manager, HVAC, FIN11) 
Architects are afraid of losing power 
“I participated under the confidentiality agreement for the strategic agreement with 
some architectural associations, somewhere here in the early 80s. They got anxious 
about their role with this technology: is it beneficial to them or is it dangerous and so 
on. If there are any ways to benefit from this technology, companies usually do not 
do that, because they would rather stay in something they have always done. It takes 









Clients fail to articulate value for the use of Building Information Models 
“Is there a value proposition? So, my question to the owners: where's the value? If I 
give an owner right now a full 3d model that has all the stuff in it, most of them don't 
know what to do with it anyway.” (PM, sub-trade, CA21) 
Failure in value proposition leads to failure in value capture 
“If you don't understand what value is, you have no good measurement system, for 
the chances of giving them value are quite low. A lot of what is delivered today, its 
value, is accidental. And it's mostly because you have experienced people who are 
willing to trust each other. And you hear stories about this all the time. And we have 
plenty of examples in [the firm]; we've taken the same people and put them on the 
different projects, and they failed because the owner didn't know what she wanted or 
something happened or their partners were not there. […] Then we have many owners 
who ask to build the cheapest building possible. They don't even think about value, 
they can't describe what value means to them. So, we are responsible for including 
the customers we work for in every business.” (Innovation manager, GC, CA11)  
 
Process of value articulation “THE WHY” is not well understood 
 “I'm not saying that open standards are wrong, but they don't focus on the outcome. 






that everyone did it. But nothing changed. I am challenging you. Yes, saying let's say 
we did it, but the outcome stays exactly the same.” (CEO, Ai start up, CA17) 
“If you include project delivery owners and stakeholders, clearly defining the value 
of the building, the value definition phase, I think that that's not really a well 
understood phase. The phase before the start of design is a phase of value definition, 
which is “why”, what problem are we trying to solve, what do we want out of the 
building in the long term. There's this thing called value capture at the end, which is 
also not in a traditional thinking process, which is like you're looking backwards to 
the beginning of the project and asking: ‘are we capturing the value?’ […] all these 
phases, value definition and value capture, might help to identify the gap. Because 
the biggest rework cycles are driven by imperfections and failures to really identify 
the WHY of the project.” (PM, Health Care Client, CA08) 
The product has declined in value with every new wave of technology  
“The product of our design processes has not improved in the past 40 years and a 
strong argument can be made for the proposition that the product has actually 
declined in value with every new wave of technology, starting with using computer 
analysis for designing structures, because what used to be a thoughtful problem-
solving process that resulted in well-thought-out constructible building details, 
became one of sticking something in the computer, slapping the numerical output on 





the dark side 
of business 
models 
Unchanged procurement is the dark side of construction 
“It is really difficult to do on our industry; most clients do procurement in a traditional 
way and do not take any risks by changing the way they are procuring services. 
Procurement is a dark side. In my opinion, contracts are part of business models. 
Basically, contracts are defining legal obligations, payments, etc. you cannot separate 
completely. Procurement is a selection criterion for services, as well as a part of 
business models and a really-really important part of that.” (Researcher_FIN20) 
“But when I look at, you know, how projects are procured. Those things have evolved 





Existing business models have systemic constraints of location 
“It is a part of system exploitation and business models. It is good to remember that 
there are no products where the price of the product would have anything to do with 
the production costs. Every product, the price for the phone is the willingness to pay. 
And the same with the houses, the price of the house has nothing to do with the 
production cost; it has everything to do with the market price. What people are willing 
to pay. With mobile phones, there is no such thing as the location for a phone; you 
buy phone because of the reputation and quality of the product, so these companies 
have to invest in innovation. But in the building industry, it is the quality of the 
product, as long as it is good enough to be bought. If you think about California, the 
houses cost several millions, but the quality was bad. Most of the houses were 
cardboard, it is crazy. But as long as clients are willing to pay the asking price, but 
you do not try to develop it better because it does not pay back. It is part of the 
ecosystem because it cannot be changed. No matter what we do. If you are able to 
reduce production costs you can save money and of course from the client side so 
that no big construction mistakes are made when you own the house, that, of course, 
the client wants to match the price with the product. Then, I do not think it is realistic 
to think that the construction industry will ever be like a car manufacturer or 
mobile phone. The situation is so different.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Business models are organised around the optimization of production costs 
“It is mainly the optimization of production costs. If you would like to make a better 
building, buyers will be interested so it will be easier to sell. The waiting time 
between when the product is ready and how long it takes to sell is an important part 
of the profit. The longer it is on your hands, the more money you lose. Basically, 






reducing production costs directly affects your profit because the market price is not 




Contractual relations are the status quo 
“Because of the contracts in construction, it is very difficult to align goals and 
benefits. […] I think it is the biggest problem, the contractual conditions. Personally, 
I have never seen any problem, which could not be solved by information 
technologies or even theoretically impossible. It would always be done. But changing 
the contractual relationship in the construction sector seems impossible because it has 
a huge tradition of status quo.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
Disconnected contracts, process, and BIM use 
“Contracts are over there, what we do to build is here, and then we have BIM over 
here and they are not really connected.” (Innovation Manager, GC, CA11_1) 
“The part of an agreement is that the architect has to supply the BIM model. And 
usually, the term BIM mode is dangerous. Anything can be a BIM model. Everybody 
can have their own BIM. So, we have to say IFC model compliant or compliant to 
anything else. It is not enough to say a BIM model; you have to be careful I am 
exporting a model. Anything I am exporting is a model. I can say that I am exporting 
a model.” (Researcher, FIN01) 
“The contract models that we are using in our industries, they are both very bad for 
the collaboration.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
“Alliance type of contracts are coming also to Finland. It is a reality. Again, to rely 
only on those new ties in contracts, it is too slow because they are such a small 
percentage. So, there should have been more of new contracts to change the 
processes. […] To gain real collaboration in a way that you are not just hiding behind 
your contracts. That’s the key area.” (Manager, HVAC, FIN10) 
“The current contracts don’t really emphasize collaboration, so everything is fine as 
long as the project is going well. But, if there are any problems people should do 
extra work, and if not, they can hide behind their contracts. […] We, as building 
owners, suffer the most, because in the end we have to pay the bills and deliver a 
building. […] I think BIM has increased collaboration and increased the need for new 





Static nature of industry  
“Industry has been so static that many people do not have any experience in managing 
big changes. But in our industry, people are used to the situation, it does not change. 
And that is why they are afraid, and it is related to culture. It is human nature; most 
people like to stay in their comfort zone and keep things as they are. But if the changes 
are a normal part of the process, it will become normal.” (Researcher, FIN20_1) 
“I am still a bit astonished about the construction sector, one of the things I have been  
trying to say is to start looking at these small residential buildings sector, but they 
say: ‘No, No, it does not apply’. But I think it really, it does apply because then you 
are much closer to what you do in the engineering industries, you develop and make 
it better and better. And in the big residential projects you do not do that. They do not 
get better!” (Researcher, FIN19) 
Sector actors are in their siloes 
“Their construction guys are in their own silo, even though they have I mean, we 
service design and construction, but it's the same people all the way through.” (CEO, 
structural engineering firm, CA07) 
“There are so many silos involved. You cannot change one, you have to change many, 
you have to change how people interact, how the information is shared, how the 
labour is divided between different players. You have to change the ecosystem more 
or less.” (Engineer, vertically integrated firm, CA23) 


















Culture is the biggest barrier to innovation  
“The culture of the industry is another dark side. People are not motivated or do not 
have the capabilities or desire.” (Researcher, FIN20_1)  
“But the problem is the culture…. people don't want to change. [..].] the industry falls 
into a category of societal habits. […] I feel like that is why there's no innovation 
because we're in the parable of the cave.” (CEO, Ai start up, CA17) 
“In my experience, the biggest problem is not a technical one but more of a cultural 
one. There is sort of established norms on how people work, and people are so used 
to it and it is so ingrained that people do not question it anymore. I think that is a big 
barrier to innovation.” (Optimisation engineer, vertically integrated firm, CA23) 
“It is not the question of technology or money; it is all about people.” (Consultant, 
CA13) 
 “This biggest challenge that we have, beyond the technical aspects, is changing 
people’s attitude and culture on how we do things and getting people to really actually 
be open to doing things differently, not just default to doing them the same way that 
they always did.” (Superintendent, GC, CA25)  
“Business culture is low. Culture and business processes have not been developed.” 
(Consultant, FIN04) 
“This is more for people and culture, I think, not about the technology. The culture is 
that we do as we have done for 100 years.” (PM, public client, FIN09) 
A culturally challenging industry and therefore financially challenging 
“Conservative attitude in the industry is very bad in the sense that most people want 
to see results. The attitude is let’s see what happens; the construction industry has an 
attitude that it is the second mouse who is getting the cheese. There is a truth in that 
as there are a lot of companies that sit back and wait. It makes sense for them”. 
(Researcher, FIN20_1) 
“Culturally challenging and therefore financially challenging.” (CEO, start up, 
CA35).  
Conservative short-sighted industry and is trained in a very conservative 
way  
 “Conservative industry and trained in a very conservative way. It is a very short-
sighted industry. Not enough science-based decisions, very ad hoc solutions vs long 
term solutions.” (CEO, technology firm, CA35) 
“I believe that it is because the construction sector and facility sector are so old 
fashioned. That is the reason.” (Manager, HVAC, FIN10) 
People were neglected in the sector for a long time 
“The people, as part of construction, have been neglected for many, many years. And 
for many different reasons. One reason is that: ‘hey, we help improve the skills, the 
capabilities, that skill of this guy, he is going to go with somebody else! Therefore, 
we don't invest in people.’ And this is what I've seen for many years. I say we have 
to change this because all the time there is a focus on technology, technology and 







Established mindset for old ways of doing things 
“The culture of the industry is ‘I have always done it and will continue doing it.’” 
(PM, software vendor, CA30) 
“People are used to bad business.” (Researcher, CA37) 
“Everybody wanted to use BIM, but they want to use it exactly the way they had 
always worked.” (CEO, GC, FIN07) 
“People who are making decisions, they are may be too old. What I can see is that 
youngsters want to use it, but they do not have the possibility of using the models and 
that is because of middle companies, middle bosses. They are so hard as they do not 
want to take on anything new to them. They want to make the same mistakes again 
and again.” (BIM manager, HVAC, FIN11) 
Mindset is critical to evolution of the sector 
“It's like way too much focus, especially now with the development of all this 






technical development, not enough on the mindset. […] But the mindsets… they're 
very short in the mindsets… there's no role model, there's no leadership.” 
(Consultant, CA13) 
“Understanding that the contract is not important; the mindset and behaviours are 
important, and the collaboration is important.” (CA11_1 manager) 
“At the end, it is about mindset and culture. Am I only going for the money regardless 
of the means or will I provide value for the client and do I see the project as a whole 
or just part of it? There are different players; for example, [GC firm] always does 
what is right for the client. So, this mindset is happening more and more. IPD gives 
structures to embrace but a change in mindset is more important.” (Innovation 
Manager, public agency, FIN21) 
Mental model or mindset is established to view elements separately 
“I think that one of the worst mindsets that we have in construction has been inherited 
from project to project, from generation to generation and is the mindset of fighting 
fires. […] they are very short in the mindsets…there's no leadership, there's no role 
modelling, right? The mindset says […] you have to suffer and to sweat blood, 
because we don't learn from project to project […] each project is unique […]. And, 
I think that one of the worst mindsets that we have in construction is this has been 
inherited from project to project, from generation to generation, and is the mindset of 
fighting fires, right? We have to be busy all the time, and being busy doesn't mean 
that you're productive, or that you're efficient. […] We have to move from the 
fighting fires mindset to the look-ahead mindset.” (Consultant, CA13) 
“The view in the industry, including here in this company, is fragmented”. 
(Innovation Manager, GC, CA11) 
Established mindset of a risk transfer attitude 
“The other problem is the transferring of risk. When I transfer risk as an owner, I 
have the false sense that risk is not going to come back to me. We keep playing ping-
pong with risk.” (Consultant, CA13) 
No one in the supply chain fully understands the process 
“I have never met anyone in our industry who would understand the whole process 
from all participants’ viewpoints. It is very difficult to gain that knowledge. And it is 
amazingly usual that very competent and experienced people in our industry have 
very little knowledge about how others are using the information that they are 
producing.” (Researcher, FIN20) 
Individuals are more preoccupied with immediate benefit than long term 
investment 
“It is a very short-sighted industry.” (CEO, start up, CA35) 
“We are very practical and very technical in construction. That is perhaps the reason 
we have been able to get results very fast.” (Consultant, CA04) 
Project manager driven or product driven? 
“Project mindset vs product mindset. In a product mindset it is about retaining 
knowledge and generating automation. Project centric means they create a lot of files, 
it is like in Hollywood, people come together to create a movie and then the team 
disbanded and created a new one to create a new movie.” (CEO, technology firm, 
CA35) 
“I think a lot of challenges implementing BIM have to do with focusing on a project 
rather than a product/ solution.” (Researcher, FIN19) 
SMEs do not want to grow 
“Companies want to stay small and family-oriented; they do not want to grow.” 






The fish is the last on to discover the water 
“The fish are the last to discover water. […] Well, it's your environment, it's your 
environment. It's the way things are. So, what does fish know about water? Exactly 
right now, we take the air for granted if the air disappeared, we would die quickly 
just like the fish. […] Now this you know, this has lots of problems, but you never 






this fishbowl. Now we're saying, ‘This would be a better fishbowl, would be a perfect 
fishbowl?’ No!” (Innovation manager, general contractor, CA11) 
Established norms that people do not question anymore 
“If you're just used to doing things one way and that ways been taught to you in a 
university or college and in practice, and this is what you've been doing for most your 
career, why would you think of anything? Why would you question the practice that 
you have been taught and have been doing most of your career?” (Innovation 
manager, general contractor, CA11) 




Mistrust by clients of the sector 
“Clients do not believe that it is the best solution to hire the same team over and over 
again. They are afraid that if you are familiar with this engineer, you would be 
teaming against them. […] I worked in the industry for 20 years and I never had the 
situation when I worked with the same team. It is always starting from scratch. It is 
deeply inbuilt mistrust; if those guys know each other, they will play against me. 
There should be some reasons which are difficult to prove because no one says, and 
perhaps they want to keep options open, so their hands are not tight.” (Researcher, 
FIN20_1) 
“[The client] said, I have all these bills. I don't know if these guys are lying to me or 
not. I don't know if these guys have done the work that they are claiming to have 
done in the bills or not. So, if you could tell me precisely if these guys have done that 
work, I'd be very happy.” (CEO, start up, CA16) 
Trust is key to innovation 
“I told you earlier that the key to innovation is trust?! I trust him to do the right thing. 
He trusts me to do the right thing. And therefore, we get the job done. […] Most 
engineers will not communicate with you. You're going to do it my way or else that's 




Business culture is very low 
“Market is very fragmented, it is local, the level of technology use, the culture of the 
business is very low. You have said people are very keen on technology in Finland, 
they are but the culture of the construction industry is to make as cheap as possible 
and as traditional as possible. ‘If I do not need to change anything, then I am happy’. 
So, fragmented market and culture of the business area.” (Researcher, FIN12) 
People are used to bad business 
“Software market is not a real problem, but people use it as an excuse because they 
got used to bad business, an excuse for not doing it, making money from change 
orders.” (Researcher, CA38) 
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Need for inter-stakeholder and inter-industry collaboration  
“It's all about how government and business and academia sort of triangulate 
on the issues and cooperate and also share information. […] Improving the 
areas of inefficiency caused by a lack of collaboration or poor collaboration, is where 
much of the improvement will be. And this in itself requires collaboration work to 
improve. We need to be educating and developing professionals in every category of 
the building industry with this collaborative vision and ability.” (CEO, architectural 
firm, CA24) 
“Smart cities require smart buildings, but smart buildings require smart cities. It is a 





People are educated in silos, but academia have started to open to 
multidisciplinary 
“Trust in construction in Finland is on a much higher level than anywhere else but 








Conservative industry and trained in a very conservative way 
“It is a chicken and egg problem: education defects the mindset of the sector and the 
sector does not use education to push the boundaries of what is possible. […] 
Conservative sector and is trained in a very conservative way”. (CEO, start up, CA35) 
“The people on the construction site, they have a technical education.” (Site Manager, 
GC, FIN06) 
Little innovative work is coming from academia 
“So few good papers are published from academia, so little innovative work coming 
from academia. If you look at most work, it is volumetric. A lot of surveys with 
anecdotal data from someone else who was a postdoc as an independent work. There 
is nothing created in academia with new knowledge that we could use in the industry, 
for example. Nothing I see is new; it is the same in Stanford and Berkeley.” (CEO, 
technology firm, CA35) 
Chicken and egg problem: Education defects the mindset of industry and 
industry does not use education to push the boundaries of what is possible 
“I would say is that they are not using education to push the limits of what’s possible; 
unfortunately, education defects the mindset of all people in the industry, it is chicken 
and egg problem again. I would say people are smart and skilled in the industry, but 
they are not applying to push the boundaries in the hard way, and honestly they need 
more people like me to push the boundaries, they need more cross pollination. And 
we need more open-minded thinking. Everyone including the owners.” (CEO, 
technology firm, CA35) 
Education is key 
“I do believe, especially after all those years, that education is key. You need to train 
a new generation with a new way of thinking. When I was younger, I heard this 
wisdom from older people: bullshit, we can do things faster. It takes so much time to 
train a young generation. But when you look how things have gone wrong, I think it 
is important to train and educate a young generation with a new way of thinking. If 
you imagine a University becoming significant player in BIM education, can you 
think of any university that exists on this planet? I do not know any. You cannot get 
quality education on BIM.” (Researcher, FIN18) 
“Educational background of my employees was not so high. I had only 3 people with 
a master’s degree; one in marketing, two in business. When you think about the 
educational level, they never understood me when I was talking about the business 
concept, its development and so on. This is one of the challenges, we have to change 
business management thinking.” (CEO, public agency, FIN14) 
Many of the people within the schools have been trained in the past 
“The people within the schools have been trained in the past. […] it's hard when 
educators are equally afraid of innovation as everyone else”. (CEO, Ai start up, 
CA17) 
Academic research does not provide quality papers or fundamentally new 
ideas 
““So, few good papers are published from academia, so little innovative work coming 
from academia. If you look at most work, it is pretty volumetric. A lot of surveys 
with anecdotal data from someone else who was a postdoc as an independent work. 
There is nothing created in academia with new knowledge that we could use in the 
industry, for example. Nothing I see is new; it is the same in Stanford and Berkeley.” 
(CEO, start-up firm, CA35) 
New generation reinvents what was already created or lost 
“New generation comes and reinvents what was already done and this also happens 
a lot in research, and even organisations as [a designated funding agency] falls into 
this trap. They give money to people to redo what others have done before. The 
European Commission also does the same. […] I have not seen anything new.” 
(Researcher, FIN18) 










Software vendors lock-in users to preserve control 
“There are some drivers against it; market-leading information technologies 
companies do not want their customers to change a system, because all of this work 
is locked into a specific system, so you do not see these software companies, like 
Autodesk, as supporters of interoperability”. (Researcher, FIN18) 
Selfish interest of the software vendor to make money 
“I agree that the software can be a strategic player, but when it comes down it, wants 
to make money.” (CEO, Ai start up, CA17) 
Software vendors use marketing power to define the value proposition with 
the use of BIM 
“Maybe, academics and the industry should stop listening to software vendors and 
make a big revision of what BIM is. But I guess practitioners are not ready to listen 
to this from me or anyone else. The problem, as I see it, is the influence that the 
software vendors have had and are having in defining what BIM is and how it should 
be used, both at the academic level, but also, and maybe mainly at the practitioner 
level. […] When this is the case, I believe then, that something is going wrong.” 
(VDC Manager, GC, CA11_1) 
Low 
diversity 
Low diversity in ideas. Need for more outsiders to cross-pollinate 
“People need outsiders and diversity, more cross pollination. An open mindset and 
not just for the industry but for owners too. Silicon Valley is a microcosm. There is 
small cross pollination. There are a few start-ups, but they are small. We need more. 
And it takes time.” (CEO, technology firm, CA35) 
Built Environment is a closed group 
“Actually, the Built Environment sector in Finland and has been quite a closed group 
in a way that it is difficult for outsiders to come in. If you want to come in and disrupt 
things differently it has been very difficult. Established companies keep boundaries 
really strict and they traditionally have been hiring only people from certain degrees 
and universities and not people from outside areas. It has been a closed community 
and I have heard that from others too. But now things are changing a little bit. When 
industry is so closed and with few players, the market is not working as it should be.” 





The rules that change has to come from the outside 
“The disruption, whatever it is, the rules that change has to come from the outside, 
because, you know, going back to this idea of received traditions, or how we learn to 
do something. How do you take years of training or years of these operational models 
and say, wait a second, I don't have to do it this way?” (PM, software vendor, CA30) 
“I see too little organized innovation taking place within the industry. Tools and 
information management have evolved profoundly over the last 10 to 15 years, but 
business processes have remained the same. That leaves doors wide open for 
outsiders to radically change the business.” (Metsi, 2018) 
Industry on its own is not able to change 
“It's all about how the government and business and academia sort of 
triangulate on the issues and cooperate and also share information.” (CEO, 
architectural firm, CA24) 
“Now, from our side, we are pulling it as best as we can, but I think it would go a 
little bit faster if the government were pushing or pulling. It is people not money.” 
(PM, public client, FIN09) 
“We are now at a level that we cannot evolve more, in my opinion. We need the 
government for that.” (BIM manager, HVAC, FIN11) 
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“What is the key driver for Uber? You should study that. Do not have answer for you, 
but they give services to users like better quality, cheaper. You can use it easily. It is 
value for money. You are at the top of the value chain and your business model is 
scalable. Where was it created? I think it was in San Francisco. It is scalable; you can 
do it in SF and Helsinki. Where is the scalability of local construction process? What 
are the key answers? Customer value – they will pay everything + Scalability. 
When you are doing the doctoral thesis, I would strongly recommend you 
compare other business areas. And Uber is an excellent example. Very traditional 
business, all over the world, very regulated and when you look at other areas, you 
can find thousands of those. Then, when you have a little bit of imagination, you can 
think about similar cases in construction as drivers.” (Manager, TEKES, FIN12) 
Why didn’t taxi companies invent Uber? It's because they didn't have an 
incentive to invent Uber! 
“You just have to know why taxi companies didn't invent Uber, it's because they 
didn't have an incentive to invent Uber. […] what Uber is doing, which is having a 
software active to dominate a car, is not a complicated strategic idea”. (CEO, VIF, 
CA32) 
“Look at Uber, they just kind of moved into cities with their lawyers and they said, 
we don't do medallions, we don't need to follow the rules because of XYZ. So, it's 
not like, you know, taxi companies were under threat from another taxi company; 
they’re under threat from something completely different”. (Manager, Software 
Vendor, CA30) 
Toyota 
“When I visited Toyota, there used to be a big Toyota factory over here, close by, but 
now makes Tesla's. And the problem with Tesla's is they can't produce cars like 
Toyota can; they can't actually build them, the quality cars fast enough, because they 
do not understand this stuff. […] This industry has a long way to go to reach 
Toyota's level of collaboration, but they do it with partners. But the interesting 
thing about Toyota was that they were open to receive visitors from Ford, Chrysler. 
All their competitors got to see what Toyota was doing, but their competitors had the 
fish problem. They came and saw what Toyota was doing, […] but they literally 
didn't believe what they saw, because they knew it couldn't be true. They were like 
the fish. They just, they could not understand anything other than the environment 
they were in. There was no other way to build cars than to have a giant factory. […] 
So they saw the factory the first time, several times and they couldn't believe it. That 
just can't be true because they only have their reality. That's true of all humans and 
fish”. (Innovation manager, GC, CA11) 
General 
Motors 
“You have to have a financial business deal that supports teams working in the 
interests of the project, the team needs to know that they are collectively at risk. […] 
Everyone has the same story. I tried to do it without that [business deal]. And then I 
had projects that kept failing. I think General Motors has been through the same thing, 
I think [client] as well. […] they need to be incentivized to work together to make the 
project well […] but the business deal still doesn't make it all work and just creates 
an environment in which everything else seems to make sense to everybody because, 
in order to win, you need these other things. But if you don't have that, it's all about 
intent and goodwill and intention, which when a project hits, and hits really hard, 
there is a very high risk of just falling apart and everybody will default to “I got to 
save my own company”. (PM, Health Care Client, CA08)) 
Semiconduct
or  
“30 years ago, chip design was similar to the building sector in the sense that many 
teams were involved in designing all kinds of the chips. […] and they all had their 
own tools, and they did their own thing. Again, in the end, the chip was put together. 
The particular thing about chip design is that, once it is designed, think of it as it goes 
to the oven; the outcomes are either it is working or an inexpensive piece of glass. It 
was very hard to design a chip that worked first time, and that also coupled with how 
costly it was to design something new, you had to stop the whole factory to try the 
new thing. The chip these days costs like 2 billion. So, if you don't use it for a week, 






were forced to go out of their silo environment where everyone was used to their own 
thing and throwing things over at each other. Construction these days is about 
throwing it all over the wall.” (Engineer, vertically integrated firm, CA23) 
Manufacturi
ng  
“In your research, you could ask a question: What if manufacturers had to make a 
building, how would they make them? Because now they just make pieces of the 
building. What if they made the entire building? How would they change the entire 
ecosystem?” (CEO, Ai start up, CA17) 
 
 
 
